Punitive Liability of Heads of Business in the EU: A Comparative Study by Ligeti, Katalin [editor] & Marletta, Angelo [editor]
KATALIN LIGETI and ANGELO MARLETTA (Edited by), Punitive liability of 
heads of business in the EU: A comparative study
Procedure and criteria for the acceptance and selection of the volumes. 
The manuscripts are selected for publication in the present series having regard to the 
relevance of the topic, the rigorous scientific methodology, the depth of the analysis, the richness 
of the bibliography and the originality of the results achieved through the research. 
In order to guarantee the highest quality standards, each volume is submitted to peer review 
and accepted by the scientific committee of the series, which may base its decision on the 
evaluation carried out by external reviewers according to an anonymous procedure. 
The criteria are the following:
- The scientific manuscripts sent to the editor or to the individual directors are submitted for
selection to the scientific committee.
- The scientific committee appoints among its members a rapporteur and one or more external
reviewers, who are distinguished Italian or international scholars selected by the scientific
committee. The committee ensures that the identities of the reviewer and the author(s) are not
 disclosed to each other.
- The reviewer is asked to provide, within a limited time frame, an analytical assessment of the
work, paying special attention to the relevance of the topic, the rigorous scientific methodology
applied, the depth of the analysis, the richness of the bibliography and the originality of the
results achieved through the research. The report of the reviewer concludes with a recom-
 mendation on whether the work deserves to be published and, if needed, remarks and
suggested modifications and/or insertions. If the topic implies the assessment of specialized
issues, technical or exclusive sectorial aspects of the topic, the reviewers may seek advice from
 scholars having expertise in that specific field.
- On the basis of the reviewers’ reports and, where applicable, after the evaluation of a new
version of the manuscript resulting from the comments and remarks mentioned above, the
scientific committee takes the final decision concerning the publication. 
GIUSTIZIA PENALE EUROPEA
Diretta da
S. Allegrezza, M. Gialuz, K. Ligeti, L. Lupária, G. Ormazabal, R. Parizot
7
1.  MICHELE SIMONATO, Deposizione della vittima e giustizia penale. Una lettura del siste-
ma italiano alla luce del quadro europeo. 2014.
2.  LUCA LUPÁRIA (a cura di), Lo statuto europeo delle vittime di reato. Modelli di tutela 
tra diritto dell’Unione e buone pratiche nazionali. 2015.
3.  LUCA LUPÁRIA (edited by), Understanding wrongful conviction. The protection of the 
innocent across Europe and America. 2015.
4.  CELINA NOWAK (edited by), The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and national 
authorities. 2016.
5. ANTONIO CAVALIERE - UWE HELLMANN - ALBERTO LUCARELLI - RAPHAËLE PARIZOT, Les 
droits fondamentaux à lʼépreuve de la prison. 2018.
6. MITJA GIALUZ, Lʼassistenza linguistica nel processo penale. Un meta-diritto fonda-
mentale tra impulsi europei e resistenze italiane. 2018.
7. KATALIN LIGETI - ANGELO MARLETTA (edited by), Punitive liability of heads of business 
in the EU: A comparative study. 2019.
PUNITIVE LIABILITY 
OF HEADS OF BUSINESS 
IN THE EU: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Edited by
KATALIN LIGETI  AND  ANGELO MARLETTA
Copyright 2019  Wolters Kluwer Italia S.r.l.
Via dei Missaglia n. 97 - Edificio B3 - 20142 Milano
I diritti di traduzione, di memorizzazione elettronica, di riproduzione e di adattamento totale o parziale, con qualsiasi 
mezzo (compresi i microﬁlm e le copie fotostatiche), sono riservati per tutti i Paesi.
Le fotocopie per uso personale del lettore possono essere effettuate nei limiti del 15% di ciascun volume/fascicolo di 
periodico dietro pagamento alla SIAE del compenso previsto dall’art. 68, commi 4 e 5, della legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633.
Le riproduzioni diverse da quelle sopra indicate (per uso non personale - cioè, a titolo esempliﬁcativo, commerciale, eco-
-
nomico o professionale - e/o oltre il limite del 15%) potranno avvenire solo a seguito di speciﬁca autorizzazione rilasciata 
da EDISER Srl, società di servizi dell’Associazione Italiana Editori, attraverso il marchio CLEARedi Centro Licenze e Autoriz-
-
zazioni Riproduzioni Editoriali. Informazioni: www.clearedi.org.
L’elaborazione dei testi, anche se curata con scrupolosa attenzione, non può comportare speciﬁche responsabilità per even-
-
tuali involontari errori o inesattezze.
Stampato da GECA s.r.l. - Via Monferrato, 54 - 20098 San Giuliano Milanese (MI)
This study was co-funded by the European Commission’s European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
under the 2016 Hercule III Programme (Grant Agreement number: OLAF/2016/D1/084).
The views in this report are strictly those of the authors. The Commission is not responsible for any 
use that may be made of the information this report contains. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Prof. Katalin Ligeti and Dr Angelo Marletta
1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Structure, objectives and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Volume overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHAPTER II
FINLAND NATIONAL REPORT
Prof. Raimo Lahti
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1. Debate on the implementation of Art. 3 of the PIF
Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Debate on corporate criminal liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Significant cases involving the liability of heads of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. Relationship with general principals of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1. General information on the system of perpetration
and complicity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2. General information on omission liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. Duty to report an offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4. General information on strict liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5. Special rules on liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Liability of heads of business (general information) . . 15
3.2. Personal scope of the liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3. Duties to control and supervise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
3.4. Violation of supervisory duties and the commission of
an offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4.1. Causal link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4.2. Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5. Delegation of control and supervisory duties: scope
and limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.6. Fulfilment of supervisory duties and disciplinary
powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.7. Liability and collective decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.8. Relationship with corporate liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.8.1. Triggering persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.8.2. Concurrence and accumulation of liabilities . 21
3.9. Compliance programmes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1. Effective powers of supervision and control and
liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3. Compliance programmes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4. Third party advice, external auditing and liability of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Liability of heads of business and sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. Criminal and punitive sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. Other sanctions and measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3. Sentencing criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4. Confiscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.5. Enforcement practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence against the
head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence
against the head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1.3. Administrative investigations and right to
silence of the head of business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. Multiple and parallel criminal and administrative
proceedings against the legal person and the head of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence . . . . 29
6.2.3. Right to silence of the head of business in
proceedings against the legal person . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3. Relationship between liability of the legal person and
liability of the head of business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
ANNEX I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
ANNEX II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CHAPTER III
FRANCE NATIONAL REPORT
Dr Juliette Tricot
1. Introduction: Criteria for imputation of criminal law
responsibilities of heads of business and their theoretical
justifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.1. The implementation of the PIF Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.2. Cases of investigation against top managers for
offences committed by their employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.3. The policy debate on the liability of company
directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.4. Introduction and scope of corporate criminal liability
in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.5. Administrative liability of legal persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.6. Policy debate on the introduction of corporate
criminal liability in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.1. General aspects of perpetration and complicity under
French criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.2. Complicity under French criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3. Omission liability under French criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4. Duty and failure to report the commission of an
offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5. Strict liability under French law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.6. Special rules on liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1. Sources and origin of the criminal liability of heads of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2. Subjective scope of the criminal liability of the heads
of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3. Liability of the head of business and duty to control
and supervise the employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4. Functional imputation and causal link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5. Subjective element (mens rea). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.6. Delegation of powers: scope and conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7. Liability of the head of business and collective
decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.8. Relationship between individual liability of the head
of business and corporate criminal liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
TABLE OF CONTENTS VII
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
3.8.1. Concurrence of liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.9. Compliance programmes and liability of the head of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.10. Failure to adopt a compliance programme and
administrative (non-criminal) liability: the Sapin II
Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4. Defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.1. General remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers as a defence. . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3. Compliance programmes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4. Bookkeeping offences and liability of the chartered
accountant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1. General remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2. Other punitive measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3. Confiscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the individual head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2. Parallel criminal or administrative proceedings
against the legal person and against the individual
head of business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.3. Is the individual liability of the head of business
shielded or diminished if the corporation has
previously pleaded guilty? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.4. Accumulation of sanctions and proportionality . . . . . . . . . 100
CHAPTER IV
GERMANY NATIONAL REPORT
Prof. Martin Paul Waßmer
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
1.1. Debate on the implementation of Art. 3 of the PIF
Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
1.1.1. Existing criminal provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
1.1.2. Violation of obligatory supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
1.1.3. Debate on the extension of criminal liability 108
1.2. Debate on corporate criminal liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
1.3. Significant cases involving the liability of heads of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.1. General information on the system of perpetration
and complicity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
VIII TABLE OF CONTENTS
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
2.2. General information on omission liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2.2.1. General description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2.2.2. Duty of care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.2.3. Link required between the omission and the
commission of the offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.2.4. Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.2.5. Regulatory offences law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.3. Duty to report an offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.4. General information on strict liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
2.5. Special rules on criminal liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.1. Liability of heads of business (general information) . . 128
3.2. Personal scope of the liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.3. Duties to control and supervise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.4. Violation of supervisory duties and the commission of
an offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.4.1. Causal link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.4.2. Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.5. Delegation of control and supervisory duties: scope
and limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.6. Fulfilment of supervisory duties and disciplinary
powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.7. Liability and collective decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.8. Relationship with corporate liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.8.1. Triggering persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.8.2. Concurrence and accumulation of liabilities . 146
3.9. Compliance programmes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.9.1. Role of compliance programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.9.2. Obligation to adopt compliance programmes 148
3.9.3. Consequences of failing to adopt compliance
programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4. Defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.1. Effective powers of supervision and control and
liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.3. Compliance programmes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.4. Third party advice, external auditing and liability of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5. Liability of heads of business and sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.1. Criminal and punitive sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.1.1. Heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.1.2. Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.2. Other sanctions and measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.2.1. Criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
TABLE OF CONTENTS IX
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
5.2.2. Regulatory offences law, civil law and
administrative law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.2.3. Registration of decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.3. Sentencing criteria and guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.3.1. Sentencing criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.3.2. Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.4. Confiscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.4.1. Criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.4.2. Regulatory offences law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.5. Enforcement practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.5.1. Criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.5.2. Regulatory offences law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.1.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence against the
head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.1.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence
against the head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.1.3. Administrative investigations and right to
silence of the head of business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.2. Multiple and parallel criminal and administrative
proceedings against the legal person and the head of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.2.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.2.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence . . . . 182
6.2.3. Right to silence of the head of business in the
proceedings against the legal person . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.3. Relationship between liability of the legal person and
liability of the head of business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.3.1. Corporation’s guilty plea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.3.2. Previous imposition of a regulatory fine
against the head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
CHAPTER V
THE NETHERLANDS NATIONAL REPORT
Dr Mark Hornman
1. Criteria for imputation of criminal law responsibilities of
heads of business and their theoretical justifications. . . . . . . . . . . . 190
1.1. Historical overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
1.2. Implementation of the PIF Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
1.3. General overview of relevant case law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
X TABLE OF CONTENTS
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
1.4. Recent developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . 198
2.1. Perpetration and participation in Dutch law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
2.2. Omission liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
2.3. Notification requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
2.4. Limitations to liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
3.1. General: two modes of liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
3.2. Actus reus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
3.3. Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
3.4. De facto position of control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
3.5. Delegation, division of tasks, supervision and re-
sponsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
3.6. Responsibility for collective decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
3.7. Corporate criminal liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
3.8. Influence of compliance programmes and/or officers 221
4. Defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
4.1. General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
4.2. Lack of power or supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
4.3. Delegation and supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
4.4. Due diligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.3. Third-party advice or review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
5. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
5.1. General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
5.2. Highlighted sanctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
6.1. Ne bis in idem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
6.2. Legal entity and head of business: two separate
subjects of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
6.3. Parallel, concentrated and consecutive proceedings . . . 235
6.4. Use of evidence and defence rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
6.5. Enforcement through administrative or criminal law? 237
ANNEX I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
ANNEX II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
CHAPTER VI
POLAND NATIONAL REPORT
Dr Witold Zontek
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
1.1. Debate on the implementation of Art. 3 of the PIF
Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
TABLE OF CONTENTS XI
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
1.2. Debate on corporate criminal liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
1.3. Significant cases involving the liability of heads of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law . . . . . . . . . . . 245
2.1. General information on the system of perpetration
and complicity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
2.2. General information on omission liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
2.3. Duty to report an offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
2.4. General information on strict liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
2.5. Special rules on liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
3.1. Liability of heads of business (general information) . . 250
3.2. Personal scope of the liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
3.2.1. Under the general rules of perpetration and
complicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
3.2.2. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code . . . . . . . . . . . 253
3.3. Duties to control and supervise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
3.3.1. Under the general rules of perpetration and
complicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
3.3.2. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code . . . . . . . . . . . 254
3.4. Violation of supervisory duties and the commission of
an offence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
3.4.1. Causal link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
3.4.2. Mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
3.5. Delegation of control and supervisory duties: scope
and limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
3.6. Fulfilment of supervisory duties and disciplinary
powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
3.7. Liability and collective decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
3.8. Relationship with corporate liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
3.8.1. Triggering persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
3.8.2. Concurrence and accumulation of liabilities . 261
3.9. Compliance programmes (general application). . . . . . . . . . . 262
4. Defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
4.1. Effective powers of supervision and control and
liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
4.1.1. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code . . . . . . . . . . . 263
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
4.3. Compliance programmes as a defence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
4.4. Third-party advice, external auditing and liability of
heads of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
5. Liability of heads of business and sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
5.1. Criminal and punitive sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
5.2. Other sanctions and measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
XII TABLE OF CONTENTS
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
5.3. Sentencing criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
5.4. Confiscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
5.5. Enforcement practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
6.1.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence against the
head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
6.1.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence
against the head of business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
6.1.3. Administrative investigations and right to
silence of the head of business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
6.2. Multiple and parallel criminal and administrative
proceedings against the legal person and the head of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
6.2.1. Right to silence of the head of business in
proceedings against the legal person . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
6.3. Relationship between liability of the legal person and
liability of the head of business. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
CHAPTER VII
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR HEADS
OF BUSINESS IN LIGHT OF THE ECtHR
AND CJEU CASE LAW
Dr András Csúri and Prof. Michiel Luchtman
1. Presumption of innocence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
1.1. The case law of the ECtHR on the compatibility
between presumptions of fact and law and the
presumption of innocence in criminal cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
1.2. The relationship between presumption of innocence
and modes of criminal liability based on lack of
supervision or control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
1.3. The presumption of innocence and heads of business
– concluding remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
2. Privilege against self-incrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
2.1. The case law of the ECtHR on the privilege against
self-incrimination in criminal matters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
2.2. The case law of the CJEU on the privilege against
self-incrimination in competition proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
2.3. The right of heads of business to remain silent in the
context of administrative or criminal investigations
against the legal entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
2.4. The potential use of evidence gathered in a previous
TABLE OF CONTENTS XIII
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
investigation against the legal entity in a subsequent
criminal proceeding against the individual head of
business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
2.5. The privilege against self-incrimination and heads of
business – concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
3. Principle of ne bis in idem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
3.1. The case law of the European Courts (ECtHR and
CJEU) on the principle of ne bis in idem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
3.2. Overview and critical assessment of the case law of
the ECtHR and of the CJEU on the compatibility of
‘dual track enforcement systems’ with the principle of
ne bis in idem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
3.2.1. ECtHR’s new approach in A. and B. v.
Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
3.2.2. Follow-up in European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
3.3. Overview and critical assessment of the case law of
the ECtHR and of the CJEU on the relationship
between individual liability and corporate liability in
the context of ne bis in idem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
3.4. Results with respect to ne bis in idem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
CHAPTER VIII
COMPARATIVE REPORT
Dr Angelo Marletta
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
2. Renewed interest in individual liability of head of business 307
2.1. Liability of heads of business in PIF Convention . . . . . 310
2.2. Liability of heads of business in the Corpus Juris . . . . . 311
2.3. New PIF Directive and liability of head of business. . 313
3. Liability of head of business and general rules of criminal
law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
3.1. Perpetration and participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
3.2. Omission liability and duties of care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
3.2.1. Omission liability: general remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
3.2.2. Omission liability and actus reus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
3.2.3. Omission liability and duties of care. . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
3.2.4. Omission liability and causal link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
3.2.5. Actus reus: interim conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
3.3. Omission liability and mens rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
4. Liability for collegiate decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
5. Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
6. Compliance programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
7. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
8. Relationship with liability of legal person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
9. Punitive administrative law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
10. Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
CHAPTER IX
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE PUNITIVE LIABILITY
OF COMPANY DIRECTORS IN A
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONTEXT
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
2. Policy options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
2.1. Policy option A): retention of the current scenario . . . . 344
2.2. Policy option B): introduction of a criminal offence of
seriously negligent supervision or control in the
current PIF Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
2.3. Policy option C): introduction of an administrative
offence of negligent supervision under Art. 325 para.
4 TFEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
3. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
ANNEX
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
ANNEX
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE TRANSVERSAL REPORT ON
THE SAFEGUARDS AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE
HEADS OF BUSINESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
TABLE OF CONTENTS XV
© Wolters Kluwer Italia

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Prof. Katalin Ligeti and Dr Angelo Marletta * 1
SUMMARY: 1. Background. – 2. Structure, objectives and methodology. – 3. Vo-
lume overview.
1. Background
In recent years, the individual liability of senior managers has been
rediscovered as an important element in building a multifaceted and ef-
fective strategy for fighting economic and financial crime.
Indeed, the commission of corporate-related offences is often
framed in a broader context of corporate misconduct, either because they
are deliberately conceived, incentivised or even instigated as part of the
corporate policy or because they are the result of a reprehensible lack of
supervision by the senior management.
Establishing the individual liability of low- and mid-level employ-
ees, along with corporate criminal liability, has delivered only partially
satisfactory responses to economic and financial crime. Thus, especially
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the emergence of the limits of pu-
nitive strategies focused only on the legal entity or the mere material
author of the offence has triggered a renewed interest in the individual
liability of senior corporate officials.
This renewed interest is currently not mirrored in the protection of
the Union’s financial interests (PIF) legal framework.
Actually, the very first instrument approximating the definition of
the offences against EU financial interests (the 1995 PIF Convention 1)
obliged the Member States ‘to take all the necessary measures’ to hold
* University of Luxembourg.
1 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on the European
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criminally liable ‘the heads of business or any persons having power to
take decisions or exercise control’ when a PIF offence was committed
‘by a person under their authority acting on behalf of the business’
(Art. 3). The provision was not the object of enthusiastic implementa-
tion; on the contrary, most Member States appeared generally reluctant
to introduce an ad hoc form of responsibility on the matter, objecting
that the existing national rules on criminal participation and complicity
would have adequately covered the responsibility of corporate owners
and directors in similar cases.
Since then, the level of approximation on the issue has remained
rather low and the special provision on the liability of company directors
has not been recast in the new PIF Directive. 2 This notwithstanding,
several policy documents have in the meantime highlighted the potential
detrimental effect of such a ‘normative gap’ on coherent PIF enforce-
ment. 3
Against this background, testing the adequacy of national rules on
criminal participation and complicity in regard to heads of business re-
presented the main academic and policy challenge underlying the pre-
sent study.
2. Structure, objectives and methodology
The study was conducted between April 2017 and April 2018, with
essential contributions by reputed academics from the selected jurisdic-
tions: Prof. Raimo Lahti (Finland), Prof. Juliette Tricot (France), Prof.
Marin Waßmer (Germany), Prof. Michiel Luchtman, Dr Mark Hornman,
Dr András Csúri (The Netherlands) and Dr Witold Zontek (Poland).
The overarching objectives of the present study are threefold: ana-
lyse and systematise the current punitive liability of heads of business in
the selected jurisdictions (Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands
Union on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, in OJ C
316, 27.11.1995, 49 ff.
2 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud affecting the Union’s
financial interests by means of criminal law, in OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29 ff
(hereinafter: ‘PIF Directive’).
3 See the Report from the Commission Implementation by Member States of the
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and its
protocols: COM (2004) 709 final; similarly, the Second Report from the Commission
on the Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the European
Communities’ Financial Interests and its Protocols: COM (2008) 77 final and, the
Staff Working Document SWD (2012) 195 final accompanying the Proposal for the
new ‘PIF Directive’.
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and Poland); enhance judicial protection of EU financial interests by
promoting comparative reflection; and systematise and design common
EU legislative standards on the punitive liability of heads of business.
The study is structured in two parts: comparative and normative.
The comparative part provides an overview of the national rules ap-
plicable to establishing the punitive liability of heads of business for of-
fences committed by their employees, with a particular focus on the pro-
visions on perpetration and participation under the general part of crim-
inal law. To this end, five national reports have been drafted on the basis
of an extensive questionnaire (Annex I) designed and discussed at the
first meeting of the working group.
The normative part delivers a set of policy recommendations on the
potential EU legal standards for the establishment of such liability and
aspires to initiate a structured debate at policy level.
3. Volume overview
The study’s comparative part includes the national reports (Chapters
2-6), the comparative report (Chapter 8) and a transversal report speci-
fically focused on the safeguards and the judicial protection of the head
of business (Chapter 7).
The national reports, following the scheme of the annexed question-
naire, provide a mapping of the national frameworks under six concep-
tual clusters: the criteria and the justification for the criminal law respon-
sibility of the heads of business, the relationship of such responsibility
with the general principles of criminal law, its concept and scope, the
possible defences, the applicable sanctions and finally the relationship
with punitive administrative law.
The outcome of such analysis, synthesised and tested in the com-
parative report, highlighted the existence of rather different approaches
that may lead to significant disparities from one Member State to an-
other and to a ‘deterrence gap’ potentially detrimental to the protection
of EU financial interests. Such conclusions constitute the background for
the normative part and the policy recommendations.
The policy recommendations (Chapter 9) are diversified and devel-
oped along three possible policy options, each one of them entailing dif-
ferent legislative ambitions and a different potential impact on the na-
tional systems.
The options considered and developed are: the maintenance of the
current scenario (Option A); the introduction of a criminal offence for
seriously negligent supervision under Art. 83 para 2 TFEU (Option
INTRODUCTION 3
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B); and the introduction of an administrative offence for negligent super-
vision on the basis of Art. 325 para 4 TFEU (Option C).
Under each policy option, specific recommendations are provided
in order to ensure the effectiveness and coherence of the liability frame-
work with fundamental rights and the general principles of criminal law.
The feasibility of each option has also been assessed and careful consid-
eration given to the need to ensure the compatibility and complementar-
ity of any new legislative action in the PIF domain with the start-up
phase of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.
4 CHAPTER I
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1. Introduction
1.1. Debate on the implementation of Art. 3 of the PIF Convention
When the 1995 Convention on the protection of European commu-
nities’ financial interests was nationally implemented in Finland in 1998,
no specific provision on the liability of heads of business was intro-
duced. In the Government Proposal, it was stated that the Convention
did not require a more extensive liability for the liability of heads of
business than what was valid law in Finland: the provisions on compli-
city in Chapter 5 of the Criminal (Penal) Code (CC) should also be ap-
plied in relation to the heads of business. 1
The statement of the Government Proposal was deficient, because
the doctrine and case law applicable to the liability of the directors of cor-
porations were not restricted to the use of complicity provisions but were
developed into principles and rules of sui generis (see below). In 1995,
two such partial revisions of the Criminal Code were carried out as part
of the total reform of the Code, and both were significant for the doctrine
on the liability of heads of business. Firstly, corporate criminal liability
was introduced by the enactment of Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code
(Act. No. 743/1995; cited in Appendix 1). Secondly, the criminal liability
within legal persons—i.e. the principles governing the allocation of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility, especially the liability of heads of busi-
ness—was partly regulated in 1995 (Act No. 578/1995), when special
provisions on such liability were given for labour and environmental of-
fences (CC 47:7; 48:7).
Considerations relating to procedural safeguards were not involved
in the national implementation of the 1995 Convention.
1.2. Debate on corporate criminal liability
The legislative works for drafting the partial revisions of the Crim-
inal Code in 1995 and for the total reform of the Code mentioned above
(Part 1.1) illustrate the policy debate.
Economic criminality became a source of concern for the authori-
ties for the first time in the late 1970s. At that time, tax fraud was re-
garded as the most common economic crime. It was estimated that
tax fraud led to a 5–10 per cent reduction in the collection of taxes.
1 Government Proposal 45/1998, 13. At that time, the provisions on complicity
were in force according to their original content in the Penal Code of 1889.
6 CHAPTER II
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In 1980, the Ministry of Justice established a broad-based project orga-
nisation to prepare a proposal for a total reform of the Criminal Code of
1889 (39/1889). The goal was to give the highest priority to reassess-
ment of the provisions on economic crime. Two years later, the Ministry
of Justice established a separate working party to examine the factual
phenomena of economic crime as well as the material legislation and
control machinery on economic crime; the working group was also en-
titled to make proposals for the improvement of the prevention, super-
vision and investigation of economic crime.
These preparations led to various government measures to tighten
control of economic crime. On the level of legislation, the most impor-
tant action was the revision of provisions on economic crime in gradual
stages of the total reform of the Criminal Code in the 1990s (1990, 1995
and 1999). 2 For instance, completely new provisions on subsidy of-
fences and business offences were incorporated into Chapters 29 and
30 of the revised Criminal Code in 1990 (769/1990). A major legislative
reform dealt with the introduction of corporate criminal liability in 1995
(in Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code: 743/1995), as well as provisions of
labour and environmental offences (Chapters 47 and 48 of the Criminal
Code: 578/1995). New clarifying provisions were also enacted on the in-
dividual criminal responsibility of directors in a corporate body in Chap-
ters 47 and 48 of the Code (CC 47:7; 48:7).
According to the Finnish Criminal Code, a corporation may be
sentenced to a corporate fine for certain enumerated, mostly econom-
ic offences. The main reasons for the introduction of this type of cor-
porate liability, as expressed in the legislative drafts, can be sum-
marised in the following way: the social significance of corporate ac-
tivity; the accumulation of actions and default; the lack of proportion-
ality between offences and punishment; the difficulties in allocating
individual criminal responsibility; the transfer of responsibility in
hierarchical relationships; the need to direct effective sanctions in
an equitable manner; and the idea that it is fair to direct reproach
at a corporate body when an offence has been committed in the op-
erations of the corporation. 3
2 An unofficial English translation of the Criminal (Penal) Code, as it was in
force in 2015 (766/2015), is available at the website of the Ministry of Justice:
https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1889/ en18890039_20150766.pdf.
3 As to a more detailed review, see M Tolvanen, ‘Trust, Business Ethics and
Crime Prevention – Corporate Criminal Liability in Finland’ (2009) Fudan Law Jour-
nal 99.
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It should be noted that the allocation of individual criminal respon-
sibility has in practice been the primary form of corporate complicity (or
liability linked to organisational crime) in relation to the criminal liabi-
lity of the corporation itself. This state of affairs can be explained by the
facts that corporate criminal liability is still a relatively young construc-
tion in Finland and it fragmentarily covers offences to which it is ap-
plicable. However, it is increasingly applied to economic and financial
offences.
Corporate criminal liability was introduced in 1995 (see above, Part
1.1). Corporate criminal liability is restricted to specific offences, mostly
economic offences. PIF offences are covered by the provisions on cor-
porate criminal liability, including, for example, subsidy offences except
when it is a question of subsidies granted for personal consumption (CC
29:6–8, 9.2, 10), tax fraud when related to taxes collected on the behalf
of European communities (CC 29:1–2, 9.1, 10), active corruption of of-
ficials or members of Parliament (CC 16:13–14b, 18) and money laun-
dering (CC 32:6–7, 9, 14).
Administrative (penal) liability of legal persons is provided to
cover specific infringements and, exceptionally, (criminal) offences.
Finnish law does not contain a clear and uniform system or definition
of administrative sanctions or administrative penal law. The field of
administrative sanctions is quite heterogeneous, and sector-specific
rules are laid down in laws governing the use of public authority. 4
There are, however, several types of such sanctions already in use,
but a comprehensive systematic review and rethinking of them is still
under investigation, most recently (2018) in a working group of the
Ministry of Justice.
A typical feature of (punitive) administrative sanctions is that most
can be imposed on legal persons as well (corporate bodies, etc.). How-
ever, the legislation is not coherent in this case either. Provisions do not
always indicate explicitly whether it is possible to impose sanctions on
both legal and natural persons.
Normally, a criminal sanction and a punitive administrative sanction
(penalty) are not established for parallel use. However, fraudulent tax
evasion has traditionally been an exception. Accordingly, minor viola-
tions of fraudulent tax evasion have been sanctioned (including when
4 See R Lahti, ‘Towards a Principled European Criminal Policy: Some Lessons
from the Nordic Countries’ in J B Banach-Gutierrez and C Harding, EU Criminal
Law and Policy (Routledge 2016), 56–69. See also L Halila and V Lankinen, ‘Admin-
istrativa sanktionsavgifter i nordisk kontext’ (2014) JFT 305, 325.
8 CHAPTER II
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it is a question of a criminal offence) by the tax authority: a penalty fee
(called a tax or customs increase) is imposed on the taxpayer (either a
legal or natural person) by this administrative public authority. As men-
tioned above, the provisions on tax fraud (CC 29:1–3) also cover tax
frauds which are related to taxes collected on behalf of European com-
munities.
In 2013, in a separate legal Act (781/2013), a prohibition of
double jeopardy was introduced for tax fraud cases (i.e. a prohibi-
tion against the cumulative use of criminal punishment and a puni-
tive administrative fee). So, as a rule, neither may charges be
brought nor court judgment passed if a punitive tax or customs in-
crease has already been imposed on the same person in the same
case (CC 29:11).
When the Market Abuse Regulation (EU No. 596/2014) and the
Market Abuse Directive (2014/57/EU) were nationally implemented
in Finland in 2016, the scope of punitive administrative sanctions for
security markets’ offences (which are regulated in Chapter 51 of the
Criminal Code) was dramatically enlarged. The Financial Supervisory
Authority (FSA) may exercise supervisory powers in respect of finan-
cial markets. The FSA imposes an administrative fine for a failure to
comply with or a violation of provisions in section 38 of the Act on
the Financial Supervisory Authority (878/2008).
Already before the 2016 reform of market abuse legislation, ad-
ministrative penalties could in quantity be several millions of euros
and could be imposed for a restraint on competition (see the Compe-
tition Act of 948/2011 with the amendments up to the Act of 1078/
2016). It should be noted that this competition infringement is not
criminalised in Finland, and so only the administrative penalty can
be imposed.
It should be noted that the introduction of corporate criminal liabi-
lity was a part of the total reform of the Finnish Criminal Code and one
of the major objectives of that reform was to reassess the punishability
and penal regulation of economic and corporate crime.
1.3. Significant cases involving the liability of heads of business
As to the examples of case law, see below.
FINLAND NATIONAL REPORT 9
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2. Relationship with general principals of criminal law
2.1. General information on the system of perpetration and complicity
Chapter 5 of the Finnish Criminal Code (Act No. 515/2003) in-
cludes provisions on attempt and complicity (see below, cited in Appen-
dix 2). The complicity provisions substantially follow the model of the
German Criminal Code. In the recodification of the Finnish criminal law
in 1990–2003, the complicity provisions were mainly retained such as
they had been in force since the enactment of the Criminal Code in
1889.
The Finnish provisions (CC 5:3–7) differentiate between principals
and co-perpetrators on the one hand, and inciters (instigators) and ac-
complices (abettors) on the other. This differentiated model of participa-
tion is in line with the emphasis on the expressive or symbolic function
of criminal law. This kind of punishment theory is strongly supported in
Finnish and Scandinavian criminal policy. The authoritative disapproval
expressed by criminal law should be differentiated according to the var-
ious roles of participants.
The indirect principal (commission of an offence through an
agent) is also a type of perpetrator, thus a new clarifying provision
(CC 5:4) was added to the Code in 2003 concerning the indirect prin-
cipal. The penal scale for an abettor is mitigated. The system of ‘bor-
rowed criminality’ (Akzessoritätsprinzip) is applied in the participation
doctrine, i.e. in both types of participation, instigation and abetting, the
liability is of an accessorial or derivative nature.
Sections 3–8 in Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code apply to two or
more individuals acting in concert in the commission of the offence.
The provisions in CC 5:3–6 define the different forms of participation
as follows:
– CC 5:3 on co-perpetration. If two or more persons have com-
mitted an intentional offence together, each is punishable as an offender.
The term ‘committed’ has been interpreted extensively in juridical prac-
tice. In the legal literature, it has been recommended to apply the Ger-
man doctrine of ‘control over crime’ (Tatherrschaft) in drawing the line
between co-perpetration and accomplice. 5
– CC 5:4 on commission of an offence through an agent, i.e. in-
direct principal (mittelbare Täterschaft). A person is sentenced as
5 See D Frände, Yleinen rikosoikeus [General Criminal Law] (Edita, Helsinki
2012) 245–246.
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an indirect principal if he has committed an intentional offence by
using, as an agent, another person who cannot be punished for
the said offence due to the lack of criminal responsibility or inten-
tion or due to another reason connected with the conditions for
criminal liability.
It should be noted that if the immediate actor fulfils the conditions
of criminal responsibility and is thus punishable for the offence, the con-
cept of indirect principal and CC 5:4 are not applicable, in contrast to
many other legal orders (such as the German Criminal Code). This fact
does not exclude that such a commission of an offence through an agent
could trigger a perpetrator’s responsibility (by interpreting ‘commission’
extensively).
– CC 5:5 on instigation. A person who intentionally persuades an-
other person to commit an intentional offence or to make a punishable
attempt at such an act is punishable for incitement to the offence as if
he were the offender.
– CC 5:6 on aiding and abetting (accomplice). A person who, be-
fore or during the commission of an offence, intentionally furthers the
commission by another of an intentional act or of its punishable attempt,
through advice, action or otherwise, shall be sentenced for abetting on
the basis of the same legal provision as the offender. The sentence is de-
termined in accordance with a mitigated (->¾) penal scale.
According to the legislative drafts and precedents of the Su-
preme Court (KKO 2009:87 and KKO 2015:10 concerning aiding
and abetting fraud or dishonesty by a debtor, respectively), an active
act or omission by the accomplice does not need to be a necessary
precondition for the consequence; furthering the probability of the
commission of the offence is enough. Neither is a special intent or
specific direction required: the applicable lowest level of intention
is defined in the general provision on intention (CC 3:6) by using
a probability assessment. 6
– Incitement to punishable aiding and abetting is punishable as aid-
ing and abetting.
There are no legal provisions or legal practice as to whether the
complicity provision should also be applied by analogy in the field of
punitive administrative law. Because such provisions are missing, a uni-
fied system of participation should be applicable.
6 As for the intention in Finnish criminal law, see Jussi Matikkala, ‘Nordic
Intent’ in Kimmo Nuotio (ed.), Festschrift in Honour of Raimo Lahti (Forum Iuris,
Helsinki 2007) 221–234.
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2.2. General information on omission liability
After the revision of the general part of the Criminal Code in 2003,
a special provision on omission liability was included in Chapter 3 of the
Code (CC 3:3):
Chapter 3, section 3 – The punishability of omission (515/2003)
(1) An omission is punishable if this is specifically provided in the
statutory definition of an offence.
(2) An omission is punishable also if the offender has neglected to
prevent the causing of a consequence that accords with the statutory de-
finition, even though he or she had had a special legal duty to prevent
the causing of the consequence.
Such a duty may be based on:
(a) an office, function or position,
(b) the relationship between the offender and the victim,
(c) the assumption of an assignment or a contract,
(d) the action of the offender in creating danger, or
(e) another reason comparable to these.
Section 1 defines the punishability of ‘genuine’ omission and sec-
tion 2 derivative omission (commission by omission: unechter Unterlas-
sungsdelikt). The latter is significant here. The definition of the prerequi-
sites for derivative omission liability is vague and therefore problematic
from the point of view of the principle of lex certa. In the travaux pré-
paratoires, the introduction of new legal definitions into the general part
of the Criminal Code—not only regarding omission, but other prerequi-
sites of liability—was regarded as an improvement in relation to the ear-
lier state of affairs when no legal definition existed. It is also noteworthy
that it must be a question of an omission of a special legal duty to pre-
vent the causing of the consequence (concerning a so-called ‘result of-
fence’).
The types of special legal duties have been defined in the provision
(CC 3:3.2), though very generally—for example, by saying that such a
duty may be based on a function or position (point a) or on another rea-
son comparable to that specifically mentioned in the section (point e).
When assessing the causal link required between the omission and
the commission of an offence (consequence), the formula of condition
sine qua non is commonly used: the omission O of the legal duty in
question is considered to be causal for result R if R would not have oc-
curred but for O. The probability test of this assessment should qualify
very near certainty.
The mens rea (imputability) requirement for omission liability is
determined by the type of offence in question, and thus depends on
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the statutory definition of the offence in the special part of the criminal
law. Chapter 3, section 5, subsection 2 of the Criminal Code prescribes
that ‘unless otherwise provided, an act referred to in the Code is punish-
able only as an intentional act’. Intent and negligence are the basic forms
of imputability (CC 3:5.1), although negligence is divided into ‘normal’
negligence and gross negligence (CC 3:7).
In the field of punitive administrative law, the same principles
which are valid in criminal law and criminal procedural law should to
a great extent be followed. The Constitutional Law Committee of Parlia-
ment has a key role in the legislative process to oversee that relevant hu-
man rights obligations and constitutional rights are taken into account in
final drafting. In its practice, it is emphasised that the regulation on ad-
ministrative sanctions should be proportionate, for example. Issues
which are related to proportionality include sanctioning of very minor
misconducts and the scaling of sanctions based on the severity of the
conduct. 7 Although the principle of legality and legal certainty (lex cer-
ta) in criminal cases does not, as such, apply to administrative sanctions,
the principle of nulla poena sine lege cannot be ignored generally in
such regulations. This provides that a sanction’s provisions must define
the punishable conduct and the sanction with sufficient definiteness. It
must emerge from the provisions that violating the statutes may be sanc-
tioned. In addition, sanctioned acts and negligent behaviours must be de-
scribed by law in order to identify them. 8 However, the requirement of
mens rea (personal guilt, blameworthiness) is in punitive administrative
law weaker and not followed without exception.
2.3. Duty to report an offence
There is no general provision about the duty to report an offence
and the criminal consequences for the failure to do so. When the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was nationally im-
plemented in Finland in 2008 (212/1998), a penal provision on failure
to report the international offence (genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes) of a subordinate was included in Chapter 11 of the
Criminal Code (CC 11:13). There is also a penal provision on failure
to report a serious offence (CC 15:10: 563/1998), but its prerequisite
7 E.g. Constitutional Law Committee 58/2010.
8 E.g. Constitutional Law Committee 60/2010 and Constitutional Law
Committee 74/2002.
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is that there is still time to prevent the offence (i.e. the offence is not
yet completed).
2.4. General information on strict liability
Strict liability for criminal offences is not allowed in Finnish law.
Intent and negligence are prerequisites for criminal liability (CC
3:5.1). The requirement of personal guilt or blameworthiness in criminal
law is in recent legal literature drawn from the constitutional right of the
inviolability of human dignity. 9
The requirement of mens rea (personal guilt, blameworthiness) is in
punitive administrative law weaker and not followed without exception
(see above, Part 2.2). A recent legislative example concerns the penalty
fee in taxation (see above, Part 1.2). The Constitutional Law Committee
of Parliament accepted in its statement that such a tax increase can be
imposed irrespective of the negligence of the taxpayer under the condi-
tion that the threshold for waiving the penalty fee is not too high and the
discretion of the tax authority is bound by law. 10
2.5. Special rules on liability
See the part on administrative liability in section 1.2.
Normally, a criminal sanction and an administrative sanction are not
established for parallel use. However, fraudulent tax evasion has tradi-
tionally been an exception. Accordingly, minor violations of fraudulent
tax evasion have been sanctioned (including when it is a question of a
criminal offence) by the tax authority: a penalty fee (called a tax or cus-
toms increase) is imposed on the taxpayer (either a legal or natural per-
son) by this administrative public authority. As mentioned above, the
provisions on tax fraud (CC 29:1–3) also cover tax frauds which are re-
lated to taxes collected on behalf of European communities.
In 2013, a separate legal act (781/2013)—a prohibition of double
jeopardy—was introduced for tax fraud cases (i.e. a prohibition against
the cumulative use of criminal punishment and an administrative penal
fee). So, as a rule, neither may charges be brought nor court judgment
9 E.g. D Frände, Yleinen rikosoikeus (n 11), 165.
10 Constitutional Law Committee 39/2017.
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passed if a punitive tax or customs increase has already been imposed on
the same person in the same case (CC 29:11).
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of heads
of business
3.1. Liability of heads of business (general information)
As mentioned above (Part 1.2), new clarifying provisions were also
enacted on the individual criminal responsibility of directors in a corpo-
rate body into Chapters 47 and 48 on labour and environmental offences
of the Criminal Code in 1995, in connection with the partial reform of
the whole Code CC 47:7; 48:7). Their content is as follows:
Chapter 47, section 7 – Allocation of liability (578/1995)
Where this Chapter provides for punishment of the conduct of an
employer or representative thereof, the person into whose sphere of re-
sponsibility the act or omission belongs shall be sentenced. In the allo-
cation of liability due consideration shall be given to the position of said
person, the nature and extent of his or her duties and competence and
also otherwise his or her participation in the origin and continuation
of the situation that is contrary to law.
Chapter 48, section 7 – Allocation of liability (578/1995)
Where this Chapter provides for punishment of conduct, the person
into whose sphere of responsibility the act or omission belongs shall be
sentenced. In the allocation of liability due consideration shall be given
to the position of said person, the nature and extent of his or her duties
and competence and also otherwise his or her participation in the origin
and continuation of the situation that is contrary to law.
A more general provision on the allocation of individual liability
was included in the reformed chapter on attempt and complicity in
2003 (CC 5:8: ‘Acting on behalf of a legal person’, cited in Appendix 2).
The guidance given in those provisions is rather vague: ‘[I]n the al-
location of liability due consideration shall be given to the position of
that person, the nature and extent of his duties and competence and also
otherwise his participation in the arising and continuation of the situa-
tion that is contrary to law’. The provision in CC 5:8 is, however, clear
when prescribing that the person who exercises actual decision-making
power in the legal person (faktischer Geschäftsführer) is to be consid-
ered equal to the member of a statutory body or management of a
corporation.
It is noteworthy that these special provisions on the allocation of lia-
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bility should be interpreted in coherence with the general provision on
derivative omission (CC 3:3.2; see above, Part 2.2).
3.2. Personal scope of the liability
The provision of Chapter 5, section 8 of the Criminal Code defines
subjective scope in the following way: ‘A member of a statutory body or
management of a corporation, foundation or other legal person, a person
who exercises actual decision-making power in the legal person or a per-
son who otherwise acts on its behalf in an employment relationship in
the private or public sector or on the basis of a commission [may be sen-
tenced for an offence committed in the operations of a legal person...]’.
This provision, along with the provisions of CC 47:7 and CC 48:7,
leaves the subjective scope open. According to the doctrine and case
law, it is important to take into consideration—except in the case of
the general provision on derivative omission (CC 3:3.2)—the acts and
other regulations concerning the corporation, foundation or other legal
person in question: how the duties of various statutory bodies or man-
agement are prescribed. For example, as to limited liability companies,
the following provisions in the Act of 624/2006 defining the duties of
the board of directors and managing director are important.
The Board of Directors shall see to the administration of the com-
pany and the appropriate organisation of its operations (general compe-
tence). The Board of Directors shall be responsible for the appropriate
arrangement of the control of the company accounts and finances (Chap-
ter 6, section 2, subsection 1).
The Managing Director shall see to the executive management of
the company in accordance with the instructions and orders given by
the Board of Directors (general competence). The Managing Director
shall see to it that the accounts of the company are in compliance with
the law and that its financial affairs have been arranged in a reliable
manner. The Managing Director shall supply the Board of Directors
and the Members of the Board of Directors with the information neces-
sary for the performance of the duties of the Board of Directors (Chapter
6, section 17, subsection 1).
As to the liability of corporate owners, there is no case law avail-
able. With reference to the provision of CC 5:8, it may be said that lia-
bility is possible when he or she exercises actual decision-making power
in the legal person.
When taking into account the general provision on derivative omis-
sion (CC 3:3.2), in which an omission of a special legal duty based on,
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for example, an office, function and position is required, it can be con-
cluded that the normal employee must have a certain independence. For
instance, an account clerk has not been regarded as being in such a posi-
tion and able to act on behalf of the legal person, but he or she may be an
accessory to an accounting offence.
3.3. Duties to control and supervise
It is typical that such a liability of heads of business is based on spe-
cific duties to control and supervise activities of the subordinates (for ex-
ample, with regard to labour safety and environmental regulations).
After the introduction of a provision on subordinate omission (CC
3:3.2; see above, Part 2.2), there is a strengthened legal basis for such
duties.
3.4. Violation of supervisory duties and the commission of an offence
3.4.1. Causal link
In principle, there should be such a causal relationship as described
in connection with the provision of CC 3:3.2 (see above, Part 2.2), at
least when it is a question of a resultant offence.
3.4.2. Mens rea
The prerequisite of mens rea should also be assessed as described in
connection with the provision of CC 3:3.2 (see above, Part 2.2). This
often means difficulties in proving intent, when the statutory definition
of the offence in question requires intent as the form of imputability. The
lowest level of intent is to be drawn by using a probability theory. 11
There are court decisions in which the formula ‘must have known...’
is used, but it is often explained to indicate a certain way to draw con-
clusions from the evidence presented by the prosecutor without referring
to the wider scope of intent.
11 See Chapter 3, section 6 (515/2003) of the Criminal Code: ‘A perpetrator has
intentionally caused the consequence described in the statutory definition if the
causing of the consequence was the perpetrator’s purpose or he or she had
considered the consequence as a certain or quite probable result of his or her actions.’
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3.5. Delegation of control and supervisory duties: scope and limits
The practice of allocation of individual criminal responsibility has
been very much in line with the guiding principles of Corpus Juris
2000, as formulated in the follow-up study. 12 See Article 12 of the
study. 13
For instance, in a recent precedent of the Supreme Court (KKO
2016:58), members of the board of directors of a potato flakes factory
(limited company) were convicted of impairment of the environment
through gross negligence (CC 48:1) when the effluent from the factory’s
potato sludge contaminated the environment. These directors had
omitted their supervisory duties as members of the company’s board
and were therefore liable for their omission to prevent the contamination
(in line with the provisions of CC 3:3.2 and CC 48:7). A factual division
of labour between the managing director (having the main responsibility
for the factory’s operational activities) and board members did not ex-
clude the supervisory duty nor the board members’ liability for the con-
sequence.
In another precedent of the Supreme Court (KKO 2007:62), the
12 See Mireille Delmas-Marty and John AE Vervaele (eds), The Implementation
of the Corpus Juris in the Member States (Vol. I, Intersentia, Antwerp 2000) 189–210
(193).
13 Article 12. – Criminal liability of the head of business or persons with powers
of decision and control within the business: public officers.
1. If one of the offences under Articles 1 to 8 is committed for the benefit of a
business by someone acting under the authority of another person who is the head
of the business, or who controls it or exercises the power to make decisions within
it, that other person is also criminally liable if he knowingly allowed the offence to
be committed.
2. The same applies to any public officer who knowingly allows an offence under
Articles 1 to 8 to be committed by a person under him.
3. If one of the offences under Articles 1 to 8 is committed by someone acting
under the authority of another person who is the head of a business, or who
controls it or exercises the power to make decisions within it, that other person is
also criminally liable if he failed to exercise necessary supervision, and his failure
facilitated the commission of the offence.
4. In determining whether a person is liable under (1) and (3) above, the fact that
he delegated his powers shall only be a defence where the delegation was partial,
precise, specific, and necessary for the running of the business, and the delegates
were really in a position to fulfil the functions allotted to them. Notwithstanding
such a delegation, a person may incur liability under this article on the basis that he
took insufficient care in the selection, supervision or control of his staff, or in the
general organisation of the business, or in any other matter with which the head of
business is properly concerned.
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chairman of the board of directors of a housing company was sentenced
for negligent homicide when he omitted the duty to take care that snow
and ice were removed properly from the roof of a house of the company,
with the result that the snow and ice fell onto a pedestrian and caused his
death. The Supreme Court argued that because the responsibility to re-
move the snow and ice from the roof was not clearly delegated to a ser-
vice company, the housing company was responsible and the liability
was allocated to the chairman of its board of directors.
3.6. Fulfilment of supervisory duties and disciplinary powers
When the offence in question has been committed (the result of the
offence is completed), there is no ground for exclusion of a person’s re-
sponsibility in that actual case. Participation in the continuation of the
situation that is contrary to law is one of the factors to be taken into ac-
count when assessing to whose sphere of responsibility the act or omis-
sion belongs (see the wording of CC 47:7 and 48:7).
Similarly, where corporate criminal liability is concerned, the con-
tinuation of the situation that is contrary to law can be taken into con-
sideration when assessing whether the care and diligence necessary
for the prevention of the offence have been observed in the operations
of the corporation (so-called ‘corporation guilt’: CC 9:2.1). See section
3.8.1 below.
3.7. Liability and collective decisions
In principle, the liability of heads of business is assessed individu-
ally. An example of collective decision-making bodies is the board of
directors of companies or other legal persons, such as the precedent of
the Supreme Court (KKO 2016:58) where members of the board of di-
rectors of a potato flakes factory (limited company) were convicted of
impairment of the environment through gross negligence (see above Part
3.5). A factual division of labour between the managing director (having
the main responsibility for the factory’s operational activities) and board
members did not exclude the supervisory duty nor the board members’
liability for the consequence.
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3.8. Relationship with corporate liability
3.8.1. Triggering persons
As mentioned above (Part 1.2), a corporation may be sentenced to a
corporate fine for certain enumerated, mostly economic, offences (Chap-
ter 9 of the Criminal Code, as amended 743/1995; cited in Appendix 1).
The corporate fine—which is the only criminal sanction available—is at
least 850 euros and at most 850,000 euros.
The Finnish doctrine behind corporate criminal liability is not
clear. 14 The acts or omissions of the individual offender are under cer-
tain conditions attributed to the legal person, not as acts of the legal per-
son but as acts of the individual for the company (CC 9:3). A crucial
precondition is that a person who is part of its statutory organ or other
management or who exercises actual decision-making authority therein
has been an accomplice in an offence or allowed the commission of the
offence, or alternatively that the care and diligence necessary for the pre-
vention of the offence has not been observed in the operations of the cor-
poration (CC 9:2). The description of those whose position may impli-
cate liability is in the first-mentioned precondition similar to the begin-
ning of the definition in Chapter 5, section 8 (‘Acting on behalf of a le-
gal person’), but as a whole the wording in CC 9:2 is more restricted.
According to a precedent of the Supreme Court (KKO 2008:3), in a case
of negligent impairment of the environment (CC 48:4), only such repre-
sentatives of the limited company who had so much independent and
considerable decision-making power that it would qualify as compliance
of an identification principle can be regarded as implicating the liability
for the corporation.
The last-mentioned precondition in CC 9:2 refers to the blame-
worthy organisational conduct (fault) of the corporation. In case of the
last-mentioned alternative, it is possible to impose a corporate fine based
on anonymous culpa. For instance, in the Supreme Court case KKO
2008:3, this last-mentioned precondition of organisational fault was
proved but not the precondition (‘identification’) which is first men-
tioned in CC 9:2.
14 See also M Tolvanen, in Fudan Law Journal (n. 8) Chapter 2.
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3.8.2. Concurrence and accumulation of liabilities
Corporate criminal liability does not replace individual criminal re-
sponsibility because they are parallel forms of liability. Normally, both
the individual manager and the company are prosecuted when the formal
conditions are met. 15 An exception is a situation where the company
was so small that the corporate fine was in fact directed to its managing
director, who was in in the same proceedings sentenced to imprisonment
for intentional impairment of the environment (CC 48:1): it was decided
to dismiss the corporate fine (precedent of the Supreme Court, KKO
2002:39).
3.9. Compliance programmes
There is no Finnish case law or legal literature on these issues to
date. To my mind, it is obvious that the adoption of compliance pro-
grammes and the appointment of compliance officers may have signifi-
cance in assessing: a) the acceptability of the behaviour of heads of busi-
ness, in particular whether there was a breach of duty of diligence (actus
reus of negligence); and b) whether organisational fault existed as a pre-
requisite for corporate criminal liability (see above, Part 3.8).
4. Defences
4.1. Effective powers of supervision and control and liability
This kind of defence is possible primarily in relation to lower-level
managerial employees. However, in a quite recent precedent of the Su-
preme Court (KKO 2013:56) concerning a work safety offence (CC
47:1), it was decided that the technical director and production manager
of a limited company were not responsible for the elimination of the de-
ficiencies of a squeezer, because they did not have enough factual influ-
ence over the resources for repairing the squeezer. The shifter was re-
garded as responsible for the supervision of the machines and their
use and was also sentenced for negligent bodily injury (CC 21:10) when
15 See generally R Lahti, ‘Über die strafrechtliche Verantwortung der juristischen
Person und die Organ- und Vertreterhaftung in Finnland’ in Festschrift für Keiichi Ya-
manaka (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2017) 131–152.
FINLAND NATIONAL REPORT 21
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
an employee was injured using the deficient squeezer. The managing di-
rector and members of the board of directors were not prosecuted.
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers
As to the delegation of control and supervision powers, see my an-
swer and references to the precedents of the Supreme Court KKO
2016:58 and KKO 2007:62 (above, Part 3.5). Decision KKO 2016:58
reiterates that a factual division of labour between the managing director
(having the main responsibility for the factory’s operational activities)
and board members did not exclude the supervisory duty nor the board
members’ liability for the consequences.
4.3. Compliance programmes
As to the significance of the implementation of compliance pro-
grammes, see my answer above (Part 3.9).
4.4. Third party advice, external auditing and liability of heads of busi-
ness
The subjects of liability have been defined in the penal provisions
on accounting offences (CC 30:9, 9a and 10; 61/2003). There is also
a penal provision on auditing offences (CC 30:10a; 474/2007). The basic
statutory definition of an accounting offence is as follows:
Chapter 30, section 9 – Accounting offence (61/2003)
If a person with a legal duty to keep accounts, his or her represen-
tative, a person exercising actual decision-making authority in a corpora-
tion with a legal duty to keep books, or the person entrusted with the
keeping of accounts,
(1) in violation of statutory accounting requirements neglects the re-
cording of business transactions or the balancing of the accounts,
(2) enters false or misleading data into the accounts, or
(3) destroys, conceals or damages account documentation
and in this way impedes the obtaining of a true and sufficient pic-
ture of the financial result of the business of the said person or of his or
her financial standing, he or she shall be sentenced for an accounting of-
fence to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years.
The liability of an external auditor should, to my mind, be assessed
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in an analogous way to the delegation of liability (see above, Part 3.5
and Part 4.2).
5. Liability of heads of business and sanctions
5.1. Criminal and punitive sanctions
This section offers some general remarks on sanction systems,
firstly about criminal sanctions, which are applicable to all kinds of sen-
tenced persons, not only to the heads of business. 16
The mechanism through which the general preventive effect of the
punishment is deemed to be reached is not deterrence in the first place
but socio-ethical disapproval, which affects the sense of morals and jus-
tice—general prevention instead of general deterrence, without calling
for a severe penal system. The legitimacy of the whole criminal justice
system is an important aim; therefore, such principles of justice as equal-
ity and proportionality are central. The emphasis on the non-utilitarian
goals of the criminal justice system—fairness and humaneness—must
be connected with the decrease in the repressive features (punitiveness)
of the system—for example, through the introduction of alternatives to
imprisonment. The significance of individual prevention or incapacita-
tion is regarded as very limited.
The first changes in the system of criminal sanctions prepared since
the 1970s pertained to alternatives to custodial sentences. Accordingly,
legislation enacted in 1996 incorporated community service as a regular
part of the system of sanctions. Legislation enacted in 2005 incorporated
conciliation—including both criminal and civil cases—as a regular part
of social welfare and the restorative justice system. Electronic monitor-
ing was introduced as a new type of criminal sanction in 2011; it shall be
imposed under certain material prerequisites as an alternative to a cus-
todial sentence of imprisonment for at most six months.
The general punishments in force are the following: fine, condi-
tional imprisonment, community service, electronic monitoring and un-
conditional imprisonment (Chapter 6 of Criminal Code; 515/2003 with
amendments up to 564/2015).
16 R Lahti, ‘Towards a more Efficient, Fair and Humane Criminal Justice System:
Developments of Criminal Policy and Criminal Sanctions during the last 50 Years in
Finland’ (2017) Law, Criminology & Criminal Justice. Cogent Social Sciences, 3
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2017.1303910).
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5.2. Other sanctions and measures
A special criminal sanction for those who have in their business ac-
tivity as an entrepreneur or a manager of an enterprise committed eco-
nomic crime or otherwise crucially omitted their legal duties was intro-
duced in 1985 (1059/1985), namely the prohibition of engagement in
business. Although it is not a necessary precondition that the suspected
person has fulfilled all definitional elements of an economic crime, this
sanction can be characterised as a criminal sanction because the inves-
tigation and prosecution follow the rules of a criminal process.
As to punitive administrative sanctions, they have been increasingly
introduced, especially in the attempt to eliminate criminal penalties for
minor and/or negligent offences (decriminalisation). It has also been pre-
sented that the flexibility of administrative decision-making to some ex-
tent explains their introduction. In addition, administrative sanctions are
used in EU law, particularly in order to safeguard the financial interests
of the Union, and this development is reflected in national legislation.
Administrative sanctions are closely related to the specific legisla-
tive objectives of a particular sector of administration and its regulatory
objectives enforced by specialised administrative authorities. The legis-
lative differences in sanctioning are largely due to the sectoral nature of
administrative sanctions. Administrative sanctions are closely linked to
enforcement and supervision procedures, and the methods of a specific
public authority. The sectoral nature of the administrative sanctions and
the priority of specific regulations (lex specialis) emphasises the fact that
administrative sanctions are part of the sectoral sanction scheme. 17
There are no punitive administrative sanctions established espe-
cially for heads of business. See also my answer above, Part 1.2.
5.3. Sentencing criteria
There are general sentencing provisions in Chapter 6 (515/2003) of
the Criminal Code, including grounds for increasing and reducing the
punishment, grounds for mitigating the punishment and the penal lati-
tude, and grounds for the choice of the type of punishment. The general
principle governing the assessment of punishment of an individual of-
17 Rangaistusluonteisia hallinnollisia seuraamuksia koskevan sääntelyn kehittä-
minen [Developing the Regulation of Punitive Administrative Sanctions] (Oikeusmi-
nisteriön työryhmän muistioluonnos 8.11.2017), 12–13 [Draft Memorandum of the
Ministry of Justice Working Group].
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fender reads as follows: ‘[T]he sentence shall be determined so that it is
in just proportion to the harmfulness and dangerousness of the offence,
the motives for the act and the other culpability of the offender manifest
in the offence’ (CC 6:4). The basis for calculating the corporate fine is
formulated in the following way: the amount of the corporate fine shall
be determined in accordance with the nature and extent of the omission
or the participation of the management and the financial standing of the
corporation (CC 9:6.1).
There are no specific sentencing criteria to determine the punish-
ment for the individual head of business; nor are general criteria/guide-
lines followed in administrative punitive law, because of the sectoral
nature of administrative sanctions.
5.4. Confiscation
Forfeiture, especially forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, is a
commonly imposed criminal sanction with respect to economic and
corporate crime. The forfeiture shall be ordered on the perpetrator, a
participant or a person on whose behalf or to whose benefit the of-
fence has been committed, where these have benefited from the of-
fence. A prerequisite for a forfeiture order is that the relevant act is
criminalised by law, and so the forfeitures are imposed in criminal
proceedings. In Finnish doctrine, forfeiture is classified as a security
measure instead of a punishment. Therefore, Article 6, Paragraphs
2–3 (fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights are
not regarded as directly applicable to the forfeiture proceedings.
Chapter 10 of the Penal Code includes the general provisions on
forfeiture; they were revised in the Act of 875/2001 as a part of the total
reform of the Code. In the Act of 356/2016, these provisions were re-
shaped in order to implement Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing
and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the EU.
The provisions were preserved as general and so their application is
not restricted to the crimes listed in Article 3 of the Directive 2014/
42/EU.
5.5. Enforcement practice
Punitive administrative sanctions (typically punitive fees) have been
introduced in various sectors of business and financial activity, and im-
plementation of the EU’s legislative instruments has increased the use of
administrative criminal law in combatting economic and financial of-
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fences. In practice, the most important administrative fee of a penal
nature is the punitive tax increase, which is set concurrently with
the assessment of taxes in cases of tax deceit. Another early example
of the adoption of a noticeable punitive fee concerns competition law:
since 1992, when a new Act on competition restrictions was enacted,
the competition restriction offence has been decriminalised and re-
placed with the provisions on a competition restriction fee. A similar
type of punitive administrative fee was adopted by the legislative Acts in
2016 for the protection against market abuse, as prescribed by Regula-
tion (EU) 596/2014. 18
The level of monetary administrative sanctions introduced when
implementing the EU’s legislative instruments is much higher than the
actual level of monetary criminal sanctions; for example, the maximum
corporate fine is only 850,000 euros.
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against the head
of business
6.1.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence against the head of business
As mentioned above (Part 1.2), a criminal sanction and a punitive
administrative sanction are not normally established for parallel use.
However, fraudulent tax evasion has traditionally been an exception
and the most recent example covers security markets offences.
In 2013, a separate legal Act (781/2013), a prohibition of double
jeopardy, was introduced for tax fraud cases (i.e. a prohibition of the cu-
mulative use of criminal punishment and a punitive administrative fee).
So, as a rule, charges may not be brought for, nor court judgment passed,
if a punitive tax or customs increase has already been imposed on the
same person in the same case (CC 29:11). This special Act was intro-
duced to take into account the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights on the application of the principle of ne bis in idem. It also indi-
cates the direction of legislative reforms in other fields of economic and
financial activity.
In Finnish procedural law, the traditionally recognised basic ele-
18 See Securities Markets Act /258/2013), as amended by the Act of 519/2016.
See also the amendment of Chapter 51 (Security markets offences) of the Penal
Code by the Act of 521/2016.
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ments of a due process or fair trial are the right to access to court, an
independent and impartial tribunal, the presumption of innocence and
guarantees of procedural rights. It is noteworthy that these procedural
principles and rules are applicable to all kinds of offences (including
corporate and corporate-related crime), except that summary (simpli-
fied) penal proceedings and fixed fine penal proceedings for minor of-
fences have some specific features which make the proceedings more
expeditious and cost-effective.
A fundamental principle that reflects the presumption of innocence
is favor defensionis (in favour of the defence). This ‘meta’ principle im-
plies specifying principles, most importantly the principle of nemo tene-
tur se ipsum accusare, or privilege against self-incrimination (an indivi-
dual may not be compelled to testify against him-/herself and the right to
silence), and the principle of in dubio pro reo (in case of unclear guilt,
the accusation shall be dismissed). The burden of proof is on the prose-
cutor’s side. A judgment of guilty may be made only on the condition
that there is no reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the defendant.
In addition to the accusatorial principle, other leading principles
governing the main hearing in the proceedings are the requirements of
orality and immediacy. Therefore, all pleadings shall, as a rule, be oral
and the opposing party has the right to cross-examine all evidence pre-
sented against him/her. The acceptability of other than oral evidence in
the open court is very restricted. 19
A general provision on evidence stipulates the following: ‘(1) A
party has the right to present the evidence that he or she wants to the
court investigating the case and comment on each piece of evidence pre-
sented in court, unless provided otherwise in law. (2) The court, having
considered the evidence presented and the other circumstances that have
been shown in the proceedings, determines what has been proven and
what has not been proven in the case. The court shall consider the pro-
bative value of the evidence and the other circumstances thoroughly and
objectively on the basis of free consideration of the evidence, unless pro-
vided otherwise in law.’ 20
19 See Criminal Procedure Act (689/1997) generally. An unofficial translation is
available from the website of the Ministry of Justice: https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/
kaannokset/1734/en17340004_20150732.pdf.
20 Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734), as the provisions on evidence in Chapter
17 enacted in 2015 (732/2015); cited in section 1 of Chapter 17. An unofficial
translation is available from the website of the Ministry of Justice: https://
www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1734/en17340004_20150732.pdf.
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6.1.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence against the head of
business
The general provisions on criminal procedure and evidence are
also applicable when assessing the use of such evidence which has
been gathered in the administrative proceedings or in foreign pro-
ceedings.
6.1.3. Administrative investigations and right to silence of the head of
business
The application of the privilege against self-incrimination is
clear in criminal proceedings. According to the Code of Judicial
Procedure (4/1734 with amendments, Chapter 17, section 25, sub-
section 2), the court may not, in criminal proceedings, use evidence
which was obtained from a person in proceedings other than a crim-
inal investigation or in criminal proceedings, through the threat of
coercive measures or otherwise against his or her will, if he or she
at the time was a suspect in an offence or a defendant, or a criminal
investigation or court proceedings were underway in respect of an
offence for which he or she was charged. If, however, a person in
other than criminal proceedings or comparable proceedings has, in
connection with fulfilling his or her statutory obligation, given a
false statement or submitted a false or untruthful document or a false
or forged object, this may be used as evidence in a criminal case
concerning conduct in violation of his or her obligation. According
to travaux préparatoires, therefore, privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is respected in criminal procedure, even though certain other
law stipulates an obligation to provide authorities with information
that otherwise could incriminate the one giving the required infor-
mation. 21
As to the privilege against self-incrimination in the context of ad-
ministrative investigations or, more generally, in administrative proce-
dures, its content and scope are uncertain and determined on the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights.
21 Government Proposal 46/2014, 88.
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6.2. Multiple and parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the legal person and the head of business
6.2.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence
The answer to the question of whether parallel criminal and admin-
istrative proceedings are allowed is, in both legal doctrine and practice,
affirmative. The principle of ne bis in idem is not regarded as applicable,
because the subjects (defendants) are different (legal person and indivi-
dual head of business).
There is normally a concentration (and, in that sense, a coordina-
tion) of the criminal proceedings against the legal person and the indi-
vidual head of business.
6.2.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence
As to this question, see mutatis mutandis above, Part 6.1.2.
6.2.3. Right to silence of the head of business in proceedings against
the legal person
As to the question of whether heads of business have the right to
silence in the context of administrative proceedings, see mutatis mutan-
dis on the privilege against self-incrimination (above, Part 6.1.3). To the
extent that privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in adminis-
trative investigations, it is also applicable to those representatives of the
legal person who have such an independent and considerable decision-
making power that it would qualify compliance with the identification
principle and therefore could be regarded as implicated in the liability
for the corporation (cf. above, a reference to the argument of the Su-
preme Court decision KKO 2008:3; Part 3.8.1).
6.3. Relationship between liability of the legal person and liability of
the head of business
A plea of guilty has a modest role in Finnish procedural law. New
legislation on consensual proceedings was enacted in 2014 (670/2014)
as part of the revision of the Criminal Procedure Act. The new legisla-
tion maintains the legality principle in prosecution as a main rule, but the
exceptions—grounds for waiving prosecution—have become more ex-
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tensive. One of the grounds for waiving prosecution is that criminal pro-
ceedings and punishment are deemed unreasonable or inappropriate in
view of a settlement reached by the suspect in the offence and the in-
jured party; the other is the action of the suspect in the offence to prevent
or remove the effects of the offence (Chapter 1, section 8).
An innovation concerns the introduction of plea bargaining, which
is intended to be applied particularly in complicated cases of economic
and corporate crime. The prosecutor may therefore, on his or her own
motion or on the initiative of the injured party, undertake measures
for the submission and hearing of a proposal for judgment in confession
proceedings. The prosecutor must at his discretion take into considera-
tion the nature of the case and the claims to be presented: the expenses
apparently resulting from, and the time required for, a hearing in confes-
sion proceedings on the one hand, and the normal procedure on the
other. Preconditions for a confession proceeding are that the suspect
in the offence in question admits having committed the suspected of-
fence and consents to confession proceedings and that the injured party
has no claims in the case or consents to confession proceedings. The
prosecutor must commit to requesting punishment in accordance with
a scale mitigated by one third. The proposal for judgment will be
handled and confirmed by the court (Chapter 1, sections 10–11, and
Chapter 5b of Criminal Procedure Act). It should be noted that the mi-
tigation of the punishment concerns a plea of one’s own guilt only, not
testifying about the guilt of accomplices.
The explained provisions on plea bargaining do not recognise a si-
tuation where the guilty plea from a legal person would shield the head
of business from criminal liability or otherwise diminish it.
In case this situation of double jeopardy occurs—which should be
avoided in line with the practice of the European Court of Human Rights
and in line with the separate legal Act (781/2013) on the prohibition of
the cumulative use of criminal punishment and an administrative penal
fee)—in fraudulent tax evasion cases, the following sentencing provi-
sion is applicable. Chapter 6, section 7, subsection 1 (515/2003) of
the Criminal Code prescribes that another consequence (sanction) of
the offence or of the sentence shall be taken as a ground mitigating
the punishment. See also the precedent of Supreme Court KKO 1981
II 14.
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ANNEX I
Chapter 9 of the Criminal Code – Corporate criminal liability
(743/1995)
Section 1 – Scope of application (61/2003)
(1) A corporation, foundation or other legal entity (in the following,
‘corporation’) in the operations of which an offence has been committed
shall on the request of the public prosecutor be sentenced to a corporate
fine if such a sanction has been provided in this Code for the offence
(441/2011).
(2) The provisions in this Chapter do not apply to offences com-
mitted in the exercise of public authority.
Section 2 – Prerequisites for liability (61/2003)
(1) A corporation may be sentenced to a corporate fine if a person
who is part of its statutory organ or other management or who exercises
actual decision-making authority therein has been an accomplice in an
offence or allowed the commission of the offence or if the care and di-
ligence necessary for the prevention of the offence have not been ob-
served in the operations of the corporation.
(2) A corporate fine may be imposed even if the offender cannot be
identified or otherwise is not punished. However, no corporate fine shall
be imposed for a complainant offence which is not reported by the in-
jured party so as to have charges brought, unless there is a very impor-
tant public interest in the bringing of charges.
Section 3 – Connection between offender and corporation (743/
1995)
(1) The offence is deemed to have been committed in the operations
of a corporation if the perpetrator has acted on the behalf or for the ben-
efit of the corporation and belongs to its management or is in a service or
employment relationship with it or has acted on assignment by a repre-
sentative of the corporation.
(2) The corporation does not have the right to compensation from
the offender for a corporate fine that it has paid, unless such liability
is based on statutes on corporations and foundations.
Section 4 – Waiving of punishment (61/2003)
(1) A court may waive imposition of a corporate fine on a corpora-
tion if:
(a) the omission referred to in section 2(1) by the corporation is
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slight, or the participation in the offence by the management or by the
person who exercises actual decision-making authority in the corpora-
tion is slight, or
(b) the offence committed in the operations of the corporation is
slight.
(2) The court may waive imposition of a corporate fine also when
the punishment is deemed unreasonable, taking into consideration:
(a) the consequences of the offence to the corporation,
(b) the measures taken by the corporation to prevent new offences,
to prevent or remedy the effects of the offence or to further the investi-
gation of the omission or offence, or
(c) where a member of the management of the corporation is sen-
tenced to a punishment, and the corporation is small, the sentenced per-
son owns a large share of the corporation or his or her personal liability
for the liabilities of the corporation are significant.
Section 5 – Corporate fine (971/2001)
A corporate fine is imposed as a lump sum. The corporate fine is at
least 850 euros and at most 850,000 euros.
Section 6 – Basis for calculation of the corporate fine (743/1995)
(1) The amount of the corporate fine shall be determined in accor-
dance with the nature and extent of the omission or the participation of
the management, as referred to in section 2, and the financial standing of
the corporation.
(2) When evaluating the significance of the omission and the parti-
cipation of the management, consideration shall be taken of the nature
and seriousness of the offence, the status of the perpetrator as a member
of the organs of the corporation, whether the violation of the duties of
the corporation manifests heedlessness of the law or the orders of the
authorities, as well as the grounds for sentencing provided elsewhere
in the law.
(3) When evaluating the financial standing of the corporation, con-
sideration shall be taken of the size and solvency of the corporation, as
well as the earnings and the other essential indicators of the financial
standing of the corporation.
Section 7 – Waiving of the bringing of charges (61/2003)
(1) The public prosecutor may waive the bringing of charges
against a corporation, if (441/2011):
(1) the corporate omission or participation of the management or of
the person exercising actual decision-making power in the corporation,
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as referred to in section 2, subsection 1, has been of minor significance
in the offence, or
(2) only minor damage or danger has been caused by the offence
committed in the operations of the corporation and the corporation
has voluntarily taken the necessary measures to prevent new offences.
(2) The bringing of charges may be waived also if the offender, in
the case referred to in section 4, subsection 2(3), has already been sen-
tenced to a punishment and it is to be anticipated that the corporation for
this reason is not to be sentenced to a corporate fine.
(3) Service of a decision not to bring charges against a corporation
or to withdraw charges against a corporation shall be given to the cor-
poration by post or through application as appropriate of what is pro-
vided in Chapter 11 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. The provisions
of Chapter 1, section 6(a), subsection 2 and section 11, subsections 1
and 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the waiving of charges apply
correspondingly to the decision (673/2014).
(4) The provisions of Chapter 1, section 12 of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act on the revocation of charges apply to the revocation of charges
on the basis of subsection 1. However, service of the revocation shall be
given only to the corporation.
Section 8 – Joint corporate fine (743/1995)
(1) If a corporation is to be sentenced for two or more offences at
one time, a joint corporate fine shall be imposed in accordance with the
provisions of sections 5 and 6.
(2) No joint punishment shall be imposed for two offences, one of
which was committed after a corporate fine was imposed for the other. If
charges are brought against a corporation which has been sentenced to a
corporate fine by a final decision, for an offence committed before the
said sentence was passed, a joint corporate fine shall also not be im-
posed, but the prior corporate fine shall be duly taken into account when
sentencing to the new punishment.
[Section 9 has been repealed: 297/2003]
Section 10 – Enforcement of a corporate fine (673/2002)
(1) A corporate fine is enforced in the manner provided in the En-
forcement of Fines Act (672/2002).
(2) A conversion sentence may not be imposed in place of a corpo-
rate fine.
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ANNEX II
Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code – On attempt and complicity
(515/2003)
Section 1 – Attempt (515/2003)
(1) An attempt of an offence is punishable only if the attempt has
been denoted as punishable in a provision on an intentional offence.
(2) An act has reached the stage of an attempt at an offence when
the perpetrator has begun the commission of an offence and brought
about the danger that the offence will be completed. An attempt at an
offence is involved also when such a danger is not caused, but the fact
that the danger is not brought about is due only to coincidental reasons.
(3) In sentencing for an attempt at an offence, the provisions of
Chapter 6, section 8, subsection 1(2), subsection 2 and subsection 4 ap-
ply, unless, pursuant to the criminal provision applicable to the case, the
attempt is comparable to a completed act.
Section 2 – Withdrawal from an attempt and elimination of the
effects of an offence by the perpetrator (515/2003)
(1) An attempt is not punishable if the perpetrator, of his or her own
free will, has withdrawn from the completion of the offence, or other-
wise prevented the consequence referred to in the statutory definition
of the offence.
(2) If the offence involves several accomplices, the perpetrator, the
instigator or the abettor is exempted from liability on the basis of with-
drawal from an offence and elimination of the effects of an offence by
the perpetrator only if he or she has succeeded in also getting the other
participants to desist or withdraw from completion of the offence or
otherwise been able to prevent the consequence referred to in the statu-
tory definition of the offence or in another manner has eliminated the
effects of his or her own actions on the completion of the offence.
(3) In addition to what is provided in subsections 1 and 2, an at-
tempt is not punishable if the offence is not completed or the conse-
quence referred to in the statutory definition of the offence is not caused
for a reason that is independent of the perpetrator, instigator or abettor,
but he or she has voluntarily and seriously attempted to prevent the com-
pletion of the offence or the causing of the consequence.
(4) If an attempt, pursuant to subsections 1 through 3, is not punish-
able but at the same time comprises another, completed, offence, such an
offence is punishable.
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Section 3 – Complicity in an offence (515/2003)
If two or more persons have committed an intentional offence to-
gether, each is punishable as a perpetrator.
Section 4 – Commission of an offence through an agent (515/
2003)
A person is sentenced as a perpetrator if he or she has committed an
intentional offence by using, as an agent, another person who cannot be
punished for said offence due to the lack of criminal responsibility or
intention or due to another reason connected with the prerequisites for
criminal liability.
Section 5 – Instigation (515/2003)
A person who intentionally persuades another person to commit an
intentional offence or to make a punishable attempt at such an act is pun-
ishable for incitement to the offence as if he or she were the perpetrator.
Section 6 – Abetting (515/2003)
(1) A person who, before or during the commission of an offence,
intentionally furthers the commission by another of an intentional act or
of its punishable attempt, through advice, action or otherwise, shall be
sentenced for abetting on the basis of the same legal provision as the
perpetrator. The provisions of Chapter 6, section 8, subsection 1(3), sub-
section 2 and subsection 4 apply nonetheless to the sentence.
(2) Incitement to punishable aiding and abetting is punishable as
aiding and abetting.
Section 7 – Special circumstances related to the person (515/
2003)
(1) Where a special circumstance vindicates, mitigates or aggra-
vates an act, it applies only to the perpetrator, inciter or abettor to whom
the circumstance pertains.
(2) An inciter or abettor is not exempted from penal liability by the
fact that he or she is not affected by a special circumstance related to the
person and said circumstance is a basis for the punishability of the act by
the perpetrator.
Section 8 – Acting on behalf of a legal person (515/2003)
(1) A member of a statutory body or management of a corporation,
foundation or other legal person, a person who exercises actual decision-
making power in the legal person or a person who otherwise acts on its
behalf in an employment relationship in the private or public sector or
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on the basis of a commission may be sentenced for an offence com-
mitted in the operations of a legal person, even if he or she does not ful-
fil the special conditions stipulated for a perpetrator in the statutory de-
finition of the offence, but the legal person fulfils said conditions.
(2) If the offence has been committed in organised activity that is
part of an entrepreneur’s business or in other organised activity that is
comparable to the activity of a legal person, the provisions in subsection
1 on an offence committed in the operations of a legal person corre-
spondingly apply.
(3) The provisions of this section do not apply if different provi-
sions elsewhere apply to the matter.
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trative law. – 6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the individual head of business. – 6.2. Parallel criminal or admin-
istrative proceedings against the legal person and against the individual
head of business. – 6.3. Is the individual liability of the head of business
shielded or diminished if the corporation has previously pleaded guilty?
– 6.4. Accumulation of sanctions and proportionality.
1. Introduction: Criteria for imputation of criminal law responsi-
bilities of heads of business and their theoretical justifications
1.1. The implementation of the PIF Convention
French law does not provide for a specific provision on fraud
against EU financial interests. The circumstance, already pointed out
by the doctrine when the former penal code was in force, 1 has not been
modified by the codification of 1992. 2
The adoption of the PIF Convention did not alter this absence. Ac-
cording to a circular published by the Ministry of Justice in 2001, 3 the
PIF Convention ‘does not require adaptation of the law’. Existing crim-
inal offences make it possible to punish all of these acts. With respect to
resource fraud, this concerns tax and customs offences and, as far as ex-
penditure fraud is concerned, mainly fraudulent offences (Article 313-1
of the Penal Code), forgery (Article 441-1 et seq. of the Penal Code) and
obtaining public aid through false declarations (Article 441-6 of the Pe-
nal Code).
Thus, the failure to adopt an ad hoc provision transposing Article 3
is justified by the French executive based on the prior conformity of na-
tional law.
1.2. Cases of investigation against top managers for offences com-
mitted by their employees
Due to the lack of adoption for transposition purposes of ad hoc
provisions, both as regards offences and as regards the criminal liability
1 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘Droit Pénal des Affaires’ 1 PUF (1990) 36.
2 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘Avant-propos’ RSC (1995).
3 Circular of 3 Jul. 2001 of the Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons,
‘Presentation of the provisions of the Act amending the Criminal Code and the
Code of Criminal Procedure and relating to corruption’, CRIM 2001-11 G3/03-07-
2001.
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of company directors, it is very difficult to identify published decisions
related to the prosecution or conviction of heads of business for EU bud-
get fraud. It is nevertheless possible to reason by analogy by identifying
the few decisions relating to the liability of directors for acts committed
by an employee concerning criminal offences which, according to the
aforementioned circular (supra 1.1.), serve to punish fraud against EU
financial interests. However, for the same reason, statistical data are
non-existent; and, in addition, it is not possible to reason by analogy
since data concerning the convictions of company directors in general
are non-existent. Apart from very general and therefore not very detailed
data concerning the criminal liability of legal persons, 4 economic and
financial crime 5 is very rarely the subject of statistical data relating to
the activity of criminal courts. 6
4 ‘Le traitement judiciaire des infractions commises par les personnes morales’
(Infostat No. 154, 2017); ‘Les condamnations de personnes morales en 2005’ (Infostat
No. 103, 2008).
5 The last statistical bulletin of the Ministry of Justice dates from 2002: ‘La
délinquance économique et financière sanctionnée par la Justice’, Infostat No. 62.
6 Abstract of Infostat No. 154, 2017, cit. ‘Le traitement judiciaire des infractions
commises par les personnes morales’: ‘Natural persons tried in the same cases as legal
persons:
In 2015, of the 3,600 cases tried by at least one legal entity, 45 per cent also
involved at least one natural person. These 1,600 “mixed” cases concern 2,500
natural persons and 1,900 legal entities. In 70 per cent of these cases, only one
natural person is tried.
Natural persons tried in these mixed cases are tried in 30 per cent of cases for
offences related to work and social security. Together with environmental offences,
competition and price offences, unintentional injuries and offences against the
immigration police and the status of nomads, these offences cover almost two thirds
of the 1,600 mixed cases.
The acquittal rate for these mixed cases is 25 per cent for natural persons and 24
per cent for legal persons.
Acquittal is therefore more often pronounced than in all cases tried in 2015 (rate
of 19 per cent for all legal persons and 4 per cent for all natural persons).
In the field of the 1,100 mixed cases involving only two authors, in cases where
the legal person is discharged, the natural person is also discharged in 84 per cent of
cases. If the legal person is convicted, the natural person is also convicted in 93 per
cent of cases.
In mixed cases, the majority of natural persons found guilty are fined (55 per
cent) and in more than one third of cases they are sentenced to imprisonment (38
per cent). In cases of environmental offences (236 natural persons convicted), prison
sentences are less often handed down (2 per cent), while natural persons are even
more often fined (77 per cent of cases). The most severely punished offences are
manslaughter (63 natural persons, 59 of whom were sentenced to imprisonment)
and fraud and breach of trust (105 natural persons, 87 of whom were sentenced to
imprisonment).
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With regard to fraud cases, two decisions handed down by the
Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation should be noted.
The first decision is an example of a decision based on the failure to
supervise. On the 17 February 2016, 7 the Criminal Chamber was to rule
on the case of a factoring company that was cheated following the pre-
sentation of false invoices drawn up on the basis of false contracts and
false time sheets by a contracting company. The managers of this second
company, who were prosecuted for organised fraud, were discharged,
the judges of the merits believing that the false documents had been es-
tablished by a secretary in good faith following the manoeuvres of one
of the company’s former commercial agents (who used an assumed
identity) carried out without the knowledge of the defendants. The fac-
toring company appealed to the Court of Cassation, arguing that ‘it is for
the managers and partners of a company to supervise the employees of
that company; that this duty of supervision implies that the offence of
fraud is characterised against those managers and partners when, by rea-
son of their negligence, one of the employees engages in fraudulent
manoeuvres benefiting the company.’
The argument was partially accepted: the Court of Cassation ob-
served, ‘To acquit Mr. Isaac and Mr. Mikäel X...co-managers of the
company Concorde of the charge of organised fraud, committed within
the framework of a factoring contract with BNP Paribas Factor, the
judgment under appeal notes that if the civil party was the victim of a
fraud by the production of false invoices drawn up on false contracts
and false statements of hours worked, the investigation does not make
it possible to refute the defendants’ argument that a third party, whose
identity could not be established but whose activity within Concorde
is proven, intervened without their knowledge to commit the offence.’
The court, then, considered that ‘given that by deciding in this way,
without seeking better if it was not the responsibility of the managers
of Concorde to ensure the accuracy of the documents attached to the
subrogatory receipts sent to BNP Paribas Factor, the Court of Appeal
did not justify its decision.’
The ground allows an intentional commission of an offence to be
attributed to corporate officers guilty merely of negligence and omis-
sion. The reasoning is not new (it concerns, for example, the intentional
offences of tax evasion and concealed work), which evokes the idea of a
In the end, 42 per cent of natural persons sentenced in mixed cases to imprisonment
were tried for labour and social security cases, fraud and breach of trust, as well as
for offences relating to the immigration police or the status of nomads.’
7 No. 15-81.150.
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‘guarantee’ to which company directors would be obliged vis-à-vis third
parties. The High Court remains cautious, which implies that the obliga-
tion for them to check the accuracy of documents effectively is not auto-
matic, but that it is likely to vary according to the circumstances (‘with-
out better seeking’).
The second decision is an example of a decision based on the notion
(doctrinal but not legal) of the moral author (on this notion, infra Part
2.1, General aspects of perpetration and complicity under French
Law). On 16 December 2009, 8 the Criminal Chamber ruled on a case
relating to a manager of a communications agency sued for soliciting
merchants by offering to rent them advertising inserts by posing as
the company ‘Yellow Pages’. This service was invoiced when the court
of appeal found that the ‘company ACF, which was set up only to obtain
funds in a short period of time, by abusing the reference to the ‘Yellow
Pages’, has not carried out any work of designing advertising inserts and
has not created any medium corresponding to future printing work’.
There was little doubt about the offence. It does not even appear to have
been challenged in the appeal against the conviction judgment. The main
issue concerned the capacity in which this manager had intervened. She
contested that she was the perpetrator of the offence that had materially
been committed by her salesmen: she had had no personal contact with
the victims. She should have been prosecuted as an accomplice, which
would have required establishing that each of the salesmen was aware of
the fraud (knew the imaginary nature of the rented advertising space)
and that it had been ‘provoked’ within the meaning of Article 121-7
of the Criminal Code. However, the prosecuting authority preferred to
see in the defendant a moral perpetrator of the fraud, which the Court
of Appeal admitted by adding ‘that the persons acting on behalf of
the Company had the status of subordinates and had received instruc-
tions which were necessarily given by the manager’. The Court of Cas-
sation specifically approved this ground. It noted that in order to find the
company guilty on this count, the judgment stated that ‘the persons act-
ing on behalf of ACF were subordinates and had received instructions
which were necessarily given by the manager’. The court then consid-
ered that ‘in the state of these statements, from which it emerges that
the defendant personally participated in the facts prosecuted, the Court
of Appeal, which characterised in all their elements the offences of fraud
and attempt of which it found the defendant guilty, justified its decision’.
8 No. 09-81.109.
FRANCE NATIONAL REPORT 41
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
This solution has been severely criticised. According to Emmanuel
Dreyer, 9 the court is committing a real fraud against the law insofar
as, legally, participation in the offence as a moral perpetrator does not
exist. According to the French scholar, the legislature condemned it
when it refused, adopting the new Code, to admit that ‘instigation’ could
be punishable in a general manner.
As regards tax fraud, criminal case law considers that the head of a
company cannot escape criminal liability by alleging—even if truth-
ful—the fact that the company is partially or totally in the hands of a
de facto manager. 10 The same applies when the director of a company
invokes his own incompetence in tax matters; the difficulties he encoun-
tered in the exercise of his functions; 11 the errors of its employees; 12 the
9 ‘Un an de droit de la publicité’, Revue Communication, commerce électronique,
2010, 7-8.
10 Cass. Crim., 2 Apr. 2014, No. 13-82.269, must be overturned, the judgment of
discharge pronounced in favour of the de jure manager where it is considered that he
did not take part in the management of the company, that he granted all his confidence
to a de facto manager, and was completing his studies and working abroad, since no
delegation of powers had taken place and the person concerned could not have been
unaware of the existence of the VAT debt which appeared on the liabilities side of
the company’s three consecutive balance sheets. Cass. Crim., 25 March 2009, No.
08-82.947: ‘in the absence of any delegation of powers, the legal or statutory
manager of a company, who cannot rely on the joint liability of the de facto
manager, must be held liable for the accounting and tax obligations of the
company’. Cass. Crim., 28 March 2007, No. 06-82.724; Cass. Crim., 28 May 2003,
No. 02-85.017; Cass. Crim., Feb. 13, 1997, No. 96-80.864. Compare, however,
Cass. Crim., 8 Nov. 2006, No. 05-85.922; Cass. Crim., 15 Dec. 2004, No. 03-87.827.
11 Cass. Crim., 10 Sept. 2014, No. 13-84.933.
12 Cass. Crim., 12 June 2014, No. 13-83.391, approving the judges of the merits
for having observed that ‘the de jure manager of the said SARL is Mr. X ... and that, in
that respect, he was required to ensure that complete and reliable accounts were drawn
up and to draw up the tax returns accordingly; that, in substance, the defendant did not
contest the reality of the amount of VAT evaded and that he indicated that he could not
ensure the follow-up of the company for which he had left the responsibility to the
secretary, his concubine and the accountant; that such explanations on the part of a
de jure manager are ineffective in the light of settled case law and the obligations
incumbent on de jure managers as regards the management of commercial
companies and the accounting obligations of the latter; that in the present case, as
the first judge pointed out exactly, these were voluntary practices which lasted more
than two years and whose sole purpose was to artificially create cash at SARL
Becomo; that, on the other hand, the accused declared at the bar of the court “that
he was not aware” of his concubine’s practices in this matter, which constitutes the
negation of his personal obligations in his capacity as manager’. Cass. Crim., 16
Dec. 2009, No. 09-80.125, the judges of the merits having rightly observed that ‘the
negligence alleged by Richard X ... in the control of his collaborators could not
exonerate him from his liability whereas with the knowledge of his fiscal
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errors of an auditor; 13 or the fraudulent acts of the above. 14 Recently,
the Criminal Chamber affirmed that in the absence of any delegation
of powers, the manager of a company must be held liable for the com-
pany’s tax obligations. 15 A few months earlier, it had affirmed in the
form of a principle that ‘in the absence of any delegation of powers,
the legal or statutory director of a company is personally bound to com-
ply with the accounting and tax obligations incumbent upon the com-
pany, the Court of Appeal justified its decision....’ 16 The case concerned
a tax fraud attributed to a company director who claimed that he did not
have the necessary knowledge to control the accounting of the compa-
nies of which he was the manager and that he had set up a structure
of nine persons in charge of ensuring this, under the authority of an ad-
ministrative and financial director.
Finally, as regards custom offences, the ‘criminal liability of the
head of business’ applies. It presupposes the personal participation in
the facts, 17 although this is presumed 18 in the absence of delegation
of powers. 19 The company director will thus be considered as an author,
in particular in his capacity as ‘holder’, or as ‘interested in fraud’ (see
infra 2.6, Special rules on liability).
obligations and already object of a previous control, it belonged to him, in his capacity
as manager of the SARL X ... to do everything possible to satisfy its tax obligations;
that he cannot hide behind the incompetence of its employees or their dishonesty to
exonerate himself...; that, if the accused justifies health problems as from August
2003, it is not established by medical documents that he was unable to perform the
administrative part of his activity as a manager and to assume his role of
supervision and management of his staff’. Cass. Crim., 19 Sept. 2007, No. 06-
88.533; Cass. Crim., 3 Oct. 1989, No. 88-87.508, by condemning the defendant on
the grounds that ‘it is up to the company manager to sign the monthly declarations
of the turnover which it achieves and not to the accountant whom the company
manager has freely chosen and retained in his service despite his shortcomings’, the
Court of Appeal, ‘did not presume the criminal liability of the defendant, but
established, without insufficiency or contradiction, his personal participation, both
material and intentional, in the offence of which he was found guilty’.
13 Cass. Crim., 25 Feb. 2009, No. 08-82.782; Cass. Crim., 20 Apr. 2005, No. 04-
83.080.
14 Cass Crim.., 8 Feb. 2012, No. 11-81.320.
15 Cass. Crim., 22 Nov. 2017, No. 16-86.550.
16 Cass. Crim., 5 Jan. 2017, No. 15-82.435.
17 Cass. Crim., 27 Feb. 2002, No. 01-83.119: Bull. Crim., No. 51.
18 Cass Crim., 5 Feb. 1998, No. 96-85.596; Bull. Crim., No. 48. See, however,
Cass. Crim., 22 Oct. 2008, No. 08-80.843; Bull. Crim., No. 213.
19 Cass. Crim., 5 May 1997, No. 95-86.136; Bull. Crim., No. 164.
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1.3. The policy debate on the liability of company directors
Sometimes referred to as principled 20 liability—as opposed to or-
dinary criminal liability 21—the liability of the head of business, also
known as the liability of private decision-makers, 22 originated from case
law.
According to a very old ruling from the Criminal Chamber of the
Court of Cassation: ‘If, in general, each person is liable to punishment
only because of his or her personal fact, this rule suffers an exception
in certain matters; in particular in the case of regulated industrial profes-
sions, the conditions or mode of exploitation imposed on industry essen-
tially oblige the head or master of the establishment who is personally
bound to have them carried out and, in the event of an offence, even
by the fault of his workers or servants, it is no less he who is deemed
to be first and foremost an offender.’ 23
Since then, and in accordance with established case law, the com-
pany manager has been held liable for offences committed in the
course of the operation of the company under his responsibility, with
the company manager being apprehended as an indirect perpetrator
20 B. De Lamy, M. Segonds, Juris Classeur Droit Pénal des Affaires, Notions
Fondamentales, fasc. 5.
21 In accordance with the rules of ordinary law, the decision-maker must, first of
all, answer for the offences he has committed materially: he is the material perpetrator
of the offence. He is also responsible for the offences to which he has materially
contributed: he is a co-perpetrator in this case. Finally, he must answer for the
offences he has ordered: the decision-maker is, in such a case, apprehended as an
accomplice by instigation, even if it is worth noting the frequent legal assimilation
of the intellectual perpetrator (mastermind) with the material perpetrator (C. Pén.,
Article 433-18; C. Monét. Fin., Article L. 465-1), infra Part 2.
22 M. Delmas-Marty, G. Giudicelli-Delage, Droit pénal des affaires, op. cit.
23 ‘Si, en général, chacun n’est passible de peine qu’à raison de son fait person-
nel, cette règle souffre exception en certaines matières; notamment en fait de profes-
sions industrielles réglementées, les conditions ou le mode d’exploitation imposé à
l’industrie, obligent essentiellement le chef ou le maître de l’établissement qui est per-
sonnellement tenu de les faire exécuter et, en cas d’infraction, même par la faute de ses
ouvriers ou préposés, ce n’est pas moins lui qui est avant tout réputé contrevenant’,
Cass Crim., 28 Jan. 1859, S. 1859, I, 364; C. Mascala, ‘La Responsabilité Pénale
du Chef d’Entreprise’, Les Petites Affiches, 19 Jul. 1996, 16. See also Cass Crim.,
28 Feb. 1956, Widerkehr; J. Pradel, A. Varinard, GADPG, No. 37: ‘La responsabilité
pénale peut cependant naître du fait d’autrui dans les cas exceptionnels, où certaines
obligations légales imposent le devoir d’exercer une action directe sur les faits d’un
auxiliaire ou d’un subordonné’ (‘Criminal liability may, however, arise from the ac-
tions of others in exceptional cases, where certain legal obligations impose a duty to
act directly on the actions of an auxiliary or subordinate person’).
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(auteur médiat), while the employee, who is responsible for the vio-
lation of the penalised norm, is apprehended as an immediate (direct)
perpetrator. 24
The 1992 Penal Code, like its predecessor, remains silent on the
subject. As the authors point out, the question is ‘very sensitive in
French law. So sensitive that Parliament finally renounced to legislate
on this point when the Penal Code was revised, preferring to abandon
the question in the hands of the courts and let case law assign liability
within the company.’ 25
Even today, the principle of criminal liability of a company man-
ager is still subject to only scattered provisions according to the various
codes (e.g. Labour Code, Article L. 4741-1). 26
Legal literature has gradually and overwhelmingly stressed that, de-
spite its deceptive appearance, this liability respects the principle of per-
sonal liability and therefore does not correspond to a case of vicarious
liability. 27
The bold case law of the Court of Cassation has given rise to nu-
merous theories aimed at establishing the (acceptable) basis that the
judges had been careful not to point out.
A synthesis of these theories is proposed by B. De Lamy and M.
24 On these notions, see infra Part 2.
25 M. Delmas-Marty, S. Manacorda, ‘Rapport National Français’, in M. Delmas-
Marty, J.A.E. Vervaele (eds), The Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member
States (vol. 2), Intersentia 2000, p. 307.
26 Article L. 4741- 1 of the Labour Code punishes with a fine of 3,750 euros
‘the employer or his delegate’ who ‘by his personal fault’ disregards the rules of
health and safety. This formula, due to a law of 17 May 2011, takes away the
employee’s responsibility and enshrines the position of the Court of Cassation,
which had remained faithful to the former text of the Labour Code designating
as responsible the ‘heads of establishments, directors and managers’ (against the
former Labour Code, s. L. 263-2)—although since 1 March 2008, the same Code
referred to ‘the employer or his servant’—and had ruled that, according to these
provisions, a breach of the health and safety rules could ‘only be attributed to
the heads of establishments or their delegate.’ This is also the case with Article
433-18 of the Penal Code, which punishes, inter alia, ‘the de facto or de jure
manager of an undertaking’ who has ‘placed’ or ‘allowed to appear’—that is by
an employee—the prohibited mention of certain qualities in an advertising
document.
27 It is true that company directors are liable whenever, by failing to prevent their
employees from committing an offence, they fail to ensure that the law is enforced.
They are therefore not really liable ‘for the actions of others’ but rather, as
Professor Larguier put it, ‘via the actions of others’, which makes it possible to
respect the principle of personal liability.
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Segonds. 28 According to these authors, three theses confronted one an-
other. 29
The first theory favours the notion of profit and risk. However, it is
neglected because of the absence of the necessary subjective dimension
in criminal law. It does, however, have the merit of emphasising pre-
cisely the need for a theory based on fault.
That is the second thesis. The decision-maker’s fault consists in the
violation of a general duty of supervision which is incumbent upon him
personally. Therefore, the breach of this obligation is also personal. Cri-
ticised in the name of the principle of legality, since such a general ob-
ligation is not spelled out in any text (this obligation is therefore neither
precise nor explicitly penalised), the thesis has also been criticised in
that it would make it possible to transform a commission offence (the
material fact having actually been committed by the employee) into
an omission offence (the manager’s abstention constitutes the material
element). However, this objection is resolved through the renewal of
theory through the notion of the ‘moral perpetrator’ (intellectual or
mediate) and through causality. If the behaviour of the head of business
does not correspond to that described in the criminal law, his/her con-
duct is nevertheless the real cause of the offence. Thus, without the de-
cision-maker’s fault of abstention, the material facts would not have
been committed; the material element is unique (it is not transformed);
the fault of the head of business is very personal; the material fact of
the employee is only the revelation (revélateur) of the criminal liability
of his employer.
The fault thesis is complemented by that of power 30 (third thesis),
which gives the mechanism its deep rationality and has the advantage of
explaining the cause of special defences also found in case law (delega-
tion of powers). The basis of the power explains why liability is assigned
28 B. De Lamy, M. Segonds, Juris Classeur Droit Pénal des Affaires, Notions
Fondamentales, Fasc. 5.
29 One author underlines the reservation (prudence) of the doctrine when it comes
to clarifying the technical basis of criminal liability as a matter of principle for heads of
businesses, Ph. Conte, ‘Remarques sur la Responsabilité Pénale du Chef d’Entreprise,
Spécialement en Matière Fiscale’, Mélanges en l’honneur de Patrick Serlooten, Dal-
loz, 2015, pp. 551–563, sp. p. 552.
30 Fault and power now combine to create this kind of liability. Thus, the failure
to oppose (in particular to prevent) the occurrence of an offence is indeed wrong, since
the agent had the power (means) to oppose it and that by not (or poorly) exercising his
powers he allowed/caused and therefore committed the offence. Rather, power is
defined here as the ability to make a decision that imposes legal constraints on
others and not merely the exercise of control or supervision.
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to the real decision-maker, whether the de facto executive or the dele-
gate. 31
The decision-maker’s powers and authority give him or her control
over the people and things for which he or she is responsible. He/she
therefore has the power to prevent the offence from being committed.
A (legal) obligation therefore derives from the powers (particularly
those of management, which confer a normative power), the breach of
which can be punished under criminal law.
The liability of the head of business is therefore very personal (the
material facts of the employee betray a poor organisation of the com-
pany for which the manager is accountable). It is a criminal liability
based on the function. The head of business is the ‘guarantor’ of the
law’s proper application (he/she alone has the power to enforce it).
Furthermore, his/her liability presupposes a fault, which is directly
drawn from the organisational defect revealed by the material fact of
the employee.
A more modern approach has attempted to show that a manager’s
responsibility has a functional basis (i.e. stems from functions) and is
of a non-behavioural nature (i.e. not based on conduct). While acknowl-
edging the resulting difficulties with regard to the principles of criminal
law, it stresses that the objective nature of imputation is not so question-
able if we accept that criminal law is no longer repressive but pursues a
regulatory function. In this context, the principles of criminal law are no
longer imposed with the same rigour. Thus, in a regulatory system, the
disappearance of fault aims to attribute the offence to the person who
was best able to prevent, correct and prevent the disorder.
Today, the doctrine agrees that the principled responsibility of the
head of a company has two persistent weaknesses: firstly, the absence
of legal foresight and the discovery by case law of cases of liability
not specifically provided for (such as the provision of the above-men-
tioned Labour Code); and secondly, the fragility of the subjective dimen-
sion, in that the decision-maker’s fault is generally presumed (no confir-
mation of the manager’s failure is required). Moreover, the nature of this
fault is undetermined, as failure may be due to simple negligence 32 or
the result of a genuine desire (e.g. to escape financial constraints).
31 A. Cœuret, ‘La Responsabilité Pénale dans l’Entreprise: Vers un Espace
Judiciaire Européen Unifié? Les Propositions ‘Espace Judiciaire Européen»
confrontées à la Situation en France’, RSC, 1997, p. 297f.
32 In French criminal law, all aspects of negligence are considered part of the
subjective dimension of the offence. French scholars consider negligence an issue of
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It should be stressed that these weaknesses only concern intentional
offences. For the offences of recklessness, Act No. 2000-647 10 July
2000, which amended Article 121-3 of the Penal Code, now provides
the legal framework for characterising the head of business as an indirect
perpetrator and for attributing to him the offence (and fault) he has per-
sonally committed through recklessness or negligence (infra Part 2).
In addition to these two criticisms, there are also those addressed to
the presumptions of responsibility. However, as suggested above, some
authors note that infringements of the principles of criminal law are mi-
tigated by the fact that imputations to heads of business are mainly sub-
ject to regulatory rather than repressive sanctions. 33
1.4. Introduction and scope of corporate criminal liability in France
The criminal liability of legal persons has been introduced in France
with the new Penal Code. 34 Article 121-2 was initially based on a prin-
ciple of speciality: only for offences explicitly referred to by the legis-
lator could legal persons incur criminal liability. However, the so-called
Perben 2 law of 9 March 2004 (entered into force on 31 December
2005) established the abandonment of the principle of speciality in fa-
vour of a generalisation of the criminal liability of legal persons for
the subjective dimension of the offence and an integral and indivisible aspect of
culpability. The objective foreseeability of the perpetration of the offence, the
breach of a duty of care, and the occurrence of the result due to the breach are
considered subjective aspects of the criminal offence. In Article 121-3 CP, the
legislature has provided a detailed rule on criminal liability for negligent conduct.
Article 121-3 CP: ‘...However, the deliberate endangering of another person is a
less serious crime where the law so provides.
A less serious crime also exists, where the law so provides, in cases of
recklessness, negligence, or failure to observe a duty of care or precaution provided
by law or regulation, if it has been established that the offender has failed to meet
the ordinary standard of care, taking into account, if appropriate, the nature of his
tasks or his functions, his responsibilities, as well as his powers and the means that
are at his disposal.
In the case referred to in the above paragraph, natural persons who have not
directly caused a harm but who have created or contributed to the creation of a
situation that permitted its occurrence or who did not take the measures necessary
to prevent it are criminally liable if they violated in a patently deliberate way a
specific duty of care or precaution provided by law or regulation or if they
committed a specified kind of misconduct leading to the exposure of another person
to a particularly serious risk that they ought to have recognised...’
33 M. Bénéjat, No. 322.
34 However, French criminal law already had special mechanisms for criminal
liability of legal entities (this was and still is the case in customs matters, for example).
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all offences (subject to the special cases of liability provided for with re-
spect to media).
Consequently, all PIF offences are liable to be committed by a legal
person who may therefore incur criminal liability.
1.5. Administrative liability of legal persons
Many criminal offences have an administrative equivalent which
may lead to the (punitive) administrative liability of the legal person
(e.g. fiscal, financial, environmental offences) and/or the decision-ma-
ker, subject to the possible application of the ne bis in idem principle (in-
fra Part 6).
This punitive liability of legal persons predates the introduction of
the criminal liability of legal persons, which was added to it.
1.6. Policy debate on the introduction of corporate criminal liability in
France
A synthesis of the doctrinal debates (former 35 and current) is pro-
posed by Bertrand de Lamy and Marc Segonds, 36 who distinguish three
main controversies.
The first is the absolute impossibility for a legal entity to carry out
the material element of any offence (objective dimension of criminal re-
sponsibility). This argument was refuted in particular by Donnedieu de
Vabres, who suggested that it was sufficient to admit the existence of a
human substratum 37 as a basis for the criminal liability of legal persons.
Article 121-2 of the Penal Code has endorsed this concept of the crim-
inal liability of legal persons by requiring, inter alia, that the offence
charged against a legal person be committed by its ‘organs’ or ‘represen-
tatives’; however, it is recognised that the organ or representative con-
cerned may be not only individual, but also collegial in nature.
The majority doctrine agrees that the criminal liability of legal per-
sons differs from the criminal liability of natural persons 38 in that, on
35 The first projects date back to the 1930s (Matter Project 1934).
36 B. De Lamy, M. Segonds, Juris Classeur Droit Pénal des Affaires, Notions
Fondamentales, Fasc. 7.
37 H. Donnedieu de Vabres, ‘Les Limites de la Responsabilité Pénale des
Personnes Morales’, RD Pén. Crim.,1950, p. 339, spécialement p. 342.
38 More broadly, ‘les principes qui gouvernent désormais le sort des personnes
physiques et des personnes morales sont différents’ (‘the principles that now govern
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the one hand, the link between the offence and the legal person can only
be indirect (mediated, médiat) 39 and, on the other hand, that the material
activity of the legal person can only be based on a legal fiction. 40
The second controversy concerns the subjective dimension of crim-
inal liability. Part of the doctrine, recalling the theory of fiction, stressed
the lack of will proper to the legal being and, in so doing, the impossi-
bility of imputing a fortiori a criminal will to it. This argument has been
rejected by the doctrine of the theory of reality, according to which the
legal person has a will distinct from that of all the natural persons who
make up the legal person. The case law, based on a narrow interpretation
of Article 121-2, has chosen an intermediate solution, considering that
the material element, as well as the intentional element, must be charac-
terised in the person of the organ 41 or representative of the legal per-
son. 42 It would therefore be advisable to reason not in terms of the im-
putability of the legal person but much more in terms of imputation of
the offence to the legal person. 43
The third controversy concerns the principles of personal liability
and personal (individualised) punishment. As for the first, the theory
of vicarious liability was quickly dismissed. Although the commission
of the offence presupposes the mediation of an organ or representative,
‘there is no derogation, but adaptation of the principle of personal liabi-
lity on the basis of the necessary legal fiction: the organs or representa-
tives are the legal person.’ 44 As for the argument based on the infringe-
ment of the principle of the personal nature of penalties, it is rejected in
that it leads to the denial of the person’s legal autonomy. However, it is
the fate of natural and legal persons are different’), cf. Ph. Conte, La Responsabilité
Pénale des Personnes Morales au regard de la Philosophie du Droit Pénal, in La Per-
sonne Juridique dans la Philosophie du Droit Pénal, éd., Panthéon Assas, 2003, p.
109, 119.
39 P. Maistre du Chambon and Ph. Conte, Droit Pénal Général: A. Colin, 6th ed.
2002, p. 197, No. 369.
40 J.-Ch. Saint-Pau, ‘La Responsabilité Pénale des Personnes Morales: Réalité et
Fiction’, in Le Risque Pénal dans l’Entreprise, Litec, 2003, p. 71.
41 Cass. Crim., 2 Dec. 1997, No. 96-85.484; No. 1997-005349; Bull. Crim.,1997,
No. 408; D. 1999, Somm. p. 152, note G. Roujou de Boubée; JCP G 1998, II, p. 682,
rapp. F. Desportes; JCP E 1998, p. 949, obs. Ph. Salvage; RJDA 1998, p. 175, note N.
Rontchevsky.
42 Cass. Crim., 18 Jan. 2000, No. 99-80.318; No. 2000-000995; Bull. Crim.,2000,
No. 28; D. 2000, Jurispr. p. 636, note J.-Ch. Saint-Pau; JCP G 2000, II, 10395, note F.
Debove.
43 P. Maistre du Chambon and Ph. Conte, op. cit., p. 196, No. 367; cf. E. Dreyer,
‘Responsabilité Pénale des Personnes Morales: Question d’Imputation ou
d’Imputabilité?’, Gazette du Palais, 3 Nov. 2015, No. 307, p. 24.
44 J.-Ch. Saint-Pau, op. cit., p. 81.
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sometimes invoked by those who dispute the justification of legal per-
sons’ liability because of the complexity of their internal structure,
which would make it impossible to determine who is ‘guilty’ as a natural
person. The fault thus sanctioned would then present the characteristics
of a collective fault and the legal person is presented as a scapegoat.
As for legislative debates, it can be noted that the explanatory mem-
orandum to the bill (in 1986) stressed the willingness of the legislator to
put an end to impunity for legal persons, particularly in criminal busi-
ness law, which is ‘all the more shocking because they are often, by
the scale of the means at their disposal, the cause of serious harm to pub-
lic health, the environment, economic public order or social legislation’
and that ‘in addition, the decision which causes the offence is taken by
the corporate bodies themselves, which determine the industrial, com-
mercial or social policy of the undertaking.’ 45 This is in line with the
legislator’s desire to remove ‘the presumption of criminal liability which
today actually weighs on decision-makers in relation to offences of
which they are sometimes unaware’ and thus to ensure ‘better respect
for the principle that, in criminal law, no one is liable except for his
or her own conduct.’ 46
Finally, the arguments of pragmatism (adapting the law to crimino-
logical reality) and fairness (reducing the extent of criminal liability of
natural persons) do not mask Parliament’s indifference to questions of
legal theory 47 and the desire to (tendentially) substitute criminal liability
of the structures for that of decision-makers. 48
Some authors thus consider that the criminal liability of legal per-
sons ‘is decreed more than established’ 49 and that it is not certain that
a theoretical basis can be found for it. 50 This would be a sui generisme-
chanism of legal imputation, essentially pragmatic, which does not re-
45 Projet de Nouveau Code Pénal, op. cit., p. 16.
46 Projet de Nouveau Code Pénal, op. cit., p. 17.
47 J.-H. Robert, Droit Pénal Général, PUF, 6th ed. 2005, p. 373.
48 This will then be confirmed by the law of 10 July 2000 on the definition of
unintentional offences (2000-647, infra).
49 X. Pin, Droit Pénal Général, Dalloz, 2017.
50 Only positivist doctrines would be able to justify it, since they are indifferent
to the notion of fault (see in this sense, J.-H. Robert, Droit Pénal Général, op. cit., p.
363). However, in reality, the liability of legal persons has not been conceived in terms
of their dangerousness (intrinsically vicious structures, security measures), but rather
in terms of their assets (significance of the economic impact of criminal sanctions).
See more explicitly in this respect Article 14 of the Corpus Juris, laying down criminal
provisions for the protection of the European Union’s financial interests, on the crim-
inal liability of groups (ed. M. Delmas-Marty, Economica, 1997, pp. 71–73). See also
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quire any conditions of imputability on the part of the entity 51 and
which does not harmonise well with the notions of fault.
Today, the doctrine seems to agree that it is not a question of vicar-
ious liability but of personal liability by representation.
It is indirect or subsequent, because it involves an offence com-
mitted by a body or representative. It is personal because the body or
representative expresses the will of the legal person. In other words,
the offence committed by the organ or representative is an offence com-
mitted personally by the legal person. 52
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law
2.1. General aspects of perpetration and complicity under French
criminal law
There are only two general categories of participant (parties to
crime) who differ as much in their actions as in their willingness: perpe-
trators and accomplices.
According to Article 121-4 of the Penal Code, the perpetrator is ‘he
who commits or attempts to commit the offending acts’.
However, it is sometimes necessary to check, before retaining the
personal liability of the agent, that the legislator has not limited the ca-
tegory of perpetrators by requiring them to be of a particular quality,
which is often the case for heads of business referred to as ‘employers’
or ‘managers’, for example (see below).
General criminal law has two forms of participation as a perpetra-
tor: coaction and instigation.
Coaction. French law does not define coaction. 53 The judge must
therefore treat this form of participation as the juxtaposition of several
solitary actions within the meaning of Article 121-4 of the Penal Code.
In other words, the co-perpetrator is another perpetrator. Nevertheless,
J. Amar, ‘Contribution à l’Analyse Économique de la Responsabilité Pénale des Per-
sonnes Morales’, Dr. Pénal 2001. Chron. 37.
51 See, however, the proposal to make the requirement of an offence committed
on behalf of the legal person by its organs or representatives a condition of
imputability: E. Dreyer, ‘Responsabilité Pénale des Personnes Morales: Question
d’Imputation ou d’Imputabilité?’ Gaz. Pal. Spécialisée, 2015, no 305–307, p. 24.
52 On the personal nature of the liability of legal persons and the idea of a ‘diffuse
fault’, see J.-C. Saint-Pau, ‘La Responsabilité des Personnes Morales: Réalité et
Fiction’, in Le Risque Pénal dans l’Entreprise, Litec, Carré droit, 2003, p. 72f.
53 E. Baron, La Coaction en Droit Pénal, Thèse Bordeaux, 2012.
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there are situations in which the co-perpetrator is also considered an ac-
complice.
Instigation. The moral perpetrator is the one who does not materi-
ally carry out the offence but who causes or allows another person to
commit the offence. His participation is in this sense of an intellectual
nature.
Very often this instigation is especially incriminated. 54 Where this
is not the case, the current law offers only a choice between perpetrator
status (Penal Code, Article 121-4) or accomplice status (Penal Code, Ar-
ticle 121-7).
However, it should not be possible for the moral perpetrator to be
treated as a perpetrator as such within the meaning of Article 121-4
of the Penal Code because he or she does not carry out the offence in
practice. On the other hand, if all the conditions for secondary participa-
tion are met, the moral perpetrator must be treated as an accomplice by
provocation or instruction.
The assimilation of the instigator to an accomplice results from Ar-
ticle 121-7 of the Penal Code, which considers as an accomplice the per-
son who ‘by means of a gift, promise, threat, order, or an abuse of
authority or power, provokes the commission of an offence or gives in-
structions to commit it’. 55
However, case law is often tempted to equate the moral perpetrator
with a material perpetrator to take account of his or her animus auctoris.
Apart from these cases, case law may deviate from legal criteria and
54 The legislator punishes the act of having carried out (faire faire), such as hav-
ing biomedical research carried out (C. Pen., Article 223-8), having unlawful proces-
sing of computer data carried out (C. Pen., Article 226-16), or having telephone can-
vassing carried out when a consumer is registered on a list of opposition to canvassing
(Consumer Code, Article L. 223-1), etc.
55 This assimilation is criticised because the repression of the accomplice is
always subordinate to the realisation of the principal offence, while the instigator has
a power of harm that deserves to be punished as such; see X. Pin, Droit Pénal Général,
Dalloz, Cours, 2017. The preliminary draft Penal Code of 1986 had taken this ap-
proach, clearly distinguishing the accomplice—who assists in the preparation or com-
mission of the offence—from the instigator who is liable to punishment irrespective of
any principal offence. It was planned to introduce an Article 121-6 worded as follows:
‘The instigator is the person who by gift, promise, deception, threat, order, abuse of
authority or power directly causes a third party to commit a crime, even if, because
of circumstances beyond the control of the instigator, the provocation is not followed
by action. The instigator is liable to the same penalties as the offender.’ However, the
drafters of the new Penal Code did not retain this draft, in particular because of the
difficulties regarding the evidence of the provocation, when it was not followed by ac-
tion.
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consider that the person who caused the offence to be committed is, be-
cause of his control over the facts and his or her animus auctoris, com-
parable to a material perpetrator. In this case, material participation is
less important than culpable intent. This assimilation occurs mainly in
two cases: first of all, where there is a subordinate relationship between
the moral perpetrator and the material perpetrator such that the latter is
merely an instrument of execution; 56 then, when the shadow man is the
real organiser of the offence. Thus, a boss who paid an employee to alter
the operation of an electricity meter in order to reduce the amount of
consumption recorded could be convicted not as an accomplice by pro-
vocation, but as the perpetrator of a deception 57 because, by assuming
the management of the criminal enterprise, he was the master of the ac-
tion. Similarly, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation held that
a company manager who had organised sales of textiles to elderly per-
sons in accordance with methods constituting the offence of abuse of
weakness (Consumer Code, Article L. 121-8 to L. 121-10) had to be
classified as a perpetrator, whereas materially it was an employee who
had committed the offence. 58
These examples are not isolated. 59
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the change of qualification
seems essentially symbolic because, in terms of repression, the accom-
plice is punished in any case as a perpetrator.
Finally, in addition to these two hypotheses, we must add the case
of an offence resulting from a collegial decision taken by majority vote.
In principle, the collegial body acts as a screen between the legal person
or any group and the voters, as the decision is anonymous and collec-
tive. 60 Nevertheless, the judges sometimes note a personal act attributable
to certain voters in order to reproach them personally for the offence re-
sulting from the collegial decision (on this point, see below).
Remarks on the theory of borrowed criminality. Perpetrators,
co-perpetrators and accomplices therefore participate in the production
of the illicit act to which each of them is associated by a link of their
own which does not pass through the person of a principal perpetrator.
56 Crim., 14 Dec. 1974, RSC 1976. 409, obs. J. Larguier. In this case, a bank
manager had asked an employee to systematically open all correspondence received
by the bank; the employee materially violated the correspondence, but the director
was convicted as the perpetrator.
57 Crim., 2 Nov. 1945, D. 1946.
58 Crim., 1 Feb. 2000, Dr. Pénal 2000. 59, obs. J.-H. Robert.
59 Crim., 28 Mar. 1996, Dr. Pénal 1996. 223, obs. J.-H. Robert.
60 Crim., 11 May 1999, RSC 2000. 194, obs. B. Bouloc.
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The materiality of this act is common to them and serves, under French
law, to determine the penalty incurred. But the responsibility of each
participant is also determined by personal factors, so that the accomplice
can be convicted when the main perpetrator is not, due to a lack of in-
tention or discernment and vice versa. If the accomplice ‘borrows’
something from the principal perpetrator, it is the name of the offence
and the penalty attached to it. 61
Remarks on the participation in the offence and criminal liabi-
lity of the head of business. The liability of the manager is an indirect
participation in the offence which does not in principle exclude the lia-
bility of servants, who are the material perpetrators of the offence. 62
2.2. Complicity under French criminal law
Non-official translation of the Penal Code:
Article 121-6: The accomplice to the offence, in the meaning of
Article 121-7, is punishable as a perpetrator.
Article 121-7: The accomplice to a felony or a misdemeanour is
the person who knowingly, by aiding and abetting, facilitates its pre-
paration or commission.
Any person who, by means of a gift, promise, threat, order, or an
abuse of authority or powers, provokes the commission of an offence
or gives instructions to commit it, is also an accomplice.
According to Article 121-7 of the Penal Code, 63 complicity (sec-
ondary participation) can be achieved either by aiding or abetting or
by instigation.
In all cases, the act of complicity must have a causal link with the
main offence (fact). 64
61 J.H. Robert, Juris Classeur, Code Pénal.
62 Crim., 23 oct. 1984, D. 1985, IR 134.
63 It should be noted that under the Penal Code, complicity in a contravention is
not always punishable. Indeed, if complicity by provocation and instruction is
punishable regardless of the nature of the offence, complicity by aid or assistance
is, subject to a legal provision to the contrary, limited to crimes and misdemeanours.
64 As mentioned above, according to the ‘theory of borrowed criminality’,
French criminal law links the act of complicity to the main offence. It is considered
that the accomplice’s conduct is justified in its connection with the main offence to
the extent that the act of complicity is ultimately neutral in itself with respect to crim-
inal law. This act will only be coloured by a criminal aspect when it has a causal link
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Complicity by aiding or abetting. The first mode of secondary
participation is complicity by aiding and abetting (Article 121-7, Para-
graph 1, Penal Code), which consists in ‘facilitating the preparation or
the commission’ of the offence. This may be the provision of material
means or a mere encouragement to commit the offence (aiding or moral
abetting). The important thing is that this aiding or abetting is the result
of a positive act, prior to or concurrent with the offence.
Firstly, it must traditionally be a positive act or active participa-
tion: 65 there can be no secondary participation on the part of a per-
son who abstains or passively assists in the commission of an of-
fence. 66
Complicity through inaction. However, abstention may be punish-
able as aiding and abetting if it reveals punishable collusion. 67
This collusion presupposes, cumulatively, the power (legal or con-
tractual) to effectively oppose the offence, the willingness to let the prin-
cipal perpetrator carry out the criminal acts, and the knowledge that
these acts are currently committed or will be committed in the near fu-
ture.
This scheme can be found in three cases.
First of all, complicity by abstention may be retained if it is the re-
sult of a prior agreement with the offender or offenders; collusion re-
places the requirement for a material act of participation, the difficulty
being to prove it. 68 Secondly, aiding and abetting by abstention may
with a main (principal) punishable act (which is reduced by case law to the material
act). It does not matter that the perpetrators (of the main offence) are not actually pun-
ished. This theory differs from the ‘theory of borrowed penalty’ which has formally
been abandoned with the new Penal Code. From now on, the accomplice is punished
as a perpetrator and not as the perpetrator. This redrafting of the text led to the question
of whether the accomplice should have the same quality as that required for the perpe-
trator for certain offences (i.e. requirement of a specific quality: manager, civil ser-
vant). The Court of Cassation replied in the negative, admitting as aiding and abetting
the conviction of a person who could not have been convicted for lack of the quality
required by the text (Crim., 20 mars 1997, No. 96-81.361).
65 It is, moreover, the characterisation of this active participation and the degree
of involvement of the individual in the offence that makes it possible to determine
whether he or she should be qualified as a perpetrator or an accomplice: see Crim.,
8 Feb. 2017, no 16-82110, Gaz. Pal. 2017, no 16, p. 43, obs. S. Detraz.
66 At most, the spectator can be accused, as the perpetrator of an autonomous
offence, such as the offence of not obstructing the commission of a crime or a
misdemeanour (§ 223-6 (1) of the Penal Code) or of not providing assistance to a
person at risk (§ 223-6 (2) of the Penal Code).
67 A. Decocq, ‘Inaction, abstention et complicité par aide et assistance’, JCP
1983. I. 3124.
68 See, however, Crim., 19 Dec. 1989, RSC 1990. 775, obs. A. Vitu (complicity
of parricide on the part of a mother who left a loaded rifle within reach of her children.
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be used against an accomplice who had a professional duty (legal or
contractual) to act to prevent the offence and who abstained, knowing
that the offence was going to be committed. 69 Finally, case law some-
times considers that the presence of aggressors in a group can be a moral
help, encouraging perpetrators in their actions.
Furthermore, the act of participation must precede or coincide with
the principal act (the main offence). However, this principle is also atte-
nuated: if the subsequent complicity results from an earlier agreement, it
remains punishable. 70 The proof of the previous agreement also in-
volves complicity.
That said, there are autonomous incriminations that apply to atti-
tudes of facilitating the offence after the fact (Article 321-1 et seq. of
the Penal Code, for instance).
Complicity by instigation. The second form of complicity is pro-
vided for in Article 121-7, Paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code. This is the
instigation that divides into complicity through the provision of instruc-
tions and through provocation.
As regards the provision of instructions or intellectual means, this is
information given in full knowledge of the facts, sufficiently precise to
be necessary for the commission of the offence.
With regard to provocation, it must not only be followed by ac-
tion, but also by ‘gift, promise, threat, order or abuse of authority or
power’. It cannot be a mere suggestion, since provocation must be
circumstantial; the judge must therefore take note of the form it
takes. 71
In all cases, an accomplice is punishable only if he or she know-
ingly associates himself or herself with the principal offence (act).
This intentional element will logically be inferred from the carrying
out of provocative or investigative acts with a view to committing the
offence; and, in the case of aiding or abetting, it should be noted that
In this case, the court appears to have equated negligence with collusion, which leads
critically to presume a previous agreement).
69 Crim., 27 Oct. 1971, Bull. Crim., no 384 (customs officer complicit in the theft
of goods he was to supervise); Crim., 15 Jan. 1979, Bull. Crim., no 271 (accountant
complicit in bankruptcy for not having verified the figures given by his client); Crim.,
28 May 1980, D. 1981. IR 137 (member of the management board of a company com-
plicit in the abuse of corporate assets because he did not oppose it); Crim., 31 Jan.
2007, AJ Pénal 2007. 130 obs. G. Royer (account auditor complicit in fraud).
70 Crim., 1 Dec. 1998, Dr. Pénal 1999. 80, obs. M. Véron (aiding and abetting the
illegal taking of interests by applying an agreement previously concluded).
71 See, for verbal provocation, Crim., 18 Mar. 2003, Dr. Pénal 2003, 95, obs. M.
Véron; D. 2004. Somm. Comm. 311, obs. B. de Lamy.
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the accomplice acted knowingly—i.e. that he had the conscience and
willingness to associate himself with the principal fact.
As for the wording of this intention, it is important to note that it is
not necessary to highlight a complete and direct agreement between the
perpetrator and the accomplice. It is possible to become an accomplice
through another accomplice if one is aware of participating in the of-
fence (‘complicity of complicity’). 72
A simple unilateral adherence to the criminal project is sufficient.
The accomplice does not have to be in exactly the same state of mind
as the perpetrator. Thus, while the main offence requires a special intent,
it does not appear that this particular mens rea must be demonstrated by
the accomplice; case law is in this vein. 73 The purpose of the intent must
be participation in the main offence. It must therefore be admitted that
the accomplice can only be charged with offences that he or she has
foreseen or could foresee. This led case law to rule out complicity in of-
fences of recklessness as a matter of principle until recently. Since 13
September 2016 (No. 15-85046), this position has been weakened and
the doctrine remains divided.
Several scholars welcomed this decision on the grounds that the in-
tentional nature of complicity would not be incompatible with the impu-
tation of an offence of recklessness, as the mere conscience of reckless-
ness would characterise the intention to associate itself with it. The ar-
gument is that the subjective element of the primary offence should not
be confused with the intent required for complicity. 74
This analysis is seductive but is criticised because it amounts to
reproaching a person criminally for having voluntarily associated
with—yet having abstained from—an act that has led to uninten-
tional damage, whereas the act without the damage does not even ap-
pear to be a crime. The mere awareness of possible damage cannot
constitute participation as an accomplice to the harmful offence. In
this case, it would have been more realistic to consider the one
who abstained as the indirect perpetrator of the damage, by showing
that his absence or silence constituted an aggravated fault (faute qua-
72 ‘...knowingly aiding or abetting the perpetrator of the fraud even through
another accomplice, constitutes the complicity incriminated by Article 121-7 of the
Penal Code’, Crim., 15 Dec. 2004, No. 04-81.684.
73 V. Crim., 9 Nov. 1992, Bull. Crim., no 364.
74 Crim., 13 Sept. 2016, no 15- 85046, RSC 2016, p. 760, obs. Y. Mayaud; JCP G,
1067, note F. Rousseau.
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lifiée) within the meaning of Article 121-4, Paragraph 4, of the Crim-
inal Code (infra).
2.3. Omission liability under French criminal law
Offences of omission. Acts of omission are generally not subject to
criminal liability. However, French criminal law provides for specific of-
fences for which omission is punishable. In these few cases, general
rules apply so that, in particular, attempt and participation are also pun-
ishable.
Moreover, in accordance with Article 121-3 Paragraph 1 of the
Criminal Code, crimes and misdemeanours are punishable only if com-
mitted intentionally. However, Article 121-3 Paragraph 3 of the Criminal
Code provides for criminal liability for negligence if the law expressly
so provides. These general requirements also apply to offences of omis-
sion expressly recognised as punishable. Therefore, intent is, in princi-
ple, generally required. However, negligence by omission is not ex-
cluded. Most importantly, the most common negligence offences—such
as negligent homicide (section 221-6 CP) and negligent bodily harm
(section 222-19 CP) —because they apply to both acts and omissions,
make negligence by omission quite common in practice.
Secondary participation. As indicated above, in French criminal
law, the existence of a punishable predicate offence is a prerequisite
for complicity. Accordingly, subject to the specific offences of omission,
because commission by omission is not, in principle, punishable, sec-
ondary participation in an act of omission is also not punishable. How-
ever, according to the case law, the criminal liability of the accomplice
by omission may be recognised when a prior agreement or a legal duty
can be established or if the offender has provided moral support (appui
moral).
Sentencing. Judges generally enjoy broad sentencing discretion in
French criminal law. The Criminal Code does not provide for minimum
sentences. As regards offences of omission, there is no legal provision in
French criminal law providing for special conditions. Furthermore, the
existence of a special judicial practice with respect to the assessment
of crimes of omission is not documented.
Specific duty to act, duty of care. There is no theory of the duty of
care in French law. Nevertheless, specific legal obligations may arise
from laws or regulations or be part of a definition of a criminal offence.
In such cases, a relevant breach may establish criminal liability by omis-
sion.
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When it is the guarantee of a professional regulation, the offence is
generally committed by a simple failure to comply with an obligation to
act. 75 This is the case of all offences relating to formalities necessary for
the life of companies, such as the omission of advertisements or formal
mentions in company documents, the omission of convening meetings
or the failure to communicate social information. Long criticised for
its reliance on a less material than virtual causal link, however, the omis-
sion does not appear to be contrary to the principle that there is no of-
fence without material activity. Indeed, the omission here consists of an
omission in the function (abstention dans la fonction). It is not a ques-
tion of ‘forcing a person to intervene in a situation which he or she has
not contributed to creating, but of requiring him or her to carry out his or
her activity without creating social danger, by making proper use of his
or her powers’. 76
In the case of regulatory offences, which punish a state of fact con-
trary to the law rather than reprehensible behaviour, guilt is a secondary
factor. The finding of non-application of the regulation seems to be suf-
ficient. Thus, ‘fault of negligence is necessarily established by the mere
evidence of non-compliance with regulations’. 77 As for intent, in addi-
tion to the fact that the professional ‘cannot fail to know’, 78 his bad faith
is inferred from the circumstances of the case according to a constant
jurisprudential formula: ‘the sole finding of an informed violation of
the statutory or regulatory prescription implies, on the part of the perpe-
trator, the criminal intent’. 79 It is only a rule of evidence, establishing
only a presumption, but it tends to become irrebuttable.
2.4. Duty and failure to report the commission of an offence
Duty to report (general remarks). There is no general obligation
to report offences. The Penal Code provides, in a section entitled ‘Ob-
stacles to access to justice’, for specific offences of non-denunciation,
75 For an extended list of offences of omission in criminal business law, W.
Jeandidier, ‘L’Élément Matériel des Infractions d’Affaires ou la Prédilection pour
l’Inconsistance’, in Mélanges Gassin, PUAM, 2007, p. 245.
76 P. Conte, P. Maistre du Chambon, Droit Pénal Général, Armand Colin, No.
308 et 346.
77 Crim., 21 Dec. 1907.
78 ‘Ne peut pas ne pas savoir’.
79 ‘La seule constatation de la violation en connaissance de cause de la prescrip-
tion légale ou règlementaire implique, de la part de son auteur, l’intention coupable’,
Crim., 12 May 2009, No. 08-87418.
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most of which protect persons. However, Article 434-1 generally crim-
inalises the offence of non-denunciation of a crime that it is still possible
to prevent or limit its effects, except for the close relatives or spouse of
the perpetrator or accomplice of the crime and persons subject to profes-
sional secrecy.
However, there is a certain obligation: ‘Every constituted authority,
every public officer or civil servant who, in the performance of his du-
ties, has gained knowledge of the existence of a felony or of a misde-
meanour is obliged to notify forthwith the district prosecutor of the of-
fence and to transmit to this prosecutor any relevant information, official
reports or documents’ (Article 40, Paragraph 2 CCP). Above all, be-
cause of their profession, some have to report certain facts.
Reporting duties of professionals. The objective of regulating pro-
fessional activity leads the legislator to seek, if necessary by threatening
criminal sanctions, the cooperation of professionals who have a power or
duty of supervision over others. Some professionals are under a legal ob-
ligation to disclose criminal acts discovered in the performance of their
duties. In addition to this professional liability, however, they may also
be liable under ordinary law (concealment or money laundering).
Criminal and disciplinary duty to disclose criminal acts. Many
professionals are what case law calls ‘necessary confidants’ (confidents
nécessaires). The legislator takes advantage of this necessity to compel
them to disclose the criminal acts of which they are aware. For some, the
obligation is criminal in nature, but for a greater majority the obligation
is merely disciplinary. In the latter case, however, the risk of criminal
liability remains, since failure to disclose offences may constitute an (or-
dinary law) non-public disclosure offence or a consequential offence
such as concealment or money laundering.
Article L. 820-7 of the Commercial Code provides for the penal duty
to report criminal acts. Despite the generality of the provision, this duty is
incumbent on the auditor alone. The notion of a criminal act is broader
than that of an offence and makes it possible to include attempted of-
fences. It also covers, without distinction, crimes, misdemeanours and
petty offences. The obligation presupposes knowledge of the facts and
not mere suspicion, unlike other reporting obligations (not penalised).
Disciplinary reporting obligations. The Monetary and Finan-
cial Code (MFC) imposes various disclosure obligations on many
professionals, all of whom have in common the ability to monitor
the activity of their clients (whether this power is the subject of their
function or whether it is incidental to it). The obligations to disclose
consist of declarations to the public prosecutor or the TRACFIN ser-
vice (French FIU). The existence of a criminal obligation on the
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auditor does not prevent him/her from also denouncing facts covered
by the MFC. However, the criminal obligation applies only where
there is certainty that the facts are wrongful. The declaration to TRAC-
FIN must be made as soon as there is any doubt. While, by virtue of the
MFC, silence only exposes the professional to disciplinary sanctions,
the risk of criminal liability is not entirely eliminated if, by not declar-
ing them, the professional conceals the criminal acts and in doing so
commits money laundering. The absence of criminal liability for fail-
ure to disclose criminal acts against professionals other than the statu-
tory auditor does not protect them from criminal prosecution. The in-
direct criminal penalties for money laundering or complicity seem
even more severe than those for the specific offence.
Duty to speak and self-accusation. Article L. 820-7 of the Com-
mercial Code does not provide for any limit on the benefit of any indi-
vidual. Case law does not seem to have settled the case where the audi-
tor becomes aware of an offence because he/she himself is personally
involved (e.g. as an accomplice). As for the doctrine, it noted that Article
L. 820-7 contrasts by its silence with its more general counterpart, Ar-
ticle 434-1 of the Penal Code, which criminalised the non-denunciation
of crime. The latter does not exempt participants in the crime from its
scope. However, by reserving the case of some of their relatives (parents
or spouses), it has allowed case law, by reasoning a fortiori, to exclude
perpetrators and accomplices. 80 The doctrine considers that the solu-
tions enshrined in the general provision should apply to the special pro-
vision, especially since the case law of the ECHR suggests it (even if it
does not require it).
2.5. Strict liability under French law
Contraventional liability (responsabilité contraventionnelle). 81
Liability based on the commission of a petty offence can be seen as
the breeding ground for cases of strict liability. According to Article
121-3, Paragraph 5, of the Penal Code, ‘there is no petty offence in
the event of force majeure’. This section is intended to describe the con-
tent of the subjective element of petty offences, at least when they are
80 Cass. C., 27 Dec. 1960: Bull. 1960, No. 624; Rev. Sc. 1961, p. 345, obs. L.
Hugueney, on Article 62 of the former Criminal Code.
81 B. De Lamy, M. Segonds, Juris Classeur Droit Pénal des Affaires, Notions
Fondamentales, Fasc. 5.
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not intentional or negligent—i.e. when the statutory instrument does not
give any indication, even implicitly, as to the nature of the subjective
element.
The origin of what is known as a ‘contraventional fault’ is a case
law. The Court of Cassation developed, as early as the nineteenth cen-
tury, a theory according to which petty offences (but also certain misde-
meanours) constituted purely ‘material’ offences. This formula meant
that these offences were fully constituted even though there was no in-
tent, recklessness or negligence, the finding of the material act alone
being sufficient.
However, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation allowed
the offender to be exonerated, not by proving his absence of fault, but by
proving a cause of criminal irresponsibility such as insanity or coercion.
Since the Penal Code of 1994, solutions of the Court of Cassation
regarding petty offences have remained in force, which is awkwardly
expressed in the last paragraph of the same text, referring to ‘force ma-
jeure’.
The authors very early on sought a basis for this case law which
greatly facilitates repression, and several proposals were made. The old-
est and still most widespread one today is to say that, in matters of petty
offences, fault is required, but it is presumed from the commission of the
offending act.
Other authors have tried to give substance to this fault by observing
that it consists of non-compliance with rules establishing a minimum
discipline necessary for life in society. Compliance with these standards
is so imperative that it is not possible to accept that the offender can
claim that he or she acted without fault or in good faith.
It follows from this reasoning that fault is a corollary of non-com-
pliance with the rule and that it is confused with the offence itself.
Therefore, it must be concluded that fault is simply the material non-
compliance with the law. Criminal culpability where petty offences
are concerned is nothing more than non-compliance with the law—that
is, a violation of a norm. Therefore, the only psychological aspect re-
quired remains the imputability of the fact.
That is why part of the doctrine does not hesitate to consider that
liability in this matter is purely objective, being reduced to proof of
the mere commission (materiality) of the facts, excluding any subjective
element. 82
82 Y. Mayaud, op. cit., No. 291.
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This presentation corresponds to the state of positive law, even if it
runs counter to the general principle that there is no criminal liability
without fault.
Extension for misdemeanours. Article 121-3, Paragraph 3, of the
Penal Code provides that unintentional misconduct means not only reck-
lessness and negligence, but also failure to comply with a duty of care or
precaution provided for by statute or regulation.
As far as the violation of an obligation of this nature provided for in
a regulation is concerned, it is often itself incriminated and punished
with petty offence penalties, which makes it very easy to establish unin-
tentional misconduct simply by establishing that the contravention has
been committed.
It can be inferred from all this that where unintentional fault con-
sists of a breach of an obligation of due care or precaution provided
for in a text, the mere finding of a violation of that text is sufficient
to characterise the fault, which is therefore reduced to the mere contra-
ventional fault.
In other words, the former case law category of ‘material offences’
has not completely disappeared, because unintentional offences, such as
manslaughter or reckless injury, are sometimes made up only of this sin-
gle fault, with the smallest of contents.
Scholars consider that the solution is not open to criticism provided
that the breach referred to in Article 121-3, Paragraph 3, of the Penal
Code is solely an obligation of due care or precaution.
However, it is logical that a person who does not comply with a
rule, having this purpose, cannot claim that he or she did not commit
a fault or that he/she was prudent when it is contradictory to claim that
he or she was prudent by failing to comply with a rule of due care or
precaution.
Thus, in this specific case, as in general in petty offence cases, it is
not possible to prove that there was no fault, but the explanation lies in
the nature of the rule that was not respected, a rule that requires due care
or precaution for others. Violation of such a rule necessarily establishes
recklessness.
On the other hand, many petty offences are constituted by non-com-
pliance with rules that are not aimed at due care or precaution. In such
cases, the violation of the rule does not appear as a sign of recklessness
or negligence, but more generally as an indiscipline sufficient to estab-
lish criminal liability.
In general, it should be noted that the category of petty offences,
which remains the third category of criminal offences, corresponds in
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many legal systems to decriminalised offences subject to administrative
repression.
Low constitutional constraints. The Constitutional Council has
belatedly conferred a constitutional value on the requirement of guilt, af-
firming, with regard to the criminalisation of the offence of ‘great speed-
ing’ (Article L. 413 (1) of the Highway Code), that ‘it follows from Ar-
ticle 9 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, with re-
gard to felonies and misdemeanours, that guilt cannot result from the
mere material imputability of penalized acts; that consequently, and in
accordance with the combined provisions of the aforementioned Article
9 and the principle of the legality of offences and penalties affirmed by
Article 8 of the same Declaration, the definition of a criminal offence, in
the case of a misdemeanour, must include, in addition to the material
element of the offence, the moral element, intentional or unintentional,
of the offence.’ 83
According to the Constitutional Council, this means that the princi-
ple applies only to felonies and misdemeanours. Moreover, the principle
does not preclude the introduction of presumptions of guilt on an excep-
tional basis. The Council thus considered that if ‘in principle the legis-
lator cannot establish a presumption of guilt in criminal matters...but ex-
ceptionally, such presumptions may be established, in particular in the
case of petty offences, provided that they are not irrebuttable, that the
rights of the defence are respected and that the facts reasonably give rise
to a likelihood of imputability’.
2.6. Special rules on liability
There are special rules on criminal liability in certain areas.
This is the case in customs matters, with presumptions relating
sometimes to the commission of the elements of the offence, sometimes
to the imputation of the offence; in press-related offences, with the fa-
mous mechanism of so-called ‘cascade liability’ (responsabilité en cas-
cade), which automatically ascribes the press offence to the director of
publication; and in transport 84 or environmental matters.
In addition to these specific provisions provided for by the law, the
83 Cons. Const., 16 Jun 1999, No. 99-411 DC, Consid. No. 16.
84 Objective criminal liability established by the Customs Code on Transport:
Article 393-1 CD.
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field of tax fraud, which is the subject of specific rules laid down by case
law, should be added..
These mechanisms use different legal techniques but have in com-
mon facilitating the proof of the offence and/or its attribution. They aim
to ensure the identification of a criminal offender.
With regard to PIF offences, it is interesting to briefly present two
particular sectors: criminal liability in customs matters and criminal lia-
bility in tax matters.
Directors’ liability in the event of customs offences (relevant to
the fight against fraud). The criminal liability of the head of business
applies in customs matters, which presupposes (as customs offences all
require intent) his/her personal participation in the commission of the of-
fence. 85
However, this is presumed 86 in the absence of delegation of
powers. 87
The company director will thus be considered the perpetrator, in
particular in his capacity as holder (détenteur), or as ‘interested in
fraud’ (intéressé à la fraude), two concepts specific to customs crim-
inal law which make it possible to presume guilt or imputation of the
offence.
The status of holder allows the presumption of criminal liability.
Article 392 §1 of the Customs Code states that ‘the holder of fraudu-
lent goods is deemed liable for fraud’. The holder is defined as the per-
son who, regardless of his capacity as an employee or principal, 88 has
physical or legal control (owner, importer, etc.) of the goods or ensures
de jure or de facto supervision.
The legal presumption of guilt dispenses with characterising the
participation of the persons concerned in the offence: their quality—-
which must be proved—is sufficient to prove it. The presumption of
guilt is irrefutable: the persons concerned do not have the power to
prove their lack of material participation in the offence as perpetrators. 89
Consequently, only force majeure and good faith are grounds for exemp-
85 Cass. Crim., 27 Feb. 2002, No. 01-83.119: Bull. Crim., No. 51.
86 Cass. Crim., 27 Feb. 2002, No. 01-83.119: Bull. Crim. No. 51; Crim. 5 Feb.
1998, No. 96-85.596: Bull. Crim. No. 48; V. vine stock. Cass. Crim, 22 Oct. 2008,
No. 08-80.843: Bull. Crim. No. 213.
87 Cass. Crim., 5 May 1997, No. 95-86.136: Bull. Crim. No. 164.
88 Cass. Crim., 23 Feb 2005, No. 01-86.922 and 03-84.441: Bull. Crim., No. 71,
company director.
89 Criminal Court, 6 May 2015, No. 13-87.428.
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tion, which allows the presumption to be considered in accordance with
Article 6 §2 CESDH. 90
Article 399 §1 of the Customs Code states that those interested in
fraud (intéressé à la fraude) ‘shall be liable to the same penalties as the
perpetrators of the offence’. Customs criminal law thus has a particular
type of criminal participation in an offence—interest in fraud—which is
very close to complicit, but has the advantage of being based on pre-
sumption of participation (presumption of interest in fraud) and allows
account to be taken of behaviours/actions subsequent to fraud.
Directors’ liability for tax fraud. In principle, and unless there is a
legal exception, the legal directors of legal persons are not criminally li-
able in their capacity as such: 91 in accordance with ordinary law (C.
Pen., Articles 121-1 and 121-4), their personal and intentional participa-
tion in tax fraud is required by case law. 92 Nevertheless, this principle is
largely artificial.
In case law, the idea of personal and intentional participation has
been considerably weakened, so that it is now ipso facto established
in the absence of delegation of powers and force majeure.
Thus, since the late 1980s, case law has considered that, since it is
the head of the legal person who is personally responsible for fulfilling
the latter’s tax obligations 93—either him/herself or through his/her em-
ployees (accountants, etc.), the activity of which he/she must then scru-
pulously monitor—any failure in this matter reveals both an involve-
ment of the manager in the fraud (by action or omission) at a material
level and, on a moral level, a fault on his part, in that it necessarily im-
plies a lack of interest shown by the natural person in his/her duties.
90 Cass. Crim., 10 Feb 1992, No. 0-83.278: Bull. Crim., No. 62.
91 Cass. Crim., 21 June 1982, No. 81-93.586: Bull. Crim., 1982, No. 165,
concerning a legal director who had never had effective management of the company.
92 See, for example, Cass. 8 Feb. 2012, No. 11-81.320. Cass. Crim., 4 May 2011,
No. 10-85.268. Cass. Crim., 4 Nov. 2010, No. 10-81.433. Cass. Crim., 16 Dec. 2009,
No. 09-80.125. Cass. Crim., 13 Mar. 1997, No. 96-81.081: Bull. Crim., 1997, No. 107,
adding that ‘an order received from a superior does not constitute a cause of criminal
irresponsibility for the offender’. Cass. 13 Feb. 1997, No. 96-80.864. Cass. Homicide,
3 Oct. 1989, No. 88-87.508.
93 See, for example, Cass. Crim., 17 June 2009, No. 08-85.106. Cass. Crim., 20
Apr. 2005, No. 04-85.527: ‘the manager of a company must be held responsible for the
company’s tax obligations towards the Administration’. Cass. Crim., 29 Feb. 1996, No.
95-83.838: Bull. Crim., 1996, No. 101: ‘the manager of the limited liability company,
who is vested by Article 49, Paragraph 5, of the law of 24 July 1966 with the broadest
powers to act in all circumstances on behalf of the company vis-à-vis third parties, is
held liable for tax obligations vis-à-vis the Administration’. Cass. Crim., 26 Jan. 1987,
No 85-96.567.
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In short, only two positive and abstract conditions are to be verified
in order to retain the criminal responsibility of the person concerned: on
the one hand, to verify that he/she is indeed a director de jure according to
the law or the statutes; and, on the other hand, to ensure that he/she was in
office at the time of the fraud. The individual can then escape criminal
liability only in the event of delegation of powers, or even force majeure.
Cases of legal presumption of (criminal) liability are hardly any dif-
ferent from the presumption of criminal liability established by the case
law on the directors of legal persons in the field of tax fraud.
It is therefore rarely implemented. 94
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of heads
of business
3.1. Sources and origin of the criminal liability of heads of business
As mentioned above, the criminal liability of heads of business is a
case law creation (supra) dating back to the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 95
It has been enshrined in certain sectors by the legislator through so-
called ‘ascribed’ offences (infractions attitrées), which a priori desig-
nate the offender by virtue of special qualities, such as that of employ-
er, 96 manager 97 or ‘presidents, administrators, directors general’. 98
Through the offence, 99 ‘functional liability’ (liability related to and
based on the function) is instituted.
94 Cass. Crim., 16 Dec. 2009, No. 09-80.125, appeal against a judgment of
conviction stating that ‘on the intentional element, Article L. 223-22 of the French
Commercial Code, applicable in tax matters, enacts a presumption of liability which
is intended to apply in matters of tax fraud [and] that the director can only fight this
presumption of liability by proof of a delegation of power or a case of force
majeure’: the French Supreme Court declared, without referring to the text of the
Commercial Code, ‘that in the state of these enunciations, without insufficiency or
contradiction, which, in the absence of delegation of powers, establish the personal
participation of the accused in the facts being prosecuted, the Court of Appeal,
which has characterised in all its material and intentional elements the offence
including Richard X. has been found guilty, has justified his decision’.
95 Crim., 30 Dec. 1892.
96 L4741-1 Labour Code.
97 L311-34 Consumer Code.
98 L242-1 Commercial Code.
99 Sometimes also qualified as professional: M. Bénéjat, La Responsabilité Pé-
nale Professionnelle, Thèse Bordeaux, 2010.
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In most cases, the manager’s liability is not based on any specific
text. Having limited it to so-called ‘regulated’ companies or professions,
the case law generally accepts that the obligation to comply with the var-
ious legal and regulatory requirements 100 weighs ‘essentially’ on the
head of business 101 and that he or she must ‘personally supervise the
application of the laws’. 102
Explicit, implicit or tacit imputations. Some authors 103 propose
to distinguish according to whether the attribution of liability to the de-
cision-maker is imposed (1) by law explicitly, (2) only possible, sug-
gested, but not imposed by law, therefore implicit, or (3) not even men-
tioned and in this sense tacit. In the first two cases, the liability of the
head of business will be exclusive if the text only targets the head of
business or cumulative when it designates other possible authors.
Explicit imputation. In rare cases, the legislator explicitly ascribes
liability to the head of business for an offence committed by a third
party. 104
Implicit imputation. Where the texts refer to the head of business
as the possible perpetrator of the offence, in most cases, it is not speci-
fied whether he/she should be held liable when the material element was
performed by a subordinate or only when this element was performed by
the head of business him/herself. Sometimes the texts target the head of
business and subordinates. In this case, imputation seems to be an alter-
native. Sometimes, the legislator provides for the sole liability of man-
agers, as is often the case in corporate criminal law.
Tacit imputation. In this case, the texts remain silent as to the per-
petrator of the offence, who may be any person. This is the most fre-
quent case in business criminal law.
Faced with this fragmentary approach of the legislator, case law
tends to standardise solutions.
Thus, for unintentional offences, ancient material misdemeanours
(délits matériels: see 2.5. Strict liability under French Law; 3.5. Subjec-
tive element (mens rea)), contraventions (petty offences) and so-called
assigned or ascribed (attitrées) offences (all those, exclusively or not,
aimed at heads of business—i.e. explicit and implicit imputations), case
100 Crim., 6 Oct. 1955, JCP 1956. II. 9098, note de Lestang.
101 Crim., 26 Aug. 1859, S. 1859. 1. 973.
102 Crim., 23 Jan. 1975, JCP 1976. II. 18333, note J.-H. Robert.
103 M. Delmas-Marty, G. Giudicelli-Delage, Droit Pénal des Affaires, PUF, 2000.
104 In the Penal Code, see Article 433-18, Article 226-16 and 17; for other
examples, as for instance in the matter of waste, see M. Delmas-Marty, G.
Giudicelli-Delage, Droit Pénal des Affaires, p. 53.
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law tends to attribute criminal liability to the decision-maker unless he/
she can prove that he/she had correctly delegated his/her powers (see
Q16).
In addition, for intentional offences, case law sometimes applies the
same principles. While affirming, in accordance with general principles,
that such offences require the personal participation of the decision-ma-
ker in order for his liability to be incurred, it tends to presume such par-
ticipation (both its objective and subjective dimensions). In practice, it
limits grounds for non-imputation to cases where powers had been (cor-
rectly) delegated. This is particularly the case in tax matters.
However, there is also comparable reasoning in customs matters
and in fraud cases (i.e. concerning the offences which serve as imple-
mentation of the PIF convention and the texts adopted by the EU sub-
sequently; cf. supra Q2).
3.2. Subjective scope of the criminal liability of the heads of business
General remarks. To the extent that the law does not define who
the head of a business is, the difficulty lies in knowing to whom to
attribute the offence. It is, in principle, the person who has the most
extensive powers, in fact or in law, and exercises them indepen-
dently. 105
The attribution of the status of (criminally) liable head of busi-
ness requires a distinction to be drawn between whether the offence
is committed in a single undertaking or involves more than one un-
dertaking. 106
Single undertaking. In this case, a distinction must be made be-
tween de jure and de facto directors. As for the former, in the case of
sole proprietorship, the person responsible in principle is the natural per-
son, owner or manager, who effectively directs them.
In other cases (legal person), the status of head of business is at-
tributed to the person or persons who holds full management powers
105 The Court of Cassation drew a surprising conclusion from this in the
particular case where the company, placed in receivership, is run by a receiver: it is
he who, instead of the debtor or the statutory organs of the debtor legal person,
becomes the head of the company in all areas, whether it is to apply company law
(convening a general meeting of shareholders, for example) or labour law (infra);
Crim., 21 Jun. 2000, Droit Pénal 2000, comm. 128, J.H. Robert.
106 Distinction borrowed from C. Coeuret, F. Fortis, F. Dusquenne, Droit Pénal
du Travail, Lictec, 2016, No. 297.
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over the personnel and property assigned to the activity. Its identifica-
tion shall be based on the type of legal person concerned.
In limited liability companies, this is the manager.
In public limited companies, it is the chairman of the board of di-
rectors and, where applicable, the chief executive officer. In the latter
case, the joint liability of the president and the director may be sought
provided that the judge verifies, on the one hand, in the company’s ar-
ticles of association, the existence of a distribution of powers and, on the
other hand, in practice, the exact personal share taken by each of them in
the commission of the offence. 107
However, the liability of the executive board must also be consid-
ered. Where a precise and official division of tasks exists between the
members of the board, each of them shall be liable for offences com-
mitted in the sector for which they are responsible. 108 In practice, it
is the chairman of the board who is prosecuted, even if it is an uninten-
tional fault and no division of labour has been carried out.
In simplified joint stock companies, this is the chairman. If the ar-
ticles of association so provide, it may be a chief executive officer or
deputy chief executive officer.
In partnerships or limited partnerships, this is the sole manager or
co-managers (subject to any planned functional distribution).
In associations, it is the president.
In unions, these are the directors or administrators in charge of the
internal management of the group.
Finally, criminal liability may be borne by the receiver who is re-
quired, in his mission, to comply with the legal and contractual obliga-
tions of the company manager (instead of the latter; supra). 109
As for de facto or actual directors, criminal judges do not hesitate to
control the effective exercise of management powers. They may waive
the liability of the ex officio manager to retain only that of the actual
manager, but they can also retain joint liability. 110
Plurality of undertakings. In criminal labour law, the responsible
company manager is the one whose staff has been the victim of the of-
fence, 111 unless the execution of the work has been placed under a sin-
gle management.
107 Crim., 23 Nov. 2010, No. 10-82.057.
108 Crim., 2 Jun. 1987.
109 Crim., 3 Mar. 1998.
110 Crim., 8 Jun. 2004, No. 03-86.331 et 13 Apr. 2010, No. 09-86.429.
111 Crim., 22 Feb. 1966, Bull. 32.
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Appointment of officers within a group of managers: the case
of corporate criminal law. In corporate criminal law, the texts gener-
ally provide for explicit (or ascribed) imputations (see above). They ex-
plicitly designate the person who bears responsibility for the acts in
question.
These legal imputations do not pose any difficulties when the desig-
nated person is only one person.
The situation is more complex when the texts are aimed at a group
of executives (the president, directors or general managers of a public
limited company, for example: Article 242-6 Commercial Code – abuse
of corporate assets). Where intent is a condition of attribution of the of-
fence, the person liable is the one who is qualified as required by law
and has knowingly committed the offence (these two conditions are cu-
mulative and distinct from each other; they must be verified separately).
Where, on the other hand, the imputation is carried out in the same way
as the imputation of petty offences—i.e. without being based on con-
crete proof of intent—the question arises as to whether all directors of
the public limited liability company can be collectively liable or whether
only their managing director (or the chairman if he or she has retained
the management) is liable.
The prevailing case law retains the liability of the executive who
exercises day-to-day management in the highest position—i.e. according
to the provisions of the articles of association of the company, either the
president or the chief executive officer. Delegation of powers is possible,
but in this case, to remain within the legal requirements, a member of the
board of directors must be appointed.
In public limited companies with a management board, a similar ap-
proach leads to criminal liability for the chairman. The responsibility of
members of the supervisory board, which is theoretically contemplated
by the doctrine, does not have an example in case law.
3.3. Liability of the head of business and duty to control and supervise
the employees
The liability of the head of business is based on control and mon-
itoring obligations. However, these obligations are not necessarily
specific and do not necessarily refer to the manager. The legal or reg-
ulatory requirements imposed on the company (i.e. the general rules
which apply to all companies and the special rules which apply spe-
cifically to the particular activity of each company) are considered
grounds for criminal liability of the head of business insofar as it is
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incumbent upon the role to ‘personally ensure strict enforcement by
its subordinates’. 112
In other words, according to case law, a general obligation weighs
on the head of business to personally ensure compliance with the rules
applicable in the company. This duty of supervision, which has some-
times been legally established, is based on both the economic power
of the head of business over the assets of the enterprise and the manage-
rial power conferred on him by his capacity as employer, managerial
power which justifies the attribute of a normative power and, in particu-
lar, a disciplinary power which he is authorised to use whenever his em-
ployees, through their actions, are likely to give rise to criminal liability
on the part of the manager of the company.
In addition, according to some authors, French case law ‘opines in
favour of the ability to make decisions that impose legal constraints on
others and not only in favour of the exercise of control or supervision,
terms that do not, in the French language, bring out the same capacity
of influence on the subjects of power.’ 113
Imputation to professional decision-makers is based on a power of
control over the subject matter of the offence. In other words, the impu-
tation of an offence to a professional who is a natural person is explained
by his capacity to influence the subject matter of the offence.
In this sense, the basis of imputation lies entirely in the professional
functions, in the ability to control the offence, which results from a de-
cision-making power exercised over the undertaking.
This abstract capacity to influence can be used to characterise a
fault. However, the automaticity of the finding of fault makes one doubt
its effectiveness. Less than a presumption of fault, there is above all a
presumption of liability. The capacity to influence constitutes a cause
of imputation and its absence—less a cause of exemption comparable
to an absence of fault than a cause of non-imputation (to which is added
another: force majeure).
3.4. Functional imputation and causal link
The liability of the head of business is a functional and non-be-
112 According to the terms of the decision of the Criminal Chamber, which is
generally regarded as the true starting point of current case law.
113 A. Cœuret, ‘La Responsabilité Pénale dans l’Entreprise: Vers un Espace
Judiciaire Européen Unifié? Les Propositions ‘Espace Judiciaire Européen’
Confrontées à la Situation en France’, RSC, 1997, p. 297 et s. sp. p. 302.
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havioural liability. Apart from cases of an autonomous offence (that
consists in having someone do something or allowing something to
be done which sanctions misconduct of management), the judge as-
cribes the offence committed by the employee to the head of business
who has not, however, accomplished the (constituting) facts.
This imputation is based on the fact that the decision-maker has, by
virtue of his functions, a power of action or non-action to provoke or
prevent the offence. It is because of this power that he derives from
his office that he is responsible for the offence.
The notion of moral or intellectual perpetrator (supra) is some-
times also advanced to justify the liability of the decision-maker: his
behaviour—although distant, although not corresponding to the mate-
rial element described in the text, and even committed before the ma-
terial action—constitutes the real cause of the offence.
This reasoning presupposes that the facts accomplished by someone
other than the head of business occurred only because the head of busi-
ness committed a fact and a fault of omission. Without this conduct on
the part of the head of business, the facts would not have happened.
The act of the third party—usually the employee—is therefore not
the real cause of the offence. It is only the opportunity that allowed the
offence to happen. In other words, ‘the immediate (or material) perpetra-
tor’s behaviour merely updated the previously virtual responsibility of
the manager’. 114
It is an abstract assessment of the causal link that is retained and is
sufficient to establish criminal liability. Indeed, the causal link is not es-
tablished with respect to a specific behaviour, but with respect to organic
function in general. Thus, imputation results less from an effective influ-
ence on the infringement than from an ability to influence. 115
Also, according to some, this abstract assessment reflects a purely
functional responsibility (and, in this sense, non-behavioural and there-
fore detached from an approach in terms of fault). It is because the de-
cision-maker, by virtue of his or her organic functions, whether acting or
not, has the power to provoke or prevent the offence that he or she is
responsible for it. This conception of causality makes it possible to iden-
tify a fault but on the condition of conceiving causality in a concrete way
(the decision-maker could actually prevent the offence but did not do
114 M. Delmas-Marty, G. Giudicelli-Delage, Droit Pénal des Affaires, PUF, 2000,
p. 58.
115 M. Bénéjat, op. cit., No. 318; see also F. Rousseau, L’Imputation dans la Re-
sponsabilité Pénale, Dalloz, 2009, NBT, No. 178.
74 CHAPTER III
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
so). However, it is an abstract conception that is retained by the case law.
The misconduct of management which justifies the organic responsibil-
ity of the company manager is artificial because it stems from his or her
position alone.
3.5. Subjective element (mens rea)
See also supra 2.6. Strict liability under French Law
The presentation of the subjective element required to establish the
criminal liability of the head of business is not uniform in legal litera-
ture. Case law on its part does not provide a clear presentation of the
issue. Nevertheless, the following general elements can be identified.
The scholars generally agree that, first and foremost, the liability of
heads of business requires that a distinction be made according to the
subjective element of the offence committed. The designation of the li-
able person is thus governed by two different regimes, the application of
which depends on the distinction between intentional and unintentional
offences. This distinction needs to be clarified.
The case of explicitly unintentional offences (e.g. manslaugh-
ter, reckless injury). 116 With regard to these offences, since the law
of 10 July 2000, which was intended to limit the criminal liability of
public officials but applies, for constitutional reasons of equality, also
to private officials, Article 121-3, Paragraph 4 of the Penal Code re-
quires a distinction to be made between direct and indirect perpetra-
tors of negligence. In order to engage the liability of the direct perpe-
trators (those who directly committed the offence), a simple negli-
gence will suffice. On the other hand, for indirect perpetrators (those
who have created or contributed to creating the situation which al-
lowed the damage to happen or who failed to take steps to prevent
it), an aggravated or ‘qualified’ fault will have to be established: that
is, either a deliberate fault (the patently deliberate breach of a duty of
care or precaution provided by law or regulation: faute délibérée), or
a gross negligence (namely, putting another person at a particularly
serious risk that the offender could not have failed to recognise). Both
types of fault constitute a heightened reproach and represent the most
serious type of negligence.
116 Under Article 121-3 CP, the offences are in principle intentional, except if ‘the
law so provides’ in cases of recklessness, negligence or failure to comply with a duty
of care or security provided for by the law or regulation.
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Where an offence of negligence 117 has been committed, the head of
business (or his/her delegate) is considered an indirect offender. There-
fore, a qualified fault must be established in order to hold him/her crim-
inally liable. Natural persons may incur criminal liability on the basis of
a simple or ordinary negligence 118 only where it can be established that
there is a direct causal connection between their conduct and the result-
ing harm.
The case of genuinely intentional offences (e.g. fraud, fraudu-
lent breach of trust, misuse of a company’s property, etc.). With re-
gard to these offences, the required mens rea consists of intent, which
can nevertheless be established by implication, deduced from the mate-
rial element. The personal participation of the head of business in the
offence has to be established.
However, the distinction (between intentional offences and non-in-
tentional offences) presupposes taking account of offences that are the-
oretically intentional but in practice considered by judges to be offences
of presumed intent and giving rise to a ‘contraventional liability’ (Q10)
when the person responsible is a head of business or, more generally, a
professional. These offences belong to the former category of material
offences which the 1994 Penal Code in principle abolished.
In the latter case, heads of business are condemned for not having
117 Offences of negligence differ from intentional offences in that negligent offenders
do not act volitionally with respect to the results of their acts; this is why they are also
called involuntary offences (infractions involontaires). Still, it should not be forgotten that
the breach of a duty of care that leads to an unintended result may well be intentional.
Consequently, it is possible to distinguish between deliberate imprudence and imprudence
that is not deliberate and between other more or less serious degrees of negligence.
118 Simple or ordinary negligence within the meaning of Article 121-3 Paragraph
3 CP is defined as the type of imprudence to which anyone can fall prey. By failing to
anticipate the consequences of his or her conduct, the offender risks being blamed for
carelessness (imprévoyance). In addition, the offender has breached either a duty of
care or a precaution provided by law or regulation or laid him- or herself open to re-
proach for failing to exercise the ordinary standard of care (indiscipline). In the case of
ordinary negligence, the offender is not aware that he or she is committing a criminal
offence. Because the offender does not anticipate the resulting harm, he or she also
does not have the intent to bring about such a result. Still, the failure to exercise the
duty of care or precaution may itself have occurred intentionally, such as the act of
deliberately running a red light. Article 121-3 Paragraph 3 CP distinguishes between
two types of ordinary negligence: recklessness or negligence (faute d’imprudence et
de négligence), on the one hand, and the breach of a duty of care or precaution pro-
vided by law or regulation (manquement à une obligation de prudence ou de sécurité
prévue par la loi ou le règlement), on the other. In order for the criminal offence de-
finition to be satisfied in the context of these kinds of simple breaches of duty, there
must be a direct causal connection between the breach of duty and the resulting harm.
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taken the precaution of organising their establishment in such a way that
in each of its components a person is charged by virtue of a delegation of
powers to ensure the application of criminal laws.
Traditional doctrine considers that the mens rea required is negli-
gence, most often presumed. The company manager is accused of failing
to supervise his employees.
This presentation respects the principle that there is no criminal lia-
bility without fault. However, the decision-maker’s fault never appears
so explicitly in case law. Above all, the fault identified by the doctrine
does not correspond to that which is actually established by the judges
and which corresponds to the mens rea of the alleged offence.
Nevertheless, two major theories attempt to show that the criminal
liability of the head of business is indeed based on a fault. 119
The first 120 consists in considering that the manager intentionally
violates ‘a duty of guarantee with regard to third parties, whether his
staff or his clientele’, a duty incumbent upon him in that capacity
(es qualités). Under these conditions, the discrepancy at the level of
the moral element disappears (it is not a question of reproaching a sim-
ple negligence, but an intention, insofar as the violation of the duty of
guarantee is voluntary). However, it is the legal result of the offence
that is modified and is aimed at violating this duty of guarantee.
The second 121 suggests that the reasoning should not start from the
(elements of the) offence but should be articulated in terms of imputa-
tion. This presupposes first of all a clear distinction between commission
of the offence and participation in the offence. Thus, participation does
not require the realisation of all the constituent elements of the offence.
In this sense, the manager’s supervisory fault may constitute an act of
participation. However, this participation would have the particularity
of giving rise to liability as an author (and not as an accomplice). This
would be a sui generis mode of participation of jurisprudential origin.
The interest of this theory would be to explain the liability of a person
who carries out a fault different from that which is incriminated. How-
ever, this theory does not solve the problems of legality, since there is no
legal provision to that effect.
119 For a presentation, see M. Bénéjat, op. cit.
120 Ph. Conte, M. Maistre du Chambon, Droit Pénal Général, Armand Colin,
2004, 7th ed. No. 440.
121 F. Rousseau, L’Imputation dans la Responsabilité Pénale, Dalloz, NBT, 2009,
No. 272.
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3.6. Delegation of powers: scope and conditions
Delegation of powers. Of ancient jurisprudential origin, 122 the le-
gal regime of delegation of power remains fully defined by the Criminal
Chamber of the Court of Cassation, 123 which has established not only
its scope of application but also the conditions relating to the delegator,
the delegate and the act of delegation.
Since four rulings of 11 March 1993, but after much hesitation, the
Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation has abandoned its previous
case law, which had the effect of limiting the delegation of power to cer-
tain areas of business criminal law. 124 This generalisation of the field of
delegation, which is intended to make the delegation of powers a normal
mode of management of the company, has received the approval of the
entire doctrine.
The absence of a delegation may constitute an organisational fault,
which could possibly be blamed on the company manager in the event
of an accident. 125 In this way, the judge assesses the company’s man-
agement. In this sense, the delegation of powers is not always a favour-
able measure (infra Part 4). For this reason, it deserves legislative con-
secration and regulation.
This delegation does not require any particular form; the important
thing is that it is ‘certain and unambiguous’ 126 and that it is not general,
but partial and limited. As for substance, the delegation is effective only
under five conditions.
Firstly, the law must not oppose it. 127
Secondly, the official must not have been personally involved in the
offence: he or she must not have interfered in the powers of the dele-
gate. 128 The delegate’s autonomy of action is a condition of delegation.
Thirdly, the power must be susceptible to delegation: this is the
122 Cass., 1902, No. 237; D. 1903, I, p. 585, note Roux.
123 The delegation of powers has not yet been the subject of a legal consecration
of general scope—only a consecration of special scope appearing in Article R. 4511-9
of the Labour Code and, since the law of 17 May 2011, in Article L. 4741-1 of the
Labour Code explicitly. Article 121-3, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code only
implicitly enshrines the jurisprudence relating to the delegation of power.
124 Cass. Crim., 11 Mar. 1993, No. 90-84.931, No. 91-80.958, No. 91-80.598 et
No. 92-80.773.
125 See for instance, Crim., 20 May 2008, no 08- 80.896, Dr. Pénal 2008. Chron.
9, obs. M. Segonds.
126 Crim., 2 Feb. 1982, Bull. Crim., No. 36.
127 See, for instance, Crim., 14 Oct. 2003, Bull. Crim., No. 190.
128 Crim., 9 Nov. 2010, no 10- 81.074, Dr. Pénal 2010. 39, obs. J.-H. Robert.
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question of the ‘own management powers’ that cannot be delegated. As
such, it would appear that the executive cannot relinquish his power of
control over the delegated authority, and certainly not his power to make
strategic decisions (if so, he would no longer be an executive). 129
Fourthly, the delegation must come from the real holder of these
prerogatives. Thus, it was held that the chairman of a public limited lia-
bility company who was sued for possession with a view to the sale of
products containing asbestos could not be exonerated by invoking a de-
legation of power granted to the chief executive officer by the board of
directors, because in this case he himself should have proceeded with the
delegation. 130 In addition, the delegation of powers implies a relation-
ship of hierarchical subordination—at least an authority relationship. 131
Fifthly, any delegation must address the competence, authority and
means required. The authority seems to be the essential condition served
by the other two: the judge will verify in concreto that the delegate had
enough command power (including disciplinary power) to obtain the ne-
cessary obedience to comply with the law from employees under his
supervision. 132 This requirement explains why the delegation of the
same task to more than one person or co-delegation is not allowed, as
the authority would then be diluted. However, sub-delegation is possi-
ble 133 provided it has been authorised by the manager.
3.7. Liability of the head of business and collective decisions
Collegial decision: non-liability for the vote. When a decision is
adopted by the collective body of a legal person and constitutes an of-
fence, can criminal liability be attributed to all natural persons who par-
ticipated in the deliberation? The Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cas-
sation gave a negative answer to this question.
A mayor and municipal councillors had been prosecuted for racial
129 See, for instance, Crim., 15 May 2007, RPDP 2008. 629 obs. L. Leturmy
(despite a delegation of powers, the company manager remains liable for breaches
of the balance sheet presentation, on the grounds that this balance sheet is the
responsibility of his or her own management).
130 Crim., 17 Oct. 2000, Dr. Pénal 2001. 22, obs. J.-H. Robert.
131 It is not essential that this hierarchical power necessarily and directly derives
from the conclusion of an employment contract (Cass. Crim., 14 Dec. 1999: RD imm.
2001, p. 68, note M. Segonds).
132 See, for instance, Crim., 8 Dec. 2009, D. 2010. 1664, obs. C. Mascala (not
valid delegation due to the youth of the delegate).
133 Crim., 30 Oct. 1996, Bull. Crim., no 116.
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discrimination on the basis of a municipal council decision. The Crim-
inal Chamber confirmed the ruling of the appeal court, dismissing the
case by holding that ‘the contested deliberation, taken by a collegial
body of the municipality, cannot be attributed to those of the municipal
councillors who voted in favour’; the trial judges had made it perfectly
clear that a decision by a legal person cannot be regarded as the result of
an addition of individual wills. 134
Collegial decision: liability for acts. However, the scope of this
judgment must be clearly limited. In fact, through a decision of 17 De-
cember 2002, 135 the Court of Cassation admitted the conviction for dis-
crimination of the deputy mayor who had proposed the disputed deci-
sion for a vote to the municipal council, of which he was the rapporteur
and the mayor an accomplice for publicly welcoming the adoption of the
resolution, even though he had been absent from the vote, and claimed
to be the origin of the adopted measure.
It therefore seems clear that mere participation in the vote allowing
the adoption of the criminal resolution is not sufficient to establish crim-
inal liability. On the other hand, this liability may be incurred where the
official may be accused of an act involving personal participation in the
offence. The decisive element of the conviction was that they claimed to
have been the initiators of the vote, so that ‘independently of the vote,
they personally participated in the offence’.
Such a distinction does not seem to be very clear, as the fact of
being rapporteur for the decision and putting it to the vote does not seem
to be easily detachable from the vote itself. 136 Nevertheless, the Crim-
inal Chamber confirmed this tendency in a judgment of 19 November
2003 137 by admitting the conviction for favouritism of a mayor who
had fixed the agenda and presided over the session of the municipal
council awarding the contested contract, the judges seeing this as the
personal commission of the offence apart from the participation in the
134 Cass. Crim., 11 May 1999, No. 97-81.653: No. 1999-002093; Bull. Crim.,
1999, No. 93; D. 2000, Somm. p. 113, G. Roujou de Boubée; Dr. Pén. 1999, comm.
140; Rev. Sc. Crim., 2000, p. 197, Y. Mayaud. For a dismissal in the case of
municipal councillors prosecuted for favouritism after a vote: CA Aix en Provence,
16 May 2007: No. 2007-336744; JCP G 2007, IV, 3108.
135 Cass. Crim., 17 Dec 2002, No. 01-85.650: No. 2002-017555; Bull. Crim.,
2002, No. 227; Dr. Pén. 2003 Comm. 44, M. Véron; Rev. Sc. Crim., 2003, p. 556,
Y. Mayaud. Appeal against CA Aix-en-Provence, 18 Jun. 2001: No. 2001-169339;
JCP G 2002, IV, 2173.
136 M. Véron, note ss Cass. Crim., 17 Dec. 2002, op. cit.
137 Cass. Crim., 19 Nov. 2003, No. 02-87.336: No. 2003-021728; Dr. Pén. 2004,
Comm. 32, M. Véron.
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vote. The mayor’s participation was therefore limited to the conduct of
the vote. As one author points out, ‘the final decision was not solely de-
pendent on the mayor’s will and was not a matter for personal action...-
Does this mean that whenever a municipal council votes on a decision
that may constitute an offence, the criminal responsibility of the mayor
who presided over the meeting must be retained?’ 138 Such a solution is
open to criticism because it gives an excessive interpretation of the no-
tion of ‘personal fact’ within the meaning of Article 121-1 of the Crim-
inal Code 139 and distorts the notion of perpetrator within the meaning of
Article 121-4 of the same Code. Indeed, the perpetrator is here more a
moral perpetrator than a material perpetrator.
3.8. Relationship between individual liability of the head of business
and corporate criminal liability
Under Article 121-2 of the Penal Code, in order to be imputed to the
legal person, the offence must have been committed by an organ or a
representative of the legal person.
Organs. The organs are the persons appointed by law or by the ar-
ticles of association of the legal person to act on behalf of the legal per-
son and to provide for its direction and management.
The bodies of local and regional authorities (mayor, president of the
general or regional council, municipal, general or regional council, etc.)
will thus be designated by the General Code of Local and Regional
Authorities.
The organs of commercial companies (manager, board of directors,
chairman of the board of directors, chief executive officers, management
board, chairman of the management board, the supervisory board, 140 as-
sembly, etc.) are laid down by the Commercial Code.
The Criminal Chamber has provided an interesting clarification
138 M. Véron, op. cit.
139 And the Court of Cassation went even further, admitting the criminal liability
of a mayor, his deputies and an adviser who only participated in the deliberations and
took part in the vote awarding illicit subsidies. Crim., 22 Oct. 2008, Dr. Pénal 2009. 3,
obs. M. Véron.
140 Since Article 12 (2) of the Criminal Code states that the offence must be
committed on behalf of the legal person, it seems difficult to imagine that
supervisory or control bodies, such as the supervisory board of a public limited
company (see Article L. 225-68 Commercial Code) or the statutory auditors of
companies, could incur criminal liability for the legal person, even if they are
bodies within the meaning of the text of the Penal Code (See J.-C. Saint-Pau).
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to the definition of the organ of an enabling entitlement society for
low-rent housing by deciding that the housing allocation commission
can be qualified as an organ of this society even if external personal-
ities sit on it. 141 It should also be noted that, in this case, the body
which may engage the criminal liability of the legal person is a col-
legial body.
In the silence of the law, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cas-
sation has admitted that the de facto executives are qualified as organs
(or representatives) within the meaning of Article 121-2 of the Penal
Code. 142
Representatives. The person who may act on behalf of the legal
entity and engage it in the eyes of third parties will be considered a re-
presentative. The interest of the concept is to include persons other than
organs. This status may thus be granted to the judicial or provisional re-
ceiver of the company who, although not an organ thereof, is neverthe-
less vested with the power to act in the name of and on behalf of the
company. Similarly, a person who holds a special power of attorney
in the corporation but is not a member of the corporation may qualify
as a representative. Also to be considered as representatives within the
meaning of Article 121-2 of the Penal Code are those who have been
granted a delegation of powers, whether they are employed 143 by the
legal entity or not. 144
The sub-delegated employee is similarly considered a representa-
tive. 145
The Court of Cassation also considered a representative a commer-
cial agent who is not employed by the legal person, expressly stating that
the status of the representative, employee or agent, is irrelevant. 146 In
the absence of a formal delegation of power, the Criminal Chamber re-
quires the trial court to explain the status and powers of the staff mem-
bers concerned and the actual, if not formal, existence of a delegation of
power in order to be able to consider them representatives of the legal
141 Crim., 11 Jul. 2017, No. 16-82426.
142 Crim., 21 May 2014, No. 13-83.758.
143 In this sense, Cass. Crim., 1 Dec. 1998, No. 97-84.773; Bull. Crim.,1998, No.
325; Rev. Sc. Crim.,1999, p. 336, obs. G. Giudicelli-Delage. Cass. Crim., 9 Nov. 1999,
No. 98-81.746; Bull. Crim., 1999, No. 252.
144 Crim., 14 Dec. 1999, No. 99-80.104.
145 Cass. Crim., 25 Mar. 2014, No. 13-80.376; JCP S 2014, 1217, note A. Coeuret
et F. Duquesne; JCP G 2014, 421, A. Donnier.
146 Crim., 23 Feb. 2010, No. 09-81.819.
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person. 147 It is admitted that delegation of powers may be a de facto de-
legation. 148
3.8.1. Concurrence of liabilities
Imputation of an offence against the legal person is not necessarily
subject to prior recognition of the liability of natural persons acting on
its behalf. The accumulation of responsibilities is allowed but it remains
optional. Article 121-2, Paragraph 3, of the Penal Code states that ‘the
criminal liability of legal persons does not exclude that of natural per-
sons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same acts’; this accumu-
lation is, however, desirable in order to avoid that the managers are re-
lieved of responsibility. 149
The draft Penal Code stated that, in the future, ‘the criminal liability
of a company manager may also be retained at the same time as that of
legal persons if it is proved that the manager has personally intervened in
the decision or in the implementation of the offence, or if the law so pro-
vides, that he/she is personally liable for certain offences, labour or social
security regulations, economic or fiscal matters...’. This interpretation has
been taken up by the Ministry of Justice, considering in particular ‘in
cases of unintentional offences, but also in cases of offences of a techni-
cal nature for which intent may result, in accordance with the traditional
case law of the Court of Cassation, from simple non-compliance, in full
knowledge of the facts, of a particular regulation, proceedings against the
legal person alone should be preferred and the natural person should only
be prosecuted as well if there is sufficient evidence of personal miscon-
duct against him/her to justify a criminal conviction.’ 150
It should be noted, however, that the reform of the law of 10 July
2000, which aimed to clarify the definition of unintentional offences,
has decriminalised unintentional offences where the causal link between
147 Crim., 11 Oct. 2011, No. 10-87.212; D. 2011, p. 2841, obs. M. Blombed, note
N. Rias; Rev. Companies 2012, p. 52 note H. Matsopoulou. Crim., 5 May 2015, No.
14-83 760; see also most recently on a non-delegated employee: Crim., 21 Nov. 2017,
No. 16-86.667.
148 Crim., 30 Mar. 2016, No. 14-84 994; Cass. Crim., 28 Feb.2017, No. 15-
87.378.
149 On the whole question, see J.-C. Saint-Pau, ‘La Responsabilité Pénale d’une
Personne Physique Agissant en Qualité d’Organe ou de Représentant d’une Personne
Morale’, Mélanges B. Bouloc, Dalloz, 2007, p. 1011 s.
150 Circ. Min. 13 Feb. 2006, NOR: JUSDO630016C.
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the negligent conduct and the damage is indirect and the fault is a simple
negligence (and not an aggravated fault: supra). In this case, the natural
person who is an indirect perpetrator cannot be prosecuted. However, if
he/she acted as an organ or a representative of a legal person, then the
legal person’s liability may be considered even though the liability of
the organ or representative envisaged as a natural person cannot be con-
sidered (the decriminalisation sought by the legislator has benefited only
natural persons and not legal persons).
Conversely, the director who has acted as an organ or representative
of the legal person is criminally liable for the alleged offences. In a deci-
sion of 6 December 2016, 151 the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cas-
sation censored the decision of a Court of Appeal which had acquitted the
natural person manager, considering that there was no element of the pro-
cedure which allowed for maintaining that he had been able to commit
the offences apart from his capacity as manager of the company (road
transport of waste without declaration, irregular waste management, ha-
zardous waste management without approval). The Court of Appeal re-
lied on Section 121-1 (personal liability). It was in his capacity as a man-
ager that he had committed the offence, as an organ of the legal person,
but not in his personal capacity. On the basis of Article 121-2, the Court
of Cassation censored the reasoning of appellate judges and specified that
the perpetrator was criminally liable, including when acting as an organ
or representative of a legal person. Consequently, the company’s liability
is not exclusive to the prosecution of the natural person, even if he or she
is an organ or representative. However, as the Amiens Court of Appeal
pointed out on 25 March 2016, 152 the prosecution of a company cannot
lead to a conviction against its organ or its representative in this capacity
(i.e. ès qualité), but only against the legal person.
It should be noted that the same delegate may be appointed by a
group of companies—which is common in construction sites—and the
Court of Cassation then considers that, in the event of an accident at
work, the workers’ health and safety offences committed by the dele-
gated employee appointed by all the companies engage the liability of
the legal person, which is the victim’s employer. 153 In this case, the de-
151 No. 15-85.152, Bulletin du Droit de l’Environnement Industriel, No. 68, Mar.
2017.
152 No. 14/00664, SARL Humtertrans, Bulletin du Droit de l’Environnement
Industriel, No. 68, Mar. 2017.
153 Crim., 13 Oct. 2009, JCP 2010. Note 152, J.-H. Robert; D. 2010. 557, note J.-
C. Planque.
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legation is particularly remarkable in that it has the effect of giving rise
to the liability of a legal person other than that which actually employs
the delegate.
The new procedure for a judicial convention of public interest
introduced by the Sapin II Law. The Sapin II Law creates the proce-
dure for a judicial convention of public interest (convention judiciaire
d’intérêt public: CJIP) which allows any legal person accused of corrup-
tion, trading in influence, money laundering, tax fraud (and their related
offences) to settle via a deal with the Public Prosecutor’s Office in ex-
change for abandonment of proceedings (Article 41-1-2 CPP).
One of the questions which the implemented decrees and practice
have not yet made it possible to answer is whether the natural persons
at the head of the legal entity concerned will be able to take advantage
of the conclusion of a CJIP to be exonerated from their criminal liability.
If the Sapin II Law provides that, despite the conclusion of a CJIP, ‘the
legal representatives of the legal person concerned remain liable as nat-
ural persons’, it remains to be seen what the policy of the National Fi-
nancial Prosecutor’s Office (PNF) will be with regard to the prosecution
of managers of companies that have effectively cooperated in the CJIP
mechanism.
According to the statements of the National Financial Deputy Pro-
secutor, natural persons will be systematically prosecuted and total ex-
emption from liability can never be one of the terms of the negotiation
in the framework of the CJIP with the legal person. 154 As for the pos-
sibility of resolving the issue of directors’ criminal liability with a sepa-
rate convention, as may be the case in the United States (where the DPA
also applies to natural persons), the law completely excludes it, since the
prosecutor’s office can only conclude a CJIP with a legal person. On the
other hand, there is nothing to prevent heads of business from negotiat-
ing a minimal mitigation of their criminal liability that could be based on
two factual elements. On the one hand, the bona fide manager could as-
sert the quality of the compliance programme implemented under the
Sapin II Law; on the other hand, the manager could avail himself of
his full cooperation within the framework of the CJIP with an early de-
nunciation and then a comprehensive internal investigation providing
the Public Prosecutor’s Office with all the necessary evidence. It is then
possible that, on the strength of these two elements tending to prove his
154 See 27 Mar. 2017, ‘Quelle coopération entre les procureurs et les entreprises
après la loi Sapin 2’, Cercle France-Amérique, statements from Éric Russo, Deputy
National Financial Prosecutor.
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good faith, the manager could negotiate a largely attenuated sentence
with the Public Prosecutor’s Office in the form of an Appearance with
Prior Acknowledgement of Guilt (comparution sur reconnaissance
préalable de culpabilité), a procedure open to natural persons. The
CJIP cannot, however, mitigate the liability of natural persons, whether
or not they are managers, who are directly responsible for the alleged acts.
3.9. Compliance programmes and liability of the head of business
For the time being, subject to what will be explained below about
the Sapin II Law of 9 December 2016, the relevant provisions of which
came into force on 1 June 2017, compliance programmes do not play
any role in ascribing criminal liability to the heads of businesses or legal
persons.
However, while the absence of a compliance programme could not,
in the absence of a legal provision requiring its adoption, be taken into
account by the criminal court, the presence of such a programme and the
finding of its effectiveness or ineffectiveness could be taken into account
by the judge in order to assess the existence and extent of the fault com-
mitted.
Apart from the criminal framework, strictly speaking, punitive reg-
ulations recognise, albeit timidly, the role of compliance programmes;
this is the case, for example, for competition law.
3.10. Failure to adopt a compliance programme and administrative
(non-criminal) liability: the Sapin II Law
Article 17 of the Sapin II Law establishes an obligation to put in
place measures to prevent and detect corruption—i.e. an anti-corruption
compliance programme. This obligation is primarily incumbent on the
head of business (president, chief executive officer or manager). The
originality of the law is therefore to provide that the manager of a com-
pany may be held personally liable for the failure of his company to com-
ply with the measures for the prevention and detection of corruption pro-
vided for in Article 17. It is therefore up to him personally to ensure that
his company has an anti-corruption programme in accordance with
French law; otherwise, he incurs an administrative sanction of 200,000
euros pronounced by the French Anti-Corruption Agency. Regardless
of this liability, the legal person is also liable. This obligation concerns
companies and managers of companies with more than 500 employees
and a turnover exceeding 100 million euros. The legal person incurs
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an administrative penalty of 1 million euros. The law also extends the
obligation to groups of companies (for all French or foreign subsidiaries)
whose parent company is headquartered in France and which have more
than 500 employees and a consolidated turnover of over 100 million
euros.
The measures provided for in Article II of Article 17 of the Sapin II
Law are intended to prevent and detect corruption committed in France,
but also committed abroad. They aim at both the prevention and detec-
tion of public corruption (involvement of a public official) and private
corruption (between two private actors).
There is no link to criminal liability. The law does not provide for
compliance programmes to be taken into account when assessing the
criminal liability of managers and the company. There are no mitiga-
tion or aggravation mechanisms. But the Public Prosecutor’s Office
seems ready to draw inspiration from foreign experiences. In addi-
tion, it could be inspired by the practice of the Competition Authority,
which refuses to take the programmes into account when assessing
liability, instead agreeing to do so for the establishment of the sanc-
tion. (Not only does the effectiveness of the programme determine
the amount of the sanction to be fixed, but the commitment to imple-
ment a credible and substantial programme may lead to a 5–15 per
cent reduction of the fine.)
4. Defences
4.1. General remarks
In principle, the only ground for the exemption of a head of busi-
ness from criminal liability is the existence of a valid delegation of
powers—i.e. meeting the criteria set out above.
However, in theory, the absence of fault—i.e. the demonstration by
the head of business that he or she has effectively and correctly imple-
mented his or her general duty of control and supervision—should con-
stitute a defence. There are few examples of this in case law. This pos-
sibility appears essentially theoretical, given the fact that the fault of the
manager is presumed.
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers as a defence
The object of delegation concerns management powers and not
the organic function of the manager. Therefore, the manager cannot
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delegate all of his powers. 155 Indeed, the liability attached to the
function remains to a certain extent, notably because of its ‘own man-
agement powers’. 156 The head of business remains liable for a set of
cases that are not really limiting but that result from the logic of the
delegation of powers mechanism. Firstly, the Criminal Chamber held
that the effects of a delegation of powers should be reversed where
the offence is habitual. 157 Secondly, the manager remains criminally
liable for the powers that he or she has not transferred. 158 Thirdly, the
criminal liability of the delegator may be sought if he has ‘personally
participated in the commission of the offence’ attributed to the dele-
gatee. 159 The intervention of the delegator in the delegated field con-
stitutes interference, which his function allows him to do, but which
neutralises the effects of the delegation of powers because, under
these conditions, the delegate no longer has the independence neces-
sary to carry out his mission.
The delegation of powers therefore appears less a cause for ex-
emption than a cause of non-imputation. Effective management
authority is the objective prerequisite for the allocation of liability.
The delegation of powers appears to be a power-seeking instrument,
proof of which rests with the prosecution authorities. However, the
case law retains from the delegation a conception in terms of grounds
for exemption. This is likely to be due to the punitive interest of this
solution, which leads to the defence having to prove the existence of
the delegation and its validity.
Subject to what has just been said (supra), delegation of powers is
the principal, if not exclusive, defence available to the head of a com-
pany.
When it meets the required conditions (supra), it has the effect of
transferring criminal liability (entirely) to the delegate.
A purely formal (paper) delegation is not enough to exempt the de-
legator; as mentioned above, the case law verifies very precisely the
conditions of the delegation of powers.
However, in the case of unintentional offences, because he is an in-
direct perpetrator, it should be more difficult to hold him liable. He can
defend himself by showing that he has committed only a simple fault of
155 Crim., 23 May 2007; Dreyer, D. 2004, p. 937.
156 Crim., 6 Nov. 2007; Bull. 266, RSC 2008 349; DP 2008, No. 23.
157 Crim., 6 Jul. 1960; Bull. No. 360.
158 Crim., 12 Apr. 2005; Bull No. 129.
159 Crim., 6 Feb. 2001, DP No. 78; 17 Sept. 2002, DP 2003 No. 9.
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negligence and not an aggravated fault. If he succeeds in doing so, under
Article 121-3, he shall not be held liable. However, case law tends often
to retain the so-called ‘specified fault’ (first form of aggravated fault), so
the decriminalisation expected of the law of 10 July 2000 did not really
take place.
4.3. Compliance programmes
In principle, the effective implementation of a compliance pro-
gramme or the designation of a compliance officer does not in any
way exempt from liability. Even the Sapin II Law does not provide
for such an effect. However, in practice, there is nothing to prevent
the criminal court from taking this into account when assessing the ex-
istence and extent of the fault committed, but no known case law ap-
pears to have done so.
4.4. Bookkeeping offences and liability of the chartered accountant
The responsibilities of the head of business and the chartered ac-
countant or auditor are independent.
Concerning the head of business, the mere quality of the director is
insufficient to establish the moral element of the offence of presentation
of unfaithful accounts. His/her personal participation (material and mor-
al) is in principle required. This is why the case law considers that the
defendant has no ‘fraudulent intention’ when he has entrusted the ac-
counting work to a third professional accountant (CA Limoges, 2 Apr.
1997) or that certain irregularities belong to fields not falling within
its competence (CA Rennes, 30 Jan. 2003).
5. Sanctions
5.1. General remarks
The penalty in business criminal law is essentially governed by or-
dinary law.
This is the case for the main, complementary and alternative penal-
ties of which the importance of some must be stressed, such as the pro-
hibition on issuing cheques (Articles 131-19 and 131-20, Penal Code),
the penalty of confiscation (Articles 131-21 and 131-21-1, Penal Code),
the prohibition on exercising a public office or professional or social ac-
tivity (Articles 131-27 to 131-29, Penal Code), the closure of an estab-
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lishment or the exclusion from public procurements (Article 131-33 and
Article 131-34, Penal Code) and the posting and dissemination of the
pronounced decision (Article 131-35, Penal Code).
In practice, criminal judges very rarely use imprisonment and when
they do, a conditional sentence is usually provided. They are sometimes
encouraged to do so by the Ministry of Justice, which recommends the
use of conditional sentences. 160
5.2. Other punitive measures
Exclusion from public procurement. The penalty of exclusion
from public procurement contracts (Article 131-34 CP) may be incurred
in case of felony and misdemeanour. It may be incurred as an additional
penalty by natural persons and as a principal penalty by legal persons. It
has a special (limited) scope of application: it may be pronounced only
in cases expressly provided for by law. In the Criminal Code, it is pro-
vided for various offences against persons, property (this is the case for
fraud, breach of trust and concealment in particular) or the nation (this is
the case for forgery and the use of forgery; for legal persons, corruption
and trading in influence are also added). Outside the Penal Code, it is
incurred in particular for customs offences.
In labour law (illegal work), exclusion from public contracts is also
an administrative sanction that may apply to the employer (natural or le-
gal person).
In tax matters, special provisions are applicable. 161
160 Circular Crim., 19 Sept. 2012, NOR: JUSD1234837C.
161 Article 50, Finance Act No. 52-401 of 14 April 1952 for the 1952 financial
year:
I. When a person is convicted for breach of a provision of the General Tax Code
providing for criminal sanctions, the prohibition to obtain procurements from the State,
departments, municipalities, public institutions as well as companies licensed or
controlled by the State, departments and municipalities may be pronounced against
him/her by the court for a maximum period of ten years from the date on which the
sentence became final. This sanction is also imposed on legal persons under whose
cover the convicted person would act to evade the above prohibition.
Where the convicted person is a de jure or de facto manager of an undertaking
liable for the tax evaded, that undertaking may not obtain procurements from the
State, departments, municipalities and public establishments or undertakings granted
or controlled by the State, departments and municipalities for a period equal to that
of the prohibition imposed pursuant to the preceding paragraph.
Exclusion pursuant to this paragraph shall automatically cease when the
undertaking provides proof that it no longer employs the sentenced person.
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Prohibition to exercise. The prohibition to exercise a commercial
or industrial profession and the prohibition to direct, administer, manage
or control an undertaking (Article 131-27 CP) is a penalty which may be
imposed in case of felony or misdemeanour on a natural or legal person
only where the law expressly so provides (special (limited) scope of ap-
plication). In particular, it is incurred in the Penal Code with regard to
offences against persons, offences against property (particularly in cases
of fraud, breach of trust and concealment), offences against the nation
(in particular corruption; in the case of forgery, the penalty is incurred
only for legal persons).
Tax matters. Individuals guilty of any of the offences relating to
direct taxes, value added tax and other turnover taxes, registration duty,
property advertising tax and stamp duty are liable to the following op-
tional additional penalties (CGI, Article 1750, 1° and 2°): the prohibi-
tion, in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 131-27
of the Penal Code, to exercise directly or indirectly, for its own account
or for the account of others, a liberal, commercial or industrial profes-
sion; and to direct, administer, manage or control in any capacity what-
soever, directly or indirectly, for its own account or for the account of
others, a commercial or industrial undertaking or a commercial com-
pany.
Customs matters. Natural persons guilty of the offences provided
for in Articles 414 and 459 of the Customs Code are liable to optional
additional penalties (Customs Code, Article 432a, 1° and 2°): the prohi-
bition, in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 131-27 of
the Penal Code, to exercise a commercial or industrial profession, to di-
rect, administer, manage or control, directly or indirectly, for its own ac-
count or for the account of others, a commercial or industrial undertak-
ing or a commercial company, the duration of this prohibition being a
maximum of 15 years (Penal Code, Article 432a, 1° and 2°), Article
131-27, Paragraph 2).
5.3. Confiscation
Nature. The confiscation penalty belongs to the category of alter-
native penalties (Articles 131-6, 10° and 131-14, 6°, Penal Code) and
of additional penalties (Article 131-16, 5°, Penal Code; Article 430,
Customs Code; Article L. 321-15, Commercial Code) which are some-
II. The provisions of paragraph I shall apply to undertakings which execute part of the
above orders as subcontractors.
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times mandatory—in the presence of objects which are defined by law
or regulation as dangerous or harmful or whose possession is unlawful
(Article 131-21, Paragraph 7, Penal Code)—and sometimes optional.
According to the special provisions contained in the Customs Code
and the Commercial Code, the confiscation penalty is also sometimes
incurred as a principal penalty (Articles 412, 414 and 416, Customs
Code; L. 322-5 Commercial Code).
Domain. The scope of the different types of confiscation varies ac-
cording to the penalty incurred.
(1) All offences punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment may
be subject to confiscation in accordance with Article 131-21 of the Penal
Code, irrespective of the subject matter.
The Criminal Code is not the only collection of punitive texts. Thus,
undeclared work is provided for and punished by Articles L. 8221-1, L.
8221-3 and L. 8224-1 of the Labour Code. The same applies to the of-
fence of tax evasion 162 or the above-mentioned provisions of the Cus-
toms Code. 163
Only property owned or freely disposed 164 of by the convict is con-
cerned. Furthermore, subject to compulsory confiscation (infra; danger-
ous or harmful objects or objects whose possession is unlawful), confis-
cation requires linking the offence to seized property (the property is the
means of the offence: it has been used to commit the offence or is in-
tended to commit it; the property is the subject of the offence; the prop-
erty is the proceeds (direct or indirect) of the offence).
(2) In addition to these hypotheses, the Penal Code authorises the
confiscation of property whose connection with the offence committed
is only presumed. 165
This only concerns offences punishable by at least five years’ im-
prisonment. The offence must have provided a direct or indirect benefit,
which is assessed as such without the law requiring it to be in confor-
162 S. Detraz, Les Sanctions de la Fraude Fiscale à l’Épreuve des Principes
Constitutionnels et Européens: Dr. Fisc. 2014, 625.
163 Offences punishable by a penalty of less than one year do not fall within the
scope of confiscation as provided for in Article 131-21 of the Penal Code. This does
not mean that this penalty does not apply. It may be pronounced if a special text so
provides.
164 This concept makes it possible to reach the property of which the sentenced
person is not the owner but of which he is the beneficial owner, although neither the
law nor the case law has yet provided a uniform and unambiguous definition of the
concept.
165 Article 131-21, Paragraph 5 of the Penal Code.
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mity with property liable to confiscation. There is therefore no need to
establish that it was acquired with illicit assets. The confiscation of prop-
erty may be ordered if the person prosecuted does not prove the origin of
the property without the investigators having the obligation to bring it
into line with the crime committed. Understood in this sense, confisca-
tion may involve property the value of which goes far beyond the profits
the person has made from the offence. Thus, all ‘unjustified’ assets are
forfeitable even if the initial profit is less important, or even small. A
presumption mechanism naturally implies that the unjustified patrimony
is the result of the direct or indirect profit generated by the offence. As a
result, confiscation can only relate to what the convicted person has ac-
quired or has had free disposal of during the period of commission of the
facts. On the other hand, it does not appear possible to deprive him/her
of previously acquired property, even if he/she would not be able to jus-
tify it.
(3) In addition, the Penal Code authorises confiscation of (all) as-
sets. 166
This penalty is provided for the most serious offences specifically
listed by law. 167 The most peculiar characteristic of this category of con-
fiscation is the fact that it is incurred as such, without any direct, indirect
or even presumed link to the offence. This is the meaning of the judg-
ment of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on 8 July
2015. 168 The confiscation of assets refers to all assets owned or freely
166 Article 131-21, Paragraph 6, Penal Code.
167 This is the case with regard to crimes against humanity (Articles 213-1, 4°
and 213-3, 2°, Penal Code), terrorism (Article 422-6, Penal Code), trafficking in
human beings, procuring and the resulting offences (Article 225-25, Penal Code),
corruption of simple minors and organised gangs, dissemination of child
pornography images in simple and organised gangs (Article 227-33, Penal Code),
offences relating to counterfeit money (Article 442-16, Penal Code), money
laundering resulting from a felony or a misdemeanour (Article 324-7, 12°, Penal
Code), association de malfaiteurs with a view to the preparation of an offence pun-
ishable by ten years’ imprisonment (Article 450-5), and non-justification of re-
sources when the additional penalty of confiscation of assets is incurred for the re-
lated offence (Article 321-10-1, Paragraph 2, Penal Code). The law of 9 July 2010
redefined the framework of Article 222-49 of the Penal Code, which already pro-
vided for the possible confiscation of the assets of those who commit certain of-
fences against narcotics legislation. The offences of transporting, detaining, offering,
selling, acquiring or using illicit narcotic drugs have been added, so that almost all
the incriminations provided for in this respect are now concerned (Article 222-49,
Paragraph 2, referring to the provisions of Article 222-37).
168 According to the Court, it follows from the provisions of Article 222-49,
Paragraph 2, Penal Code which provides for the confiscation of the property of
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disposed of by the person, whatever they may be and especially what-
ever their date of acquisition.
Rights of third parties. The confiscation of property freely dis-
posed of 169 by the sentenced person shall be subject only to the rights
of the owner in good faith.
Good faith is presumed. It is therefore up to the prosecution to show
that the owner of the thing left to the convict’s free disposal is acting in
bad faith.
Nota Bene. Regarding absence of ignorance of the owner: some
seizure decisions suggest a particularly rigorous conception of good
faith, opening the door to a more flexible assessment of bad faith.
The latter is not limited to the reported evidence of what the owner knew
of the fraudulent use that was made of his property or the nature of the
offences committed by the person who had the free disposal of his prop-
erty. It may also result from circumstances that suggest he could not
ignore it. 170
persons guilty of drug offences, that this penalty may be imposed ‘without it being
necessary to establish that the property has been acquired illegally or that it
constitutes the direct or indirect proceeds of the offence’, Crim., 8 Jul. 2015, No.
14-86.938.
169 A person had the vehicle he was driving confiscated for driving it without a
licence on the grounds that it had been used for the commission of the offence. The
problem was that the said vehicle did not belong to the convicted person but to the
SARL of which he was the manager. The company therefore intervened voluntarily
before the Court of Appeal in order to obtain its restitution. This approach did not
succeed because the accused regularly drove without a licence and because, in
addition, though he was not the direct owner of the confiscated vehicle, he was at
least free to dispose of it. It is this analysis that the Criminal Chamber of the
Court of Cassation validated in a decision of 3 February 2014. See also, Crim., 15
January 2014, No. 13-81.874 on the assessment of the owner ’s bona fide
confiscation requirement (JCP G 2014, 136). Thus understood, bad faith refers to
the owner’s knowledge of the use that was made of the property—in other words,
that it had been used to commit the offence. It is true that it could not be
otherwise. The representative of the legal person was the manager responsible for
the principal offence—two legal personalities for the same intent, so that the legal
person could not ignore the use made of the vehicle.
170 Crim., 9 Dec. 2014, No. 13-85.150: An investigating judge ordered the
seizure of two buildings jointly and severally owned by the accused and his wife.
With regard to the latter, who was not prosecuted, it was said that ‘sharing her daily
life since 1997, knowing his criminal record, she can hardly claim to have ignored
the doubtful origin of these funds with regard to the financial situation of her
partner, who had lived through a period of unemployment and whose income was
not high.’ A statement of reasons for the seizure was upheld by the chamber of
investigation, while the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation rejected the
appeal in that ‘in the state of these statements, from which it follows that Mrs Y.
could not be regarded as a bona fide owner within the meaning of Article 131-21 of
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The victim is a bona fide third party whose property cannot be con-
fiscated (even if it was used to commit the offence) and must be re-
turned.
Case of legal persons.
Felonies and misdemeanours. Law No. 2010-768 of 9 July 2010
redefined the legal regime for confiscation from legal persons. Hence-
forth, the confiscation pronounced against legal persons follows the
same legal regime as that applicable to natural persons, subject to the
following remarks.
Petty offences. The regulation which punishes the offence may pro-
vide for certain additional penalties mentioned in Article 131-16 of the
Penal Code (Penal Code, Article 131-43). This is the case for the con-
fiscation of ‘the thing which served or was intended to commit the of-
fence or the thing which is the product of it’ (Article 131-16, 5°) as well
as that of ‘the animal used to commit the offence or against which the
offence was committed’ (Article 131-16, 10°) whose legal regime is
modelled on that of Article 131-21 (Article 131-48, Paragraph 5). One
of the consequences is notably the possibility of pronouncing the sen-
tence in value terms.
Confiscation of assets. The confiscation of assets liable to be im-
posed on legal persons does not follow the same legal regime as that of
natural persons. Penalty is only possible in the case of crimes against
humanity (Criminal Code, Article 213-3), certain offences of procuring
(Article 225-25) or terrorist acts (Article 422-6).
In customs matters, confiscation is a penalty of a fiscal/administra-
tive (not criminal) nature which is subject to a specific regime defined
by the Customs Code.
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against the indi-
vidual head of business
Constitutional Council case law. The ne bis in idem principle
does not have constitutional value in France (constant solution since
1989 171). Nevertheless, the principle of necessity (provided for by
Article 8 DDHC) may lead to the prohibition of the accumulation
the Penal Code, and since it is not important whether the person indicted had only
undivided rights in the seized real estate, the investigating chamber justified its
decision’.
171 Implicit but certain solution: Cons. const. 28 Jul. 1989, No. 89-260 DC, Loi
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of prosecution and punitive sanctions. Indeed, ‘the principle of neces-
sity of penalties does not only apply to sentences handed down by the
criminal courts, but extends to any sanction having the character of a
punishment’. 172 However, this principle ‘shall not preclude the same
acts committed by the same person from being prosecuted differently
for the purposes of sanctions of a different nature under separate sets
of rules’. 173 Thus, accumulation is prohibited only in respect of ‘the
same acts’, ‘committed by the same person’, ‘liable to be subject to
sanctions which are not of a different nature’. 174 A final criterion as-
sumes that sanctions fall under ‘separate sets of rules’. While this cri-
terion also extends the requirement that proceedings and sanctions be
subject to the same order of jurisdiction, 175 it now appears to require
only that the ‘two punitive systems protect the same social inter-
ests’. 176
Two clarifications are needed regarding the interpretation and appli-
cation of these criteria.
Firstly, subject to the decision of 18 March 2015, 177 if the Coun-
cil finds that the criminal and administrative financial penalties ‘are
comparable in amount’, the fact that the criminal court may impose
Relative à la Sécurité et à la Transparence du Marché Financier, JO 1 Aug. 1989 p.
9676.
172 Ibid. cons. 22.
173 Cons. const., 18 Mar. 2015, No. 2014-453/454 QPC and No. 2015-462 QPC
(EADS).
174 Cons. 26.
175 This requirement was presented as a fourth criterion. Affirmed by the Council
in 2015, it was challenged from the outset and quickly abandoned. This criterion was
based on the duality of jurisdictional orders: the judicial order to which criminal
sanctions belong and the administrative order to which part of the administrative
sanctions belong. It should be noted that some of the sanctions imposed by the
Independent Administrative Authorities (such as the Competition Authority or the
Financial Market Authority) are punitive in nature and fall within the judicial order
and not within the administrative order. According to this test, therefore, it was
sufficient that the proceedings were not within the same order of jurisdiction for
accumulation to be permitted.
176 Recital 25.
177 Decision cited above in which the Council considered, on the one hand, that
‘the financial penalties imposed by the sanctions commission of the Autorité des
Marchés Financiers can be very severe and reach...up to six times those incurred
before the criminal court’ and, on the other hand, that the functions of
administrative sanctions (taking into account the seriousness of the breaches
committed and the benefits or profits, if any, derived from such breaches) are
comparable to criminal sanctions (imposed according to the circumstances of the
offence and the personality of the perpetrator). It concluded that the facts ‘must
be regarded as susceptible to sanctions which are not of a different nature’ (recital
26).
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other penalties (imprisonment for natural persons and dissolution for
legal persons, besides additional penalties), this is sufficient to con-
clude that ‘the facts provided for and punished by the aforementioned
articles must be regarded as likely to give rise to sanctions of a dif-
ferent nature’ and therefore to consider the accumulation
authorised. 178 Thus, the mere fact that the criminal court can impose,
in addition to a fine, a prison sentence or an additional penalty is suf-
ficient to allow accumulation.
This approach obliterates the scope of the principle of necessity,
as only a few criminal offences do not carry a prison sentence. More-
over, as regards those carrying only a fine, the latter are often accom-
panied by additional penalties, and even if this is not the case, the fine
may still be replaced by one of the alternative penalties listed in Ar-
ticle 131-6 of the Penal Code, in accordance with Article 131-7 of the
same Code. Thus, in any event, the criminal court may impose a sen-
tence of a non-monetary nature. This leads the doctrine to hold that
the ‘earthquake’ resulting from the Grande Stevens decision was only
a minor jolt.
This is all the more true since, secondly, the Council affirmed (in
the context of tax procedures) that ‘the principle of the necessity of of-
fences and penalties cannot prevent the legislator from laying down sep-
arate rules allowing the initiation of procedures leading to the applica-
tion of several sanctions in order to ensure effective punishment of of-
fences’. 179 Thus, since administrative and criminal procedures (and pen-
alties) ‘make it possible to ensure the protection of the State’s financial
interests together with equality before the tax authorities, pursuing com-
mon purposes that are both dissuasive and punitive’, ‘the recovery of the
necessary public contribution and the objective of combating tax evasion
justify the initiation of additional procedures in the most serious cases of
fraud’. Consequently, ‘in addition to the inspections on the basis of
which the tax authorities may apply financial penalties, it is possible
to initiate criminal proceedings under the conditions and procedures pro-
vided for by law’.
The Court of Cassation implemented the principles laid down by
the Constitutional Council and ruled out the application of Protocol 7
to the CESDH by stating: ‘Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, supplementing
178 Cons. const., 14 Jan. 2016, No. 2015-513/514/526 QPC.
179 Decision No. 2016-545 QPC du 24 Jun. 2016, M. Alec W. et al., Pénalités
Fiscales pour Insuffisance de Déclaration et Sanctions Pénales pour Fraude Fiscale,
cons. 21.
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the European Convention on Human Rights, only applies, according to
the reservation made by France, to offences falling within the jurisdic-
tion of criminal courts under French law and does not prohibit the im-
position of tax penalties in parallel with the penalties imposed by the pu-
nitive judge’ and that ‘contrary to what the plaintiff maintains, this res-
ervation is not challenged by the European Court of Human Rights’.
Moreover, it added that ‘Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
does not in itself have the effect of prohibiting, as a matter of principle,
the accumulation of tax and criminal penalties’. 180 This decision was is-
sued after the decision of the European Court in case A and B v. Norway
of November 2016.
Finally, the principle of necessity, as interpreted by the Council,
does little to limit accumulation cases.
However, in the case of authorised accumulation, ‘the principle of
proportionality implies that in any event the aggregate amount of any
penalties imposed shall not exceed the higher of one of the penalties in-
curred’. 181
Where accumulation is prohibited, the case law of the Constitu-
tional Council requires the legislator either to maintain in force only
one of the two procedures or to provide a mechanism for coordinating
proceedings. 182
180 Cass. Crim., 22 Feb. 2017, No. 14-82.526; Cass. Crim., 28 Jun 2017, No. 16-
81.149; Cass. Crim., 13 Sept. 2017, No. 15-84.823.
181 Constant case law since the above-mentioned 1989 decision.
182 This was the case with market abuse. The reform took place with the law of
21 June 2016 (L. No. 2016-819 reforming the system of repression of market
abuse). Of all the possible options (decriminalisation, limitation of administrative
penalties, etc.), the referral (aiguillage) solution was finally chosen in this area—-
i.e. consultation between the public prosecutor and the French Financial Market
Authority (AMF) aimed at avoiding double prosecution. Neither the AMF nor
the public prosecutor (Article 705-1 CPP) can initiate proceedings if the other
has already taken this initiative against the same person for the same facts (Article
L. 465-3-6, I Monetary and Financial Code). In addition, prior to any initiation of
public proceedings or notification of a grievance, the public prosecutor or the AMF
must inform the other of its intention. The informed authority then has a period of
two months to indicate whether or not it intends to institute proceedings for these
facts (Article L. 465-3-6, II and III MFC). Silence kept by the informed authority is
tantamount to acceptance of the undertaking of the pursuit by the other. On the
other hand, if it also wishes to take legal action, there may be a discussion between
the two. Failing a waiver by one of the two authorities, the Attorney General of the
Paris Court of Appeal is competent to arbitrate. He has two months in which to ren-
der his decision, which will be final and cannot be appealed (Article L. 465-3-6, IV
MFC). In order to avoid undermining the referral mechanism, the law of 21 June
2016 restricts the possibility of a civil party petition with regard to market abuse.
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Exchange of information and transmission of procedures.
Criminal prosecution authorities may receive disclosure of docu-
ments by independent administrative authorities such as the Compe-
tition Authority (Article L. 462-6, Paragraph 2, Commercial Code) or
the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (Article L. 621-20-1 MFC) who
may become aware of criminal acts when carrying out their own
supervisory activities.
In tax matters, the evidence gathered in the course of the tax pro-
ceedings—in particular through the power to access premises—may be
used in concurrent or subsequent criminal proceedings. The judicial
authority and the police also require the tax administration to provide
information, including information gathered in the course of adminis-
trative proceedings.
Right to silence in administrative proceedings: customs matters.
Customs (non-judicial) officers may require professionals to provide
documents and information even from those who may have taken part
in the offence to which these documents relate; moreover, refusal con-
stitutes a fifth-class customs offence (Customs Code, Article 413 bis,
§ 1). However, the Court of Cassation does not see any violation of Ar-
ticle 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Cass. Crim, 16
June 1999, No. 98-83.451); in the same sense, according to the Consti-
tutional Council, ‘Article 65 of the Customs Code ignores neither the
principle that no one is bound to accuse himself, which derives from Ar-
ticle 9 of the Declaration of 1789, nor any other right or freedom that the
Constitution guarantees’ (Cons. const., 27 Jan. 2012, No. 2011-214
QPC).
6.2. Parallel criminal or administrative proceedings against the legal
person and against the individual head of business
Parallel proceedings against the legal person and the head of busi-
ness on the same facts are permitted. No concentration or coordination
of prosecutions is required or organised.
Thus, in tax matters, the solution was expressly affirmed by the
Court of Cassation, based in particular on the judgment of the Court
Indeed, if the alleged victim could initiate public proceedings by filing a complaint
with a civil party before the investigating judge or a direct summons to appear be-
fore the criminal court, even though proceedings before the AMF are already under
way, the problem of double prosecution would arise again. This is the reason why,
from now on, a civil party petition is admissible only if the prosecutor has the pos-
sibility to prosecute (Article L. 465-3-6, VII and VIII MFC).
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of Justice of 5 April 2017: ‘Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights does not preclude criminal proceedings from being instituted
for tax evasion against the natural person, the representative of the legal
person who has been subject to tax sanctions for the same facts (cf. the
ECJ judgment of 5 April 2017, C-217/15 and C-350/15)’. 183
As to the possibility of using evidence obtained in the course of ad-
ministrative proceedings in criminal proceedings, the same rules as those
indicated above (see 6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceed-
ings against the individual head of business) apply.
6.3. Is the individual liability of the head of business shielded or dimin-
ished if the corporation has previously pleaded guilty?
Liabilities of the legal person and the natural person are indepen-
dent. Thus, the legal person may conclude a judicial convention of pub-
lic interest (CJIP, see above) with the public prosecutor (Article 41-1-2
CPP). This does not affect the conditions under which its managers may
be held criminally liable or subject to prosecution.
With regard to the procedure for appearance on prior acknowl-
edgement of guilt (CRPC, Article 495-7 CPP seq.), the circular of
2 September 2004 184 states that ‘the new provisions do not exclude
the application of the CRPC to a legal entity, which must then be rep-
resented by a natural person in accordance with the provisions of Ar-
ticle 706-43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Because of the pro-
visions of Article 706-44, which prohibits any coercive measure
against the person representing the legal person being prosecuted, on-
ly the proceeding of “convocation” may be used. In practice, it may
be advisable in the event of the use of the CRPC against a legal per-
son, that only the latter be prosecuted and that the CRPC not be used
at the same time against the legal representative of the legal person,
even if there is nothing to prevent recourse at the same time to this
procedure against the natural person’.
6.4. Accumulation of sanctions and proportionality
As noted above, where accumulation of proceedings and penalties
is permitted, this accumulation is referred to as ‘capped’. This means
183 Crim., 6 Dec. 2017 – No. 16-81.857.
184 Crim., 2004-12 E8/02-09-2004.
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that it is limited by the principle of proportionality, which requires taking
into account the amount of sanctions imposed in relation to the same
facts so that the aggregate amount of sanctions imposed does not exceed
the legal maximum incurred.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Debate on the implementation of Art. 3 of the PIF Convention
In Germany, Art. 3 of the PIF Convention on the liability of heads
of business has not been implemented by a new legal provision. The leg-
islator has justified this by the fact that the existing provisions are suffi-
cient, because Art. 3 does not require the introduction of a criminal of-
fence regarding the violation of obligatory supervision. 1 No further ex-
planation was given. The background is the following.
1.1.1. Existing criminal provisions
Heads of business and other decision-makers could be held
criminally liable on the basis of their intentional acts or omissions
as principals (sect. 25 (1) StGB), joint principals (sect. 25 (2) StGB),
abettors (sect. 26 StGB) or aiders (sect. 27 (1) StGB), if an inten-
tional PIF offence—for instance, a fraud (sect. 263 StGB)—is com-
mitted by a person under their authority acting on behalf of the busi-
ness. According to jurisprudence, 2 the head of business, if he has
1 Bundestag document No. 13/10425, 12.
2 BGHSt 40, 218, 236 f.; 48, 331, 342; 49, 147, 163 f.
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given instructions to an employee, can be not only an abettor, but
even an indirect perpetrator (by virtue of the rule of organisation:
kraft Organisationsherrschaft). 3 On the other hand, a head of busi-
ness can also be criminally liable for an intentional omission (sect.
13 (1) StGB). According to the prevailing opinion in criminal
science, 4 finally confirmed by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH)
in 2009 and again in 2012, 5 the head of business is responsible un-
der law to ensure that a company-related crime (betriebsbezogene
Straftat), committed by a person under his authority, does not occur
(so-called criminal-law business employer liability: strafrechtliche
Geschäftsherrenhaftung). Furthermore, an intentional omission by
the head of business or decision-maker is in general equivalent to
the realisation of the statutory elements of an offence through a posi-
tive act. 6 In such a case, he has failed to fulfil his duty of obligatory
supervision. Therefore, he may be punished as a principal or secondary
participant. 7 As all PIF offences are intentional offences (see Art. 1
PIF Convention), it is not possible for the head of business or any other
decision-maker to be held liable under criminal law for negligent con-
duct or omission. A criminal liability for negligence presupposes that
the negligent commission (e.g. of fraud) is also punishable by law—i.e.
that a corresponding criminal negligence offence exists.
1.1.2. Violation of obligatory supervision
The criminal liability of the head of business or another decision-
maker for an intentional company-related crime, committed by a person
under his authority, requires not only proof of causality but also proof of
intent (and, in case of fraud, proof of enrichment intent: Bereicherungs-
absicht). These proofs are often very difficult to provide. Regarding
causality, the prevailing opinion demands that by the necessary supervi-
sory measures, the success of a crime would have been prevented ‘with
almost certain probability’, 8 since the application of the so-called ‘risk-
increase doctrine’ (Risikoerhöhungslehre) contradicts current criminal
3 Overview Waßmer, in: Heidelberger Kommentar zum StGB, 2nd ed. 2015, § 25
marginal no. 38 et seq.
4 Cf. only Geneuss ZIS 2016, 259, 260.
5 BGHSt 54, 44; BGHSt 57, 42.
6 Cf. only Fischer, StGB, 64nd. ed. 2017, § 263 marginal no. 22.
7 Cf. only Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 336 et
seq.
8 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 321 et seq.
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law. 9 Furthermore, with regard to the mental element, usually not only
will the proof that the head of business or another decision-maker knew
about the possibility of committing the offence be very difficult to con-
duct, but so too will the proof that he ‘wanted’ the offence.
In order to overcome these practical difficulties, the German Act on
Regulatory Offences (OWiG) contains within sect. 130 OWiG a provi-
sion on the ‘violation of obligatory supervision in operations and enter-
prises’ that significantly reduces the requirements. The official transla-
tion 10 of sect. 130 (1) OWiG is as follows:
Sect. 130 OWiG – Violation of obligatory supervision in operations
and enterprises
(1) Whoever, as the owner of an operation or undertaking, inten-
tionally or negligently omits to take the supervisory measures required
to prevent contraventions, within the operation or undertaking, of duties
incumbent on the owner and the violation of which carries a criminal
penalty or a regulatory fine, shall be deemed to have committed a reg-
ulatory offence in a case where such contravention has been committed
as would have been prevented, or made much more difficult, if there had
been proper supervision. The required supervisory measures shall also
comprise appointment, careful selection and surveillance of supervisory
personnel.
On the one hand, the strict causality requirement is reduced, since it
is sufficient that the contravention committed by a person under super-
vision would have been made ‘much more difficult’ by proper supervi-
sion. On the other hand, not only an intentional, but also a negligent vio-
lation of supervisory duties is covered. Finally, committing an offence is
a mere objective condition of punishment (objektive Bedingung der
Ahndung)—that is, intent and negligence on the part of the supervisor
need not extend to it.
However, it should be noted that sect. 130 OWiG is a mere admin-
istrative offence. The German legislator has not introduced a criminal
offence for the breach of the supervisory obligation—i.e. ‘upgraded’
sect. 130 OWiG—because the head of business could be declared crim-
9 Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 47th ed. 2017, marginal
no. 297.
10 Official translation of the German Act on Regulatory Offences in the version
of 12.5.2015 provided by Neil Mussett, available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/owig/index.html
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inally liable if he has intentionally failed to fulfil his duty of supervision
and has therefore participated in a company-related crime committed by
a person under his authority.
Apart from that, the introduction of a specific criminal offence
with regard to the violation of obligatory supervision and based on
sect. 130 (1) OWiG—i.e. a further ‘extension’ of criminal liability—-
would encounter considerable resistance in criminal science. German
criminal law is based on the principle of legality and the principle of
culpability (cf. Art. 103 German Basic Law (GG); sect. 1 StGB).
These principles also apply to the regulatory offences law, whereby
the principle of legality follows from the law (sect. 3 OWiG) and
the principle of culpability from the jurisdiction of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court. 11 Therefore, serious constitutional and dogmatic
objections were raised quite early against the extensive concept of
sect. 130 OWiG. 12 It was assumed that the offence is linked to the
abstract endangerment of legal interests (abstraktes Gefährdungs-
delikt). 13 According to the now dominant opinion, 14 these concerns
are resolved. Sect. 130 OWiG does not oblige taking meaningful ab-
stract actions, but only avoiding the concrete danger that subordinates
commit contraventions that belong to certain areas. Therefore, sect.
130 OWiG is constituted by the concrete endangerment of legal inter-
ests (konkretes Gefährdungsdelikt). In addition, the objections raised
against the reception of the risk-increase doctrine can be overcome by
a restrictive interpretation, since the danger must have been realised
in the subordinate’s contravention (protective purpose context:
Schutzzweckzusammenhang). 15
1.1.3. Debate on the extension of criminal liability
In recent decades, there have been debates on whether liability
11 Cf. only BVerfGE 9, 167, 169.
12 Schünemann, Unternehmenskriminalität und Strafrecht, 1979, p. 208 et seq.;
Thiemann, Aufsichtspflichtverletzung in Betrieben und Unternehmen, 1976, p. 104
et seq.
13 Thiemann, Aufsichtspflichtverletzung in Betrieben und Unternehmen, 1976, p.
114.
14 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 19, 21.
15 Achenbach, wistra 1998, 298 et seq.; Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum
OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal no. 113.
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should be extended, in order to clarify the position of the head of busi-
ness and to eliminate or mitigate causality problems.
The introduction of a specific criminal offence has often been
suggested. In the 1970s, not only did the Commission of Experts
on Combating Economic Crime 16 and the Interministerial Working
Group on Environmental Liability and Criminal Environmental
Law 17 support the introduction of a new criminal offence, but the in-
troduction was also recommended by scientists 18 and the 49th Ger-
man Lawyers’ Day (Deutscher Juristentag) in 1972. 19 It was argued
that traditional criminal offences cannot be applied to economic mis-
conduct due to the division of labour and collectivisation. In 1979,
Schünemann 20 suggested amending sect. 13 StGB for criminal of-
fences as well as sect. 8 OWiG for regulatory offences, establishing
the risk-increase doctrine. However, in science, the proposals were
predominantly rejected since the implementation of the risk-increase
doctrine in criminal law was seen as an unacceptable erosion of cen-
tral principles. 21 Therefore, the German legislator did not take up the
proposals.
However, changes were made in 1994 to the regulatory offences
law, revising sect. 130 OWiG. Prior to this, the provision presup-
posed that contravention had been ‘prevented’ under proper supervi-
sion, which required proof that the contravention would have been
avoided with near certainty. 22 However, in practice, this proof could
hardly be provided. As early as 1983, the Federal Government’s
draft law on the Second Act to Combat White-Collar Crime pro-
posed an improved ‘functional and practicable design’ of sect. 130
OWiG, 23 following the recommendations of the Expert Commission
on Economic Crime, 24 by implementing the risk-increase doctrine.
16 Sachverständigenkommission zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität,
Tagungsberichte Bd. XIV, 1978, p. 30 et seq.
17 Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe ‘Umwelthaftungs- und Umweltstrafrecht’,
Arbeitskreis ‘Umweltstrafrecht’, 1988, p. 78 et seq.
18 Tiedemann,Welche strafrechtlichen Mittel empfehlen sich für eine wirksamere
Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität? Gutachten C zum 49. DJT, 1972, p. C 56 et
seq.
19 Verhandlungen des DJT, Vol. II, 1972, M 109.
20 Schünemann, Unternehmenskriminalität, 1979, p. 207.
21 Waßmer, Strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 360 et seq.
22 BGH wistra 1982, 34.
23 Bundestag document No. 10/318, 43 et seq.
24 Sachverständigenkommission zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität,
Tagungsberichte Bd. XIV, 1978, p. 42 et seq.
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The Committee on Legal Affairs (Rechtsausschuss) of the Bundes-
tag, however, rejected this proposal in 1986 because it would have
changed the structure of sect. 130 OWiG, and because difficulties
of proof do not justify change. 25 In 1991, the Federal Government’s
draft law on the Second Law on Combating Environmental Crime
took up the proposal again. 26 It was stated that deviations from
the requirement of strict causality are not alien even to criminal
law; for example, according to the jurisdiction, aiding (sect. 27
StGB) does not require the activity to be the cause of the criminal
success of the offence, because it is sufficient to encourage or facil-
itate the offence. 27 The German Bundesrat took up the proposal and
demanded the introduction of a criminal offence, supplementing
sect. 130 OWiG. 28 However, the Committee on Legal Affairs de-
clined to do so, but was in favour of the revision of sect. 130 OWiG.
For this reason, since 1994 it has been sufficient that the contraven-
tion would have been made ‘much more difficult’ had there been
proper supervision.
1.2. Debate on corporate criminal liability
The German legal system only provides for administrative liability.
Sect. 30 OWiG, which permits the imposition of regulatory fines, is not
limited to specific company-related offences. 29 It applies to all criminal
and regulatory offences as a result of which duties incumbent on the le-
gal person or on the association of persons have been violated, or where
the legal person or the association has been enriched or was intended to
be enriched. All PIF offences are included, not only fraud affecting the
EU financial interests (PIF Convention), but also active and passive cor-
ruption of officials (First Protocol) as well as money laundering (Second
Protocol). The official translation of sect. 30 (1) and (2) OWiG is as fol-
lows:
Sect. 30 – Regulatory Fine Imposed on Legal Persons and on As-
sociations of Persons
25 Bundestag document No. 10/5058, 37.
26 Bundestag document No. 12/192, 33.
27 Bundestag document No. 12/192, 33.
28 Bundestag document No. 12/192, 38 et seq.
29 Cf. only Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130
marginal no. 103 et seq.
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(1) Where someone acting
1. as an entity authorised to represent a legal person or as a member
of such an entity,
2. as chairman of the executive committee of an association without
legal capacity or as a member of such committee,
3. as a partner authorised to represent a partnership with legal capa-
city, or
4. as the authorised representative with full power of attorney or in
a managerial position as procura-holder or the authorised representative
with a commercial power of attorney of a legal person or of an associa-
tion of persons referred to in numbers 2 or 3,
5. as another person responsible on behalf of the management of the
operation or enterprise forming part of a legal person, or of an associa-
tion of persons referred to in numbers 2 or 3, also covering supervision
of the conduct of business or other exercise of controlling powers in a
managerial position, has committed a criminal offence or a regulatory
offence as a result of which duties incumbent on the legal person or
on the association of persons have been violated, or where the legal per-
son or the association of persons has been enriched or was intended to be
enriched, a regulatory fine may be imposed on such person or associa-
tion.
(2) The regulatory fine shall amount
1. in the case of a criminal offence committed with intent, to not
more than ten million euros,
2. in the case of a criminal offence committed negligently, to not
more than five million euros.
Where there has been commission of a regulatory offence, the
maximum regulatory fine that can be imposed shall be determined
by the maximum regulatory fine imposable for the regulatory offence
concerned. If the Act refers to this provision, the maximum amount of
the regulatory fine in accordance with the second sentence shall be
multiplied by ten for the offences referred to in the Act. The second
sentence shall also apply where there has been commission of an act
simultaneously constituting a criminal offence and a regulatory of-
fence, provided that the maximum regulatory fine imposable for the
regulatory offence exceeds the maximum pursuant to the first sen-
tence.
The introduction of criminal liability has been the subject of lively
debate for more than 200 years. In the course of the enlightenment, dur-
ing the nineteenth century it became generally accepted in the German
legal arena that a punishment of legal persons was inappropriate, be-
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cause punishment presupposes the capacity to act and the culpability of
a natural person. 30 Therefore, neither the particular criminal laws of the
German states, nor the Imperial Criminal Code of 1871 (Reichsstraf-
gesetzbuch: RStGB) contained provisions on criminal liability. In
1887, the German Imperial Court (Reichsgericht) confirmed that a legal
person ‘as a fictitious legal entity is deprived of its natural capacity to act
and, at the same time, of its criminal responsibility for what its organs
act in their representation’. 31 Nevertheless, in 1919, after the First World
War, sect. 357 Imperial Fiscal Code (RAO) (the later sect. 393 RAO)
was introduced, which established criminal liability of legal persons in
tax criminal law, probably due to fiscal interests. However, the provision
did not gain any practical significance until it was repealed in 1967, be-
cause the German Imperial Court ruled in 1926 32 that the punishment of
the management excluded punishment of the legal person.
After the Second World War, the policy debate was revived in West
Germany as provisions, which were enacted by the Allied occupation
forces, regarding foreign exchange and antitrust law, imposing criminal
sanctions against legal persons. 33 In 1953, the German Federal Court of
Justice (BGH) considered the provisions, which were regarded as ex-
pressions of Anglo-Saxon legal thought, applicable but contrary to the
principles and notions of German criminal law since they did not reflect
the social-ethical concept of culpability and punishment. 34
The debate continued during the Great Reform of Criminal Law in
the 1950s and 1960s. Following a controversial debate, the Great Crim-
inal Law Commission (Große Strafrechtskommission) rejected by a ma-
jority the criminal liability of legal persons, but ultimately voted in fa-
vour of including at least a provision in the general part of the Criminal
Code that would allow ‘monetary sanctions’. 35 This was intended to ab-
sorb illegal profits and other illegal benefits. Later, the Special Commit-
tee (Sonderausschuss) of the German Bundestag for the Criminal Law
Reform dealt again with the question. After an intensive discussion, a
compromise solution was found, implementing an amendment to the
OWiG. 36 Sect. 23 OWiG (the later sect. 30 OWiG) was introduced
30 Fundamental Paul Johann Anselm von Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des gemeinen in
Deutschland geltenden Peinlichen Rechts, 1801, p. 29.
31 RGSt. 16, 121, 123 et seq.
32 RGSt. 61, 92, 95 et seq.
33 Jescheck, ZStW 65 (1953), 211, 217 et seq.
34 BGHSt 5, 28, 32 et seq.
35 Niederschriften der Großen Strafrechtskommission, Bd. IV, 1958, p. 329 et
seq., 333 et seq., 574.
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on 1 October 1968 as a general, uniform and conclusive provision to al-
low regulatory fines to be imposed.
Prior to this, there had already been the possibility to impose admin-
istrative fines (Ordnungsstrafen) on legal persons, which were regarded
not as criminal fines but as ‘neutral in value’. 37 In the Weimar Republic,
sect. 17 of the Ordinance against Misuse of Economic Power Positions
of 2 November 1923 allowed, according to the jurisdiction, 38 the impo-
sition of an unlimited administrative fine on legal persons. During the
Nazi era, the possibility of imposing administrative penalties had been
greatly expanded to avoid judicial control. 39 In the post-war period, ef-
forts to correct the rule of law led to a distinction being made between
criminal offences and mere regulatory offences (Ordnungswidrigkeiten).
As the need for criminal policy to impose sanctions on companies in-
creased, numerous special provisions were introduced which allowed
the imposition of regulatory fines. 40 The legislator took the view that
this was not problematic, because it was assumed that a regulatory fine
was of an ‘aliud-like’ nature compared with a criminal fine, and that it
was only a ‘side effect’ of the offence. 41 However, in 1986 sect. 30
OWiG was revised. 42 Since then, it has been a main consequence of
the act. Furthermore, today’s prevailing opinion assumes that there is
no qualitative difference between criminal fines and regulatory fines,
but only a quantitative difference (‘plus-minus’). 43
In the 1990s, the debate about the introduction of corporate criminal
liability was reopened after several major scandals. In July 1997, the
German Federal State of Hesse (Bundesland Hessen) presented a
draft. 44 In January 1998, the Federal Minister for Justice appointed a
commission on the reform of the criminal sanctions system. However,
in November 1999, the commission ultimately voted by a majority
against the introduction of corporate criminal law. 45 The members con-
36 Protokolle Sonderausschuss Strafrechtsreform, p. 397 et seq., 409 et seq., p.
419 et seq., p. 1079 et seq.
37 Schmitt, Strafrechtliche Maßnahmen gegen Verbände, 1958, p. 70 et seq.
38 KG Kartell-Rundschau 1929, 213.
39 Mitsch, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal no.
24 et seq.
40 Bundestag document No. V/1269, 58.
41 Bundestag document No. V/1269, 58 et seq.
42 2. Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität (2. WiKG), BGBl. I
1986, p. 712.
43 Mitsch, Recht der Ordnungswidrigkeiten, 2nd ed. 2005, § 3 marginal no. 7 et
sqq.
44 Cf. Hamm NJW 1998, 662; Wegner, ZRP 1999, 186, 187 et seq.
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sidered the existing regulatory fines to be sufficient and argued that there
are considerable dogmatic and constitutional objections to the introduc-
tion of criminal fines. Instead, the further development of existing in-
struments was recommended.
In recent years, the debate has flared up again, as companies can
now be held criminally liable in most EU Member States. At the Au-
tumn Conference of the German Justice Ministers in Berlin on 15 No-
vember 2012, it was discussed whether the imposition of regulatory
fines is ‘still sufficient’ and ‘still appropriate’. 46 In September 2013,
the Minister for Justice of the Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia
(Bundesland Nordrhein-Westfalen) presented the draft of a Federal Cor-
porate Criminal Code (Verbandsstrafgesetzbuch). 47 This draft was de-
bated controversially. 48 It was not only the necessity of introducing cor-
porate criminal law that was questioned, but also whether the provisions
could be integrated into the existing German criminal law. Finally, the
proposal was not implemented because the Coalition Agreement of
the Grand Coalition (CDU/CSU/SPD) of November 2013 had only pro-
mised to ‘examine’ the introduction of a ‘corporate criminal law for
multinational corporations’. 49 Whether the criminal liability of legal
persons will be introduced in the current legislative period is not clear.
According to the still prevailing opinion, 50 the criminalisation of le-
gal persons is not compatible with the basic categories of criminal law
and, with regard to sect. 30 OWiG, not necessary. It is argued that cor-
porations which could not act are neither culpable nor punishable. A cor-
poration cannot suffer and learn from a criminal sanction for the future.
Introducing corporate criminal liability would bear the risk that persons
acting on the behalf of the corporation could face individual criminal
sanctions, and additionally would be burdened with a corporate criminal
sanction. The counter-opinion 51 does not share these objections and as-
sumes that corporations act either by an ‘original’ organisational action,
45 Abschlussbericht der Kommission, in: Hettinger (ed.), Reform des
Sanktionenrechts, Vol. III, 2002, p. 351, 354 et seq.
46 www.justiz.nrw.de/WebPortal/JM/justizpolitik/jumiko/beschluesse/2012/
herbstkonferenz12/ind ex.php.
47 www.strafrecht.de/media/files/docs/Gesetzentwurf.pdf.
48 Görtz WiJ 2014, 8, 14; Hein CCZ 2014, 75, 76; Hoven ZIS 2014, 19, 23; Lei-
pold NJW-Spezial 2013, 696; Löffelmann JR 2014, 185, 188 et seq; Mitsch NZWiSt
2014, 1 et seq., 5; Schünemann ZIS 2014, 1, 7 et seq; Willems DRiZ 2013, 354 et
seq; Witte/Wagner BB 2014, 643, 648; Zieschang GA 2014, 91 et seq.
49 Cf. ‘Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten’, Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU/CSU
und SPD, 27.11.2013, p. 101.
50 Cf. only Schünemann, ZIS 2014, 1 et seq.
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as independent and responsible subjects with a corporate culture, or by
the ‘attribution’ of the culpable conduct of the persons acting on their
behalf. It is also argued that there is no double jeopardy as the individual
persons and the legal person are different legal entities.
1.3. Significant cases involving the liability of heads of business
Cases in which top managers were investigated for offences com-
mitted by an employee acting on behalf of the business are rare. Most
decisions and judgments do not seem to be published, but there are some
available in the media, journals and databases. In many cases, as far as
can be seen, only the company was punished for criminal acts.
- Staatsanwaltschaft München I: Penalty notice of 15 December
2008 52
The Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office I issued on 15 December
2008, according to sect. 30 (4) OWiG in conjunction with sect. 130
OWiG, a penalty notice and imposed an independent regulatory fine
of 395 million euros against Siemens AG. Therefore, the violation of
the supervisory duty of the entire board of management was sanctioned.
The compliance system of Siemens AG was judged to be insufficient
due to the lack of sufficient human resources and the lack of an effective
control system for detecting and prosecuting violations. This led to the
creation of slush funds (schwarze Kassen) in many business areas,
which were used to pay bribes. However, only 250,000 euros served
as a punishment: the regulatory fine was mainly used to absorb the ille-
gal profits. The penalty notice completed the investigation.
- BGH: Judgment of 17 July 2009 – 5 StR 394/08 = BGHSt 54, 44
The defendant—the head of the legal department and at the same
time head of the internal audit department of the Berliner Stadt-
reinigungsbetriebe (BSR)—was accused as a participant in a fraud
against property owners. He had not informed the management board
or the supervisory board of the miscalculation of an employee that he
had noticed, although this was possible and reasonable. The BGH
confirmed the conviction because the defendant, as head of the inter-
51 Waßmer, Die Sanktionierung von Auslandsbestechung nach dem OWiG, in:
Hoven/Kubiciel (ed.), Das Verbot der Auslandsbestechung, 2016, p. 165, 178 et seq.
52 Cf. http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/einigung-mit-behoerden-siemens-
beendet-schmiergeld affaere-mit-milliardenbusse-a-596598.html.
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nal audit department, was obliged, according to sect. 13 (1) StGB, to
prevent fraudulent account statements, even if he had not fulfilled
the function of a so-called compliance officer, who is responsible
for preventing legal violations within the company.
- LG Düsseldorf: Decision of 21 November 2011 – 10 KLs 14/11 =
wistra 2013, 80
A fine of 149 million euros was imposed by the Regional Court
(Landgericht) of Düsseldorf on a corporation in the banking industry
pursuant to sect. 30 of the OWiG, because a member of the extended
management board committed a criminal offence (assistance in tax eva-
sion). Customer advisors of the corporation had supported clients in
their tax evasion on a large scale: the member of the board deliberately
promoted tax evasion instead of preventing it.
- BGH: Decision of 20 October 2011 – 4 StR 71/11 = BGHSt 57,
42
The defendant, a foreman in a municipal building yard, had been
accused of tolerating the repeated physical abuse of an employee by col-
leagues during working hours. The BGH stated that the position of a
company owner or superior may result in an obligation to prevent crim-
inal offences committed by subordinated employees, but that the obliga-
tion is limited to the prevention of company-related criminal offences
and does not include acts an employee only commits on the occasion
of his activity in the company. The defendant was acquitted, since the
criminal offence was not company-related: it was not related to the ac-
tivity to be carried out within the framework of the employment rela-
tionship.
- OLG Celle: Decision of 29 March 2012 – 2 Ws 81/12 = NZWiSt
2013, 68
The two defendants—the head of the internal sales department of a
company’s sales office and an employee of the planning department in
this branch office—were accused of restricting competition through
agreements in the context of public bids (sect. 298 StGB). The Higher
Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Celle did not exclude either
the liability pursuant to sect. 130 OWiG or the liability of the company
pursuant to sect. 130 OWiG. Therefore, the case was transferred back to
the Chamber of the Regional Court (Landgericht) of Stade for a new de-
cision as it had not yet been established that a criminal offence under
sect. 298 StGB or a regulatory offence under sect. 81 GWB had actually
been committed.
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- OLG Karlsruhe: Decision of 26 July 2016 – AK 96/16= LMuR
2016, 214
The Local Court (Amtsgericht) of Waldshut-Tiengen fined the pro-
duction manager of a sausage production company employing 80 to 100
people 400 euros for violation of obligatory supervision (sect. 130
OWiG). Several sausage samples taken by the food safety authorities in-
dicated a higher fat content than the packaging specified. The Higher
Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) of Karlsruhe overturned the deci-
sion and referred the case back because it was not clear that the produc-
tion manager had been instructed by the owner or another authorised
person to manage the business in whole or in part (sect. 9 (2) sentence
1 no. 1 OWiG). In this respect, further observations had to be made of
the organisation, the significance of the sausage production and the hier-
archical position of the production manager.
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law
2.1. General information on the system of perpetration and complicity
German criminal law follows a differentiated system of participa-
tion in intentional offences—i.e. it distinguishes in sect. 25 to 27 StGB 53
between principals and secondary participation (Täterschaft and Teil-
nahme). This system, which is based on a restrictive definition of the
term ‘participation’, takes into account the different levels of contribu-
tion at factual level. 54 In contrast, in the case of negligence offences,
German criminal law follows the unified system. According to this,
53 Official translation of the German Criminal Code in the version of 10.10.2013
provided by Michael Bohlander, available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/
index.html:
Sect. 25 StGB - Principals
(1) Any person who commits the offence himself or through another shall be
liable as a principal.
(2) If more than one person commit the offence jointly, each shall be liable as a
principal (joint principals).
Sect. 26 StGB - Abetting
Any person who intentionally induces another to intentionally commit an
unlawful act (abettor) shall be liable to be sentenced as if he were a principal.
Sect. 27 StGB - Aiding
(1) Any person who intentionally assists another in the intentional commission of
an unlawful act shall be convicted and sentenced as an aider.
(2) The sentence for the aider shall be based on the penalty for a principal. It shall
be mitigated pursuant to sect. 49 (1).
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every person who has made a contribution to the realisation of the of-
fence is then deemed to be a principal. Therefore, the different levels
of contribution to the crime are not taken into account until the imposi-
tion of the penalty. However, it should be noted that all PIF offences are
intentional offences (cf. Art. 1 PIF Convention).
In contrast, German regulatory offences law 55 follows a unified
system that applies to intentional offences as well as negligent offences
(cf. sect. 14 (1) sentence 1 OWiG). According to this, every person who
has made a causal contribution to the realisation of the offence is
deemed to be a participant. This is important with regard to sect. 130
OWiG. However, according to the prevailing opinion, participation al-
ways presupposes an intentional contribution to the intentional act of an-
other person. 56 This restrictive interpretation is intended to prevent
overstretching with regard to criminal law. The (main) participant of
the regulatory offence must therefore have committed an unlawful act
with intent. In contrast, a culpable act is not required (sect. 14 (3) sen-
tence 1 OWiG, ‘limited accessoriness’: limitierte Akzessorietät). If the
participant does not have the required special qualification by the of-
fence (for instance, board member), it is sufficient that a participant
who makes an intentional contribution has the required qualification
(cf. sect. 14 (1) sentence 2 OWiG).
54 Waßmer, in: Heidelberger Kommentar zum StGB, 2nd ed. 2015, Vorbemer-
kung zu §§ 25 ff. marginal no. 1.
55 Sect. 14 OWiG – Participation
(1) If several persons participate in a regulatory offence, each of them shall be
deemed to have committed a regulatory offence. This shall also apply if special
personal characteristics (sect. 9 subsect. 1) giving rise to the possibility to impose a
sanction pertain only to one participant.
(2) Participation may be sanctioned only if the factual elements of an act set forth
in a statute enabling imposition of a regulatory fine are unlawfully fulfilled, or if in
cases where an attempt may also be sanctioned, the attempt has at least been made.
(3) If one of the participants does not act reprehensibly, this shall not mean that
sanctioning of the others is precluded. If the statute provides that special personal
characteristics preclude sanctioning, this shall apply only to a participant who
displays such characteristics.
(4) If the statute provides that an act which would otherwise be a regulatory
offence is a criminal offence in view of special personal characteristics of the
perpetrator, this shall apply only to a participant who displays such characteristics.
56 BGHSt 31, 309 (311 et seq.); Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 16th ed. 2014, § 14
marginal no. 5b.
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2.2. General information on omission liability
The German law system provides for omission liability.
2.2.1. General description
Within sect. 13 StGB 57 there is a general provision in the German
Criminal Code for cases in which the omission to avert a result is treated
as an active act (unechtes Unterlassungsdelikt). Sect. 13 (1) StGB estab-
lishes two conditions.
Firstly, whosoever fails to avert a result which is an element of a
criminal provision shall only be liable if he is ‘responsible under law’
to ensure that the result does not occur. ‘Responsible under law’ is the
guarantor (Garant). In the opinion of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, the wording is compatible with the principle of lex certa, since
jurisprudence and doctrine require a ‘special’ legal obligation and have
developed criteria. 58 According to the prevailing opinion, 59 the guaran-
tor status can result from a law, a contract (also a null and void contract,
as far as its validity is trusted), a previous endangering behaviour
(Ingerenz) and a close natural connection (enge natürliche Verbin-
dung). There are protectors of legal assets (Beschützergaranten)
and supervisors of sources of danger (Überwachergaranten).
Secondly, the omission has to be ‘equivalent’ to the realisation of
the statutory elements of the offence through a positive act (Ent-
sprechensklausel). However, according to the prevailing opinion, 60 this
condition has no function in the case of ‘pure’ criminal offence of suc-
cess (reine Erfolgsdelikte), since the deliberate cause of success is suffi-
cient. The condition is only relevant for behavioural offences
(verhaltensgebundene Straftaten) that depend on a specific manner in
which they are committed (e.g. treacherous murder).
57 Sect. 13 StGB – Commissions
(1) Whosoever fails to avert a result which is an element of a criminal provision
shall only be liable under this law if he is responsible under law to ensure that the
result does not occur, and if the omission is equivalent to the realisation of the
statutory elements of the offence through a positive act.
(2) The sentence may be mitigated pursuant to sect. 49 (1).
58 BVerfG NJW 1998, 50, 56.
59 Cf. only Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 47th ed. 2017,
marginal no. 716 et seq.
60 Cf. only Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 47th ed. 2017,
marginal no. 730.
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2.2.2. Duty of care
The German Criminal Code does not contain any general provision
about the ‘duty of care’. The duties are based on statutory rules as well
as unwritten rules that exist outside criminal law—i.e. in civil law and
public law. In addition, in some areas (for instance, compliance), written
but non-statutory standards have emerged that indicate which measures
shall be taken. The observance of these standards is indicative that the
‘duty of care’ was fulfilled (see 4.3).
Statutory rules are referred to as ‘special standards’. 61 For exam-
ple, under the German Money Laundering Act (Geldwäschegesetz:
GwG), there are due diligence obligations for independent traders,
banks, insurance companies, etc. (sect. 10 ff. GWG). In the absence
of written rules, unwritten rules have to be applied. The ‘general stan-
dard’ is the behaviour of a ‘prudent and conscientious person’ from
the criminal’s ‘public sphere’ (Verkehrskreis). For example, members
of the board of directors of a stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft)
must exercise the diligence of a prudent and conscientious managing
director when conducting their business (cf. sect. 93 AktG). Concre-
tisations provide general principles based on experience (allgemeine
Erfahrungssätze) and common usage (Verkehrssitte). The behaviour
of a prudent and conscientious person sets the minimum standard.
However, individual abilities must also be taken into account—i.e.
special knowledge and special abilities. 62
Nevertheless, some authors 63 argue that linking criminal liabili-
ty to the violation of unwritten duties is not compatible with the lex
certa principle. It is argued that, especially in the case of negligence
offences—and the same applies to omissions—the preconditions un-
der which behaviour is punishable by law must be written, as other-
wise it would not be possible to foresee whether there is a risk of
criminal liability. According to the prevailing opinion, 64 however,
even unwritten duties are compatible with the lex certa principle.
61 Cf. only Rengier, Strafrecht Allgemeinen Teil, 9. ed. 2017, § 52 marginal no.
16.
62 Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. I, 4th ed. 2006, § 24 marginal no. 53 et
seq.
63 Duttge, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. 1, 3rd ed. 2017, § 15 mar-
ginal no. 33 et seq.; Schmitz, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. 1, 3rd ed.
2017, § 1 marginal no. 56 et seq.
64 Bohnert ZStW 94 (1982), 68, 80; Herzberg ZIS 2011, 444, 451 et seq.
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In view of the variety of life, it would be impossible to determine all
duties. 65
2.2.3. Link required between the omission and the commission of the
offence
The omission must have ‘caused’ the success. In case of an ac-
tive action, the prevailing opinion 66 follows the equivalence theory
(Äquivalenztheorie), according to which the causality is based on
the ‘conditio sine qua non formula’. However, in case of an omission,
the formula has to be reversed, and so-called ‘quasi-causality’ (Qua-
si-Kausalität) applies. It is therefore asked whether the success would
not have occurred if the required action had taken place. That’s why it
is a hypothetical causality. The formula is often supplemented by the
addition ‘with almost certain probability’, to express that in hypothe-
tical processes there is never certainty. 67
For cases of omission, some authors promote a risk-reduction doc-
trine 68 (i.e. the opposite of the risk-increase doctrine). According to this,
it should suffice for the attribution of success if the required action
would have reduced the risk of success. This doctrine must be rejected,
as it loosens the causal link (in dubio pro victima et contra reum) and
transforms crimes constituted by the violation of legal interests into
crimes constituted by mere endangerment. 69
2.2.4. Mens rea
Non-genuine criminal offences by omission (sect. 13 StGB) can
also be committed intentionally and negligently (cf. sect. 15 StGB). 70
Intent is the will to realise an offence in knowledge of all objective cir-
cumstances—in short, knowledge and willingness to realise the offence.
There are three forms. First degree intent (Absicht) is present if the of-
65 Puppe, in: Nomos Kommentar zum StGB, 5th ed. 2017, § 13 marginal no. 155.
66 Cf. only BGH NJW 2010, 1087, 1090; Rengier, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil,
9th ed. 2017, § 49 marginal no. 13.
67 BGH St. 37, 106, 127.
68 Cf. only Greco ZIS 2011, 674 et seq.; Stratenwerth/Kuhlen, Strafrecht Allge-
meiner Teil, 6th ed. 2011, § 13 marginal no. 52 et seq.
69 Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Vol. II, 2003, § 31 marginal no. 51.
70 Sect. 15 – Intent and negligence
Unless the law expressly provides for criminal liability based on negligence, only
intentional conduct shall attract criminal liability.
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fender wants to achieve the success, second degree intent (Wissentlich-
keit) if the offender foresees the success as certain. Third degree intent
(Eventualvorsatz) requires as a cognitive component that the offender
has recognised the serious possibility of realisation of the success.
The requirements for the voluntary component are in dispute. According
to the dominating doctrine, 71 it is sufficient for the offender to take the
risk of realisation of the success seriously and to resign (seriousness the-
ory). On the other hand, German jurisdiction 72 demands that the offen-
der accepts the realisation of success (allowance theory), which is ob-
vious if he carries out his project despite extreme danger and leaves
the realisation of success to chance. The jurisdiction takes the determi-
nation of the voluntative component in economic offences particularly
seriously. In these cases, the overall assessment is always decisive. 73
An intentional omission presupposes that the offender is aware of the
realisation of the success of the offence, knows the circumstances that
justify his duty to act, knows the possibility of averting the success
and wants the success to occur.
Negligence is present if the offender causes the success of the of-
fence without recognising or wanting to do so. In this context, it is pos-
sible to differentiate between the seriousness of breach of duty of care
and predictability. 74 Unconscious negligence is present if the offender
fails to take care and thereby causes the success without realising it.
Conscious negligence is in place if he considers the success as possible
but trusts in non-occurrence, contrary to duty. Gross negligence (Leicht-
fertigkeit) presupposes a very high degree of negligence in objective and
subjective terms, and roughly corresponds to gross negligence in civil
law (grobe Fahrlässigkeit). The perpetrator disregards the imposing pos-
sibility of the realisation of the success out of particular carelessness or
does not make the simplest and most obvious considerations. In order to
ascertain negligence, diligence and predictability are examined in an ob-
jective and subjective way (double check).
71 Sternberg-Lieben/Schuster, in: Schönke/Schröder, StGB, 29th ed. 2014, § 15
marginal no. 73a et seq.
72 Cf. only BGHSt 36, 1, 9 et seq.; 44, 99, 102.
73 Cf. only BGHSt 48, 331, 348; BGH NStZ-RR 2008, 239.
74 Cf. only Rengier, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 9. ed. 2017, § 52 marginal no. 7
et seq.
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2.2.5. Regulatory offences law
German regulatory offences law is in general governed by the same
principles as criminal law. There exist comparable provisions on omis-
sion (sect. 8 OWiG) and on intent and negligence (sect. 10 OWiG). As
described in German regulatory offences law, within sect. 130 OWiG
exists a special provision on the violation of obligatory supervision in
operations and enterprises. This provision covers intentional and negli-
gent violations of obligatory supervision. In addition, the causality re-
quirement is mitigated since it is sufficient that the contravention would
have been made much more difficult had there been proper supervision.
2.3. Duty to report an offence
Sect. 138 StGB punishes the omission to bring planned offences to
the attention of the authorities. It is a genuine criminal offence com-
mitted by omission (echtes Unterlassungsdelikt), which imposes the
duty on everyone to make an effort to report certain offences if he is
aware of their planning or commission. There is only a duty to report
an offence, however, not a duty to prevent it. 75 Otherwise, there is no
general duty to report planned crimes. Sect. 138 StGB is supplemented
by sect. 139 StGB, which contains exceptions.
Sect. 138 StGB 76 contains three different offences. Sect. 138 (1)
75 Sternberg-Lieben, in: Schönke/Schröder, StGB, 29th ed. 2014, § 138 marginal
no. 1.
76 Sect. 138 – Omission to bring planned offences to the attention of the
authorities
(1) Whosoever has credible information about the planning or the commission of
the following offences:
1. preparation of a war of aggression (sect. 80);
2. high treason under sections 81 to 83 (1);
3. treason or an endangerment of peace under sections 94 to 96, sect. 97a or sect.
100;
4. counterfeiting money or securities under sect. 146, sect. 151, sect. 152 or
counterfeiting debit cards and blank euro cheque forms under sect. 152b (1) to (3);
5. murder under specific aggravating circumstances (sect. 211), murder (sect.
212), genocide (sect. 6 of the Code of International Criminal Law), a crime against
humanity (sect. 7 of the Code of International Criminal Law), or a war crime (sect.
8, sect. 9, sect. 10, sect. 11 or sect. 12 of the Code of International Criminal Law);
6. an offence against personal liberty in cases under sect. 232 (3), (4), or (5), sect.
233 (3), each to the extent it involves a felony, sect. 234, sect. 234a, sect. 239a or sect.
239b;
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StGB objectively presupposes that certain criminal offences are com-
mitted or planned. The offences that trigger the obligation to report
are enumerated in a catalogue (No. 1 to 8) that is considered to be un-
systematic, 77 since both felonies (Verbrechen) (for instance, murder,
manslaughter, robbery) and mere misdemeanours (Vergehen) (for in-
stance, disclosure of state secrets) are included. The offender must have
credible information about the planning or commission at a time when
the commission or result can still be averted. Rumours or the possibility
of recognition are not sufficient. 78 If the commission or result of the act
can no longer be averted, the obligation to report no longer applies. 79
Furthermore, a report ‘in time’ to the authorities or the threatened person
must have been omitted. An authority can be considered any govern-
ment agency whose tasks include hazard-preventing or defensive inter-
vention—e.g. the police. 80 The notification is made in time if it is still
possible to prevent the commission or its result—i.e. there is a margin of
discretion. 81 Finally, the offender must intentionally refrain from mak-
ing the notification. Sect. 138 (2) StGB extends the duty to report certain
terrorist offences, namely the preparation of a serious violent offence en-
dangering the state (sect. 89a StGB) as well as the forming of terrorist
associations in Germany (sect. 129a StGB) and abroad (sect. 129b
7. robbery or blackmail using force or threat to life and limb (sections 249 to 251
or sect. 255); or
8. offences creating a danger to the public under sections 306 to 306c, sect. 307
(1) to (3), sect. 308 (1) to (4), sect. 309 (1) to (5), sect. 310, sect. 313, sect. 314, sect.
315 (3), sect. 315b (3), sect. 316a or sect. 316c
at a time when the commission or result can still be averted, and fails to report it
in time to the public authorities or the person threatened, shall be liable to
imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine.
(2) Whosoever credibly learns
1. of the commission of an offence under sect. 89a or
2. of the planning or commission of an offence under sect. 129a, also in
conjunction with sect. 129b (1), 1st and 2nd sentences,
at a time when the commission can still be averted, and fails to report it promptly
to the public authorities, shall incur the same penalty. Sect. 129b (1) 3rd to 5th
sentences shall apply mutatis mutandis in the case of No. 2 above.
(3) Whosoever by gross negligence fails to make a report although he has
credible information about the planning or the commission of an unlawful act, shall
be liable to imprisonment of not more than one year or a fine.
77 Fischer, StGB, 64th ed. 2017, § 138 marginal no. 4.
78 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 138 marginal no. 11.
79 BGHSt 42, 86, 88.
80 Hohmann, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. III, 3rd ed. 2017, § 138
marginal no. 16.
81 Hohmann, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. III, 3rd ed. 2017, § 138
marginal no. 14.
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StGB). In these cases, prompt report to the authorities must have been
intentionally omitted. It also depends solely on whether the commission
of the offence (not the result) is feasible. According to sect. 138 (3)
StGB, the grossly negligent omission of a required report is also punish-
able by law. This is relevant if the offender forgets to report or if there is
a mistake with regard to the necessity of the report. 82 A person involved
in the commission or planning as principal or secondary participant can-
not be punished by sect. 138 StGB. 83
Sect. 139 StGB 84 contains exceptions. According to sect. 139 (1)
StGB, if in cases under sect. 138 StGB the offence has not been at-
tempted, the court may order a discharge. Pursuant to sect. 139 (2)
StGB, a clergyman is not obliged to report what has been confided to
him. According to sect. 139 (3) StGB, relatives, professional secrecy
bearers (for instance, lawyers, defence lawyers and doctors) and their as-
sistants are not obliged to report an offence if they have made earnest
efforts to dissuade their relatives, clients or patients from committing
82 Hohmann, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. III, 3rd ed. 2017, § 138
marginal no. 20.
83 Cf. only BGH NJW 1956, 30, 31; BGH StV 2017, 441; Hohmann, in: Münchener
Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. III, 3rd ed. 2017, § 138 marginal no. 22.
84 Sect. 139 – Exceptions to liability
(1) If in cases under sect. 138 the offence has not been attempted the court may
order a discharge.
(2) A clergyman shall not be obliged to report what has been confided to him in
his capacity as a spiritual counsellor.
(3) Whosoever fails to report an offence, if the report would have had to be made
against a relative, shall be exempt from liability if he made earnest efforts to dissuade
him from committing the offence or to avert the result, unless it is a case of
1. murder (sect. 211 or sect. 212);
2. genocide under sect. 6 No 1 of the Code of International Criminal Law, or a
crime against humanity under sect. 7 (1) of the Code of International Criminal Law, or
a war crime under sect. 8 (1) No 1 of the Code of International Criminal Law;
3. abduction for the purpose of blackmail (sect. 239a (1)), hostage taking (sect.
239b (1)) or an attack on air or maritime traffic (sect. 316c (1)) by a terrorist
organisation (sect. 129a, also in conjunction with sect. 129b (1)).
Under the same conditions an attorney, defence counsel, physician,
psychotherapist, or child or youth psychotherapist shall not be obliged to report
what was confided to them in their professional capacity. The professional assistants
of those persons named in the 2nd sentence above and those persons who work for
them as part of their professional education shall not be obliged to report what they
learn in their professional capacity.
(4) Whosoever averts the commission or the result of the offence other than by
reporting shall be exempt from liability. If the commission or result of the offence does
not take place regardless of the contribution of the person obliged to report his earnest
efforts to avert it, the result shall suffice for exemption from liability.
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the offence or to avert the result; this does not apply to particularly seri-
ous offences (catalogue). According to sect. 139 (4) StGB, anyone who
averts the commission or result of the offence other than by reporting
shall be exempt from punishment. Moreover, anyone who has made ear-
nest efforts to avert the result is exempt from liability if the commission
or result of the offence does not take place, regardless of the contribution
of the person obliged to report.
2.4. General information on strict liability
German criminal law does not allow for strict liability offences (see
section 2.5, however). According to German understanding, it is self-
evident that punishment presupposes culpability and that the offender
must be proven culpable. 85 The Federal Constitutional Court has ruled
on this in several decisions. 86 The inner reason for the reproach of cul-
pability lies in the fact that man is based on free, responsible and moral
self-determination. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, 87 the
principle of culpability is constitutionally based on Art. 103 (2) GG. The
principle of culpability is also rooted in the dignity and personal respon-
sibility of the individual (laid down in Art. 1 (1) and Art. 2 (1) GG). Fi-
nally, the principle of culpability is also an application of the rule of law
set out in Art. 20 (3) GG. 88
The presumption of innocence implies that proof of culpability is
required. This presumption is a special application of the rule of law
(Art. 20 (3) GG) and is also anchored in Art. 6 (2) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR). 89 According to this, a defendant is
presumed innocent until proven culpable. Here, the principle of official
investigation applies, which obliges the court to investigate ex officio all
incriminating and all exonerating circumstances, 90 i.e. the defendant
does not have to actively prove his innocence. The presumption of inno-
85 Cf. only Bock, in: Ambos/König/Rackow (eds), Rechtshilferecht in Straf-
sachen, 2015, § 87b IRG marginal no. 341; Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar
zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 335 HGB marginal no. 53.
86 BVerfGE 9, 167, 169; BVerfGE 58, 159, 163; BVerfGE 123, 268, 413.
87 BGHSt 2, 194, 200.
88 BVerfGE 20, 323, 331.
89 Cf. only BVerfGE 74, 358, 370; von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau,
Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2017, § 46 OWiG marginal no. 11.
90 Trüg/Habetha, in: Münchener Kommentar zur StPO, 2016, § 244 marginal no.
47 et seq.
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cence is also laid down in Art. 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
(CFR) of the European Union.
In regulatory offences law, it also applies that the imposition of a
regulatory fine presupposes culpability. According to sect. 1 OWiG, ‘a
regulatory offence shall be an unlawful and reprehensible act, constitut-
ing the factual elements set forth in a statute that enables the act to be
sanctioned by imposition of a regulatory fine’. As in criminal law, ‘rep-
rehensibility’ means personal responsibility for one’s own conduct and
presupposes that the perpetrator is capable of recognising the wrong
of his act and of acting upon this insight. 91
Culpability must also be proven in regulatory offences law. How-
ever, in a decision from 1959, the Federal Constitutional Court 92 did
not object to a former regulatory offence (sect. 23 of the Wirtschafts-
strafgesetz (WiStrG) 1949), which placed the burden of proof on owners
or managers. This provision provided that a regulatory fine could be im-
posed if in the event of contraventions being committed in an enterprise,
the owner or manager was unable to prove that he had taken obligatory
supervision. The Court argued that the main reason for this was that it
was merely a regulatory offence. 93 In addition, there would be a certain
presumption that the owner or manager had been aware of the contra-
vention and had not prevented it, at least by neglecting his duty incum-
bent, so that it would not be unreasonable to wait and see what was put
up for discharge. 94 Moreover, unlike criminal law, there is no duty to
prosecute regulatory offences. 95 Finally, the fact that the legislator
had changed sect. 23 WiStrG 1949 in the meantime, now demanding full
proof, did not mean that the provision was contrary to the rule of law. 96
In 1987, the Federal Constitutional Court also stated, referring to the de-
cision of 1959, that not every form of culpability presumption is con-
trary to rule of law, but that it is ‘a matter of the structuring of the legal
facts in individual cases and other circumstances’. 97 Nonetheless, the
prevailing opinion today assumes that an assumption of culpability is
not only contrary to the rule of law in criminal law, but also in regulatory
offences law. 98
91 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 1 marginal no. 8.
92 BVerfGE 9, 167 et seq.
93 BVerfGE 9, 167, 169.
94 BVerfGE 9, 167, 170 et seq.
95 BVerfGE 9, 167, 171 et seq.
96 BVerfGE 9, 167, 173 et seq.
97 BVerfG NStZ 1988, 21.
98 Cf. only Hörster, Die strict liability des englischen Strafrechts, 2009, p. 148.
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2.5. Special rules on criminal liability
Special rules on criminal liability do not exist in German law. The
general rules of responsibility apply to all fields. It should be noted,
however, that the legislator can design the substantive criminal law as
well as the regulatory offences law in such a way that procedural prob-
lems of proof are avoided or mitigated. Therefore, results can be
achieved which are obtained in other legal systems through ‘strict liabil-
ity’. The following designs are possible: 99
Shortening or alteration of the facts to be proved. As an example
of the reduction of difficulties of proof due to changes in the facts, sect.
130 OWiG (violation of obligatory supervision in operations and enter-
prises) could be cited. It is sufficient that the contravention would have
been ‘made much more difficult’ had there been proper supervision.
Introduction of offences constituted by abstract endangerment.
With this design, mere preparatory actions can be punished. Abstract
dangerous behaviours are much easier to prove, since causality problems
do not arise and with regard to intent, knowledge of the suitability of the
performed action for damage is sufficient.
Forming a non-result constituted offence instead of a consti-
tuted result. With this design, the occurrence of success is waived. It
is already punishable by criminal law to take action.
Introduction of negligence offences. In order to overcome eviden-
tiary difficulties in the case of wilful offences, the negligent commission
is made an offence, whereby the offence acts as a ‘catch-all offence’. As
an example, sect. 264 StGB (subsidy fraud) can be cited, in which gross
negligence is also punishable.
Introduction of duties whose violation is punishable. Evidence
difficulties can be reduced by punishing the violation of reporting, infor-
mation, documentation, disclosure and cooperation duties. This can al-
ready result in a conviction. Evidence of further circumstances is not re-
quired.
Introduction of ‘possession crimes’. In this case, possession
of certain dangerous objects is punishable by criminal law in order
to avoid evidentiary difficulties. As an example, sect. 29 (1) No. 3
of the Narcotics Act (Betäubungsmittelgesetz: BtMG) could be ci-
ted.
99 Hörster, Die strict liability des englischen Strafrechts, 2009, p. 165 et seq.
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3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of heads
of business
3.1. Liability of heads of business (general information)
The German criminal law system does not establish the liability of
heads of business through a specific provision. Criminal liability can
only arise from the general rules (see 1.1). As far as an intentional omis-
sion is concerned, the provisions on perpetrators and secondary partici-
pants (sect. 25 to 27 StGB) are relevant. Heads of businesses could be
held criminally liable if a criminal offence is committed by a person un-
der their authority acting on behalf of the business, on the basis of their
personal acts as principals (sect. 25 (1) StGB), joint principals (sect. 25
(2) StGB), abettors (sect. 26 StGB) or aiders (sect. 27 (1) StGB). In the
case of an omission (sect. 13 StGB), the so-called criminal-law business
employer liability does apply.
In addition, criminal liability may result from criminal provisions
that are linked to the violation of special duties. An example of this is
sect. 266 StGB (embezzlement and abuse of trust). According to that
provision, the organs of legal persons have to safeguard the property in-
terests of the legal person; in the event of an unlawful violation of duty,
they may be prosecuted. 100
A special rule on the responsibility of heads of business exists in
German regulatory offences law (see supra 1.1.2). Sect. 130 OWiG is
a provision on the ‘violation of obligatory supervision in operations
and enterprises’. It is a genuine offence committed by omission.
3.2. Personal scope of the liability
The scope of sect. 130 OWiG is to impose at least a regulatory fine
if, with regard to a violation of obligatory supervision, criminal liability
is excluded according to the strict general rules. Sect. 130 OWiG signif-
icantly reduces the requirements for liability (see 1.1). On the one hand,
the strict causality requirement is mitigated, since it is sufficient that the
contravention ‘would have been made much more difficult’ by proper
supervision. On the other hand, not only intentional but also negligent
violations of supervisory duties are covered. Finally, committing an of-
fence is a mere objective condition of sanctioning (objektive Bedingung
100 Waßmer, in: Graf/Jäger/Wittig, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2nd ed.
2017, § 266 StGB, marginal no. 49.
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der Ahndung)—i.e. intent and negligence on the part of the supervisor
need not extend to it. The regulatory fine could be imposed against
the ‘owner’. In addition, a regulatory fine may be imposed against the
corporation in accordance with sect. 30 OWiG, because a violation of
obligatory supervision pursuant to sect. 130 OWiG is a company-related
regulatory offence.
According to sect. 130 OWiG, the supervision duty exists for the
owner of an operation or enterprise. Who is the ‘owner’ does not depend
on the ownership or capital participation, but on who is responsible for
the fulfilment of obligatory supervision. 101 The owner can be a natural
person—for instance, in the case of a sole proprietor (Einzelkaufmann).
In the case of a commercial partnership—for instance, a limited partner-
ship (Kommanditgesellschaft)—or a legal person—for instance, a lim-
ited liability company (GmbH) or a stock corporation (Aktien-
gesellschaft)—the commercial partnership or legal person itself is the
owner. 102 The shareholders may be the owners in their entirety, but they
are neither individually nor collectively the normal addressees of sect.
130 OWiG. However, since commercial partnerships or legal persons
cannot themselves commit offences, sect. 9 OWiG (acting for another)
stipulates that certain natural persons who act on their behalf must be
referred to.
Sect. 9 OWiG regulates the so-called ‘liability of organs and rep-
resentatives’ (Organ- und Vertreterhaftung). The provision only ap-
plies if certain natural persons act who ‘represent’ a commercial part-
nership, legal person or another person—i.e. it must be a person who
belongs to the ‘management area’. 103 This includes, on the one hand,
in accordance with sect. 9 (1) OWiG, persons who act as an entity
authorised to represent a legal person or as a member of such an en-
tity (No. 1), as a partner authorised to represent a commercial partner-
ship (No. 2) or as a statutory representative of another (No. 3). On the
other hand, in accordance with sect. 9 (2) sentence 1 OWiG, addi-
tional persons are included: persons commissioned by the owner or
someone otherwise so authorised to manage a business, in whole or
in part (No. 1), or persons expressly commissioned to perform on
101 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 25.
102 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 25.
103 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
3.
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their own responsibility duties which are incumbent on the owner
(No. 2), if they act on the basis of this commission. According to sect.
9 (3) OWiG, this shall also apply if the legal act which was intended to
form the basis of the power of representation or the agency is void—i.e.
the person is a de facto organ or representative. 104
3.3. Duties to control and supervise
The sanctioning of the violation of obligatory supervision in opera-
tions and enterprises by sect. 130 OWiG is generally intended to ensure
that sufficient precautions are taken against the commission of com-
pany-related contraventions. 105 With the introduction of this provision
in 1968 (originally in sect. 33 OWiG, from 1974 on in sect. 130), all for-
mer special provisions of state and federal law, which previously pro-
vided for the sanctioning of the violation of obligatory supervision in
special areas, were repealed. 106 The reasons for the unification were, 107
on the one hand, that the combination of personnel and means of pro-
duction has considerable advantages for the owner of an operation or en-
terprise as it expands his scope of action and adds further competences.
On the other hand, the division of labour between employees poses a
particular danger, since people are often more willing to take risks
and behave less in accordance with the rules if they act under pressure
from corporate goals and without supervision. Thus, there is a risk that
employees will commit offences. It must therefore be ensured that the
owner not only benefits from the advantages of the division of labour,
but also that he is liable for the disadvantages. For this reason, the owner
is under a duty to exercise proper supervision to counteract the specific
hazards arising from the employment—i.e. resulting from the opening of
a particular source of danger. 108
Sect. 130 (1) OWiG does not describe which concrete supervi-
sory measures the owner must take. It follows from the text that he
is only obliged to carry out ‘proper supervision’ (sentence 1), and that
the required supervisory measures shall ‘also’ (i.e. not exclusively)
comprise ‘appointment, careful selection and supervision of supervi-
sors’ (sentence 2). Furthermore, the supervisor is always obliged to
104 Valerius, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 9 marginal no. 53.
105 Bundestag Document V/1269, p. 67.
106 Bundestag Document V/1269, p. 67 et seq.
107 Cf. only Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no. 5.
108 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 385 et seq.
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carry out overall supervision. 109 Sect. 130 (1) OWiG does not pre-
scribe a specific organisation according to general opinion: this is a
question of the individual case. 110 The supervisory measure must be
required—that is, it must be not only a suitable and the most careful
means, but also a legally permissible and reasonable means. 111 Ac-
cording to the systematic ‘five-level model’, 112 the owner is obliged
to observe the following measures:
Level 1: Careful selection of employees and supervisors.
Level 2: Proper organisation and distribution of tasks.
Level 3: Appropriate instruction and information on tasks and du-
ties.
Level 4: Adequate monitoring and control, including sampling.
Level 5: Intervention in case of non-compliance.
The extent of the required supervisory measures is primarily deter-
mined by type, size, organisation of the company and monitoring possi-
bilities, but also by the variety and importance of the relevant regula-
tions to be observed and the susceptibility of the company and its em-
ployees to violations of regulations. 113 The personal responsibility of
employees (Eigenverantwortung) and the principle of trust (Vertrauens-
grundsatz) that applies to the division of labour must also be taken into
account. 114 The relationship between the cost of the supervisory mea-
sure and the probability of a violation is decisive for reasonableness.
3.4. Violation of supervisory duties and the commission of an offence
3.4.1. Causal link
German criminal law always requires a causal link. The supervisor
shall only be liable in accordance with the general rules if there is a
109 BGHSt 25, 158, 163; Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed.
2018, § 130 marginal no. 40.
110 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no. 41.
111 Vgl. Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, Vor §§ 38–40b marginal no. 77.
112 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 42.
113 BGHSt 9, 319, 322 et seq.; BGHSt 25, 158, 163; OLG Stuttgart NJW 1977,
1410; OLG Düsseldorf wistra 1991, 39; OLG Zweibrücken NStZ-RR 1998, 312.
114 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 51.
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causal link between the violation of the supervision duty and the com-
mission of an offence by the subordinate. The type of required causal
link depends on the solution of the dispute, as to whether the supervisor
who remains unlawfully inactive (sect. 13 StGB) is a principal (sect. 25
StGB) or an aider (sect. 27 StGB).
German jurisdiction traditionally follows, with regard to the distinc-
tion between perpetrators and secondary participants, the subjective the-
ory and differentiates between whether the omitting party had a princi-
pal’s will or a participant’s will. 115 Indications for the inner attitude are
not only subjective criteria, such as the degree of personal interest in the
success of the offence and the will to dominate it, but also objective cri-
teria, such as the extent of the participation in the offence and the dom-
ination of the offence. However, this approach results in a case-by-case
jurisdiction, which makes it difficult to make a clear distinction.
German science therefore mainly follows the ‘doctrine of domina-
tion of the offence’ (Tatherrschaftslehre), and thus an objective theo-
ry. 116 The principal is the person who, as a ‘central figure’, rules or
dominates the commission of the offence—i.e. who can run or stop
the realisation according to his will. The participant is the person
who, as a ‘marginal figure’, only initiates (abettor) or supports (aider)
the realisation of the offence. With regard to the violation of required
supervision, it is partly assumed, 117 on the one hand, that supervisors
who do not prevent the commission of an offence are, in general, prin-
cipals. On the other hand, it is also partly assumed 118 that the supervisor
can only be punished as an aider. In contrast, the prevailing view 119 is
right to assume that even in the case of an omission, the criteria of dis-
tinction may be whether the offence is dominated or not. If the supervi-
sor has the power to prevent the commission of the offence, he is a ‘cen-
tral figure’, and thus (if there is an agreement between the principals) a
joint principal (Mittäter) or (without agreement) an additional principal
(Nebentäter). 120 If he lacks domination of the offence, he cannot pre-
115 Cf. only RGSt. 53, 292, 293; 58, 244, 247; BGHSt 2, 150, 151; 43, 381, 396.
116 Cf. only Waßmer, in: AnwaltKommentar, 2nd ed. 2015, § 25 StGB marginal
no. 21.
117 Cf. only Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil II, 2003, § 31 marginal no. 140 et
seq.
118 Jescheck/Weigend, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 5th ed. 1996, § 64 III 5.
119 Joecks, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. I, 3rd ed. 2017, § 25 mar-
ginal no. 236;Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 47th ed. 2017, mar-
ginal no. 734.
120 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, p. 345 et seq.
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vent the commission—i.e. he is only a ‘marginal figure’, thus a mere
aider. This means the supervisor is the principal if he can ‘prevent’
the commission of the offence, and if there is a ‘success-causality’ in
this sense—i.e. a strict causal link. In contrast, he is an aider if he can
only ‘complicate’ the commission of the offence. 121 In this sense, in
the case of aiding by omission, it can be said that there is a ‘risk reduc-
tion’ (in contrast, if the aider actively takes part in the commission, there
is a ‘risk increase’). 122
Within the framework of sect. 130 OWiG, and thus in German
regulatory offences law, the causal link can be established in two
ways. On the one hand, the causal link exists if proper supervision
would have ‘prevented’ the commission of the contravention (first al-
ternative). Therefore, a strict causal link is required in the sense that
the contravention would not have been committed ‘with almost cer-
tain probability’ (quasi-causality). 123 In practice, however, this alter-
native is largely meaningless, as this proof can rarely be made. On the
other hand, it is sufficient that proper supervision would have made
the commission of the contravention ‘much more difficult’ (second
alternative). Thus, the legislator has adopted the risk-reduction doc-
trine. 124 Here too, however, it must be established ‘with almost cer-
tain probability’ that proper supervision would have reduced the risk
of commission substantially. If that finding is not possible, the super-
visor must be acquitted in dubio pro reo. Whether proper supervision
would have made the commission ‘much more difficult’ is a question
of the individual case. 125 This prerequisite is especially lacking in the
case of ‘excesses’ (Exzesstaten). These are company-related contra-
ventions which lie outside the scope of what can be expected from
life experience and in which the possibility of preventing or hindering
their commission seems a priori unrealistic. 126 Finally, it should be
noted that not every violation of obligatory supervision which is
121 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, p. 351 et seq.
122 Cf. Wessels/Beulke/Satzger, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 47th ed. 2017, mar-
ginal no. 582.
123 Cf. only Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no.
41.
124 Niesler, in: Graf/Jäger/Wittig, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2nd ed.
2017, § 130 marginal no. 66.
125 Niesler, in: Graf/Jäger/Wittig, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2nd ed.
2017, § 130 marginal no. 66.
126 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 112.
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causal for the commission is sufficient, but that according to the dom-
inant opinion 127 in the commission of the contravention, the risk of
violation of the supervisory obligation must have been realised (so-
called protective purpose context: Schutzzweckzusammenhang).
3.4.2. Mens rea
So far as the criminal liability of the supervisor as perpetrator or
secondary participant of a PIF offence is concerned, there must be in-
tent in accordance with the general rules. The supervisor who allows
the commission of an offence by a subordinate to happen must have
intent with regard to the offence of the subordinate—i.e. he must
know about the commission (cognitive component) and he must want
it (voluntative component). This presupposes that the supervisor’s in-
tent not only encompasses all objective and subjective elements of
the offence committed by the subordinate, but also that the intent en-
compasses the non-intervention, the quasi-causality and the circum-
stances that justify the position of guarantor. 128 However, all forms
of intent are sufficient, so third-degree intent (Eventualvorsatz) is
sufficient. 129 Therefore, it is sufficient that the supervisor has, on
the one hand, recognised the serious possibility of the commission
and, on the other hand, taken the risk of the commission seriously
and resigned or accepted it. Secure knowledge that the subordinate
will commit an offence is not required, but the supervisor must regard
the commission as ‘probable’. Whether this is the case has to be de-
termined on the basis of the overall circumstances (for instance, pre-
vious violations). In any case, it is not sufficient that the supervisor
should have known that an offence would be committed.
In practice, however, it is usually very difficult not only to prove
that the supervisor knew about the possibility of the commission of a
specific offence, but also to prove that he had ‘approved’ the specific
offence. 130 A further complicating factor is the fact that liability is prob-
lematic if the offence presupposes the existence of special intentions. 131
For example, in the case of fraud (sect. 263 StGB), there must be enrich-
127 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 118.
128 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 331.
129 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 331 et seq.
130 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 332.
131 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 333.
134 CHAPTER IV
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
ment intent. Thus, it must be proved that the supervisor himself had en-
richment intent or that he knew of the subordinate’s enrichment intent.
The responsibility according to sect. 130 OWiG applies to inten-
tional and negligent violations of obligatory supervision. Intention or
negligence must refer to the omission of the obligatory supervision mea-
sures but not to the commission of the concrete contravention. This fol-
lows from the reason that the contravention is a mere ‘objective condi-
tion of sanctioning’.
An intentional violation of obligatory supervision can be assumed if
the supervisor knew that he had to take certain supervisory measures. It
is not necessary to know about the contravention, but it is sufficient to
know that failure to take certain supervisory measures may result in the
risk of commission of a contravention of the type committed by the sub-
ordinate. 132 If no supervisory measures have been taken at all, intent is
obvious, 133 but even then intent must be proved. 134 In the event of a
mistake of fact with regard to the factual existence of the risk of com-
mission of a contravention (e.g. if the supervisor is not aware of the cir-
cumstances requiring intervention) 135 or the factual suitability, necessity
or reasonableness of supervisory measures, 136 a negligent violation is
possible (cf. sect. 11 (1) OWiG). In the event of a mistake of law—in
particular, if the supervisor is ignorant of the existence or applicability
of a legal provision—he shall not be deemed to have acted reprehensibly
if he could not avoid this error (cf. sect. 11 (2) OWiG).
A negligent violation of obligatory supervision can be assumed if
the supervisor should have known that the failure to take certain super-
visory measures may result in the risk of commission of a contravention
of the type committed by the subordinate. 137 In practice, this is often
obvious, as the owner must be aware of the situation in his company. 138
132 OLG Frankfurt wistra 1985, 38; OLG Karlsruhe Justiz 1980, 395; Rogall,
in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal no. 119.
133 Hermanns/Kleier, Grenzen der Aufsichtspflicht in Betrieben und Unterneh-
men, 1987, p. 83; Maschke, Aufsichtspflichtverletzungen in Betrieben und Unterneh-
men, 1997, p. 66.
134 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 119.
135 Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 130 marginal no. 32.
136 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no. 72.
137 Cf. only von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und
Steuerstrafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 67.
138 Cf. only Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no.
73.
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3.5. Delegation of control and supervisory duties: scope and limits
The delegation of tasks to subordinates is typical for companies. In
these cases, we speak of vertical delegation. In principle, it is up to the
owner to decide whether and to what extent tasks are delegated. How-
ever, above a certain company size, the owner must delegate tasks in or-
der to fulfil his duties. The duty to delegate certain tasks arises from the
‘diligence of a prudent and conscientious manager’ or ‘ordinary busi-
nessman’ (e.g. sect. 93 (1) AktG; sect. 43 (1) GmbHG). 139 The delega-
tion serves not only to distribute the work, but also to reduce liability,
since responsibility for the delegated tasks may also be transferred.
However, the delegation does not relieve the owner of his own duties
in relation to the operations: he remains the norm addressee and must
ensure the fulfilment of duties. 140 Therefore, the continuing obligation
to respect company-related duties leads to duties of selection, organisa-
tion, instruction, supervision and control. 141 These duties constitute the
reverse side of the right to delegate.
Therefore, the owner may also delegate the supervision and control
of subordinates to supervisory personnel. This task is not exclusively in-
cumbent on the owner, which can also be derived from sect. 130 (1) sen-
tence 2 OWiG: ‘The required supervisory measures shall also comprise
appointment, careful selection and surveillance of supervisory person-
nel.’ If the owner is able to personally ensure the fulfilment of all duties,
the use of supervisory personnel is not required. 142 Otherwise, he must
delegate it. Sect. 130 (1) sentence 2 OWiG intends to prevent the owner
from invoking that he was not able to exercise his supervisory duties be-
cause of the size of the company or for reasons related to his person (e.g.
overwork, illness or vacation). 143
As with all delegations, there are duties to select, organise, instruct
and supervise even supervisors. This is expressly stated in sect. 130 (1)
sentence 2 OWiG. The owner must select subordinates or persons who
do not have to be employees 144 but who are suitable for this task. The
139 Schulze NJW 2014, 3484.
140 Cf. only Tiedemann NJW 1986, 1842, 1845.
141 Waßmer, Die strafrechtliche Geschäftsherrenhaftung, 2006, p. 254 et seq.
142 Vgl. von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 45.
143 von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuerstra-
frecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 45.
144 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
91.
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persons have to be personally and professionally qualified. When se-
lecting supervisors, the owner has, with regard to the increased respon-
sibility of these persons, a much greater duty of care than when select-
ing other persons. 145 In addition, there must be a clear assignment of
tasks—i.e. the supervisors must know exactly who, when and where
they have to supervise. In practice, the subject and scope of the dele-
gation are often recorded in writing. Furthermore, the owner must in-
struct all supervisors adequately—that is, make them familiar with the
supervisory tasks—unless he can assume sufficient knowledge based
on learning and experience. 146
Finally, the owner must also supervise and control the supervi-
sors—i.e. ensure that they perform their task properly. To this end,
the supervisors shall report regularly to the owner on the measures
they have taken. 147 In addition, the supervisors and the owner him-
self must not only perform regular and therefore predictable controls,
but also random controls, which are unforeseen. 148 The controls must
be carried out in such a way that subordinates must fear the detection
of contraventions. 149 In summary, the appointment of supervisors
does not end the owner’s duty of supervision and control, but merely
reduces the intensity. 150
In addition, it should be noted that there are two types of supervisor,
whose assignment has different conditions and consequences.
In accordance with sect. 9 (2) sentence 1 No. 2 OWiG, a (here re-
ferred to as) ‘qualified’ supervisor is expressly commissioned to per-
form, on his own responsibility, tasks incumbent upon the owner of
the company. These tasks include the supervision and control of subor-
dinates. 151 One characteristic feature of a qualified supervisor is the ‘ex-
press’ mandate, which serves legal certainty and transparency. In the in-
terest of the delegates, and to ensure compliance with the duties as-
sumed, clear conditions should be created and an all too easy transfer
145 von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 45.
146 von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 45.
147 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no. 64.1.
148 Cf. BGHSt 9, 319, 323; BGHSt 25, 158, 163; OLG Köln wistra 1994, 115;
Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no. 64.1.
149 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 64.
150 BayObLG NJW 2002, 766.
151 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
84.
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of responsibility should be counteracted. 152 On the other hand, the man-
date must also enable the commissioner to perform the tasks ‘on his own
responsibility’: i.e. he must be able to make decisions on his own, hav-
ing freedom of action and decision-making authority. 153 The required
freedom of choice is given if the commissioner is able to take the nec-
essary measures on his own and without asking others, in particular
superiors. 154 The reason for these strict conditions is that the mandate
justifies a norm addressee’s position of supervisor, which can lead to
his liability under criminal law or regulatory offences law. 155 Firstly,
this means that the qualified supervisor is at least partly on an equal sta-
tus with the owner, so that he is responsible in accordance with sect. 130
OWiG. Secondly, the corporation is also responsible in accordance with
sect. 30 OWiG, as the qualified supervisor exercises controlling powers
in a managerial position, and thus constitutes ‘another person’ within the
meaning of sect. 30 (1) No. 5 OWiG. 156 According to the dominant
opinion, the compliance officer is also one of the commissioners within
the meaning of sect. 9 (2) sentence 1 no. 2 OWiG 157, and among the
representatives of sect. 30 OWiG. 158 This is true if the compliance of-
ficer has been expressly commissioned with the performance of control
and supervisory tasks on his own. 159
On the other hand, the supervisor is a (here referred to as) ‘simple’
supervisor if the express mandate to exercise the control and supervisory
tasks under his own responsibility is missing. The consequence is, on the
one hand, that the simple supervisor is not allowed to make decisions
but has to involve the owner. On the other hand, the simple supervisor
is not responsible pursuant to sect. 130 OWiG, as his position does not
correspond to that of the owner. Finally, he does not belong to the repre-
sentatives of sect. 30 OWiG, so that in case of a violation of supervisory
152 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
87.
153 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
88.
154 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
88.
155 BGHSt 58, 10, 13 = BGH NJW 2012, 3385.
156 Vgl. Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 margin-
al no. 88.
157 Cf. only Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17. ed. 2017, § 9 marginal no. 23.
158 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
88.
159 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 9 marginal no.
90.
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duties, the company’s responsibility can only exist if there is an inten-
tional or negligent violation of the owner’s obligatory supervision in this
regard.
3.6. Fulfilment of supervisory duties and disciplinary powers
As soon as the head of business or another supervisor becomes
aware of the possible commission of an offence by a subordinate, there
are three duties: the duty to clarify the facts, the duty to stop the offence
and the duty to sanction the offence. 160 The adoption of these measures
also results from sect. 130 (1) sentence 1 OWiG, as the holder is obliged
to ‘proper supervision’. 161
The initiation of clarification measures must identify not only the
perpetrators and participants involved in the offence but also the causes
of the offence. Regarding the ‘whether’ of the clarification, the supervi-
sor does not have any discretionary powers. 162 In principle, a compre-
hensive clarification must be carried out, since only this ensures that an
offence is not repeated. 163 With regard to the ‘how’ of the investigation,
the owner can initiate internal investigations by internal departments (in-
ternal auditing, controlling, compliance and/or legal departments) or by
external lawyers and auditors (internal investigations or forensic ser-
vices). On the other hand, the owner can leave the investigation to the
judicial authorities by initiating criminal proceedings by means of crim-
inal complaint or criminal request. The discretionary decision must be
based on whichever method appears to be the most appropriate response
in the specific case. 164 There is no general duty to file criminal com-
plaints. 165 A duty to involve the judicial authorities (so-called ‘reduction
of discretionary powers to zero’) exists only in exceptional cases, in par-
ticular if there is a statutory duty to report, as in the case of an offence
from the catalogue of sect. 138 StGB, or if money laundering or terrorist
financing is suspected in accordance with sect. 43 GwG. In addition, the
160 Reichert ZIS 2011, 113, 117 et seq.
161 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 65 et seq.
162 Rönnau/Schneider ZIP 2010, 53, 59; von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau
(eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 48.
163 Reichert, ZIS 2011, 113, 117.
164 Reichert, ZIS 2011, 113, 118.
165 Cf. only Bürkle CCZ 2010, 4, 10 et seq.; Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar
zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 333 HGB marginal no. 45, 46.
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aspects that speak in favour of performing internal investigations (e.g.
duty of care for subordinates; priority of internal clarification; confiden-
tiality; no loss of reputation; risk of sanctions for the company; nemo
tenetur se ipsum accusare) must be weighed against those who advocate
the involvement of the judicial authorities (policy of zero tolerance;
more effective information; deterrence; transparency). 166
If the clarification reveals that an offence is committed, the super-
visor must stop it and take precautions to prevent cases of recurrence.
For this purpose, it is necessary for the supervisor to ensure that the area
in which the offence was committed is subject to constant and specific
monitoring—i.e. there are increased duties of supervision. 167 Again, the
supervisor has no discretion as to ‘whether’ he intervenes. On the other
hand, he has the choice of ‘how’ to intervene if there are several equally
promising possibilities. 168
Finally, the supervisor must sanction the offence appropriately. The
sanction has to be clear and noticeable, as the severity determines how
conscientiously the subordinates will perform their duties in the future
and carelessness may give the impression that violations do not entail
any consequences. 169 In addition, in the event of inactivity, the owner
himself is exposed to criminal liability, in particular due to participation
in the offence (sect. 25-27 StGB), assistance after the fact (sect. 257
StGB) or assistance in avoiding prosecution (sect. 259 StGB).
Regarding the ‘whether’ of sanctioning, the prevailing opinion
assumes that there is no margin of discretion, since a sanction has
a general and special preventive effect. However, the ‘how’ of the
sanction—i.e. the type and amount—is a matter of discretion. 170
On the one hand, there are instruments of sanctions and disciplinary
measures available under labour law: extraordinary termination with-
out notice; regular termination within a specified period of time or
dismissal for variation of contract; changes in the working condi-
tions; warning notices; company or contractual fines; offsetting
against claims for damages; retention of parts of the remuneration.
On the other hand, claims for damages under the terms of employ-
ment, service and contract for work may be asserted. Finally, in the
166 Reichert, ZIS 2011, 113, 117 et seq., 120 et seq.
167 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 68.
168 Rönnau/Schneider ZIP 2010, 53, 60; Reichert ZIS 2011, 113, 118 et seq.
169 Reichert ZIS 2011, 113, 119.
170 Reichert ZIS 2011, 113, 117 et seq., 120.
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event of serious offences, it is appropriate to initiate criminal pro-
ceedings by means of a criminal complaint or criminal request. These
sanctions, which must be permissible under labour law in the indivi-
dual case, 171 can be applied alternatively or cumulatively, depending
on the nature and severity of the offence. 172 The decision shall take
into account the principle of proportionality and the reasonableness
of the sanction. In some cases, reluctance to impose sanctions may
also be necessary, in particular if the willingness to cooperate of a
person involved is necessary for the clarification of the facts, and this
goal can only be achieved against a partial or complete ‘amnesty’. 173
3.7. Liability and collective decisions
A company’s management regularly consists of several members. In
the case of a stock corporation, the executive board is the management
body, which may consist of several persons (sect. 76 (1) AktG). Simi-
larly, a limited liability company may have several managing directors
(sect. 6 (1) GmbHG). If the management consists of several members,
then all are only authorised to manage the company jointly unless the ar-
ticles of association, the rules of procedure or statutes stipulate otherwise
(cf. sect. 77 (1) AktG; sect. 35 (2) sentence 1 GmbHG). All members
have a general responsibility—a so-called ‘all-round responsibility’—for
the fulfilment of company duties. 174 However, since the members cannot
carry out all tasks together, the tasks are divided into departments and
delegated.
In the case of company-related violations affecting individual de-
partments (e.g. production, marketing), the responsibility of members
who are not internally responsible must be denied on account of the
validity of the principle of trust. 175 However, the internal division of
responsibilities does not result in an exemption from responsibility
but merely alters the weighting of responsibility. 176 The members
who are not internally responsible therefore have a duty to supervise,
171 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 65.
172 Reichert ZIS 2011, 113, 120.
173 Reichert ZIS 2011, 113, 120.
174 Cf. Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 331 mar-
ginal no. 18.
175 OLG Celle NZWiSt 2013, 68, 71.
176 BGHSt 21, 264, 277.
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which is, however, reduced (to a mere duty to observe) and only in-
tervenes on special occasions. The reason for this is that people at the
same level are not obliged to carry out general mutual checks due to
the lack of subordination. 177 Therefore, an internally not responsible
member is only responsible if he recognises that the internally re-
sponsible member does not take appropriate action or if he has con-
crete indications of maladministration. In these cases, there is an ob-
ligation to intervene—i.e. the member who is not internally responsi-
ble must, as far as possible and reasonable, ensure that the company-
based duties are fulfilled.
In the case of cross-departmental matters that relate to basic duties
(e.g. accounting) 178 or in which the company as a whole is affected, as
in crisis and exceptional situations (e.g. recall of dangerous prod-
ucts), 179 the management is called to act as a whole. Members must
therefore decide jointly. In the case of collective decisions, the prevailing
opinion assumes that the managers are joint principals. 180 Therefore, in
the case of majority voting, any person who has voted in favour of the
unlawful decision may be liable on the basis of mutual attribution of
votes. However, those who have voted against the unlawful decision
are not liable, as there is no mutual decision in this respect. 181 Those
who abstain cannot be held responsible either, according to a favourable
opinion, even if the vote in favour is reached, since there is a lack of a
mutual decision. 182 However, members who have voted or abstained
from voting against the unlawful decision may also be held responsible
if the unlawful decision is implemented. 183 Because of their general re-
sponsibility, these members must, as far as possible and within reason-
177 Cf. OLG Hamm NJW 1971, 817; OLG Naumburg NZV 1998, 41, 42; von
Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2017, §
130 OWiG marginal no. 27; Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed.
2018, § 130 marginal no. 72; Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht,
2013, § 331 marginal no. 19.
178 Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 331 marginal
no. 18.
179 BGHSt 36, 106, 123.
180 BGHSt 37, 106, 129; Knauer, Die Kollegialentscheidung im Strafrecht, 2001,
p. 142 et seq.
181 Waßmer, in: AnwaltKommentar StGB, 2nd ed. 2015, § 25 marginal no. 73.
182 Knauer, Die Kollegialentscheidung im Strafrecht, 2001, p. 206 et seq.;
Waßmer, in: AnwaltKommentar StGB, 2nd ed. 2015, § 25 marginal no. 73; Joecks,
in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. III, 3rd ed. 2017, § 25 marginal no. 258.
183 Joecks, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, Vol. III, 3rd ed. 2017, § 25
marginal no. 258; Waßmer, in: AnwaltKommentar StGB, 2nd ed. 2015, § 25 marginal
no. 73.
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able bounds, take all measures permitted to prevent the implementation
of an unlawful decision. In particular, supervisory boards or the share-
holders must be informed. If further action is required, the member must
resign if this is necessary in order to avoid criminal liability. 184 If these
duties are not fulfilled, the offender may be criminally liable by active
action or, if the implementation is not prevented by other persons, by
omission. 185
3.8. Relationship with corporate liability
There is no corporate criminal liability under German law, but only
a liability under the regulatory offences law. In accordance with sect. 30
OWiG, a regulatory fine can be imposed on a legal person, or an asso-
ciation of persons, if certain persons have committed a company-related
offence. The requirements under which a regulatory fine can be imposed
are high.
3.8.1. Triggering persons
Sect. 30 (1) OWiG requires that natural persons who have a leading
position in certain companies commit certain criminal or regulatory of-
fences.
Only corporations that are drafted as legal persons (e.g. limited lia-
bility company (GmbH); stock corporation (AG)), associations without
legal capacity or partnerships with legal capacity are included (cf. sect.
30 (1) No. 1-3 OWiG). All partnerships with legal status have been in-
cluded since 30 August 2002. 186 Previously, only commercial partner-
ships (general commercial partnership (OHG); limited partnership
(KG)) were included. After the jurisprudence acknowledged that civil
law partnerships (BGB-Gesellschaften) themselves could also be holders
of rights and duties, equal treatment became necessary. 187 According to
the prevailing opinion, legal persons under public law are also included,
184 Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 331 marginal
no. 19.
185 Joecks, in: Münchener Kommentar zum StGB, 3rd ed. 2017, § 25 marginal
no. 258.
186 Gesetz zur Ausführung des Zweiten Protokolls v. 19.6.1997 zum
Übereinkommen über den Schutz der finanziellen Interessen der Europäischen
Gemeinschaften (etc.), BGBl. I 2002, p. 3387.
187 BT-Drs- 14/8998, p. 8.
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since the provision does not contain any restrictions. 188 The federal,
state and local governments, on the other hand, do not seem to be sanc-
tionable. 189 In the case of a (partial) universal legal succession, the reg-
ulatory fine may be imposed on the legal successor(s) since 30 June
2013 in accordance with sect. 30 (2a) OWiG. Previously, there was a
sanction gap, as a fine could only be imposed because of the principle
of legality (Art. 103 (2) GG) if identity or ‘near’ identity existed be-
tween the former and the new capital composition from an economic
point of view. 190
Firstly, executive organs are included. The person in question
must be an entity authorised to represent a legal person or a member
of such an entity (No. 1), a chairman of the executive committee of an
association without legal capacity or a member of such a committee
(No. 2), or a partner authorised to represent a partnership with legal
capacity (No. 3). Secondly, since 1 November 1994, 191 certain repre-
sentatives—namely the authorised representative with full power of
attorney or in a managerial position as procura-holder or the
authorised representative with a commercial power of attorney (No.
4)—have also been included. This enlargement should counteract
the concealment of responsibility. 192 Thirdly, since 30 August
2002, all other persons responsible on behalf of the management, also
covering supervision of the conduct of business or other exercise of
controlling powers in a managerial position, have been added (No.
5). This includes, in particular, supervisory boards. This addition
was made for the implementation of Art. 3 (1) of the Second Protocol
to the PIF Convention. 193 In addition, the extension should further
counteract the shift of responsibility to subordinate levels. 194
Not every offence committed by a person who has a leading po-
sition is sufficient as a linking offence but, according to sect. 30 (1)
sentence 1 OWiG, only offences as a result of which duties incum-
bent on the legal person or on the association of persons have been
188 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 35 m.w.N.
189 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 37 m.w.N.
190 Vgl. BGHSt 57, 193; Waßmer NZWiSt 2012, 187.
191 2. Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Umweltkriminalität (2. UKG), BGBl. I 1994,
p. 1440.
192 BT-Drs. 12/192, p. 32.
193 BT-Drs. 14/8998, p. 10.
194 BT-Drs. 14/8998, p. 11.
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violated, or where the legal person or the association of persons has
been enriched or was intended to be enriched. Thus, only company-
related offences are included. 195 The offence must also have been
committed culpably, as the corporation is blamed for the natural per-
son’s guilt. The most important linking offence is sect. 130 OWiG,
since criminal and regulatory offences are frequently committed by
subordinates. This makes it possible to hold the corporation liable
if an employee has committed an offence and the intentional or neg-
ligent violation of obligatory supervision by a person who has a lead-
ing position is ascertained. However, this regulatory technique does
result in gaps in sanctions if a subordinate has committed a com-
pany-related contravention and there is ‘only’ the violation of obliga-
tory supervision by a person who does not hold a leading position. 196
By delegating the supervision of subordinates to supervisors located
below the management level, this sanction gap can be intentionally
exploited, especially in larger corporations. In such cases, no regula-
tory fine can be imposed on the corporation.
Finally, there must be a link to representation—i.e. the person who
has a leading position must have acted as an entity authorised to repre-
sent a legal person, etc. According to the legal explanation, the principal
‘generally’ does not act as a representative if he ‘acts in his own inter-
est’. 197 Therefore, German jurisdiction has long followed the so-called
interest theory, 198 according to which the link to representation exists if
the principal acts ‘at least also’ in the interests of the represented cor-
poration when viewed from an economic point of view, but not if he acts
exclusively for his own benefit. However, this differentiation led to a
significant reduction in insolvency offences and was hardly feasible in
negligence offences, which is why a so-called theory of function was es-
tablished in legal literature, according to which the principal must have
used legal or actual possibilities of action arising from his position. 199 In
the meantime, the Federal Court of Justice 200 has abandoned the interest
theory and demands action ‘in the business circle of the represented’
(so-called business circle theory)—i.e. not just ‘on occasion’. Acting
within the business circle is given if the principal ‘acts legally’—that
195 BT-Drs. V/1269, p. 60.
196 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 92.
197 BT-Drs. V/1269, p. 61.
198 Cf. only BGHSt 30, 127, 128 et seq.
199 Perron, in: Schönke/Schröder, StGB, 29. ed. 2014, § 14 marginal no. 26.
200 BGHSt 57, 229 = BGH NJW 2012, 2366.
GERMANY NATIONAL REPORT 145
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
is, acts on behalf of the legal person or brings about binding legal con-
sequences for the legal person on the basis of the existing power of rep-
resentation.
3.8.2. Concurrence and accumulation of liabilities
Responsibility of the natural person and responsibility of the cor-
poration must concur. The corporation is only liable if a person who
has a leading position within the corporation commits an unlawful
and culpable company-related criminal or regulatory offence. However,
a sanctioning of the natural person for the linking offence is not manda-
tory. In accordance with sect. 30 (4) sentence 1 OWiG, a regulatory fine
may be assessed independently if proceedings are not commenced, or if
such proceedings are discontinued, or if imposition of a criminal penalty
is dispensed with. In addition, it is even possible to assess a so-called
‘anonymous’ regulatory fine if the identity of the offender cannot be as-
certained but it is clear that one of the corporation’s leaders must have
committed the connecting offence. 201 Nevertheless, according to sect.
30 (4) sentence 3 OWiG, the independent assessment of a regulatory
fine against the legal person or association of persons shall be precluded
where the criminal or regulatory offence cannot be prosecuted for legal
reasons—i.e. in the case of a statute of limitation in particular, but also
in the case of immunity, extraterritoriality, amnesty or lack of criminal
request. 202
The liability of the corporation according to sect. 30 OWiG does not
exclude individual liability. Penalties or regulatory fines may also be im-
posed on those persons who have leading positions or on the subordi-
nates even if the corporation itself is not fined.
3.9. Compliance programmes
3.9.1. Role of compliance programmes
Compliance programmes are designed to ensure that a corporation’s
conduct is lawful, i.e. that the corporate organs, representatives and sub-
ordinates comply with all legal requirements and prohibitions, as well as
201 Vgl. BGH NStZ 1994, 346; Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17. ed. 2017, § 30
marginal no. 40.
202 Cf. only Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17. ed. 2017, § 30 marginal no. 42.
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internal guidelines and voluntary codes. For the implementation, a com-
pliance officer is often appointed who acts as a link between manage-
ment and decision-makers in the departments. By setting up an effective
compliance programme, the owner fulfils his legal duty under sect. 130
OWiG to ensure proper supervision. If the compliance programme is ef-
fective, it ensures that company-related contraventions by subordinates
are prevented, or at least made much more difficult. If subordinates com-
mit company-related contraventions despite this, these could not be
avoided by ‘proper supervision’. Therefore, an intentional or negligent
violation of obligatory supervision within the meaning of sect. 130
OWiG is ruled out, and due to the lack of a linking offence, so too is
the imposition of a regulatory fine against the corporation in accordance
with sect. 30 OWiG. It is neither possible nor necessary to structure the
supervisory measures in such a way that no contravention can occur. 203
In this way, an effective compliance programme ensures that responsi-
bility of the leading persons and the corporation for violations of super-
visory duties is eliminated and that liability is ‘waived’. 204 However, if
there are any doubts about the effectiveness of the compliance pro-
gramme, at least a negligent violation of obligatory supervision cannot
be ruled out. 205
Therefore, it is not surprising that in recent years, supported by
intensified criminal prosecution, companies have increasingly estab-
lished compliance programmes 206 and employed compliance offi-
cers. 207 As an empirical study from 2013 208 indicates, these pro-
grammes have led to a significant decline in economic crime in these
companies. However, most companies still lack compliance struc-
tures. This is partly due to the fact that the considerable effort in-
volved in setting up compliance structures is spared. 209 On the other
hand, there are fears that strict internal regulations will not only have
considerable disadvantages for the company’s business activities but
203 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 56.
204 Cf. only von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 44; Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum
OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal no. 58.
205 Von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 44.
206 BRAK, Stellungnahme Nr. 9/2013, p. 4.
207 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 15th ed. 15.04.2017, § 130 marginal no. 126.
208 PricewaterhouseCoopers (ed.), Wirtschaftskriminalität und Unternehmens-
kultur 2013, 2013, p. 16 et seq.
209 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 15.07.2017, § 130 marginal no. 126.1.
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will also raise the standard for the obligatory supervisory measures to
be taken. 210
Finally, the existence or establishment of a compliance pro-
gramme can lead to a reduction of regulatory fines (which may be
imposed on the owner or the legal person) when a subordinate com-
mits a contravention. 211 This is because both existing and future
compliance efforts can be taken into account to reduce regulatory
fines. However, this is not mandatory, since the owner of a company
is obliged to exercise proper supervision and the establishment of a
compliance programme serves only to fulfil this duty. It is therefore
proposed that in the future, with respect to companies that have intro-
duced an effective compliance system, fines should be reduced or
lifted in order to provide an incentive for companies to seek effective
compliance. 212
3.9.2. Obligation to adopt compliance programmes
German law does not provide for a general obligation to adopt a
compliance programme or even appoint a compliance officer. Sect.
130 OWiG is regarded as the central norm 213 but does not impose
a general obligation to introduce compliance programmes. 214 How-
ever, the prevailing opinion has long concluded from the obligation
for ‘proper supervision’ that at least large companies have a duty
to set up an audit department. 215 Today, this is referred to as the es-
tablishment of a compliance organisation. 216 The extent to which
compliance measures are appropriate depends in particular on the size
of the company and the risk aptitude. While, in smaller companies, a
distribution of tasks with installed control is sufficient, large compa-
210 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 15.07.2017, § 130 marginal no. 128.
211 Cf. only von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und
Steuerstrafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 44; Gehring/Kasten/Mäger CCZ
2013, 1, 10.
212 Moosmayer NJW 2012, 3013, 3017.
213 Bock ZIS 2009, 68, 69.
214 Niesler, in: Graf/Jäger/Wittig, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2nd ed.
2017, § 130 marginal no. 13.
215 BGH wistra 1982, 34; OLG Köln wistra 1994, 315; Rogall, in: Karlsruher
Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal no. 56.
216 von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 44; Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar
zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal no. 57.
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nies may implicitly be obliged to set up a compliance management
system. 217
For certain companies and business segments, there are statutory re-
quirements for more or less comprehensive organisational duties, in par-
ticular, the establishment of a compliance function or risk management
system. In this respect, it should be noted that in many companies in
Germany, risk management, internal control and compliance are organi-
sationally separated, although the overall aim is to ensure that the rele-
vant rules are complied with. 218
In accordance with sect. 91 (2) AktG, the executive board of a stock
corporation must take appropriate measures—in particular, set up a
monitoring system—so that developments that could jeopardise the ex-
istence of the company are identified at an early stage. As a result, stock
corporations are regularly obliged to set up a risk monitoring system. 219
As a rule, a risk management officer is appointed, who reports regularly
to both the executive board and the supervisory board, and records and
monitors risks centrally. 220 In addition, according to sect. 4.1.3. of the
legally non-binding 221 German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC),
‘[T]he Management Board ensures that all provisions of law and the
company’s internal policies are complied with, and endeavours to
achieve their compliance by the group entities (Compliance). It shall
also institute appropriate measures reflecting the company’s risk situa-
tion (Compliance Management System) and disclose the main features
of those measures.’
Sect. 33 of the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandels-
gesetz: WpHG) establishes organisational duties for investment service
providers. In accordance with sect. 33 (1) sentence 2 no. 1 WpHG, ap-
propriate principles must be established; funds must be kept available
and procedures set up to ensure that the company itself and its employ-
ees comply with the obligations of the WpHG, in particular by establish-
ing a permanent, effective and independent compliance function. Credit
institutions are obliged to establish a compliance function as part of the
internal control system in accordance with sect. 25a (1) sentence 3 No.
3c of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz: KWG). In accor-
217 von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 44.
218 Moosmayer NJW 2012, 3013, 3016.
219 Oltmanns, in: Heidel (ed.), AktG, 5th ed. 2018, § 91 marginal no. 6.
220 Oltmanns, in: Heidel (ed.), AktG, 5th ed. 2018, § 91 marginal no. 8.
221 BGH NJW 2008, 855.
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dance with sect. 29 (1) of the German Insurance Supervision Act (Ver-
sicherungsaufsichtsgesetz: VAG), insurance companies must also have
an effective internal control system that includes at least a compliance
function.
Finally, in accordance with sect. 4 (1) GwG, persons and companies
subject to the Money Laundering Act must have an effective risk man-
agement system that is appropriate with regard to the type and scope of
the business activities in order to prevent money laundering and terrorist
financing. In accordance with sect. 4 (2) GwG, risk management com-
prises a risk analysis (sect. 5 GwG) and internal security measures (sect.
6 GwG). Pursuant to sect. 7 (1) GwG, certain persons and companies
must appoint an anti-money laundering officer at management level
who is responsible for compliance with the money laundering regula-
tions.
3.9.3. Consequences of failing to adopt compliance programmes
If a company does not have a compliance programme, despite it
being required by law, the regulatory authorities may in regulated sec-
tors, such as securities service providers, credit institutions and insur-
ance companies, dismiss the managing directors for lack of suitabil-
ity. 222
With regard to criminal law or regulatory offences law, the absence
of a compliance programme does not have any immediate consequences.
The mere fact that a company has not set up a compliance programme
does not constitute a violation of the obligatory supervision pursuant to
sect. 130 OWiG. 223 However, if a subordinate commits a company-re-
lated contravention, it is obvious that the existence of an effective com-
pliance programme would have made the commission much more diffi-
cult. Although appropriate compliance measures cannot rule out the pos-
sibility of contraventions within the company, they can significantly re-
duce the probability. Therefore, even if the participation of the owner in
an offence of the subordinate cannot be proved according to general
rules (sect. 13, 25 to 27 StGB), there will almost always be a negligent
violation of obligatory supervision pursuant to sect. 130 OWiG. This
makes it possible to impose a regulatory fine against the corporation
in accordance with sect. 30 OWiG.
222 Vgl. VG Frankfurt am Main WM 2004, 2157.
223 Niesler, in: Graf/Jäger/Wittig, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2nd ed.
2017, § 130 marginal no. 12.
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4. Defences
4.1. Effective powers of supervision and control and liability
As explained, the owner of a company is obliged to exercise ‘proper
supervision’ in accordance with sect. 130 (1) OWiG. The supervisory
measures include adequate control and supervision of subordinates.
The omission of any supervisory measures is unjustifiable from any
point of view. This can also be deduced from sect. 130 (1) sentence 2
OWiG, according to which ‘the required supervisory measures shall also
comprise appointment, careful selection and surveillance of supervisory
personnel’. The express mention of the supervisory personnel is in-
tended to prevent the holder from invoking that he was unable to exer-
cise his supervisory duties due to the size of the establishment or for rea-
sons relating to his person (see section 3.5).
However, even effective supervisory measures cannot exclude with
certainty that contraventions will occur but can only significantly reduce
the probability. It is neither possible nor necessary to design the super-
vision in such a way that no contraventions can occur at all. In general
opinion, the supervisory measures must not only be appropriate and ne-
cessary, but also reasonable. 224 This applies, on the one hand, to the
subordinates and, on the other hand, to the owner. From the subordi-
nate’s point of view, ‘proper supervision’ must preserve human dig-
nity. 225 A ‘total’ surveillance (e.g. through complete video surveillance)
would be harassing and would destroy the required relationship of trust
between employer and employee. Therefore, law does not permit it. 226
From the owner’s point of view, no measures can be demanded that are
unrealistic and disproportionate in terms of costs. 227 In addition, mea-
sures that have a priori a small chance of success and only represent
a ‘poking around in the dark’ are unacceptable. 228 Excessive bureaucra-
tisation of the company and thus excessive impairment of the effective-
ness of its activities cannot be demanded.
224 Cf. BGH wistra 1986, 222, 223; BayObLG wistra 2001, 478, 479; OLG
Düsseldorf NStZ-RR 1999, 151; Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 15.07.2017, §
130 marginal no. 51; von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau (eds), Wirtschafts- und
Steuerstrafrecht, 2017, § 130 OWiG marginal no. 35; Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar
zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal no. 51.
225 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 51.
226 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 15.07.2017, § 130 marginal no. 53.
227 Beck, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 15.07.2017, § 130 marginal no. 54.
228 OLG Frankfurt am Main VRS 56, 109, 111.
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Therefore, the owner can claim that he has taken all necessary and
reasonable supervisory measures but that the subordinate’s contraven-
tion could not be avoided. This is obvious when the subordinate has
committed an intentional contravention and deliberately eliminated con-
trol mechanisms. The same applies to excesses, the prevention of which
is a priori unrealistic.
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers
The delegation of control and supervision of subordinates to super-
visors cannot relieve the owner of his duties. As outlined (see section
3.5), sect. 130 (1) sentence 2 OWiG states that the ‘appointment, careful
selection and supervision of supervisory personnel’ are part of the re-
quired supervisory measures. It is agreed that, despite delegation, the
owner shall always exercise overall supervision. 229 This is also shown
in sect. 9 (1) and (2) OWiG, according to which the person represented
also remains obliged. Therefore, by delegation, the holder cannot fully
relieve himself of his duties: delegation does not ‘break’ responsibil-
ity. 230
As a result, the owner is also subject to supervisory duties with re-
gard to supervisors. As with every delegation, there are duties of selec-
tion, organisation, instruction and supervision. If the owner has indica-
tions or knowledge that the supervisor is not performing the supervision
task properly, he is obliged to intervene. The same applies if there are
mistakes in selection, organisation or instruction. This is true for simple
and qualified supervisors (with regard to this differentiation, see section
3.5), as there are also supervisory duties if a supervisor has been ex-
pressly commissioned to act on his own responsibility. Despite this, qua-
lified supervisors are still subject to overall supervision by the owner,
albeit at a reduced level.
In the case of contraventions committed by subordinates, this
means that if the supervisor has fulfilled his tasks properly, the owner
is not responsible. If a simple supervisor has not fulfilled his tasks
properly, the owner is responsible under sect. 130 OWiG if there
was a violation of his duties to select, organise, instruct and super-
229 BGHSt 25, 158, 163; KG JR 1972, 121, 122; Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar
zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal no. 40; Schmidt-Husson, in: Hauschka/Moos-
mayer/Lösler (eds), Corporate Compliance, 3rd ed. 2016, § 6 marginal no. 36.
230 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 130 marginal
no. 40.
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vise. However, there is no violation of supervisory duty if the owner
had no reason to doubt that the supervisor fulfils the task correctly
and if, at the same time, the owner had ensured that he would be in-
formed as reliably and as early as possible of abuses. 231 If, on the
other hand, a qualified supervisor has not fulfilled his tasks properly,
he is, being on the same level as the owner, responsible under sect.
130 OWiG. In addition, the owner may have violated his duties to se-
lect, organise, instruct and monitor.
4.3. Compliance programmes
The goal of a compliance programme is to systematically create
the prerequisites for preventing or significantly impeding contraven-
tions and to identify and deal with contraventions that have already
occurred. Therefore, the focus is on risk analysis, deviation analysis,
dealing with exceptional situations and the resolution as well as the
prevention of non-compliance situations. In this context, all measures
and processes to ensure compliance with the rules constitute a com-
pliance management system. 232 In this respect, non-statutory (mini-
mum) standards have emerged that indicate which measures shall
be taken to systematically set up, maintain, monitor and improve a
compliance organisation. The observance of the standard indicates
that those responsible for the company have fulfilled their ‘duty of
care’ (see section 2.2.2).
Compliance management systems do not have to be designed in a
uniform way but can take into account the specific characteristics of
the organisation (size, structure, activities, products, specific risks,
etc.). In Germany, the following standards are important: 233
Standard for Compliance Management Systems (TR CMS
101:2015), supplemented by a Compliance Guide (TR CMS
100:2015), both published by TÜV Rheinland. 234
Auditing Standard 980 (IDW PS 980), published by the Institute of
231 Schmidt-Husson, in: Hauschka/Moosmayer/Lösler (eds), Corporate Compli-
ance, 3rd ed. 2016, § 6 marginal no. 38.
232 Wegner PStR 2014, 19.
233 Vgl. Ziegler, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 130 marginal no.
36 et seq.
234 TÜV Rheinland (ed.), Compliance-Management-Systeme, Standard und Leit-
faden TR CMS 101:2015 und TR CMS 100:2015, 2015.
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Public Auditors in Germany (ISW) 235 and considered a reference
framework to meet the minimum standards of an effective compliance
system for companies with more than 700 employees and annual sales
of more than 100 million euros. 236
Risk management according to the Committee of Sponsoring Orga-
nizations of the Treadway Commission (at present, COSO-Internal Con-
trol 2013), which is examined from a three-dimensional view of the
company and its risk management system (so-called COSO-cube: com-
pany objectives, components, organisational structure).
ISO 19600 (Compliance Management Systems) and ISO 31000
(Risk Management), published by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO); IDW PS 980 and ISO 19600, and ISO 19600
and ISO 31000, complement each other. 237
If a compliance management system meets a standard, the owner’s
liability is in general excluded. 238 If there are any doubts, a negligent
violation of the supervisory duty cannot be ruled out. Regular certifica-
tions prove whether the standard is met. For example, by having the sys-
tem audited in accordance with IDW PS 980, companies receive proof
that their system is appropriate and effective. 239 As a result, more and
more companies are having compliance management systems set up
and certified in order to reduce liability for the management and the
company and to counter possible allegations of culpable violations of or-
ganisational duties. 240
4.4. Third party advice, external auditing and liability of heads of busi-
ness
The use of an external auditor does not exclude the responsibility of
the owner for offences committed in the audited area. In practice, exter-
235 Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (ed.), IDW Verlautbarungen zu Governance,
Risk und Compliance: IDW PS 980, IDW PS 981, IDW PS 982, IDW PS 983,
IDW Praxishinweis 1/2016, IDW PH 9.980.1, 2017.
236 Ziegler, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 130 marginal no. 38.
237 Ziegler, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 130 marginal no. 42.
238 Cf. only Ziegler, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 130 marginal
no. 36.
239 Cf. only Schmidt, in: Hauschka/Moosmayer/Lösler (eds), Corporate Compli-
ance, 3rd ed. 2016, § 45 marginal no. 14; Wegner PStR 2014, 19.
240 Schmidt, in: Hauschka/Moosmayer/Lösler (eds), Corporate Compliance, 3rd
ed. 2016, § 45 marginal no. 13.
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nal auditing of financial statements is usually carried out by an auditor
who prepares an audit report (sect. 321 of the German Commercial Code
(HGB)) and then issues a corresponding audit opinion (sect. 322 HGB).
In this respect, however, the contents of the auditing are important. The
audit report must not only report on the type, scope and result of the audit
(sect. 321 (1) sentence 1 HGB), but also on any detected inaccuracies or
violations of legal regulations, as well as facts that indicate serious viola-
tions (sect. 321 (1) sentence 3 HGB: the so-called ‘great duty to speak’).
However, the auditor does not have to search for evidence of criminal
offences, but only report if he discovers signs of irregularity 241 (e.g. un-
usual transactions; unexplained payments). 242 Contrary to popular public
opinion, external auditing is not a mistrust audit. Sect. 317 (1) sentence 1
HGB states that the audit of financial statements shall only be conducted
in such a way that inaccuracies and violations are detected in the case of
‘conscientious professional conduct’, whereby a ‘critical attitude’ (IDW
PS 200.17) and the risk of manipulated sales revenue (IDW PS 210) must
be taken into account. The purpose of the investigation is not to uncover
offences; 243 therefore, external auditing is no guarantee that the financial
statements and reports are accurate.
Nevertheless, in practice, the owner’s responsibility with regard to
accounting offences (in particular, sect. 331 HGB) is usually severely
limited if he has delegated bookkeeping and accounting, as usual, to ac-
countants or tax consultants. In this case, as with every delegation, there
are duties of selection, organisation, instruction and supervision. There-
fore, if suitable persons have been selected and instructed, the supervi-
sory measures are usually limited to supervision and control. 244 Due to
the lack of expert knowledge, it will usually be impossible for the owner
to carry out the control himself, so he has to rely on the external audi-
tor’s judgment. Unless the owner has concrete indications of irregulari-
ties, he will regularly lack intent. 245 In practice, evidence of the of-
241 Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 332 HGB
marginal no. 2.
242 Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 332 HGB
marginal no. 14.
243 OLG Karlsruhe WM 1985, 940, 943; Spatscheck/Wulf DStR 2003, 173, 178;
Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 332 HGB marginal no. 2.
244 Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 331 HGB
marginal no. 18.
245 Waßmer, in: Münchener Kommentar zum Bilanzrecht, 2013, § 332 HGB
marginal no. 112.
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fence will only succeed if the owner has actively intervened in ac-
counting—e.g. to brighten up the economic situation.
5. Liability of heads of business and sanctions
5.1. Criminal and punitive sanctions
With regard to sanctions, a distinction must be made between heads
of business (organs, representatives) and the corporation. In addition,
confiscation is at least in part a sanction under German law (see section
5.4).
5.1.1. Heads of business
A head of business can be held criminally liable as a principal or
secondary participant (sect. 25–27 StGB) if he has committed or been
involved in an intentional offence (cf. 1.1). In this respect, there is re-
sponsibility not only for active action but also for omission, in particular
for not intervening against offences committed by subordinates. The
punishment and the scope of penalties threatened by the respective crim-
inal provision are decisive for the sanctioning.
For example, fraud (sect. 263 (1) StGB) is punishable by imprison-
ment not exceeding five years or by a fine. This also applies to the at-
tempt (sect. 263 (2) StGB). In especially severe cases, the penalty shall
be imprisonment from six months to ten years (sect. 263 (3) sentence 1
StGB). An especially serious case typically occurs if the offender (cf.
sect. 263 (3) sentence 2 Nos. 1 to 5 StGB) acts on a commercial basis
or as a member of a gang; causes a major financial loss or acts with the
intent of placing a large number of persons in danger of financial loss;
places another person in financial hardship; abuses his powers or his po-
sition as a public official; or pretends that an insured event has hap-
pened. If the offender acts on a commercial basis and as a member of
a gang, he shall be liable to imprisonment from one to ten years, in less
serious cases from six months to five years (sect. 263 (5) StGB). The
framework of penalties mentioned applies to principals (sect. 25 StGB)
and abettors (sect. 26 StGB). For aiders (sect. 27 (1) StGB), the penalty
is to be reduced according to sect. 49 (1) StGB (sect. 27 (2) sentence 2
StGB). In the case of an omission, the sentence may be mitigated pur-
suant to sect. 49 (1) StGB (sect. 13 (2) StGB). This also applies to
the attempt (sect. 23 (2) StGB). The mitigation pursuant to sect. 49
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(1) StGB is based on the legal framework of penalties, wherein various
stages are provided for.
Since 24 August 2017, 246 sect. 44 (1) sentence 1 StGB provides
that if a person has been sentenced for a criminal offence, the court
may, in addition, impose a temporary driving ban as an ancillary punish-
ment, prohibiting the person from driving any class of motor vehicle or a
specific class on public roads for a period from one to six months. Ac-
cording to sect. 44 (1) sentence 2 StGB, the driving ban can now be im-
posed even if the offence was not committed in connection with the
driving of a motor vehicle or in violation of the duties of a driver, in par-
ticular if it appears to be necessary to influence the offender or to defend
the legal system or to avoid the imposition of a custodial sentence or its
enforcement. The temporary driving ban is a special preventive warning
and reflection punishment. 247 However, it is not yet possible to assess
the practical significance of the driving ban for offences that are not re-
lated to driving.
If the head of business’s responsibility is excluded in accordance
with the general rules of criminal law, he may be held liable under sect.
130 OWiG for a violation of obligatory supervision. Sect. 130 (1) OWiG
stipulates that the head of business must be the owner of the company
(or be on an equal basis with the owner in accordance with sect. 9
OWiG) and that a subordinate must have committed a company-related
contravention which would have been prevented or substantially im-
peded by appropriate supervision. With regard to a criminal offence,
the regulatory offence may carry a regulatory fine not exceeding one
million euros in accordance with sect. 130 (3) sentence 1 OWiG. With
regard to a regulatory offence, in accordance with sect. 130 (3) sentence
3 OWiG, the maximum regulatory fine shall be determined by the max-
imum regulatory fine imposable for the regulatory offence. This shall
also apply in accordance with sect. 130 (3) sentence 4 OWiG in the case
of a violation simultaneously carrying a criminal penalty and a regula-
tory fine, provided that the maximum regulatory fine imposable exceeds
the maximum pursuant to sect. 130 (3) sentence 1 OWiG.
246 Gesetz zur effektiveren und praxistauglicheren Ausgestaltung des
Strafverfahrens, BGBl. I 2017, p. 3202.
247 v. Heintschel-Heinegg, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 44 marginal
no. 1.
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5.1.2. Corporations
A regulatory fine may be imposed on legal persons or associations
of persons pursuant to sect. 30 (1) OWiG if one of their organs or repre-
sentatives has committed a company-related offence. Pursuant to sect.
30 (2) sentence 1 OWiG, the regulatory fine shall amount in the case
of a criminal offence committed with intent to not more than ten million
euros (No. 1), and in the case of a criminal offence committed negli-
gently to not more than five million euros (No. 2). This fine framework
has been in force since 30 June 2013 248 and was previously limited to a
maximum of one million euros, or rather 500,000 euros. The tenfold in-
crease has been imposed in order to raise the maximum amount to a le-
vel that is ‘effective, proportionate and deterrent’. 249
Also effective from 30 June 2013, sect. 30 (2) sentence 2 OWiG
was introduced, according to which, if an act refers to this provision,
the maximum amount of the regulatory fine shall be multiplied by ten
for the offences referred to in the act. Such a reference was created with-
in sect. 130 (3) sentence 2 OWiG. As a consequence, in the event of a
violation of supervision by intent which led to a criminal offence, a fine
of ten million euros (in the case of an intentional offence) or five million
euros (in the case of a negligent offence) will be imposed (instead of
only one million euros or 500,000 euros respectively). This substantial
increase was justified by the fact that intentional violations of obligatory
supervision can cause considerable economic damage. 250
Pursuant to sect. 30 (2) sentence 2 OWiG, the maximum regulatory
fine that can be imposed for the commission of a regulatory offence
shall be determined by the maximum regulatory fine imposable for
the regulatory offence concerned. This shall also apply in accordance
with sect. 30 (2) sentence 4 OWiG, where there has been commission
of an act simultaneously constituting a criminal and a regulatory offence,
provided that the maximum regulatory fine imposable for the regulatory
offence exceeds the maximum pursuant to sect. 30 (2) sentence 1
OWiG.
The financial benefit is also absorbed in accordance with sect. 17
(4) OWiG in respect of regulatory fines imposed. 251 The assessment
248 Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen,
BGBl. I 2013, p. 1738.
249 Bundestag document No. 17/11053, 21.
250 Bundestag document No. 17/11053, 23.
251 Sackreuther, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 15.7.2017, § 17 marginal no. 116.
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of a regulatory fine incurred by the legal person or association shall, in
respect of one and the same offence, preclude a confiscation pursuant to
sect. 73 or sect. 73a StGB or pursuant to sect. 29a OWiG (cf. sect. 30 (5)
OWiG).
5.2. Other sanctions and measures
With regard to other sanctions and measures, German law distin-
guishes between natural persons and legal persons and associations of
persons.
5.2.1. Criminal law
In criminal law, the court may impose, according to sect. 70 StGB,
an order for professional disqualification from one year to five years
against a natural person who has been convicted of an unlawful act com-
mitted in abuse of his profession or trade or in gross violation of the at-
tendant duties. The disqualification is not limited to certain offences. It
may cover the engagement in a profession, branch of profession, trade or
branch of trade. The disqualification intends to protect the public from
the risks which may arise from further engagement. 252 Despite the seri-
ous consequences, the order is, according to the prevailing opinion, a
pure measure of incapacitation. 253 In practice, the stigmatising effect
counteracts social rehabilitation. 254
The requirement for an order of professional disqualification is
that the offender has either been convicted or has not been convicted
solely because he was proved to have acted in a state of insanity. This
also holds true if a state of insanity cannot be ruled out. Furthermore,
a comprehensive evaluation of the offender and the offence must
show that by further engagement in the profession or trade, there is
a danger that the perpetrator will commit serious unlawful acts of
the kind committed (sect. 70 (1) sentence 1 StGB), and that the use
of the measure is not disproportionate to the seriousness of the of-
fence committed or expected to be committed (sect. 62 StGB). The
disqualification order may be made in permanence if there is reason
to believe that the statutory maximum period will not suffice to avert
252 BVerfG BeckRS 2003, 24274.
253 OLG Karlsruhe StV 1993, 403, 404.
254 Waßmer, in: AnwaltKommentar StGB, 2nd ed. 2015, § 70 marginal no. 2.
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the danger posed by the offender (sect. 70 (1) sentence 2 StGB). In
addition, if there are cogent reasons for assuming that an order of pro-
fessional disqualification will be ordered, the judge may, by order,
disqualify the accused on a provisional basis (sect. 132 a (1) sentence
1 StGB). However, the order of professional disqualification has
gained little practical significance because it is a drastic measure
and it is very difficult to assess the danger of repetition. 255
5.2.2. Regulatory offences law, civil law and administrative law
In contrast, regulatory offences law does not provide for an order of
professional disqualification. This applies equally to natural persons, le-
gal persons and associations of persons. However, there is a wide range
of instruments available for countering any commission of an offence.
These instruments are used exclusively to prevent dangers.
First of all, there is the possibility of a trade ban, whereby an
authority can order a disqualification of a profession or trade. The cen-
tral regulation is sect. 35 GewO, which applies to so-called ‘stationary
trades’ (stehende Gewerbe)—i.e. trades that are not classified as either
travel trades or market trades. Accordingly, the competent authority shall
prohibit the engagement in an activity in whole or in part if facts demon-
strate the unreliability of the trader or of a person entrusted with the
management of the company, provided that the prohibition is necessary
to protect the general public or the persons employed. A prohibition is
‘necessary’ if milder means (e.g. warning letters) are not sufficient for
protection. A complete ban is ultima ratio and only considered an excep-
tion (e.g. in case of mental illness). 256 In addition, administrative regu-
lations enable prohibition of other trade activities, in particular travel
trades (sect. 59 GewO), catering trades (sect. 15 of the Restaurant Act
(Gaststättengesetz: GastG)) and craft trades (sect. 16 (3) of the Crafts
Code (Handwerksordnung: HWO)). For the duration of insolvency pro-
ceedings, the trade ban is temporarily excluded in accordance with sect.
12 GewO if the unreliability is largely due to the disorderly financial cir-
cumstances.
Furthermore, it is possible to prohibit the use of facilities. The com-
petent authority may, for example, prohibit the use of commercial instal-
lations at any time on account of risks to the public interest, in accor-
255 Waßmer, in: AnwaltKommentar StGB, 2nd ed. 2015, § 70 marginal no. 5.
256 Ambs, in: Erbs/Kohlhaas, Strafrechtliche Nebengesetze, 213th delivery March
2017, § 149 GewO marginal no. 6.
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dance with sect. 51 GewO. According to sect. 20 of the Federal Emis-
sion Control Act (BImSchG), the operation of installations subject to ap-
proval may be banned in whole or in part, or decommissioning or dis-
posal ordered, insofar as the operation entails immediate dangers. Ac-
cording to sect. 25 BImSchG, corresponding powers of the competent
authority exist for installations that do not require approval.
Moreover, in the event of a threat to the public interest, the liquida-
tion of a legal person or association as a measure under civil or admin-
istrative law is possible. This can be considered a ‘death penalty’. Which
provision applies depends on the legal form: stock corporation (sect. 396
AktG), private limited company (sect. 62 GmbHG), cooperative (sect.
81 GenG), association (sect. 43 BGB) or foundation (sect. 87 BGB).
In practice, these regulations have only been relevant in one case so
far. 257 There are plenty of reasons for a restrained application: the pre-
conditions are very high; dissolution is subsidiary to other measures, in
particular the dismissal of directors; regulations can be revoked by insol-
vency and the establishment of successor companies; and dissolution has
serious social and economic consequences. 258
Finally, sect. 3 and sect. 17 No. 1 and 2 of the Association Act
(Vereinsgesetz) permit the prohibition of a business association if it
is directed against the constitutional order or against the idea of inter-
national understanding or violates state-protecting criminal provisions.
This intends to prevent any circumvention of bans in the interest of na-
tional security. 259 An ordinary liquidation procedure does not normally
lead to the rapid and effective destruction of a company, since the li-
quidation is regularly carried out by its organs, which poses a danger
for misuse of the company’s assets.
5.2.3. Registration of decisions
In accordance with sect. 3 No. 1 of the Federal Central Register Act
(Bundeszentralregistergesetz: BZRG), legally binding decisions by
which a German court has recognised a criminal offence are entered
in the Federal Central Register maintained by the Federal Office of Jus-
tice (BfJ). The so-called ‘certificate of conduct’ (Führungszeugnis) con-
257 KG JW 1937, 1270.
258 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 128.
259 Wache, iin: Erbs/Kohlhaas, Strafrechtliche Nebengesetze, 210th delivery Sep-
tember 2016, § 17 VereinsG marginal no. 1.
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tains fines of more than 90 daily units and prison sentences of more than
three months, according to sect. 32 (2) No. 5 letter a BZRG. The same
shall apply in accordance with sect. 32 (2) No. 8 BZRG for measures of
rehabilitation or incapacitation and ancillary penalties. In addition, the
certificate of conduct for authorities (sect. 30 (5) and sect. 31 BZRG)
includes all convictions which were committed in connection with the
engagement in a trade or the operation of an economic enterprise, if
the certificate is intended for certain administrative decisions (cf. sect.
149 (2) No. 1 GewO)—e.g. admission to a trade.
A legally imposed regulatory fine of more than 200 euros is entered
in the central trade register in accordance with sect. 149 (2) No. 3
GewO, which is also kept by the Federal Office of Justice (BfJ). The
aim is to ensure effective protection for the general public.
In addition, several federal states have introduced corruption and
contract registers in recent years, which can be used to exclude traders
and companies from public contracts. However, the conditions for regis-
tration differ. In the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, for exam-
ple, a misconduct is to be entered in the register if it is listed in the cat-
alogue of sect. 5 (1) of the Anti-Corruption Act NRW (KorruptionsbG
NRW). 260 The catalogue covers many economic and tax offences, in-
cluding fraud, subsidy fraud, corruption and tax evasion. According to
sect. 5 (2) KorruptionsbG NRW, the registration is not only made in
the event of a criminal conviction, but also for the duration of a criminal
proceeding or regulatory fining proceeding if there is no reasonable
doubt about a ‘serious misconduct’ in view of the evidence.
At the federal level, on the other hand, all plans to establish a cen-
tral register failed for a long time. 261 Finally, on 1 June 2017, the
Bundestag passed a resolution to introduce a nationwide competition
register. 262 The register, which will be maintained by the Federal Cartel
Office (Bundeskartellamt), should be operational by 2020. The registers
of the federal states will then be deleted. In particular, legally enforce-
able convictions, orders to impose penalties or regulatory fines for cer-
tain offences will, in accordance with the revised sect. 123 (1) and (4) of
the German Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettsbewerbsbeschränkun-
260 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Korruptionsbekämpfung und zur Errichtung und
Führung eines Vergaberegisters in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Korruptionsbekämpfungsgesetz
– KorruptionsbG) of 16.12.2004, GV NRW 2005, p. 8.
261 Cf. only BT-Drs. 16/9780; rejecting Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des
Ausschusses für Wirtschaft und Technologie (9. Ausschuss), BT-Drs. 11/11312.
262 Gesetz zur Einführung eines Wettbewerbsregisters und zur Änderung des
Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen of 18.7.2017, BGBl. I 2017, p. 2739.
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gen: GWB), necessarily lead to exclusion from competition. The of-
fences include not only corruption, terrorist financing, money launder-
ing, withholding of social security contributions and tax evasion, but
also fraud and subsidy fraud insofar as these offences are directed
against the EU budget or against budgets managed by the EU or on
its behalf. The prosecution authorities will be obliged to inform the Fed-
eral Cartel Office electronically. The obligation to make an enquiry will
normally apply to orders with a value of 30,000 euros or more. How-
ever, registration will not automatically lead to exclusion from a tender
procedure. Rather, the contracting authorities must examine within their
discretionary powers and decide whether a company is excluded.
5.3. Sentencing criteria and guidelines
5.3.1. Sentencing criteria
In criminal law, the punishment is determined in three steps. 263 In a
first step, the legal framework of penalties to which the judge is bound
(basic offence, qualification, privilege; especially serious cases; less seri-
ous cases) is determined.
In a second step, the classification of the offence in the framework
is carried out by assessing the unlawfulness and guilt, in accordance
with sect. 46 StGB. According to the so-called ‘margin theory’, 264 this
is an act of discretion. The scope is limited downwards by the ‘already’
guilt-appropriate punishment, and upwards by the ‘still’ guilt-appropri-
ate punishment. According to sect. 46 (1) sentence 1 StGB, the guilt of
the offender—i.e. the unlawfulness, which can be graded according to
its severity 265—is the basis for sentencing. Sect. 46 (1) sentence 2 StGB
stipulates that the effects which the sentence can be expected to have on
the offender’s future life in society shall be taken into account (for in-
stance, loss of employment) 266—i.e. aspects of prevention. 267 Accord-
ing to sect. 46 (2) sentence 1 StGB, when sentencing, the court shall
263 Cf. only von Heintschel-Heinegg, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 46
marginal no. 3 et seq.
264 BGHSt 7, 28, 32; BGHSt 20, 264, 266 et seq.
265 Kühl, in: Lackner/Kühl/Heger, StGB, 28. ed. 2014, § 46 marginal no. 23.
266 Waßmer, in: Graf/Jäger/Wittig (eds), Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, 2nd
ed. 2017, § 266 StGB marginal no. 276.
267 Kühl, in: Lackner/Kühl/Heger, StGB, 28. ed. 2014, § 46 marginal no. 26 et
seq.
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weigh the circumstances in favour of and against the offender. Sect. 46
(2) sentence 2 StGB contains a catalogue of aspects to be considered: the
motives and aims; the attitude reflected in the offence and the degree of
force of will in its commission; the degree of the violation of the of-
fender’s duties; the modus operandi and the consequences caused by
the offence to the extent that the offender is to blame for them; the of-
fender’s prior history and his personal and financial circumstances; his
conduct after the offence, particularly his efforts to make restitution
for the harm caused, as well as the offender’s efforts at reconciliation
with the victim. Sect. 46 (3) StGB stipulates that circumstances which
are already statutory elements of the offence must not be considered
(prohibition of double exploitation). For example, in the case of fraud
(sect. 263 StGB), the intention to enrich must not be taken into account.
In a third step, the type and amount of punishment are determined.
This includes the choice between imprisonment and a fine, the consid-
eration of warning, deferment and discharge, as well as suspended sen-
tence. The classification of the case has to be based on the average case,
whereby it has to be noted that the vast majority of offences achieve
only a relatively low degree of severity due to the wide penalty frame-
works. 268 A fine is imposed by sect. 40 StGB according to the daily unit
system, whereby the court shall determine the amount of the daily unit,
taking into consideration personal and financial circumstances. The
court shall typically base its calculation on the actual average one-day
net income or the average income achievable in one day. A daily unit
shall not be set at less than one euro and not at more than 30,000 euros.
Once the sentence has been determined, follow-up decisions may be
necessary, in particular measures of rehabilitation and incapacitation.
In regulatory offences law, the fine is also determined in three steps.
In a first step, the legal framework for regulatory fines is determined. 269
Sect. 17 (1) OWiG states that the fine shall not be less than five euros
and, unless otherwise provided by statute, shall not exceed 1,000 euros.
According to sect. 17 (2) OWiG, if the law threatens to impose a regu-
latory fine for intentional and negligent action without distinction as to
the maximum regulatory fine, the maximum sanction for a negligent ac-
tion shall not exceed half of the maximum regulatory fine imposable.
In a second step, the classification of the offence in the framework
is carried out by assessing unlawfulness and guilt in accordance with
268 BGHSt 27, 2, 4 et seq.
269 Cf. only Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 17 marginal no.
1 et seq.
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Sect. 17 (3) OWiG, whose three criteria are based on sect. 46 StGB. 270
Sect. 17 (3) sentence 1 OWiG states that the significance of the offence
and the charge faced by the perpetrator shall form the basis for the as-
sessment. The objective significance is given first and foremost, and
thus takes precedence over the subjective charge. It depends on the con-
tent and scope of the act. The degree and extent of endangerment or im-
pairment of the legal goods shall be decisive. 271 The assessment criteria
are: 272 the frequency of similar violations; the type of execution; and the
duration. The objective significance is also relevant for the subjective
charge. The more serious it is, the more serious the charge will be. 273
In addition, special subjective circumstances can increase or decrease
the charge. 274 For example, relevant predicate offences increase the
charge, while confession, insight and remorse alleviate it. According
to sect. 17 (3) sentence 2 OWiG, the perpetrator’s financial circumstan-
ces shall also be taken into account. In practice, the financial circumstan-
ces are regarded as an equally important factor in the event of serious
offences. 275 The financial circumstances arise from the income and as-
sets at the time the fine is imposed, taking into account debts and ali-
mony obligations. 276 Other circumstances may be taken into account
at a lower level. 277 In this way, the effects on the public 278 or the per-
petrator’s lack of regret 279 can be taken into account. However, the pre-
sumption that the employer will reimburse the regulatory fine does not
justify a higher fine. 280 Apart from that, the prohibition of double ex-
ploitation (sect. 46 (3) StGB) also applies to regulatory offences. 281
In a third step, the amount of the regulatory fine is determined. In
this context, all burdening and exonerating circumstances, as well as the
perpetrator’s financial circumstances, must be taken into account and
270 Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 17 marginal no. 7.
271 Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17th ed. 2017, § 17 marginal no. 16.
272 Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 17 marginal no. 9.
273 Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17th ed. 2017, § 17 marginal no. 17.
274 Katalog bei Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 17 marginal
no. 11.
275 Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17th ed. 2017, § 17 marginal no. 22.
276 Mitsch, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 17 marginal
no. 87.
277 Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17th ed. 2017, § 17 marginal no. 15, 26 et seq.
278 Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 17 marginal no. 12.
279 Gürtler, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17th ed. 2017, § 17 marginal no. 26a.
280 Mitsch, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 17 marginal
no. 56.
281 Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 17 marginal no. 23.
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weighed against each other. Sect. 17 (4) OWiG also provides for absorp-
tion of the financial benefit. Absorption of the advantage constitutes the
‘base’ of the sanction on which the regulatory fine is imposed, if neces-
sary beyond the statutory maximum.
5.3.2. Guidelines
Guidelines on fines exist in areas where very high fines can be im-
posed. For antitrust law, the Guidelines for the Setting of Fines in Cartel
Administrative Offence Proceedings 282 should be mentioned. In exer-
cising its discretionary powers and in accordance with sect. 81 (7)
GWB, the Bundeskartellamt (BKartA) laid down guidelines by which
it will proceed against companies and associations of companies in as-
sessing the punitive element of fines imposed for ‘serious’ cartel admin-
istrative offences. For securities trading, in February 2017 the German
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) issued the WpHG-Ad-
ministrative Fine Guidelines II. 283 These guidelines supplement the pre-
vious Guidelines (I) from November 2013.
In addition, for areas in which low fines are frequently imposed,
there are catalogues of fines that take into account the need for sche-
matic legal consequences in case of minor offences. They have the ad-
vantage of easy handling, but the disadvantage, on the other hand, that
all cases are treated in the same way. The most important catalogue is
that of road traffic law. 284
5.4. Confiscation
Confiscation is envisaged in criminal law and regulatory offences
law. In some cases, it is a punishment; in others, it is a preventive mea-
sure sui generis or a measure of incapacitation.
282 Leitlinien für die Bußgeldzumessung in Kartellordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren
(25.6.2013), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Leitlinien/
Bekanntmachung%20-%20Bu%C3%9Fgeldleitlinien-Juni%202013.html.
283 WpHG-Bußgeldleitlinien II (February 2017), https://www.bafin.de.
284 Anlage 1 zu § 1 Abs. 1 der Verordnung über die Erteilung einer Verwarnung,
Regelsätze für Geldbußen und die Anordnung eines Fahrverbotes wegen
Ordnungswidrigkeiten im Straßenverkehr vom 14.3.2013 (BGBl. I p. 498), zuletzt durch
Art. 3 der Verordnung vom 18.5.2017 (BGBl. I p. 1282) geändert (Bußgeldkatalog-
Verordnung, BKatV).
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5.4.1. Criminal law
In criminal law, confiscation of what was obtained by an offence is
provided for in sect. 73 et seq. StGB, which was redesigned as of 1 July
2017 by a major reform. 285 The former so-called Verfall is now termed
Einziehung (confiscation). The new provisions apply retroactively to all
criminal proceedings which had not been concluded by 1 July 2017. To
the extent that the confiscation of a particular object is impossible, the
court shall order the confiscation of a sum of money which corresponds
to the value of what was obtained, unless this is excluded (cf. sect. 73c,
73d, 73e StGB). The collection of the monetary value is also possible
(sect. 76 StGB).
The confiscation of what was obtained by principals and secondary
participants shall be mandatorily ordered in accordance with sect. 73 (1)
StGB. The court shall order the confiscation of what was obtained ‘by’
(durch) an unlawful act or ‘for’ (für) it. In contrast to the former Verfall,
in which the entirety of what had been obtained was seized in accor-
dance with the so-called gross principle (Bruttoprinzip)—i.e. without
any expenses being taken into account 286—now, using the Einziehung
principle, what had been obtained less expenses is determined in two
steps. 287 Therefore, a softened gross principle applies. In a first step,
what was obtained is to be determined purely from an objective point
of view (rein gegenständlich), oriented on the enrichment law (Be-
reicherungsrecht) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch:
BGB). In a second step, the extent or value of what was obtained is de-
termined, taking into account expenses. Although, by the former Verfall,
the principal or secondary participant was often deprived of more than
he had received, the jurisprudence always denied a punitive character
and regarded it as a preventive measure sui generis and a quasi-condi-
tional compensation measure. 288 The same will also apply to the new
confiscation. In addition, in accordance with sect. 73 (2) StGB, the con-
fiscation shall extend to benefits derived from what was obtained—i.e.
fruits of the law and benefits of use. 289 In accordance with sect. 73 (3),
the order may also extend to objects which the principal or secondary
285 BGBl. I p. 872.
286 Cf. only BGH wistra 2010, 477, 479; Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, 2nd
ed. 2016, § 38 marginal no. 220.
287 Bundestag document No. 18/9525, 56 (62).
288 BGHSt 47, 260, 265; BVerfG NJW 2004, 2073; critical Eser, in: Schönke/
Schröder, StGB, 29. ed. 2014, § 73 marginal no. 2, 4.
289 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 73 marginal no. 29.
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participant has acquired by way of sale of an object (No. 1) as replace-
ment for its destruction, damage or forcible loss or on the basis of a sur-
rogate right (No. 2).
Furthermore, since 1 July 2017, by sect. 73a StGB, so-called ‘ex-
tended confiscation’ (Erweiterte Einziehung) has become generally pos-
sible. Sect. 73a (1) StGB states that the court shall order the confiscation
of objects if they have been obtained by or on behalf of another unlawful
act. This should make it possible to confiscate illegally acquired assets
even if their origin cannot be ascertained from a specific offence. The
extended confiscation shall not be punitive. 290 The legislator 291 wanted
to create an effective way of absorbing illegal profits, in particular to
combat organised crime; the continuation of an illegal asset allocation
shall be prevented and thus the incentive to commit offences shall be re-
moved. At the same time, capital for further offences shall be with-
drawn, and so a general preventive effect 292 shall be achieved.
In accordance with sect. 73b StGB, it is also possible to confiscate
what was obtained by third parties. This form of confiscation is not con-
sidered a punishment but only ‘profit absorption in line with inter-
ests’. 293 Confiscation shall be ordered, on the one hand, in accordance
with sect. 73b (1) sentence 1 No. 1 StGB, if the principal or secondary
participant has acted ‘for’ the third party—i.e. in particular for a legal
person or association of persons. On the other hand, in accordance with
sect. 73b (1) sentence 1 no. 2 StGB, confiscation is also possible if what
was obtained has been transferred free of charge or for no legal reason
(letter a) or has been transferred, and the third party has recognised or
should have recognised that it stems from an unlawful act (letter b).
The same shall apply in accordance with sect. 73b (1) sentence 1 No.
3 StGB if obtained property has been transferred to the third party as
an heir (letter a) or beneficiary of the compulsory portion or legacy
holder (letter b).
Finally, sect. 74 et seq. StGB provides for the confiscation of the
products, means and objects of the offence. The new law no longer dis-
tinguishes between the punitive character and the security character as a
‘mixed institution’. 294 Here, too, the value can be recovered as a substi-
tute if confiscation is impossible (cf. sect. 74c StGB) and, where appli-
290 BVerfG NJW 2004, 2073.
291 Bundestag document No. 12/989, 1.
292 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 73a marginal no. 1.
293 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 73a marginal no. 1.
294 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 74 marginal no. 28.
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cable, retroactively (sect. 76 StGB). The actions of organs or represen-
tatives of a legal person or association of persons are attributed (cf. sect.
75 StGB), whereby confiscation can take place against the corporation.
Under the new law, confiscation of the products and means of the
offence is permissible as a punishment if it is an intentional offence
(sect. 74 (1) StGB). 295 In addition, it is necessary that the principal or
secondary participant acted at least with diminished responsibility. 296
Apart from that, he must be the owner of the items (sect. 74 (3) sentence
1 StGB). The confiscation of objects of the offence has to be in accor-
dance with special provisions (sect. 74 (2) StGB). In this respect, sect.
264 (6) sentence 2 StGB permits the confiscation of goods which have
been acquired at a lower price through subsidy fraud. 297 Even in these
cases, the principal or secondary participant must be the owner of the
items (sect. 74 (3) sentence 2 StGB).
In addition, sect. 74a StGB permits the confiscation of the products,
means and objects of the offence of third parties. This form of confisca-
tion is similar to punishment, 298 which is why constitutional objections
are widespread. 299 The basic condition is that the third party has either
contributed by being at least grossly negligent of the fact that the items
have been used as a means of offence or object of an offence (No. 1), or
that the third party has acquired the items in a reprehensible manner in
the knowledge of circumstances that would have permitted confiscation
(No. 2). In addition, it is necessary that the items belong to the third
party.
Sect. 74b (1) StGB permits confiscation for security reasons, even if
the principal or secondary participant has acted without guilt (No. 1), or
if the items belong to a third party not involved in the act (No. 2). In the
event of a third-party confiscation, an appropriate compensation will be
paid from the public treasury (sect. 74b (2) StGB). Compensation is ex-
cluded, except for hardship, in three cases: firstly, if the third party, at
least by gross negligence, contributed to the fact that the items were used
as a means of the offence or were the object of an offence; secondly, if
the third party has acquired the items dishonestly with knowledge of cir-
cumstances that would have allowed their confiscation; and thirdly, if
295 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 74 marginal no. 23.
296 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 74 marginal no. 23.
297 Perron, in: Schönke/Schröder, StGB, 29. ed. 2014, § 264 marginal no. 84.
298 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 74a marginal no. 1.
299 Cf. only Julius ZStW 109 (1997), 58, 86.
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confiscation without compensation would be lawful on the basis of pro-
visions outside criminal law.
Finally, sect. 76a StGB allows for an independent confiscation pro-
cedure (so-called ‘objective procedure’ 300) if, for reasons of fact, no per-
son can be prosecuted or convicted of the offence.
5.4.2. Regulatory offences law
The regulatory offences law also provides for confiscation. In order
to simplify the application of the law, the absorption is in principle car-
ried out with the regulatory fine. 301 Therefore, according to sect. 17 (4)
sentence 1 OWiG, the regulatory fine shall exceed the financial benefit
that the perpetrator has obtained from commission. If the statutory max-
imum does not suffice for that purpose, in accordance with sect. 17 (4)
sentence 2 OWiG, it may be exceeded. In the prevailing opinion, unlike
the former Verfall in criminal law, the absorption of benefits is carried
out in accordance with the so-called net principle (Nettoprinzip) 302—i.e.
a netting takes place in which costs and other expenses incurred are de-
ducted from the obtained amount.
If the perpetrator has gained something for an act or arising out of
an act, and if a regulatory fine has not been imposed on him, in accor-
dance with sect. 29a (1) OWiG, confiscation of a sum up to the amount
of the advantage gained may be ordered. This provision was also
amended. As in criminal law, what was obtained is now to be deter-
mined in two steps. 303 In the case of a confiscation against third parties,
according to sect. 29a (2) OWiG, it is also possible to confiscate a sum
up to the amount corresponding to the value obtained.
The regulatory offences law also provides for the confiscation of
items in sect. 22 et seq. OWiG. Contrary to criminal law, confiscation
is only permissible if it is expressly permitted by law. As in criminal
law, confiscation has different purposes.
Finally, sect. 29 OWiG permits the confiscation of items from a le-
gal person or an association of persons if an organ or representative has
acted.
300 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 76a marginal no. 1.
301 Heuchemer, in: BeckOK-StGB, 35th ed. 1.8.2017, § 74 marginal no. 23.
302 BGH NJW 2017, 2565, 2567; Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, 2nd ed. 2016,
§ 39 marginal no. 341.
303 Bundestag document No. 18/9525, 56, 62.
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5.5. Enforcement practice
There are no official statistics in Germany that comprehensively re-
cord the actual level of penalties or regulatory fines imposed on man-
agers or corporations for the commission of PIF offences. Nevertheless,
the available statistics show that the penalties and regulatory fines are
generally mild, since the frameworks are far from being exhausted.
5.5.1. Criminal law
The penalties imposed by courts are based on the prosecution sta-
tistics published annually by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt). In 2015, 88,894 persons were sentenced for (general) fraud
(sect. 263 (1) StGB), comprising 83,256 persons for simple fraud (sect.
263 (1) StGB) and 5,638 persons for serious cases (sect. 263 (3) and (5)
StGB). 304 Under general criminal law 85,972 persons were sentenced:
73,618 to a fine (85.6 per cent), 12,354 to prison (14.4 per cent). In
9,661 cases (78.2 per cent), the courts suspended the enforcement of
the sentence for a probationary period. 305
Of the 12,354 imprisonments, 2,619 were for under six months
(21.1 per cent), 1,406 were for six months (11.4 per cent), 1,977 ranged
from six to nine months (16 per cent), 2,341 from nine to twelve months
(18.9 per cent), 3,217 from one to two years (26 per cent), 503 from two
to three years (4.1 per cent), 253 from three to five years (2 per cent) and
38 from five to ten years (0.3 per cent). 306 This means that 67.5 per cent
of all imprisonments were up to one year and the penalty framework
(simple fraud: up to five years) was far from being exhausted.
For the 73,618 fines, 7,327 were under 15 daily units (10 per cent),
26,402 ranged from 16 to 30 (35.9 per cent), 34,530 from 31 to 90 (46.9
per cent), 5,025 from 91 to 180 (6.8 per cent), 324 from 181 to 360 daily
units (0.4 per cent), and more than 361 daily units were imposed in just
ten cases (0.01 per cent). 307 This means that 92.3 per cent of the fines
reached only up to 90 daily units, whereupon the sentenced person is not
deemed to have a criminal record.
304 Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Rechtspflege Strafverfolgung 2015, p. 25, 37.
305 Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Rechtspflege Strafverfolgung 2015, p. 92 et
seq.
306 Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Rechtspflege Strafverfolgung 2015, p. 160 et
seq.
307 Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Rechtspflege Strafverfolgung 2015, p. 196.
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5.5.2. Regulatory offences law
The Federal Office of Justice (Bundesamt für Justiz) collects all de-
cisions on regulatory fines for the central trade register (Gewerbezentral-
register). Sect. 149 (2) No. 3 of the Trade Code (GewO) provides that
decisions on regulatory fines are to be entered for a regulatory offence
which a) is committed in connection with the operation or activity of
a commercial enterprise or b) is carried out by a representative within
the meaning of sect. 9 OWiG or by a person expressly designated as
the person responsible in a legal provision. A further prerequisite is that
the fine amounts to more than 200 euros.
The Federal Office of Justice maintains partial registers for natural
persons as well as legal persons and associations. However, the partial
register for natural persons only indicates the type of business in which
a regulatory fine was imposed. Therefore, it is not clear whether fines
were imposed according to sect. 130 OWiG. In 2015, 308 34,046 regis-
trations were made in accordance with sect. 149 (2) No. 3 GewO:
8,897 fines of up to 300 euros (25.9 per cent), 18,818 fines from 300
up to 1,000 euros (54.7 per cent), 5,772 fines from 1,000 up to 5,000
euros (16.8 per cent), 483 fines from 5,000 up to 20,000 euros (1.4
per cent), 51 fines from 20,000 up to 50,000 euros (0.15 per cent) and
25 fines of over 50,000 euros (0.07 per cent).
The partial register for legal persons and associations contains de-
cisions on regulatory fines pursuant to sect. 30 OWiG. In 2015, 309
2,907 registrations were made in accordance with sect. 149 (2) No. 3
GewO: 507 fines of up to 300 euros (17.4 per cent), 1,396 fines from
300 up to 1,000 euros (48 per cent), 738 fines from 1,000 up to 5,000
euros (25.4 per cent), 171 fines from 5,000 up to 20,000 euros (5.9
per cent), 32 fines from 20,000 up to 50,000 euros (1.1 per cent) and
63 fines of over 50.000 euros (2.2 per cent). Therefore, the framework
of up to ten million euros is not even approached in the vast majority of
cases.
308 Bundesamt für Justiz (ed.), Übersicht über die Eintragungen im
Gewerbezentralregister (Teilregister für natürliche Personen), as at: 31.12.2016, table 01.
309 Bundesamt für Justiz (ed.), Übersicht über die Eintragungen im
Gewe rbe zen t r a l r eg i s t e r (Te i l r e g i s t e r f ü r j u r i s t i s ch e Pe r sonen und
Personenvereini-gungen), as at 31.12.2016, table 01.
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6. Relationship with punitive administrative law
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against the head
of business
In German law, either a regulatory fining proceeding or a criminal
proceeding must be carried out, whereby criminal proceedings take pre-
cedence in case of a criminal offence. 310 That priority is secured by sev-
eral regulations.
Pursuant to sect. 35 (1) OWiG, the administrative authorities shall
be responsible for prosecuting and punishing regulatory offences (pri-
mary jurisdiction). If the administrative authority has evidence that the
act is a criminal offence, it must hand the matter over to public prosecu-
tion (sect. 41 (1) OWiG). Conversely, the public prosecution office has
to return the matter to the authority if it refrains from criminal proceed-
ings (sect. 41 (2) OWiG).
In criminal proceedings, the public prosecution office is responsible
for prosecuting the offence in accordance with sect. 40 OWiG, even
from the legal point of view of a regulatory offence. The administrative
authority must therefore submit a preliminary investigation. This pri-
mary jurisdiction of the public prosecution office is only breached by
way of exception—e.g. by sect. 82 of the Act against Restraints of Com-
petition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: GWB) and sect. 96
of the Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz: EnWG).
In addition, the public prosecution office may, in accordance with
sect. 42 (1) sentence 1 OWiG, take over prosecution of a regulatory of-
fence until a fine decision has been issued if a criminal offence con-
nected with the regulatory offence is being pursued (secondary jurisdic-
tion). Such a connection exists, in accordance with sect. 42 (1) sentence
2 OWiG, if, with regard to the same offence, someone is accused of both
a criminal offence and a regulatory offence, or if a person is accused of a
criminal offence and another of a regulatory offence. However, accord-
ing to sect. 42 (2) OWiG, the public prosecution office shall take over
prosecution only for the purpose of accelerating the proceedings or on
account of the factual connection or if, for other reasons, it is deemed
appropriate for the investigation.
In the course of regulatory fining proceedings, in accordance with
sect. 81 OWiG, criminal proceedings shall be initiated if the court finds
310 Cf. only Seith, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 41 marginal no.
1.
GERMANY NATIONAL REPORT 173
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
that the act can also be interpreted as a criminal offence. In this case, the
person concerned shall be informed of the change in the legal assess-
ment at the request of the public prosecution office or ex officio (sect.
81 (1) sentence 2 and (2) sentence 1 OWiG). Upon this information,
the person concerned shall have the legal status of a defendant (sect.
81 (2) sentence 2 OWiG). The hearing shall be adjourned if the court
finds it necessary or if the defendant requests it. The hearing shall be
interrupted if the court considers this to be necessary or if the defendant
so applies (sect. 81 (2) sentence 3 OWiG). In further proceedings, the
special provisions of the regulatory fining proceedings shall no longer
apply (sect. 81 (3) sentence 1 OWiG). Thus, a further charge is no longer
necessary, but the court changes the aspect and the form of the proceed-
ings by its own decision. 311
Sect. 82 OWiG regulates the reverse case if the court carries out
criminal proceedings and the indictment contains a regulatory offence
or if there is a mere regulatory offence. According to sect. 82 (1)
OWiG, the court shall also evaluate the offence referred to in the in-
dictment from the legal point of view of a regulatory offence. In ac-
cordance with sect. 82 (2) OWiG, the special provisions of the OWiG
shall apply in further proceedings, where the court admits the indict-
ment for a main hearing only from the legal point of view of a reg-
ulatory offence.
Finally, sect. 83 OWiG contains rules for mixed proceedings. In ac-
cordance with sect. 83 (1) OWiG, the procedural simplifications pro-
vided for the fining proceedings shall apply to the procedural part relat-
ing to the regulatory offence. The reason for this is that the simplifica-
tion of procedures should be maintained despite the connection. 312
6.1.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence against the head of business
With the transition to criminal proceedings, only the provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung: StPO) apply. Ac-
cording to sect. 81 (3) sentence 2 and half-sentence 1 OWiG, evidence
taken up to that point in the presence of the person concerned may also
be used if it has been taken pursuant to the special provisions of the
OWiG. In this case, witnesses and experts do not have to be questioned
again, documents do not have to be read out again, and a site inspection
311 Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 81 marginal no. 2.
312 Lutz, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 83 marginal no.
1.
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does not have to be repeated. 313 The reason for this is a principle of Ger-
man criminal procedure law according to which trial proceedings must
take place in the presence of the accused. Exploitation of evidence
which took place without the defendant and did not give him the oppor-
tunity to question evidence would not be acceptable. 314
However, pursuant to sect. 81 (3) sentence 2 and half-sentence 2
OWiG, this shall not apply to a simplified taking of evidence. This con-
cerns cases in which the taking of evidence must be repeated in accor-
dance with the rules of criminal procedure:
Replacement of the examination of a witness, of an expert or of an-
other person concerned by a reading aloud of the records regarding a
previous examination or of documents containing a written statement
made by them (sect. 77a (1) OWiG).
Reading out statements by authorities and other agencies regarding
their official observations, investigations and knowledge, as well as re-
garding those of their staff, even if the preconditions contained in sect.
256 StPO do not apply (sect. 77a (2) OWiG).
Obtaining a statement from an authority by telephone and stating its
substantial content at the main hearing (sect. 77a (3) OWiG).
Stating the substantial content of a document (sect. 78 (1) sentence
1 OWiG).
Including a statement in the record, if the person concerned, a de-
fence counsel and the representative of the public prosecution office
have taken cognisance of the wording of the document or had an oppor-
tunity to do so (sect. 78 (1) sentence 2 OWiG).
It should also be noted that evidence is excluded if its use is pro-
hibited. However, there are only a few legal prohibitions on use of
evidence in German law. For example, according to sect. 136a (3)
sentence 2 StPO, statements which were obtained using prohibited in-
terrogation methods (for instance, torture) shall not be used. There is
no general rule in German law as to when an unwritten prohibition is
to be assumed. Prohibitions can result from the rule of law, the im-
perative of a fair procedure and fundamental rights. 315 According
to the theory of legal spheres, in case of the violation of a standard,
313 Seitz/Bauer, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17. ed. 2017, § 81 marginal no. 23.
314 Lutz, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 81 marginal no.
26.
315 Vgl. Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, 2nd ed. 2016, § 40 marginal no. 49.
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it must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis whether the violation
substantially affects the legal sphere of the party concerned. 316 The
theory of protective purpose examines whether the violated standard
is intended to exclude an unlawfully obtained result of the evidence
from use of evidence. 317 Today’s prevailing opinion is based on
the theory of interest consideration, according to which, in each case,
a comprehensive weighing of the interests of prosecution against the
individual interests concerned is required. 318 This means that only
serious and deliberate violations by the prosecution authorities lead
to a prohibition on use of evidence, not merely negligent or clumsy
violations. 319
Finally, it is important that procedural errors or violations of prohi-
bitions on collection of evidence do not have a remote effect. The ‘fruit
of the poisonous tree’ doctrine is, unlike in the Anglo-American area,
not recognised by the prevailing opinion. 320 Insights gained through un-
lawful measures may be used as a so-called ‘trace approach’ (Spuren-
ansatz) for obtaining new evidence. 321 The jurisdiction argues that it
is unacceptable that a procedural error paralyses the entire criminal pro-
cedure, and that an effective fight against crime requires a limitation of
the effects of violation. 322 Only in the case of particularly serious viola-
tions, such as illegal housing surveillance, 323 for example, is it not per-
mitted to make use of the trace approach.
6.1.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence against the head of
business
In criminal proceedings, sect. 261 StPO states that the principle of
free evaluation of evidence applies. This principle also applies in regu-
latory fining proceedings via sect. 46 (1) OWiG. In order to establish the
truth, under sect. 244 (2) StPO, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the
taking of evidence to all facts and means of proof relevant to the deci-
sion.
316 BGHSt 11, 213, 215 et seq.
317 Rudolphi MDR 1970, 92, 97 et seq.
318 BGHSt 47, 172, 179; BVerfG NJW 2009, 3225; Rogall NStZ 1988, 385, 392.
319 Cf. only BGH wistra 2010, 231.
320 Cf. only Roxin/Schünemann, Strafverfahrensrecht, 29. ed. 2017, § 24 margin-
al no. 60.
321 BGHSt 27, 355, 358.
322 BGHSt 34, 362, 364 et seq.
323 BVerfGE 109, 279, 332.
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In regulatory fining proceedings, sect. 77 (1) sentence 1 OWiG also
stipulates that the court is obliged to investigate the truth. However, ac-
cording to sect. 77 (1) sentence 2 OWiG, the court shall also refer to the
importance of the matter. The court should not be obliged to exhaust
every source of knowledge down to the last remnant even in the simplest
case. 324
In the context of the taking of evidence, findings from foreign pro-
ceedings may also be introduced, in particular through the testimony of
witnesses and the reading out of documents. The use of evidence is only
excluded if a legal prohibition exists or if the consideration of interests
exceptionally indicates that the individual interests of the accused out-
weigh the interests of persecution.
In German law, with sect. 393 (2) sentence 1 of the Fiscal Code
(Abgabenordnung: AO), there exists a legal prohibition on the use of
taxation procedures. Where, during criminal proceedings, the public
prosecutor’s office or the court learns from tax records of facts or evi-
dence which the taxpayer, in compliance with his obligations under
tax law, revealed to the revenue authority before or in ignorance of
the initiation of criminal proceedings, this knowledge may not be
used against him for the prosecution of an act that is not a tax crime.
However, it is possible to exploit further facts or evidence that have
only been ascertained on basis of the tax records. 325 In addition, in
accordance with sect. 393 (2) sentence 2 AO, the prohibition of use
shall not apply if there is a compelling public interest (sect. 30 (4)
no. 5):
(a) felonies and wilful serious offences against life and limb or
against the state;
(b) economic crimes, which are likely to substantially disrupt the
economic order or to substantially undermine general confidence in
the integrity of business dealings or the orderly functioning of authori-
ties and public institutions;
c) if disclosure is necessary to correct publicly disseminated incor-
rect facts.
Finally, sect. 161 (2) StPO must be observed. According to this
section, personal data that have been obtained as a result of a mea-
sure taken pursuant to another statute may only be used as evidence
324 Hettenbach, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 15.7.2017, § 77 marginal no. 1.
325 Bachler, in: BeckOK-StPO, 27. ed. 1.1.2017, § 393 AO marginal no. 11.
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to clear up an offence without the consent of the person affected by
the measure if such a measure could have been ordered (so-called
‘hypothetical reserve intervention’: hypothetischer Ersatzein-
griff). 326 This prohibition is intended to prevent circumvention of
the strict provisions of criminal proceedings and regulatory fining
proceedings. However, only data from authoritative measures which
have no equivalent in the StPO or OWiG are excluded. In addition,
the prohibition of use of evidence is also invalidated by the fact that
findings may be used as a ‘trace approach’ for obtaining new evi-
dence. 327
6.1.3. Administrative investigations and right to silence of the head of
business
In case of regulatory fining proceedings, at the commencement of
the first examination the person concerned shall be informed of the reg-
ulatory offence with which he is charged and of the applicable law pro-
visions, and shall be advised that the law grants him the right to respond
to the charges or not to make any statement (sect. 136 (1) sentence 1
StPO in conjunction with sect. 46 (1) OWiG). This applies not only
to the first examination by a court, but also to the first examination
by an administrative authority (sect. 163a (3) sentence 2 StPO), which,
in the course of regulatory fining proceedings, takes on the role of the
public prosecutor’s office (sect. 46 (2) OWiG). Apart from that, mere
hearing of the person concerned is sufficient for regulatory fining pro-
ceedings—in contrast to criminal proceedings—in accordance with sect.
55 (1) OWiG. The hearing may take the form of an oral hearing, or may
provide the opportunity to make a written statement by sending a ques-
tionnaire. 328 The reason for this simplification is that regulatory fining
procedures are geared towards accelerated execution, the degree of un-
lawfulness is lower and the sanctions are less severe. 329 However, the
person concerned must always, even in cases of a mere hearing, be in-
formed of the accusation and of the right to silence. 330 Thus, the person
concerned is entitled to a comprehensive right to silence which is based
326 BT-Drs. 16/5846, p. 64.
327 Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, 2nd ed. 2016, § 40 marginal no. 32.
328 Straßer, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 1.7.2017, § 55 marginal no. 23 et seq.
329 Schulz, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 55 marginal no. 1.
330 Straßer, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed. 1.7.2017, § 55 marginal no. 38 et seq.
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on the nemo tenetur principle and the guarantees of fair proceedings laid
down in Art. 6 ECHR. 331
If the right to silence is not instructed, there is, according to the
prevailing opinion in the literature, as in criminal proceedings, a pro-
hibition on the use of statements unless it is certain that the person
concerned was aware of the right without being instructed. 332 How-
ever, the jurisdiction has left it open as to whether a prohibition exists
in regulatory fining proceedings. 333 Nevertheless, this is supported
by the fact that the person concerned shall be guaranteed a fair trial
and shall not be taken by surprise. 334 However, there is no prohibi-
tion of use if the person concerned spontaneously made a statement
prior to the instruction. 335
If an official supervisory procedure (for instance, in the area of se-
curities supervision) coincides with a regulatory fining procedure, the
supervisory procedure must be carried out in accordance with the provi-
sions on the regulatory fining procedure. 336 In particular, the right to si-
lence of the person concerned shall not be undermined by a request for
information under supervisory law (so-called ‘prohibition of role rever-
sal’: Verbot der Rollenvertauschung). 337 If this aspect is disregarded,
there is a prohibition on the use of evidence obtained in supervisory pro-
cedure. 338
6.2. Multiple and parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the legal person and the head of business
In German law, integrated proceedings must be conducted against
the organ or representative on the one hand, and against the legal person
or association of persons on the other.
German law provides for a concentration of proceedings. The deci-
sion on a regulatory fine pursuant to sect. 30 OWiG shall in principle be
331 Monka, in: BeckOK-StPO, 27. ed. 1.1.2017, § 136 marginal no. 7.
332 Cf. only Bohnert/Krenberger/Krumm, OWiG, 4th ed. 2016, § 46 marginal no.
83.
333 BGHSt 38, 214, 228; OLG Oldenburg VRS 1988, 286.
334 Lutz, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 55 marginal no.
16.
335 BGH NJW 1990, 461; Monka, in: BeckOK-StPO, 27. ed. 1.1.2017, § 136
marginal no. 22.
336 Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, 2nd ed. 2016, § 40 marginal no. 30.
337 Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, 2nd ed. 2016, § 40 marginal no. 30.
338 Waßmer, in: Fuchs (ed.), WpHG, 2nd ed. 2016, § 40 marginal no. 31.
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taken uniformly with the decision on the criminal or regulatory offence
committed by the organ or representative. 339 Sect. 30 (4) OWiG only
allows independent (isolated) proceedings if criminal or regulatory fin-
ing proceedings are not commenced, or if such proceedings are discon-
tinued, or if imposition of a criminal penalty is dispensed with. Sect. 444
(1) sentence 1 StPO stipulates that if, in criminal proceedings, a decision
has to be given on imposition of a regulatory fine against a legal person
or an association of persons, the court shall order their participation in
the proceedings in respect of the offence. According to sect. 88 (1)
OWiG, the same applies to regulatory fining proceedings. If an admin-
istrative authority decides on the assessment of a regulatory fine against
a legal person or an association, that authority shall also be competent to
order participation in the proceedings and the appointment of an attorney
or of any other person who may be appointed as defence counsel (sect.
444 (1) StPO). Implementing regulations can be found in the Guidelines
for Criminal Procedure and Penalty Proceedings (Richtlinien für das
Strafverfahren und das Bußgeldverfahren: RiStBV). The legal person
or association shall have the status of a subsidiary participant (Neben-
beteiligter). 340 Sect. 444 StPO secures the right to a hearing (Art. 103
(1) GG), which is also guaranteed to a legal person or association of per-
sons. 341
In criminal proceedings, the consolidation takes place as follows. If
the accused is part of the management, the public prosecutor checks
whether the imposition of a regulatory fine against the legal person or
association is also possible (No. 180a (1) sentence 1 RiStBV). In this
case, the organs or representatives are to be heard in the preparatory pro-
ceedings (No. 180a (1) sentence 2 RiStBV). In the indictment or in the
petition for a criminal order, the prosecutor then applies for the partici-
pation of the legal person or association, in particular if the imposition of
a regulatory fine opens up the possibility of taking appropriate account
of the economic circumstances, also with regard to the advantage ob-
tained by the offence (No. 180a (2) sentence 1 RiStBV). In the indict-
ment, the prosecutor announces the request for a regulatory fine to be
imposed, and in the request for a criminal order he applies for this
(No. 180a (2) sentence 3 RiStBV). This is particularly relevant in cases
339 Schmidt, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zur StPO, 7th ed. 2013, § 444 marginal
no. 1.
340 OLG Hamm NJW 1973, 1851, 1852.
341 Inhofer, in: BeckOK-StPO, 27. ed. 1.1.2017, § 444 marginal no. 2.
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of white-collar crimes (No. 180a (2) sentence 3 RiStBV). The same ap-
plies to regulatory fining proceedings.
Separate proceedings are generally inadmissible, which shall be ob-
served at each stage of proceedings. 342 If criminal proceedings are
pending against an organ or representative, the basis for independent
proceedings is withdrawn. However, this does not immediately lead to
the invalidity of an independent procedure. Only an objection constitutes
an obstacle to proceedings. 343 The same shall apply mutatis mutandis in
case of pending regulatory fining proceedings. 344 If proceedings against
an organ or representative have been concluded in a legally binding
manner, the subsequent imposition of a regulatory fine against the legal
person or association of persons is not possible. 345 If both proceedings
have been concluded separately and in a legally binding manner, the de-
cisions are legally incorrect but not void. 346 In this case, however, it is
possible to reopen the proceedings (sect. 85 OWiG). 347
6.2.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence
In criminal and regulatory fining proceedings, sect. 261 StPO pro-
vides for the principle of free evaluation of evidence (cf. section 6.1.2).
The extent to which the court is obliged to clarify facts depends on the
circumstances and the previous course of proceedings. Evidence gath-
ered in administrative proceedings against the legal person or associa-
tion of persons may also be significant. However, the findings made
there are not binding; rather, the court always conducts a hearing of evi-
dence, the result of which is decided by the court on the basis of free
conviction. The court is not even bound by declarations in final criminal
judgments relating to the defendant’s previous criminal offences. 348 In
the event of a transition from regulatory fining proceedings to criminal
342 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 179.
343 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 180.
344 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 181.
345 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 182.
346 BGH wistra 1990, 67.
347 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 184.
348 BGHSt 43, 106, 107 = BGH NJW 1997, 2828.
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proceedings, pursuant to sect. 81 (3) sentence 2 OWiG, the evidence ta-
ken up to that point in the presence of the person concerned may also be
used (cf. 6.1.1).
6.2.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence
In proceedings against an organ or representative, information ob-
tained in other proceedings (for instance, in administrative proceedings)
may be introduced and taken into account by the hearing of evidence
(reading out of documents, hearing of witnesses, statements). This also
applies the other way around—i.e. in proceedings against the legal per-
son or association of persons. However, use is excluded if there is a legal
prohibition or the individual interests outweigh the pursuit interests (cf.
section 6.1.1). In addition, there is a legal prohibition on the use of find-
ings from taxation procedures (cf. section 6.1.2). Finally, with regard to
the usability of evidence from non-punitive measures, sect. 161 (2) StPO
is relevant (cf. section 6.1.2).
6.2.3. Right to silence of the head of business in the proceedings
against the legal person
The organ or representative who is prosecuted for a criminal or reg-
ulatory offence has his own constitutionally protected right to silence in
unified criminal or regulatory fining proceedings. This results from his
position as defendant and from the nemo tenetur principle. 349
On the other hand, the legal person or association of persons in crim-
inal proceedings has, as a subsidiary participant, only a simple statutory
right to silence resulting from the equivalence with a defendant (in pre-
liminary proceedings sect. 444 (2) sentence 2, 432 (2), 163a (3) sentence
2, 136 (1) sentence 2 StPO; in main proceedings sections 444 (2) sen-
tence 2, 433 (1), 243 (4) sentence 1 StPO). The same applies to regula-
tory fining proceedings (sect. 46 (1) OWiG). The right to silence of the
legal person or association of persons is exercised by its governing
bodies and is not tied to representation in proceedings. The governing
bodies have the same status as the defendant and must not be forced into
the role of witnesses. 350
349 Vgl. von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht,
2017, § 30 OWiG marginal no. 75.
350 BGHSt 9, 250, 251 = BGH NJW 1956, 1448; OLG Frankfurt GA 1969, 124.
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It is controversial whether the legal person or association of per-
sons is also entitled to an independent, constitutionally protected
right to silence on the basis of the nemo tenetur principle. This is im-
portant if the same facts are investigated in various preliminary pro-
ceedings against different individual defendants, if the legal person
or association is only involved in one procedure as a subsidiary par-
ticipant, and if the organs are to be used as witnesses in another pro-
cedure. 351 In a decision of 26 February 1997, 352 the German Federal
Constitutional Court expressly rejected an independent right to si-
lence, since the nemo tenetur principle is based on the principle of
human dignity (Art. (1) GG) and is therefore not transferable to legal
persons; moreover, a regulatory fine imposed on a legal person does
not contain a charge of guilt or ethical disapproval but should only
compensate for the benefits derived from the act. Today, this juris-
diction is predominantly criticised, 353 as the law on silence might
also be based on the constitutional principle of the rule of law
(Art. 20 (3) GG), the principle of equality (Art. 3 GG) and the fun-
damental right to property (Art. 14 GG). Furthermore, in view of the
fine framework of sect. 30 (2) OWiG, which has been increased, and
in view of the will of today’s legislature, which for reasons of deter-
rence goes beyond mere compensation, it can be assumed that the ar-
gumentation of the Federal Constitutional Court is no longer in ac-
cordance with the current legal situation. 354 Finally, the case law
of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights confers on legal persons a right to silence based on Art. 6 (1)
ECHR. 355 According to the German Federal Constitutional Court,
however, the case-law of both courts must be taken into account
when interpreting national law. 356 It does not matter whether the
governing body also acts as a litigant in the proceedings, since the
right to silence is linked to its function. 357 The right to silence ap-
351 Vgl. von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht,
2017, § 30 OWiG marginal no. 77.
352 BVerfGE 95, 220, 242 = BVerfG NJW 1997, 1841.
353 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 209.
354 Vgl. von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht,
2017, § 30 OWiG marginal no. 78.
355 Cf. Minoggio wistra 2003, 121, 125 et seq.
356 Cf. only BVerfG NJW 3428, 3433.
357 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 209.
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plies not only in the case of a subsidiary participation according to
sect. 444 StPO, but also in relation to the questioning of an organ
or representative as witness in another procedure insofar as the facts
are identical. 358
However, previous governing bodies may not, in contrast to active
bodies, invoke the right to silence. 359 They may therefore be heard as
witnesses, as well as other persons belonging to the legal person or as-
sociation of persons. According to sect. 55 StPO, they are only entitled
to refuse to answer any questions the reply to which would subject them
or one of their relatives to the risk of being prosecuted for a criminal or
regulatory offence. 360
6.3. Relationship between liability of the legal person and liability of
the head of business
6.3.1. Corporation’s guilty plea
German law does not exclude or diminish the individual liability of
an organ or representative by virtue of the corporation’s guilty plea.
Rather, the imposition of a regulatory fine on a legal person or associa-
tion presupposes that one of the organs or representatives—i.e. one of
the persons named in sect. 30 (1) nos. 1 to 5 OWiG—has committed
a criminal or regulatory offence. The imposition of the penalty or regu-
latory fine on the representative shall be independent of the imposition
of the fine on the legal person or association of persons.
However, there are three peculiarities. Firstly, in practice, the op-
tion of imposing an isolated regulatory fine (sect. 30 (4) sentence 1
OWiG) is used frequently. This applies to cases in which criminal
proceedings or regulatory fining proceedings have not been com-
menced, are discontinued or are dispensed with. Therefore, the pro-
ceedings against the person responsible are often suspended on the
basis of an agreement between the parties involved, and only a reg-
ulatory fine is imposed on the corporation. This consensual solution
is very popular because it avoids time-consuming investigations, ty-
358 Cf. von Galen/Maass, in: Leitner/Rosenau, Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht,
2017, § 30 OWiG marginal no. 79.
359 BVerfG BB 1975, 1315.
360 Rogall, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 30 marginal
no. 209.
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ing up resources and any public hearings with media attention that
damage the reputation of a corporation and its decision-makers. 361
Thus, the criminal defence regularly works intensively on suspending
proceedings against the defendants.
Secondly, it is possible to impose a so-called anonymous regulatory
fine on a legal person or association. This applies to cases in which the
identity of the offender—for instance, of a fraud (sect. 263 StGB) or a
violation of obligatory supervision (sect. 130 OWiG)—cannot be iden-
tified, but it is certain that one of the persons named in sect. 30 (1) Nos.
1 to 5 OWiG is guilty. In these cases, it is certain that an organ or repre-
sentative has committed the offence; therefore, a regulatory fine can be
imposed on the corporation. That is why, in appropriate cases, the gov-
erning bodies may attempt to prevent the identification of the person re-
sponsible, thereby ensuring that only a regulatory fine is imposed on the
corporation. 362
Thirdly, the imposition of a regulatory fine shall not give rise to
double punishment. This would be possible in the case of a so-called
one-man corporation, where the person concerned acted in the capacity
of both managing director and sole shareholder. In such cases, if the nat-
ural person has been sanctioned, a regulatory fine will not be imposed
against the corporation. 363
6.3.2. Previous imposition of a regulatory fine against the head of busi-
ness
The previous imposition of a regulatory fine is always taken into
account in German law. In this context, a distinction must be made as
to whether the regulatory fine has been imposed by a criminal court
or by a prosecuting authority.
In accordance with sect. 84 (2) sentence 1 OWiG, a legally binding
court judgment on the offence as a regulatory offence also precludes its
prosecution as a criminal offence. The same applies pursuant to sect. 84
(2) sentence 2 OWiG for a legally binding court order. The court’s de-
cision has a barring effect. 364 A prosecution is only possible within the
361 Cordes/Reichling NJW 2016, 3209, 3210.
362 Schmitt-Leonardy, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 30 marginal
no. 58.
363 Schmitt-Leonardy, in: Blum/Gassner/Seith (eds), OWiG, 2016, § 30 marginal
no. 60.
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framework of a reopening. The reopening of proceedings to the disad-
vantage of a person, under sect. 85 (3) sentence 1 OWiG in conjunction
with sect. 362 StPO, is only possible under very strict conditions, and
only for the purpose of creating a conviction in accordance with criminal
law:
1. If a document produced as genuine, for the defendant’s benefit, at
the main hearing was false or forged.
2. If a witness or expert, when giving testimony or an opinion for
the defendant’s benefit, was guilty of wilful or negligent violation of
the duty imposed by the oath, or of wilfully making a false, unsworn
statement.
3. If a judge or lay judge participated in drafting the judgment who
was guilty of a criminal violation of his official duties in relation to the
case.
4. If the person acquitted makes a credible confession, in or outside
the court, that he committed the criminal offence.
According to sect. 85 (3) sentence 2 OWiG, the reopening for this
purpose shall also be permissible if new facts or items of evidence have
been submitted which, separately or in conjunction with former evi-
dence taken, are apt to substantiate conviction for a felony.
According to sect. 84 (1) OWiG, if a regulatory fining notice has
become legally effective, the same offence can no longer be prosecuted
as a regulatory offence. However, prosecution as a criminal offence is
still possible. It is irrelevant whether new circumstances have subse-
quently become known or the nature of the offence was simply mis-
judged. 365 In accordance with sect. 86 (1) sentence 1 OWiG, if the per-
son concerned is subsequently sentenced in criminal proceedings for the
same act, the regulatory fining notice shall be rescinded to this extent.
According to sect. 86 (2) OWiG, amounts of money which have been
paid or collected on the basis of the rescinded regulatory fining notice
shall be first deducted from an assessed criminal fine, then from the in-
cidental consequences ordered which obligate the offender to effect pay-
ment and, lastly, from the costs of the criminal proceedings. The deci-
sions shall be rendered in the judgment or in another final decision (sect.
86 (3) OWiG). Sect. 86 OWiG thus provides a simplified reopening pro-
364 OLG Stuttgart NZV 1997, 91, 92; Ganter, in: BeckOK-OWiG, 16th ed.
15.7.2017, § 84 marginal no. 15.
365 Seitz/Bauer, in: Göhler, OWiG, 17. ed. 2017, § 84 marginal no. 13.
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cedure. 366 This enforces the principle of sect. 21 (1) sentence 1 OWiG,
according to which only criminal law shall be applied if an act is a crim-
inal offence and a regulatory offence.
366 Lutz, in: Karlsruher Kommentar zum OWiG, 5th ed. 2018, § 86 marginal no.
1.
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1. Criteria for imputation of criminal law responsibilities of heads
of business and their theoretical justifications
1.1. Historical overview
‘A criminal offence can only be committed by a natural person. The
fiction of legal personality does not apply to criminal law.’ 1
These words, derived from the explanatory memorandum of the
Dutch Penal Code of 1886 (Wetboek van Strafrecht; hereafter DPC),
are indicative of the vision of the legislator of 1881 regarding the pos-
sibility of criminal liability of legal persons. They also clearly reflect the
notion of universitas delinquere non potest as advocated by Von Sa-
vigny. 2 As a consequence, the individuals making up the organs of
the judicial person were personally held accountable in case of any cor-
porate misconduct. 3 After all, all alleged corporate criminal acts were,
in reality, deemed to be acts of those individuals. This vision was held
until the 1930s when the classic laissez-faire economic approach began
to make way for a more interventionist state. For a state that no longer
chose to limit itself to creating the preconditions for individual freedom
but actively wanted to regulate and influence social and socioeconomic
life in a time of deep economic crisis, ignoring the legal person and its
economic power became impossible. It had to be accepted as an inde-
pendent subject of punitive law. 4 As a consequence, the paradigm in le-
gal theory shifted and started to accept juristic persons as legal realities
instead of mere legal fictions.
The envisaged careful introduction of corporate criminal liability
was, however, interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War
and its associated occupation legislation. Yet, despite its rash introduc-
tion into Dutch law, corporate criminal liability has remained ever since,
1 H.J. SMIDT, Geschiedenis van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, Band I, revised and
supplemented by J.W. Smidt (H.D. Tjeenk Willink, Haarlem 1891) 450.
2 F.C. VON SAVIGNY, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Band II (Veit Berlin
1840) 312.
3 The way in which these provisions were shaped evolved over time, each time
reflecting the current point of view on incorporation and management responsibility.
4 J.A.E. VERVAELE, ‘Historische ontwikkeling van het bijzonder Strafrecht’, in:
F.G.H. KRISTEN et al. (eds), Bijzonder strafrecht. Strafrechtelijke handhaving van so-
ciaal-economisch en fiscaal recht in Nederland, (Boom Lemma Publishers, The Hague
2011), 13-21; D. ROEF, TH. DE ROOS, ‘De strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de
rechtspersoon in Nederland: rechtstheoretische beschouwingen bij enkele praktische
knelpunten’, in: M. FAURE, K. SCHWARZ (eds), De strafrechtelijke en civielrechte-
lijke aansprakelijkheid van de rechtspersoon en zijn bestuurders (Intersentia, Antwerp/
Groningen 1998) 54–77.
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without any real criticism. Moreover, the specific provisions on indivi-
dual criminal liability of leading figures within corporations are still
modelled after this predominantly administrative occupation legisla-
tion. 5 The first major post-war application is in the Economic Offences
Act of 1950 (Wet op de Economische Delicten; hereafter EOA), which
enabled corporate criminal liability for—and restricted it to—economic
offences. It also prolonged the liability of those that ordered or actually
directed these corporate offences. In 1976, a general provision on corpo-
rate criminal liability was introduced, the current Article 51 DPC, creat-
ing corporate criminal liability for all offences. This article reads as fol-
lows:
1. Criminal offences can be committed by natural persons and legal
persons.
2. If an offence is committed by a legal person, criminal proceed-
ings may be instituted and the punishments and other measures provided
for by law may be implemented where appropriate:
a) against the legal person; or
b) against those who ordered the commission of the offence
(opdrachtgeven), as well as those who actually directed the prohibited
act (feitelijk leidinggeven); or
c) against both those named under (a) and (b).
3. For the purpose of the application of the above paragraphs, legal
persons shall be deemed to include an unincorporated company, a part-
nership, a shipping company and a capital asset set aside for a special
purpose (doelvermogen).
Strikingly, this generalisation did not cause much debate, nor did
the way in which this provision shaped the liability of leading officials
or the fact that procedural safeguards were not greatly developed. 6 After
all, despite the lack of clear criteria for imposing liability, corporate
criminal liability did not give rise to major issues in legal practice.
For the legislator, the generalisation was simply a ‘last step’ to be taken.
5 Even though the concept of feitelijk leidinggeven can be found in one (insignif-
icant) law dating just prior to the Nazi invasion, the 1937 Vestigingswet Kleinbedrijf,
as amended by Stb. 1939, 639 X, owes its fame to the occupation legislation.
6 R.A. TORRINGA, Strafbaarheid van rechtspersonen (dissertation University of
Groningen, Gouda Quint, Arnhem 1984) 66: ‘What makes the history of the introduc-
tion of corporate criminal liability so fascinating, is that almost every step of the de-
velopment has been taken in the delusion or even in assertive assurance that nothing
new was going on.’
THE NETHERLANDS NATIONAL REPORT 191
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
Therefore, there was no need for a ‘profound theoretical contempla-
tion’. 7 As such, the legislator showed great confidence in the prosecu-
tion policy of the Prosecutor’s Office as well as the ability of the judi-
ciary to reach a well-considered and appropriate outcome in each indi-
vidual case.
At the same time, the legislator focused mainly on the liability of
corporations, leaving individual criminal liability of natural persons
mostly unattended. This also reflected the then dominant view in crim-
inology that, when it comes to corporate criminality, one should focus
on the rotten barrel and not look for individual rotten apples. 8 Accord-
ing to Brants and Brants, this can be easily explained. Offences that
were prosecuted under the EOA were mostly of a regulatory nature, in
which context it was deemed more appropriate to prosecute corporations
rather than individuals, as the offences were either committed with the
aim of benefiting the corporation or were violations directly related to
the company’s business operations. As a consequence, case law on or-
dering and actually directing started off quite slowly. Most of the rele-
vant case law is from the 1980s when the Prosecutor’s Office discovered
this provision as an effective instrument to tackle fraud, a crime that is
primarily committed for personal and not corporate gain. In many cases,
the juristic person serves as a mere vehicle for the fraud and is left de-
prived afterwards. 9
1.2. Implementation of the PIF Convention
Based on the above, it comes as no surprise that the provision of
Article 51 DPC also seemed well equipped to tackle fraud with EU
funds. According to the Dutch legislator, no specific legislative action
was required, as Article 3 of the PIF Convention on the liability of heads
of business was already fully implemented through Article 51 (2)
DPC. 10 The latter provision is, according to Article 5:1 (3) General Ad-
7 KAMERSTUKKEN II 1975/76, 13 655, nr. 3, 8; TORRINGA (n 6) 67.
8 This does not mean that corporate criminal liability was fully embraced by all.
A very prominent scholar who always retained reservations is Remmelink, as legal
entities, in his view, did not truly fit into the ‘moral community’ of criminal law (J.
REMMELINK, Mr. D. Hazewinkel-Suringa’s Inleiding tot de studie van het Nederlandse
Strafrecht (Gouda Quint, Deventer 1996) 159–160).
9 C.H. BRANTS, K.L.K. BRANTS, De sociale constructie van fraude (dissertation
University of Amsterdam, Gouda Quint, Arnhem 1991) 149.
10 Commission (EC), ‘Annex to the Report from the Commission.
Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’
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ministrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht; hereafter GALA)
also applicable to administrative proceedings. While the jurisprudence
from the administrative courts on corporate and individual liability is
very interesting, as it seems to be developing at a much faster rate than
its criminal law counterpart, the main focus of this report will be on
criminal law stricto sensu, as all PIF offences are enforced through crim-
inal law. 11
1.3. General overview of relevant case law
As previously stated, fraud is what sparked the use of Article 51
(2)(b) DPC. Because Article 51 (2)(b) refers to those who are actually
directing criminal offences, this provision was expected, and has proven
to be, successful in piercing corporate veils and ‘unveiling’ fraudulent
criminal networks, as it focuses on de facto rather than de jure power
(for more on this, see Part 3). As such, fraudsters could no longer hide
behind straw persons who were appointed as formal directors in order to
evade liability. 12
Moreover, in the early days, the use of Article 51 (2)(b) DPC re-
mained limited to cases of active management involvement in criminal
activities. As such, defining case law on the limits of liability under this
provision developed rather late. 13 The first and also defining case on
passive involvement in criminal corporate activities is the case against
various members of the board of directors of N.V. Slavenburg’s bank.
Financial Interests and its Protocols. Article 10 of the Convention’, SEC (2004) 1299,
103.
11 For an overview of the relevant provisions, see Commission (EC), ‘Annex to
the Report from the Commission. Implementation of the Convention on the Protection
of the European Communities’ Financial Interests and its Protocols. Article 10 of the
Convention’, SEC (2004) 1299, 78–116. Whereas the Commission (EC), ‘Report from
the Commission. Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the European
Communities’ Financial Interests and its Protocols. Article 10 of the Convention’,
COM (2004) 709 final, 7, mentions that none of the member states fully complies
with the PIF instruments, Annex (n 10), 52 states that, with regard to Article 3 of
the PIF Convention, the Netherlands is completely in line with the requirements set
by this provision. Commission (EC), ‘Second Report from the Commission.
Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’
Financial Interests and its Protocols. Article 10 of the Convention’, COM (2008) 77
final, 13, shows that the Netherlands has now transposed all relevant provisions.
12 See, most prominently, Supreme Court 16 June 1981, NJ 1981, 586 (Papa
Blanca).
13 BRANTS, BRANTS (n 10) 149; A. MULDER, ‘Feitelijke leiding geven aan de ver-
boden gedraging, indien het strafbaar feit door een rechtspersoon in begaan’, TVVS.
Maandblad voor Ondernemingsrecht en Rechtspersonen 1988, Vol. 31 (8) 214.
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In short, the allegations against the Slavenburg bank and its top manage-
ment boil down to facilitating tax evasion, money laundering and mort-
gage fraud; all violations were prosecuted as forgery (valsheid in ges-
chrifte; Art. 225 DPC). Founded in 1925, this small bank followed an
aggressive but successful growth strategy in the decades after the Sec-
ond World War. It became a dominant player by offering credit under
riskier conditions and to less solvent debtors. Moreover, it was willing
to offer financial services to more unconventional businesses (e.g. the
then infamous Casa Rosso in the Amsterdam red light district). Yet
the corporate structure did not evolve at the same pace as the company’s
size; nor were proper checks and balances in place. As a consequence,
senior management lost its grip over the company, which had developed
into a jumble of autonomous empires. At the same time, management
kept pushing for higher targets and came down hard on those who failed
to achieve them. In a sense, the board still tried to run the company like
the small comprehensive bank it once was, even though it had simply
outgrown that phase. The result was a rather fickle involvement of the
bank’s top management, ranging from a complete lack of interest in cer-
tain dossiers to micromanagement of others. These conditions proved a
fertile breeding ground for large-scale fraud which—like everything else
in the bank—showed no general strategy or modus operandi but rather
took on different forms wherever it occurred. 14 Key questions were if
and to what extent the members of the board of directors could be held
responsible for these fraudulent acts of the bank: whether these acts
could be attributed to the bank itself was never seriously doubted. In this
case, the Supreme Court ruled that actually directing requires dolus
eventualis, which means that one can only direct offences of which
one has knowledge. Culpable ignorance does not suffice, 15 wilful blind-
ness excluded. This means that one can only direct offences of which
one is more or less aware (see Part 3 for a more in-depth analysis of this
knowledge requirement). It is also this knowledge that activates and de-
termines the scope of the duty of care to put an end to these criminal
activities (once again, see Part 3 for further details). The outcome of this
case is widely seen as a defeat for the prosecution as the courts ruled that
14 For further reference, see M.J. HORNMAN, De strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid
van leidinggevenden van ondernemingen. Een beschouwing vanuit multidimensionaal
perspectief (dissertation Utrecht University, Boom juridisch 2016) 3–5, 145–147, from
which this description is derived.
15 Supreme Court 16 December 1986, NJ 1987, 321 and 322/AA 1987, 167–175
(Slavenburg II).
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the suspects were either unaware of these fraudulent acts or did enough
to stop them. More specifically, the The Hague Court of Appeal ruled
that, in light of the culpability principle, criminal liability could not be
predicated upon the argument that ‘the bank was organised in the way
it was’, 16 even though it could be argued that these gross institutional
insufficiencies lie at the heart of the reproach of the bank’s board of di-
rectors. 17
Whilst the The Hague Court of Appeal’s line of reasoning has been
subject to criticism, it has been reaffirmed by the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal in the Ahold accounting fraud. Ahold’s CEO and CFO had
signed false control letters that misrepresented the company’s control
over a daughter company and handed these letters over to the company’s
accountant. They also signed side letters that reflected the real situation,
but those were only given to the joint venture partners, thereby deceiv-
ing the accountant while reassuring the company’s partners. One of the
defendants stated that he did not properly read the documents, nor prop-
erly understood their content, before signing them, and was therefore
unaware of their fraudulent nature. Whilst the Court of Appeal con-
demned him for doing so, it did agree that the board members were ex-
pected to read numerous documents and found that one cannot expect
them to have in-depth knowledge of all applicable accounting rules.
‘Criminal law cannot result in risk-liability’, was the Court’s final con-
clusion. 18
A few years ago, the financial sector was once again under scrutiny.
This time a specialised London based branch of the Rabobank, the lar-
gest bank of the Netherlands, was accused of manipulating the Libor in-
terest rates, together with a number of other major European banks.
Whether the Dutch management was aware—let alone understood the
complexities—of these transactions remains unclear to this day. After in-
vestigation, the Prosecutor’s Office assumed this was most likely a con-
spiracy of rogue employees and, even though the bank’s supervision me-
chanisms were not up to standard, found insufficient support for a crim-
inal prosecution against (leading) individuals in the Netherlands. As a
consequence of this scandal, the bank’s CEO resigned. The case against
the bank itself ended in an out-of-court settlement. 19 A complaint
16 The Hague Court of Appeal 2 December 1987, NJ 1988, 433.
17 More extensively on this, see HORNMAN (n 14).
18 Amsterdam Court of Appeal 28 January 2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BH1971.
19 https://www.rabobank.com/nl/float/libor/index.html and https://www.om.nl/
actueel/nieuwsberichten/@32206/rabobank-betaalt-70/.
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against this settlement and the decision not to prosecute individuals was
rejected by the Court of Appeal. 20 It also found insufficient support for
a criminal prosecution.
The CEO of chemical company Chemie-Pack was initially not so
lucky when he was prosecuted after an explosion and heavy fire that de-
stroyed his business due to the use of a blowtorch by an employee in the
proximity of highly inflammable chemicals. However, the court ruled
that whilst the company consistently disregarded safety and environ-
mental regulations, it could not be established that the CEO was aware
of the use of the blowtorch even though this had become standard pro-
cedure within the company in order to prevent pipelines from freezing.
As a consequence, the court ruled that the CEO could not be held re-
sponsible for causing the explosion and fire. 21
The most extensive and well-known fraud with EU funds in the
Netherlands is the so-called European Social Fund scandal that occurred
in the late 1990s/early 2000s. As a result of this, the Netherlands had to
reimburse all the unjustly received subsidies from the European Regio-
nal Development Fund (ERDF), and several prosecutions—relatively
minor in relation to the widespread nature of the fraud—were instigated;
their outcome is unclear. 22 Unfortunately, there are no reliable empirical
data on the number of prosecutions and convictions for EU-related
fraud. Fraud is an overarching term that is not used in the official statis-
tics of the Centraal bureau voor de Statistiek (Statistics Netherlands).
Fraud can therefore be prosecuted under many labels, such as deceit, for-
gery, money laundering, crimes against public order (e.g. membership of
a criminal organisation), etc. Furthermore, crimes committed against the
interests of the EU are not registered as a separate subcategory in these
statistics. As a consequence, the scope of fraud with EU funds in the
Netherlands remains unclear. Nonetheless, there are sporadic media re-
ports and press releases from the Prosecutor’s Office that indicate that
20 The Hague Court of Appeal 19 May 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1204. The
Court of Appeal also doubted whether such a prosecution would be successful, because
most people involved were subject to simultaneous administrative, criminal and
parliamentary investigations in numerous countries. During these investigations,
they were forced to make potentially self-incriminating statements, the
consequences of which could not be undone.
21 District Court Breda 21 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2012:BY7000 and
’s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal 22 April 2016, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2016:1597.
22 For a more in-depth analysis of this scandal, see R.M. KRUG, Gemakkelijk geld.
Kroniek van de problemen met het Europees Sociaal Fonds in Nederland (dissertation
Radboud University, privately printed 2014).
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investigations are under way and that prosecutions are being insti-
gated. 23
1.4. Recent developments
Even though corporate criminal liability and liability of company
directors have existed in the Netherlands for a number of decades with-
out much turbulence, several recent developments deserve special atten-
tion as they reflect a change in the perception and prosecution of white-
collar crime. Firstly, it has been widely signalled that there is an increase
of punitiveness towards fraud, (socio-)economic and environmental of-
fences. This has resulted in higher sanctions in legal statutes, 24 higher
sentences in legal practice 25 and a growing resentment in society against
out-of-court settlements for corporate misconduct (the last, by the way,
for several reasons). Partly, this is due to resentment against corporations
and their directors getting off easily (class justice). On the other hand,
there is also wide-ranging criticism over the stand-still in the develop-
ment of case law and the absence of proper judicial oversight over re-
cord-breaking out-of-court settlements, 26 especially since many of these
settlements are reached in a combined action between Dutch and foreign
(mostly American) regulatory agencies. The harshest point of criticism,
however, is the absolute lack of transparency on how these settlements
are calculated. 27 Many argue that some of them might even exceed the
23 See, for example, https://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/aanhoudingen-om-
miljoenenfraude-esf-gelden~a3788693/; https://www.om.nl/@88906/doorzoekingen/.
24 See, for example, KAMERSTUKKEN II 2006/07, 30 800 VI, nr. 90; KAMERSTUKKEN
II 2012/13, 33 685, nr. 3 (which explicitly refers to abuse of EU funds as an argument
for reform).
25 https://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1198526/strafrechtexpert-tijd-dat-bestuurder-
wegkomt-met-taakstraf-of-boete-is-voorbij.
26 See, for example, C. VAN ASPEREN DE BOER, M. VAN DUIJVENBODE, ‘Schikkings-
cultuur in fraudezaken ondermijnt de rechtsontwikkeling’, Nederlands Juristenblad
2014, Vol. 89 (10) 641-646; M.J. BLOTWIJK, M. FERNANDEZ-BERTIER, ‘Out-of-Court
Criminal Dispute Resolution in the Netherlands, Belgium and the U.S.’, Tijdschrift
voor Sanctierecht & Onderneming 2015, Vol. 5 (2/3) 95–107; M. PHEIJFFER, ‘Aanpak
financieel-economische criminaliteit: sch(r)ikken!’, Strafblad 2014, Vol. 12 (2) 90–96;
A. VERBRUGGEN et al., Onderneming en strafbaar feit (Sdu, The Hague 2017) 92.
27 For instance, the press release regarding the Libor settlement on the
Prosecutors Office website was less than 35 lines. See https://www.om.nl/vaste-
onderdelen/zoeken/@32206/rabobank-betaalt-70/ and (in English) https://
www.om.nl/vaste-onderdelen/zoeken/@32207/rabobank-pays-dutch/.
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maximum penalty that could be imposed by law, or at least the sentence
that would be imposed by a judge. 28
Moreover—but in close connection to the above—there seems to be
another shift in prosecutorial policy. Until very recently, when settling
the case against the corporation, criminal defence lawyers could arrange,
as part of the plea agreement, for the natural persons involved in the of-
fence not to be prosecuted. Nowadays, such a deal has become much
harder, as Dutch prosecutors seem to have embraced the US Yates mem-
orandum, 29 and are not only opting for the prosecution of individuals,
but are also expecting the settling company to hand over all incriminat-
ing evidence as part of the deal. 30
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law
2.1. Perpetration and participation in Dutch law
Articles 47 to 51 DPC (see annex for an English translation) provide
for a differential system of participation that distinguishes between per-
petration and various modes of participation. 31 Perpetration applies when
one person commits a crime, either directly (physically) or indirectly
(‘functionally’), 32 by himself, thus personally fulfilling all elements of
28 C. VAN ASPEREN DE BOER, M. VAN DUIJVENBODE, ‘Openheid in schikkingspraktijk
OM’, Nederlands Juristenblad 2015, Vol. 90 (1) 21–22; T.R. VAN ROOMEN, A. VER-
BRUGGEN, ‘Internationale trends in preventie, detectie en repressie van corruptie’, Tijds-
chrift voor Sanctierecht & Onderneming 2017, Vol. 7 (4) 158; K.J.C. VRIEND, ‘De hoge
en bijzondere transactie; een pleidooi voor rechterlijke controle op de afdoening buiten
geding’, Tijdschrift voor Bijzonder Strafrecht & Handhaving 2016, Vol. 3 (4) 194–204.
29 https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download.
30 VERBRUGGEN et al. (n 26) 91.
31 For a more extensive description of the Dutch system of perpetration and
participation (with a focus on responsibility for international crimes), see M.
CUPIDO, M. HORNMAN, W. HUISMAN, ‘Dutch Report on Individual Liability for Business
Involvement in International Crimes’, Revue International de Droit Pénal 2017, Vol.
88 (1) 223-255.
32 Contrary to many other legal systems, Dutch criminal law has two forms of what
is generally described as indirect perpetration: doen plegen and functioneel plegen. The
former shows great similarities with the German concept of unmittelbare Täterschaft, as
it requires the direct perpetrator to be an innocent agent, in the sense that he cannot be
punished for whatever reason. As such, Dutch law does not demand that the direct per-
petrator was used as an unknowing and will-less tool. The direct perpetrator can be fully
aware of the criminal nature of his actions. The decisive determination is whether there is
a reason for being unpunishable. Any reason will do—for instance, lacking the required
capacity (kwaliteit) to commit the offence (J. DE HULLU, Materieel strafrecht. Over alge-
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the crime definition. All situations in which multiple persons are engaged
in criminal conduct are labelled as participation. The responsibility of
participants—or accessories—is derivative of the responsibility of the
perpetrator, which means that the criminal responsibility of participants
only arises when the perpetrator has in fact prepared, attempted or com-
mitted a crime. This is known as the principle of dependency (accessor-
iteit). 33 Further distinction can be made between direct participation and
indirect participation. Direct participators are those who jointly fulfil all
the elements of the crime: as such, they are on the same level as the per-
petrator—i.e. co-perpetration and indirect perpetration (doen plegen). In-
direct participators—i.e. instigators and aiders—are generally more de-
pendent on the perpetrator, as they have less control over how the acts
of participation will unfold. 34 As a consequence, there are several provi-
sions in the DPC on the responsibility of indirect participators in case the
perpetrator, despite the acts of the indirect participator, does not commit
the offence, goes much further, or goes in a completely different direction
than the participator anticipated. 35 As aiders are seen not as principals
but as less blameworthy secondary participants who have a more subsidi-
ary role, several exceptions apply. First of all, aiding is only punishable in
the case of a (choate or inchoate) crime (misdrijf), not in the case of a
misdemeanour (overtreding; Art. 48 DPC). Moreover, there is a manda-
tory reduction of the maximum sentence by one third (Art. 49 DPC). Be-
sides the traditional forms of participation set out in Articles 47 and 48
DPC, Article 51 (2) DPC allows for the prosecution of those who either
ordered (opdrachtgeven) or actually directed (feitelijk leidinggeven) of-
fences committed by a legal person. The former is perceived to assume
a more initiating role and closer involvement than the latter. 36 The scope
mene leerstukken van strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid naar Nederlands recht (Wolters
Kluwer, Deventer 2015) 473–475). This form of indirect perpetration is seen as a form of
participation. Functioneel plegen on the other hand, is seen as a form of perpetration. For
a clear overview of the differences between functional perpetration and the concept of
Organisationsherrschaft, see H. VAN DER WILT, ‘On Functional Perpetration in Dutch
Criminal Law. Some Reflections Sparked Off by the Case against the Former Peruvian
President Alberto Fujimori’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 2009, Vol.
4 (11) 615–621.
33 DE HULLU (n 32) 438.
34 D.H. DE JONG, ‘Vormen van strafbare deelneming’, in: J.B.J. VAN DER LEIJ
(eds), Plegen en deelnemen (Wolters Kluwer, Deventer 2007) 115.
35 Article 46a, 47(2), and 49(4) DPC. However, dolus eventualis will smoothen
most cases of diverging intent (see DE HULLU (n. 32) 444–447, 466–467, 476,
481–482, 493–495, 504–505).
36 R. VAN ELST, Strafbare rechtspersonen en hun leidinggevers (Ars Aequi Libri
Nijmegen 1997) 66; DE HULLU (n 32) 502–503; E. SIKKEMA, ‘De strafrechtelijke aan-
sprakelijkheid van leidinggevenden in Nederland’, in: E. SIKKEMA, P. WAETER-
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of feitelijk leidinggeven is broader, as it also encompasses forms of pas-
sive involvement—i.e. not intervening where management should have
intervened. It is basically uncontested that ordering is nothing more than
a specific form of the more comprehensive notion of actual directing. 37
As a consequence, it is hardly ever used in legal practice and will not be
touched upon any further in this report.
In addition to these general forms of participation, various forms of
participation or indirect involvement are penalised as separate offences.
For instance, benefitting from a crime by obtaining certain objects or
profits can be qualified as money laundering, especially when its criminal
origin is concealed (Art. 420bis and 420quater DPC); and, even without
being directly personally involved in the commission of group crimes,
one can be liable for membership of a criminal organisation—i.e. an or-
ganisation that seeks to commit crimes (Art. 140 DPC). 38 This requires
that the accused had positive knowledge (onvoorwaardelijk opzet) of the
organisation’s criminal purpose and actively participated in this organisa-
tion through acts that either served or were directly related to the realisa-
tion of the criminal purpose. 39
Like criminal law, administrative law uses a differentiated participa-
tion system, albeit with a more restricted scope of potential offenders.
Next to those who either physically or functionally perpetrated the of-
fence, regular administrative law only allows for the sanctioning of
co-perpetrators and of those who ordered or actually directed the acts
of a corporation (Art. 5:1 GALA). Administrative tax offences also fall
under this provision, but do allow for the prosecution of aiders and in-
citers for certain misdemeanours. Criminal tax offences are subject to
the general participation system of criminal law. Whilst there used to
INCKX (eds), De strafrechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid van leidinggevenden – in de
economische context – Preadvies voor de jaarvergadering van de Nederlands-Vlaamse
Vereniging voor Strafrecht 2010, (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2010) 66; S.N. DE
VALK, Aansprakelijkheid van leidinggevenden (dissertation University of Groningen,
Kluwer, Deventer 2009) 426.
37 VAN ELST (n 36) 66; DE HULLU (n 32) 508; SIKKEMA (n 36) 67; H.D. WOLSWIJK,
‘Feitelijk leidinggeven en opdracht geven’, in: J.B.J. VAN DER LEIJ (ed), Plegen en
deelnemen (Kluwer, Deventer 2007) 111.
38 L.F.H. ENNEKING et al., Zorgplichten van Nederlandse ondernemingen in-
zake internationaal maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen: Een rechtsvergelijkend
en empirisch onderzoek naar de stand van het Nederlandse recht in het licht van de UN
Guiding Principles, (Boom Juridische uitgevers 2016) 227–228; F.G.H. KRISTEN,
‘Maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen en strafrecht’, in: A.J.A.J. EIJSBOUTS
et al. (eds), Maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen (Wolters Kluwer, Deventer
2010) 151–155.
39 KRISTEN (n 38) 154.
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be substantial differences between administrative and criminal tax law,
and general criminal law itself, regarding the interpretation and applica-
tion of notions of substantive law, these have almost all disappeared. All
these domains are now converging, and both the tax and the criminal di-
visions of the Supreme Court are trying to align their jurisprudence. 40
In light of the focus of this report, only functional perpetration
(functioneel plegen) and actually directing (feitelijk leidinggeven) will
be taken into further account, as they lend themselves more easily to
an omission-based approach than others and were specifically designed
to deal with heads of business.
2.2. Omission liability
Like many other legal systems, Dutch law distinguishes between
provisions that penalise active or positive acts (commissiedelict) and
those that penalise failures to act (omissiedelict); both can be further dif-
ferentiated into temporary (aflopend delict) and enduring offences (voort-
durend delict). Dutch law also recognises that certain criminal acts that
would normally require a positive act, like killing another person, can,
under certain conditions, be fulfilled through an omission (oneigenlijk
omissiedelict)—e.g. by denying food to a baby. 41 Whilst there is no gen-
eral provision on omissions, it is held that omissions can only be pun-
ished if there was an obligation to act—i.e. a duty of care (zorgplicht). 42
Clearly this raises issues from a legality perspective, as these duties of
care are open norms and therefore quite undetermined, both in substance
and with regard to their addressees. Critics state that there is a real risk
that the person concerned will subsequently have to find out from the
court what efforts he should have undertaken in order to evade liability,
while there was no clarity on this prior to his actions. It is up to the ac-
cused to find this out for himself, in the hope that this interpretation will
40 See, for example, Supreme Court 1 December 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:
AU7741, BNB 2007, 151 (denouncing the attribution of intent from one natural person
to another) and Supreme Court, 3 October 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2542 (on fiscal argu-
able positions). As a consequence, with the exception of Article 69 (4) State Taxes Act
(Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen; further STA) that prohibits prosecuting tax crimes
as forgery (Art. 225 DPC), there are no relevant special diverging rules on liability.
41 DE HULLU (n 32) 77–79, 81–82.
42 E. GRITTER, ‘Functioneel daderschap: dogmatische inbedding en praktische uit-
werking’, in: E. GRITTER (ed.), Opstellen Materieel Strafrecht (Ars Aequi Libri, Nijme-
gen 2009) 15; H.D. WOLSWIJK, ‘Strafbaar nalaten: een zorgplicht minder’, in: A. HAR-
TEVELD et al. (eds), Systeem in ontwikkeling. Liber amicorum G. Knigge (Wolf Legal
Publishers, Nijmegen 2005) 547–565.
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not turn out to be (evidently) incorrect. 43 Nonetheless, open norms and
duties of care are the norm in regulatory law and probably will continue
to be for a long time, especially when it comes to norms that are enforced
through administrative law where the weight of the culpability and legal-
ity principle is already more limited to begin with. 44 In most cases, it is
possible to fill in this open norm using explanatory memoranda, guide-
lines from governmental or professional (supervisory) agencies, jurispru-
dence and legal literature. It also must be kept in mind that many regu-
latory provisions are created in consultation with the sector to which they
apply. As a consequence, their content cannot come as a complete sur-
prise.
Because there is no general provision, the scope and nature of the
duty of care will have to be determined on a case-by-case approach in
which the specific duty of care provision is decisive. As a consequence,
there is no general norm for the required mens rea. In some cases, intent
will be required; other provisions will settle for negligence, whereas
misdemeanours (overtredingen) and administrative offences are strict
liability provisions. Here, culpability is presumed, but can be rebutted
by an absence of all blameworthiness plea (see Part 4 for more on the
latter).
In theory, the foregoing also holds true for causality. In this regard,
too, the specific provision is decisive, albeit that the overall criterion for
causality is always the same: can the alleged consequence reasonably be
attributed to the defendant? In essence, this test boils down to a multi-
factorial approach that takes into account all the well-known causality
theories, the specific underlying offence and the legal interests it pro-
tects, the accused’s mens rea, and the endangering character of the de-
fendant’s actions. 45 In this regard, conditio sine qua non is an important
but not decisive factor. If the defendant’s prior actions seriously raised
the risk of the consequence setting in, then causality can be established,
even if it remains unclear whether there was a conditio sine qua non re-
lationship. 46
43 B.J.V. KEUPINK, Daderschap bij wettelijke strafrechtelijke zorgplichtbepalin-
gen. Over het gedragingsbestanddeel ‘zorgen’ in het materiële strafrecht (dissertation
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2011) 399–400.
44 F.G.H. KRISTEN, ‘Het materieelstrafrechtelijk legaliteitsbeginsel’, in: F.G.H.
KRISTEN et al. (eds), Bijzonder strafrecht. Strafrechtelijke handhaving van sociaal-
economisch en fiscaal recht in Nederland (Boom Lemma, The Hague 2011) 325–331.
45 DE HULLU (n 32) 188–189. The reasonable attribution test was originally devel-
oped in private law, but now applies to all areas of Dutch law.
46 Supreme Court 30 September 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF9666, NJ 2005, 69.
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Some modes of liability under Dutch law lend themselves more
easily to an omission-based approach than others. Especially, func-
tional perpetration and actually directing are relevant in this regard.
Whilst these modes of liability encompass both active and passive in-
volvement, 47 liability is normally based (at least in part) on the in-
adequacy of supervision. 48 In particular, the Supreme Court has ac-
cepted that a functional perpetrator’s failure to fulfil the level of care
that can reasonably be expected to prevent criminal acts from occur-
ring (due diligence) can be regarded as acceptance of these acts. 49 Si-
milar phrases are known from earlier jurisprudence on actually di-
recting. 50 Indirect perpetration and instigation require that the ac-
cused acted as auctor intellectualis. On this account, omission-like
constructions, whilst theoretically possible, seem highly unlikely in
practice. In contrast, aiding through omission is more probable. It
is accepted that one can aide through omission by creating an oppor-
tunity—for instance, by allowing access to a location or person. 51
The main issue in such cases will be to prove that these supportive
acts were intentionally omitted. 52 Also for co-perpetration, establish-
ing the accused’s criminal intent will be the principal focus in cases
of omission. Dutch criminal law does not require that co-perpetrators
are physically present when the offence is committed. 53 Thus, co-
perpetration by omission is theoretically possible, yet the requirement
of making an essential contribution seems to limit establishing liabi-
lity on the basis of passive conduct.
47 For actually directing, this was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its
judgment of April 2016. See Supreme Court 26 April 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:733,
NJ 2016, 375.
48 See, for example, Supreme Court 16 December 1986, NJ 1987, 321 and 322/
AA 1987, 167–175. Cp. G. KNIGGE, ‘Doen en laten; enkele opmerkingen over da-
derschap’, Delikt & Delinkwent 1992, Vol. 22 (2) 132, 139, who states that the required
promoting of acts (see Part 3 for further detail) will normally be the result of a com-
bination of commissions and omissions.
49 Supreme Court 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938, NJ 2006, 328;
Supreme Court 8 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3487, NJ 2016, 23.
50 Supreme Court 20 November 1984, NJ 1985, 355 (NCB); Supreme Court 16
December 1986, NJ 1987, 321 and 322/AA 1987, 167–175 (Slavenburg II).
51 See, for example, Supreme Court 16 August 2005, ECLI:NL:HR: 2005:AT6058,
NJ 2005, 490.
52 Supreme Court 14 April 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:949, NJ 2015, 338
53 Supreme Court 17 November 1981, NJ 1983, 84.
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2.3. Notification requirements
According to Article 161 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure
(Wetboek van Strafvordering; hereafter DCCP), anyone who bears
knowledge of an offence is allowed to report this offence. However,
there is no general obligation to do so, with the exception of severe crim-
inal offences (Art. 160 DCCP)—i.e. crimes against the security of state
that endanger lives, crimes against life itself, and rape—or (under certain
conditions) for public bodies or servants. The latter are obliged to come
forward and notify the judicial authorities in case (i) they bear knowl-
edge of embezzlement, forgery or the acceptance of bribes committed
by another public servant; or (ii) the crime was committed by a public
servant who used his position as a public servant to commit the offence;
or (iii) the crime consists of misusing funds or regulations of which the
proper use or execution was commissioned onto a public servant (Art.
162 DCCP). The aforementioned obligation does not apply if this would
expose the individual himself, or a person in relation to whom he could
claim testimonial privilege, to criminal prosecution (Art. 162 (3)
DCCP). Notwithstanding this formal obligation to report, reality shows
a more nuanced picture. Public bodies grant themselves a certain level of
discretion in this regard and sometimes choose to deal with these of-
fences internally and not report them. 54
As such, there is a notification requirement for PIF offences for
public officials. There is no similar obligation for the private sector.
However, Dutch law does impose several notification requirements or
duties of care upon companies or persons engaging in certain economic
activities that could encounter PIF offences. Most of these requirements
are directed against financial institutions and serve either to prevent or to
help discover criminal activity. 55 For example, there is an obligation to
notify the Dutch Finance Intelligence Unit 56 in case of so-called ‘un-
usual transactions’ (ongebruikelijke transacties) in order to prevent
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 57 Furthermore, com-
54 E. KOLTHOFF, ‘Publiek integriteitsonderzoek door private partijen’, in: P. PON-
SAERS et al. (eds), Outsourcing policing (Maklu, Antwerp 2015) 165.
55 Not all of these obligations relate to financial institutions. See, for example, the
Prevention Abuse of Chemicals Act (Wet voorkoming misbruik chemicaliën) which
imposes a number of notification requirements on ‘operators as mentioned in Regula-
tion (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February
2004 on drug precursors’.
56 https://www.fiu-nederland.nl/en, last visited 29 November 2017.
57 Violating such a notification obligation sometimes leads to a large settlement.
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panies can be required to do client research and trace the identity of the
‘ultimate beneficial owner’ (UBO) before concluding a business deal, or
to intensify client research in case of a ‘politically exposed person’
(PEP).
2.4. Limitations to liability
Whilst not explicitly mentioned in the DPC, 58 the notion of nulla
poena sine culpa—also known as the principle of personal liability—lies
at the heart of Dutch criminal law. Individuals can only be held respon-
sible for crimes to which they made a contribution (actus reus) with a
guilty mind (mens rea). This does not imply that an individual must al-
ways act with either intent, recklessness or negligence—as such, there is
no prohibition on strict liability per se; but in its landmark judgment on
this issue, the Supreme Court has ruled that criminal liability cannot be
established in the absence of all blameworthiness (afwezigheid van alle
schuld). 59 A complete lack of guilt is irreconcilable with criminal re-
sponsibility. An accused can only be liable if he could have acted differ-
ently and thus can be blamed for not doing so. 60 Dutch law allows for
this minimum level of culpability to be presumed to be present. Thus, it
is not up to the Prosecutor’s Office to prove that this threshold is met,
but if during the course of the proceedings it turns out to be likely (aan-
nemelijk) that this minimum level of culpability is lacking, the accused
can no longer be held liable nor be punished. 61
See, for example, https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@96507/groothandel-
leverde/ (in Dutch) regarding a wholesale company in agricultural and horticultural
products that accepted a two-million-euro settlement to avoid prosecution on money
laundering and aiding in the production of hemp.
58 Recently, it has been codified in Dutch administrative law in Article 5:41
GALA, but one can debate whether this principle and the legality principle have the
same weight in administrative law as they have in (core) criminal law. In the
regulatory field, judicial protection seems to rely more on the procedural safeguards
like the principles of good governance and less on substantive principles like
legality and culpability.
59 According to Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution, judges are not allowed to
assess whether Acts of Parliament are in accordance with the constitution. This is left
up to both houses of parliament.
60 Supreme Court, 14 February 1916, NJ 1916, 861; E. GRITTER, Effectiviteit en
aansprakelijkheid in het economisch ordeningsrecht (dissertation University of Gro-
ningen, Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2003) 125; E.H.A. VAN LUIJK, Het
schuldbeginsel in het Nederlandse strafrecht. Een verkenning aan de hand van de
geschiedenis van het Nederlandse strafrecht, de kentekenaansprakelijkheid en het
EVRM (dissertation University of Groningen, Ridderprint BV, Ridderkerk 2015) 448.
61 DE HULLU (n 32) 375–376.
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Following this thought, the Supreme Court has also held that indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for criminal offences committed by a
group or a legal person cannot and may not be based on the accused’s
mere membership of that group 62 or on the mere fact that he is in charge
of that legal person. 63 Criminal responsibility will always require at
least some kind of guilt and a legally relevant contribution, active or pas-
sive, to the commission of the crime. As such, vicarious liability in the
strict sense is not allowed. 64
Notwithstanding these general starting points, the principle of
personal liability has acquired a somewhat different meaning in
Dutch law in recent decades. Originally, it was also strongly linked
to the notion of nulla poena sine actione, or, more precisely, a predo-
minantly physical interpretation of the concept of a ‘criminal act’. 65
However, as this interpretation slowly began to make way for a
broader understanding, creating space for various forms of indirect
perpetration and, eventually, the acceptance of corporate criminal lia-
bility, the two notions began to grow apart. Currently, neither inter-
pretation of the nulla poena principle is seen as irreconcilable with
either corporate criminal liability or the liability of heads of business.
If one is willing to embrace the idea that acting through another is in
no way substantially different from direct personal action, and if one
is likewise willing to accept that culpability does not necessarily refer
to a mental state, as is the case if blameworthiness is defined as
‘could have acted differently’, both corporate and hierarchical ac-
countability are in line with these principles. Therefore, in the Neth-
erlands, the principle of personal liability does not entail—as has
been feared by Ligeti—that ‘criminal liability of heads of business re-
mains mere law in the books that will never be applied’. 66 Article 51
(2) DPC is definitely neither a dead letter nor a paper tiger, but has
62 However, this does not mean that being a member of that group cannot amount
to a separate offence, i.e. membership of a criminal organisation (Art. 140 DPC). This
provision does not require that the accused was directly involved in the commission of
a crime. Instead, it suffices that the accused intentionally contributed to a group’s
criminal endeavour in a more general sense in order to further actions.
63 Supreme Court 24 Augustus 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AP1508.
64 In this report, the terms vicarious liability and strict liability are used in the
meaning as set out by A.C. MICHAELS and R.G. SINGER in the Encyclopaedia of Crime
& Justice, Volume 4, J. DRESSLER (ed.), (Macmillan Reference, New York 2002)
1541, 1622–1625.
65 A.M. VAN WOENSEL, In de daderstand verheven (dissertation University of Am-
sterdam, Gouda Quint, Arnhem 1993) 7–16 and 42–43.
66 K. LIGETI, ‘Criminal liability of heads of business’, in: Z. ÐURDEVIĆ (ed.),
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been applied regularly, in particular in relation to economic crimes
and fraud.
Moreover, the de facto meaning of the culpability principle for
legal practice must not be exaggerated. Even though the European
Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) defines important proce-
dural preconditions for the determination of liability, it does not set
forward any general limitations on liability. 67 Whilst the Dutch Su-
preme Court does set forward such a limitation with the nulla poena
sine culpa principle, it does so primarily on a theoretical level: its
practical implications remain hard to determine as there is no static
lower limit for liability. The minimum degree of culpability that is
required—the threshold for liability—is determined by courts on a
case-by-case approach based on the circumstances of the case and
the value that society attributes to the guilt principle following its
shared sense of justice. 68 In this regard, strict liability regulatory of-
fences take a special position. 69 ECtHR and European Court of Jus-
tice (hereafter ECJ) case law do not prohibit strict liability or re-
versed onuses—presumptions of facts or law—as long as it remains
possible for the accused to rebut the underlying presumption of
blameworthiness. 70 Moreover, such provisions are frequently used
and generally accepted in Dutch regulatory law. The only limitation
is that the presumption of responsibility must remain within reason-
able limits. 71 While the importance of what is at stake is an impor-
Current issues in European criminal law and the protection of EU financial interests
(Austrian Association of European Criminal Law, Zagreb 2006) 91.
67 VAN LUIJK (n 60) 364–365, 386–387, 431–432: there is no substantive guilt
principle laid down in the ECHR; nor does Article 7 ECHR oblige the inclusion of
subjective elements in either crime definitions or conditions for perpetration and par-
ticipation (see a.o. ECtHR 29 October 2013, application no. 17475/09, par. 70 (Var-
vara v. Italy)).
68 VAN LUIJK (n 60) 241, 435, 438.
69 This does not remain limited to the culpability principle. With regard to the
principle of legality, the ECtHR is more lenient in allowing the use of vague terms
in regulations when the addressees are professional parties, as they can be held to
higher standards (KRISTEN (n 44) 325–331), as well as more extensive interpretations
of acts regarding socio-economic activities. With regard to outsourcing, see, a.o.
ECtHR 28 June 2011, application no. 577/11 (Het Financieele Dagblad v. The Nether-
lands).
70 J.H. BLOMSMA, Mens rea and defences in European criminal law (dissertation
Maastricht University, Intersentia, Cambridge 2012) 224–225; DE HULLU (n 32)
213–215; VAN LUIJK (n 59) 323–365, 387, 397–404; SIKKEMA (n 36) 90–91. See a.o.
ECtHR 7 October 1988, application no. 10519/83 (Salabiaku v. France); ECtHR 25
September 1992, application no. 13191/87 (Pham Hoang v. France).
71 ECtHR 30 March 2004, application no. 53984/00 (Radio France a.o. v.
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tant weight factor in that regard, 72 this importance has to be judged
from various angles. It is not just the perspective of the defendant
that is decisive. Other considerations, such as the importance of ef-
fective law enforcement, also have to be taken into account. 73
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of heads
of business
3.1. General: two modes of liability
As mentioned in Part 2, Dutch law knows various modes of liability
in both criminal and administrative law that are well-suited to address
heads of business in relation to their responsibility for acts of subordi-
nates. However, only two of them truly resemble the notion of hierarchi-
cal accountability: functional perpetration (functioneel plegen) and actu-
ally directing (feitelijk leidinggeven). Whilst only the latter is mentioned
in the actual reports from the Commission and the working paper an-
nexed to it, both modes of liability could serve well in holding leading
officials accountable for acts of their subordinates.
Functional perpetration is seen as the older of the two concepts,
even though both modes of liability have roots dating back prior to
the current Penal Code of 1886. Functional perpetration can be seen
as the Dutch equivalent of the notion that also lies at the basis of indirect
perpetration: qui facit per alium, facit per se (‘he who acts through an-
other, acts himself’). It is generally seen as a ‘jurisdictional artefact’ that
blossomed as a consequence of the increase in regulatory laws in the
1930s. 74 Laws that regulate economic activities such as selling, build-
ing, operating, exporting, etc., lend themselves well to a more abstract
interpretation of the notion ‘act’ that also includes acting through the in-
tervention of another person. Yet, this interpretation still places the func-
tional perpetrator at the same level as the direct physical perpetrator.
Being able to act through another person requires power over that per-
son. It is this notion of power that lies at the heart of functional perpe-
France); European Commission of Human Rights 10 December 1991, application no.
16641/90 (A.G. v. Malta).
72 VAN LUIJK (n 59) 18–19, 328–347, 364–368, 397–404, 449–450.
73 E. GRITTER, ‘Toerekening van opzet of schuld in het fiscale boeterecht: legiti-
matie en achtergronden’, Delikt & Delinkwent 2001, Vol. 41 (4) 371; VAN LUIJK (n 60)
404.
74 VAN DER WILT (n 32) 616.
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tration and creates a responsibility for the acts of others, 75 in most cases
subordinates.
Whereas functional perpetration is generally seen as an issue of le-
gal interpretation, 76 actually directing has a more explicit foundation as
a distinct sui generis form of participation in Article 51 (2) DPC. This
form of participation differs from all others because it specifically de-
mands that a corporation can be identified as the offender, thus as per-
petrator or participant. The actual director is reproached for directing
these offences committed by the corporation. Therefore, this form of lia-
bility corresponds more to the concept of respondeat superior (‘let the
master answer’), holding management officials accountable for the ac-
tions of their corporation. 77
Whilst the two modes of liability show great similarity, especially
when it comes to criteria for actus reus, the distinction between perpe-
75 DE HULLU (n 32) 159.
76 KNIGGE (n 48) 129, 132; G. KNIGGE, H.D. WOLSWIJK, Het materiële strafrecht
(Wolters Kluwer, Deventer 2015) 298; W.H. VELLINGA, F. VELLINGA-SCHOOTSTRA, ‘Een-
heid in daderschap?’ in: A.E. HARTEVELD et al. (eds), Systeem in ontwikkeling. Liber
amicorum G. Knigge (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2005) 527.
77 The nature and level of involvement required for actually directing have long
been debated. To a certain extent, this discussion is still reflected in the various English
translations used for the term feitelijk leidinggeven. Nearly every publication on this
topic in English uses another terminology and voices a different kind of involvement.
De Doelder uses the phrase ‘actually giving guidance to the forbidden action’ (H. DE
DOELDER, ‘Criminal Liability of Corporations: A Dutch Update’, in: U. SIEBER et al.
(eds), Strafrecht und Wirtschaftsstrafrecht: Dogmatik, Rechtsvergleich, Rechtstatsa-
chen (Tiedemann-Festschrift, Carl Heymanns, Munich 2008) 563–576). Keulen and
Gritter translate feitelijk leidinggeven as ‘actually controlling the commission of the
offence’ (B.F. KEULEN, E. GRITTER, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability in The Netherlands’,
in: M. PIETH et al. (eds), Corporate criminal liability: Emergence, convergence, and
risk (Springer, Dordrecht 2011) 177–191). Van der Wilt opts for a literal translation as
‘factual or de facto leadership’ (VAN DERWILT (n 32)). Whilst the last is in itself correct,
this description emphasises the accused’s position within the corporation—being one
of de facto leadership—rather than the actual conduct that is required in order to be
criminally liable. In my view, the requisite conduct is best reflected in Van Strien’s
translation of ‘actually directing’ (A.L.J. VAN STRIEN, De rechtspersoon in het straf-
proces. Een onderzoek naar de procesrechtelijke aspecten van de strafbaarheid van
rechtspersonen (dissertation Leiden University, Sdu Uitgeverij, The Hague 1996).
The feitelijk leidinggever does more than give subtle guidance: he directs the events,
either implicitly, explicitly or from behind the scenes. Having said that, it is accepted
that the actual course of events may differ to a certain extent from the behaviour that
was anticipated, taken into account or even foreseen. Moreover, the actual director
does not have to fully control the corporation’s behaviour, nor is it required that those
who physically commit the offences are aware of the fact that they are silently sup-
ported by an actual director.
THE NETHERLANDS NATIONAL REPORT 209
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
tration and participation has two major implications that are relevant for
this research. The first is that there is an inevitable consequence for the
required mens rea (see below). The second is that, in order to be a per-
petrator—unlike the case with participation—one must also personally
be the addressee of the legal norm, otherwise the accused lacks the re-
quired capacity to violate the legal norm by himself. In the field of eco-
nomic regulatory law, the addressee is often ‘the licensee’ (vergunning-
houder), ‘the taxable person’ (belastingplichtige) or ‘the one that oper-
ates an establishment’ (drijver van de inrichting). In many cases, only
the legal person will qualify as such and not the heads of business.
As a consequence, these officials cannot be prosecuted as functional per-
petrators, but only as actual directors.
3.2. Actus reus
Functional perpetration requires that the suspect had the power of
decision over whether or not the acts occurred (disposal) and that these
acts belonged to the realm of activities which the accused, as becomes
apparent from the general course of daily events, accepted or used to ac-
cept (apparent approval). 78 The latter also includes situations in which
the defendant did not live up to the duty of care that could reasonably
be expected in order to prevent the alleged acts from occurring. 79
Whilst actually directing covers active forms of endorsing commit-
ting offences, just like the word directing presumes, it also encompasses
more indirect forms of involvement as well as passive engagement. 80
Besides actively and effectively controlling and steering the corporation’s
behaviour, actually directing also includes situations where the illegal
acts are a foreseeable and inevitable consequence of the general policy
set out by the actual director—for instance, by imposing such a tight time
schedule that respecting rest periods or safety regulations becomes nearly
illusionary. 81 Furthermore, it covers situations in which the accused con-
tributed to the offence to such an extent that he must be regarded as the
person taking the initiative for the illegal conduct. A clear example of the
latter is a case in which the director of a small airport implicitly sug-
gested to a subordinate that it would be a good idea to mislead the autho-
78 Supreme Court 23 February 1954, NJ 1954, 378.
79 Supreme Court 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938, NJ 2006, 328;
Supreme Court 8 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3487, NJ 2016, 23.
80 Supreme Court 26 April 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:733, NJ 2016, 375.
81 See, for example, Supreme Court 22 March 1983, NJ 1983, 502.
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rities about the necessity of granting an exemption to the ban of night
flights, an insinuation that the subordinate took to heart. 82 Passive in-
volvement can generate liability when the actual director (i) knows the
corporation is engaging or will engage in criminal activities, and (ii)
omits to take measures to either halt or prevent the occurrence or continu-
ance of these activities, despite (iii) being authorised, or at least able, and
(iv) reasonably bound to do so. Under these circumstances, which form
the threshold for liability, the manager can be considered having deliber-
ately promoted the prohibited acts. 83 As such, the distinction between ac-
tive and passive involvement is not without consequences. In the case of
direct involvement, the accused will be bound to intervene personally and
effectively from the outset. In the case of passive involvement, an obli-
gation to intervene arises only once the accused becomes aware of the
misconduct. Moreover, his duty of care will be shaped by what he knows
about the nature, scope and severity of the criminal behaviour that is tak-
ing place within the corporation.
3.3. Mens rea
From a dogmatic perspective, because it is a form of perpetration,
the functional perpetrator is seen as committing the acts himself, albeit
through the behaviour of someone else. As a consequence, it must be
established that he personally meets the mens rea requirements as set
out in the offence at hand, should such mental elements for liability
be mentioned. The mere observation that the defendant failed to take
into account the necessary duty of care is therefore not automatically
sufficient to impose criminal liability. After all, this does not automati-
cally entail that the functional perpetrator grossly disregarded his duty of
care, let alone did so intentionally. 84 There has been a recent shift in ju-
risprudence in that sense. Traditionally, the concept of acceptance en-
tailed a subjective criterion of dolus eventualis, 85 which required that
82 Supreme Court 10 February 1987, NJ 1987, 662.
83 Supreme Court 16 December 1986, NJ 1987, 321 and 322/AA 1987, 167–175
(Slavenburg II).
84 D.R. DOORENBOS, ‘Schuldige rechtspersonen in de risico-maatschappij. Toere-
kenen, toerekenen en nog eens toerekenen’, in: P.H.P.H.M.C. VAN KEMPEN et al.
(eds), Levend strafrecht. Strafrechtelijke vernieuwingen in een maatschappelijke con-
text. Liber amicorum Ybo Buruma (Kluwer, Deventer 2011) 147–148; M.J. HORNMAN,
‘Concretisering van redelijke toerekening; invulling van de Drijfmestcriteria in de fei-
tenrechtspraak’, Delikt & Delinkwent 2010, Vol. 40 (3) 392; SIKKEMA (n 36) 46.
85 See VAN ELST (n 36) 33–34; KNIGGE (n 48) 141; VAN WOENSEL (n 65) 96–98;
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the functional perpetrator at least tolerated the crime committed by the
physical perpetrator. However, in more recent case law, the Supreme
Court has stipulated that acceptance also includes not taking reasonable
measures of care to prevent criminal conduct. By interpreting acceptance
in more objective terms, the Supreme Court significantly broadened the
concept of functional perpetration. 86 However, the Supreme Court con-
tinues to stress that any mens rea standard required by the underlying
offence should always be fulfilled by the functional perpetrator person-
ally. 87 Liability of natural persons cannot be established vicariously,
which means that dolus or culpa can never be attributed to a leading of-
ficial.
In the Netherlands, participation always requires intent. One cannot
cooperate or incite by accident. In this regard, Dutch law demands that
participants act intentionally both in relation to their participation and in
relation to the crimes for which they stand trial (so-called ‘double in-
tent’). 88 If the underlying offence itself does not require intent, but is
a misdemeanour or settles for culpa, then intent remains limited to the
act of participation, 89 which, in case of actually directing, means that
the accused has to be aware of the act that is being committed or is
bound to be committed by the legal person. The accused does not have
to know that the corporate act also amounts to an offence, but he does
have to be aware of the act itself. After all, one cannot direct actions of
which one is not aware. 90 In a nutshell, it must be established that the
accused can be said to have intentionally promoted the illegal conduct of
the corporation. 91 The decisive determination is whether the manag-
er—although, as mentioned above, authorised and reasonably obliged
to do so—failed to take measures to prevent or end the act of the legal
H.D. WOLSWIJK, ‘Functioneel daderschap en IJzerdraadcriteria’, Delikt & Delinkwent
2001, Vol. 31 (10) 1089.
86 Supreme Court 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938, NJ 2006, 328;
Supreme Court 8 December 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:3487, NJ 2016, 23; E. GRITTER,
‘Functioneel plegen door een natuurlijk persoon’, in: J.B.J. VAN DER LEIJ (ed), Ple-
gen en deelnemen (Kluwer, Deventer 2007) 22; DE HULLU (n 32) 162–163; M. KESS-
LER, ‘Beschikkingsmacht centraal bij functioneel plegen. Beschouwingen naar aanleid-
ing van het drijfmestarrest’, in: B.F. KEULEN et al. (eds), Pet af. Liber amicorum
D.H. de Jong (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2007) 205–206; DE VALK (n 36) 410.
87 Dating back to Supreme Court 23 February 1954, NJ 1954, 378.
88 DE HULLU (n 32) 443–447; KNIGGE – WOLSWIJK (n 76) 261–266.
89 DE HULLU (n 32) 444–445; KNIGGE – WOLSWIJK (n 76) 262.
90 MULDER (n 13) 216, 219; D.R. DOORENBOS, ‘Slecht leiding geven’, in: A.A.
FRANKEN, TH.J. KELDER (eds), Sporen in het strafrecht. Liber amicorum Jan Sjö-
crona (Kluwer, Deventer 2014) 33, 40.
91 Supreme Court 16 December 1986, NJ 1987, 321 and 322/AA 1987, 167–175
(Slavenburg II).
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person, and willingly accepted the considerable possibility that the pro-
hibited act would occur. This means that he knew and accepted that the
corporation was or would become involved in criminal activity. Having
said that, actually directing does not require in-depth knowledge of the
alleged criminal conduct. Detailed knowledge about when, where and
how the offence is committed is not necessary. 92 It suffices that the ac-
tual director knows that the illegal act or a similar illegal act is taking
place, or is about to take place. At the same time, knowledge still entails
more than a vague feeling that something within the corporation might
be wrong. 93 Ignorance due to poor management does not suffice, no
matter how blameworthy that ignorance might be. 94 Yet wilful blind-
ness is not excused, 95 though this standard is difficult to meet in large
and/or complex businesses in which top management’s involvement in
day-to-day activities is limited. Case law on this issue is, in my view,
quite lenient, letting senior managers of large corporations get away with
serious disregards of their duties. 96 For instance, in the Ahold account-
ing fraud case, one of the accused was acquitted of intentionally de-
frauding documents because he allegedly did not read and/or understand
the control and side letters he signed and therefore claimed he was un-
aware of their misleading character. 97
In sum, the mens rea requirement for actually directing differs
strongly from functional perpetration. When it comes to culpability of-
fences or misdemeanours, the latter can be liable even if he is not aware
but could and should have known about them. For actually directing,
this does not suffice. Here, the knowledge standard still stands, as was
recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. 98
92 VAN ELST (n 36) 59–60; DE HULLU (n 32) 507.
93 C.H. BRANTS, ‘Slavenburg en de grenzen van het strafrecht’, Recht en kritiek
1988, Vol. 14 (1) 52.
94 D.R. DOORENBOS, ‘Daderschap en aansprakelijkheid van leidinggevenden’, in:
D.R. DOORENBOS et al. (eds), Onderneming en sanctierecht. Handhaving van finan-
cieel toezichtrecht, in het bijzonder onder de Wft en Pw (Kluwer, Deventer 2013) 170;
HORNMAN (n 14) 441.
95 Supreme Court, 13 January 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AN9177, NJ 2005, 63;
MULDER (n 13) 218; SIKKEMA (n 36) 77; DE VALK (n 36) 432–433.
96 For more detail on this issue, see HORNMAN (n 14) and M.J. HORNMAN, ‘Feite-
lijk leidinggeven. Hoe een weinig vernieuwend arrest toch veel nieuws kan brengen;
een kritische beschouwing’, Tijdschrift voor Bijzonder Strafrecht & Handhaving
2016, Vol. 3 (3) 128–139.
97 Amsterdam Court of Appeal 28 January 2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BH1971
(Ahold accounting fraud; CFO Fahlin).
98 Supreme Court 26 April 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:733, NJ 2016, 375.
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3.4. De facto position of control
The criminal liability of functional perpetrators and actual directors
is based on their de facto leading position within an organisation. Hold-
ing an official (de jure) position is not required, 99 nor in itself sufficient
for imposing liability. 100 The decisive circumstance is whether the ac-
cused held a position that enabled him to intervene and halt or promote
the illegal act. After all, the reproach is not that the accused held a lead-
ing position within the company that committed an offence, but that he
was one of the ones that advanced (bewerkstelligen or bevorderen) the
commission of that offence using his internal position within the corpo-
rate hierarchy. 101 Therefore, a senior leading position is not necessary;
lower level management can also qualify as long as the manager has
power over the criminal act that was committed either by (in case of ac-
tual directing) or on behalf of (in case of functional perpetration) the cor-
poration.
3.5. Delegation, division of tasks, supervision and responsibility
While delegation is allowed, it is not without limitations, nor with-
out problems. Delegation will, in principle, shift responsibility to the
subordinate, making him primarily accountable for all criminal activity
of which the required countermeasures fall within his scope of author-
ity. 102 However, delegation does not (at least in theory) alter the fact that
the superior still has de jure authority and de facto power to intervene.
Therefore, the key question is whether a superior is bound to intervene
or whether he may rely on his subordinate. In general, it seems that
where a subordinate has been specifically entrusted to act, such actions
will no longer be expected of the superior. Only if it becomes clear—-
either along the way or from the outset—that the subordinate is unable
or unwilling to respond adequately, must the superior step in: 103 other-
wise, the primary responsibility lies with the subordinate. A clear ex-
99 Supreme Court 16 June 1981, NJ 1981, 586.
100 Supreme Court 24 August 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AP1508.
101 In that sense, this form of liability has to be distinguished from Article 140 (3)
DPC, which penalises leaders of so-called criminal organisations just for being leaders.
102 See, for example, Supreme Court 16 June 1981, NJ 1981, 586; DE HULLU (n
32) 504; HORNMAN (n 14) 62–64, 209; SIKKEMA (n 36) 68; WOLSWIJK (n 37) 84–85,
90–91.
103 District Court Rotterdam 18 April 1986, NJ 1986, 666; Court of Appeal, The
Hague 2 December 1987, NJ 1988, 433.
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emption is made when the subordinate is personally involved in criminal
conduct. In that case, delegation to subordinates or a division of tasks
has no meaning and the superior will be bound to intervene personally
from the start, or as soon as he gains knowledge of the offence. 104
Both delegation and division of tasks are subject to a reasonable-
ness test, which entails a normative assessment. 105 As a consequence,
delegating responsibilities will also require a delegation of the corre-
sponding authorisation; the subordinate is otherwise set up for failure.
Moreover, delegation and division of tasks will be rejected if these con-
cern responsibilities relating to the corporation’s core activities or activ-
ities that could endanger the company’s existence. 106 Such key respon-
sibilities can neither be delegated nor left completely to other members
of the corporation’s directing mind. At a minimum, the accused must
keep a proverbial finger on the corporation’s pulse and monitor such ac-
tivities from a distance. Finally, even if delegation and/or a division of
tasks is accepted, courts may still find that by delegating or dividing
tasks, especially crucial ones, the accused knowingly accepted the sig-
nificant risk that certain illegal conduct could occur (dolus eventua-
lis). 107
While delegation as such will not discharge the superior, it can cre-
ate a (potentially impregnable) hurdle to establish liability. After all, all
forms of complicity in crimes require that the accused is, at least to a
certain degree, aware of the criminal conduct committed by those in
the lower ranks of the corporation’s hierarchy. For actually directing,
it has been reaffirmed several times that one can only direct criminal acts
of which one is aware. Considering that delegation potentially reduces
the possibilities of the superior to gain such knowledge, delegation
may still effectively shield him from liability.
An issue which is expected to be heavily debated in the near future
is that of supervision. Old, but still leading, case law from the 1980s
gives the impression that there is no real, or at least no far-reaching, duty
to supervise subordinates. In the Slavenburg case (mentioned in Part 1),
104 Supreme Court 16 June 1981, NJ 1981, 586; HORNMAN (n 14) 65–68.
105 DE HULLU (n 32) 507.
106 See, for example, District Court, Rotterdam 6 February 2014, ECLI:
NL:RBROT:2014:1436.
107 See, for example, District Court, Overijssel 25 June 2015, ECLI:
NL:RBOVE:2015:2999. In this regard, there seems to be a slight distinction
between administrative and criminal law. The latter is more likely to use the dolus
eventualis approach, whereas administrative courts are more inclined to simply refuse
delegation from the outset.
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the board of directors of the former Slavenburg bank issued several or-
ders to put an end to the bank’s ‘supporting activities’ related to tax eva-
sion and money laundering and entrusted one of its members as the ac-
countable manager. The board did not take any follow-up action. It did
not verify whether the orders were being followed and/or had the desired
effect; nor did it request the accountable manager to inform the other
members of the board about the progress that was being made. Accord-
ing to the Court of Appeal, neither the board as a whole nor the CEO
personally, were bound to do so. As long as there were no signs to
the contrary, the board members were allowed to presume that all was
taken adequate care of by those directly responsible. 108 Given the wide-
spread and systematic nature of the ‘supporting activities’, one could ar-
gue that it was highly unlikely this conduct would simply be terminated
overnight and that close monitoring should surely be in place. Yet, a
negligence standard (culpa) for actually directing had just prior been
clearly rejected by the Supreme Court, 109 a decision that was reaffirmed
in 2016. 110 As a consequence, ignorance due to poor management is in-
sufficient to create liability, a view that still has the support of various
prominent scholars. 111 It is hardly disputable that slack supervision qua-
lifies as poor management. In the wake of the recent case law on func-
tional perpetration which broadened the scope of acceptance, the ques-
tion has risen whether a similar interpretation should be applied to actual
directing, 112 a question that the Supreme Court, as mentioned, has an-
swered in the negative. Nonetheless, one cannot deny that jurisprudence
in this regard seems to be ‘on the move’. 113 After all, poor or a complete
lack of supervision could, under certain conditions, qualify as wilful
blindness. At this moment, however, it is unclear what those conditions
are. In this regard, lower case law, especially in the administrative field,
108 The Hague Court of Appeal 2 December 1987, NJ 1988, 433.
109 Supreme Court 19 November 1985, NJ 1985, 125 and 126 (Slavenburg I); Su-
preme Court 16 December 1986, NJ 1987, 321 and 322/AA 1987, 167–175 (Slaven-
burg II).
110 Supreme Court 26 April 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:733, NJ 2016, 375.
111 DOORENBOS (n 90); DE HULLU (n 32) 504, 506–507.
112 Conclusion of Advocate-General Vellinga to Supreme Court 14 February
2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BU8789, NJ 2012, 133; C.M.I. VAN ASPEREN DE BOER, ‘Fei-
telijk leidinggeven in besluiten van AFM, DNB en NMa langs de strafrechtelijke meet-
lat (Deel I)’, Tijdschrift voor Sanctierecht & Compliance 2014, Vol. 4 (1) 19–30; A.N.
KESTELOO, De rechtspersoon in het strafrecht, (Kluwer, Deventer 2013) 102–104.
113 J.T.C. LELIVELD in his annotation to Court of Appeal, The Hague 19 May
2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:1204, NBSTRAF 2015, 119 (Rabobank Libor, Article
12 DCCP procedure).
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seems to have become more demanding, holding heads of business to a
higher duty of care; 114 yet, at the same time, recent jurisprudence is very
limited and mostly related to small companies, where it is much harder
to successfully claim that one was unaware of illegal corporate conduct.
3.6. Responsibility for collective decisions
Even though Dutch criminal law rejects collective accountability,
responsibility for taking part in joint decisions is accepted. When a
group of managers collectively has participated in a decision-making
process or later endorsed a decision, all persons belonging to this group
will be liable because of their active endorsement of this decision and its
follow-up actions. Because such a collective decision is seen as active
involvement in committing the offence, a division of tasks or a delega-
tion of responsibilities will not impede liability as long as the criminal
behaviour can be traced back to that joint decision. All of those involved
at a management level will be more or less equally bound to put an end
to those criminal activities, irrespective of any division of tasks they
may have made amongst them selves. Also, they will be liable for all
of the criminal activity that flows from that one decision—even for
criminal acts of which they were completely unaware. 115
Having said that, it is generally accepted that corporate officials
who oppose criminal behaviour, but are overruled or outvoted by others,
lack the required mens rea. At the same time, merely distancing oneself
from the offences by not participating will not always be sufficient to
escape liability. Whether one is still bound to intervene depends on
the circumstances of the case. 116 Even though this issue has not expli-
114 The Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal has put forward that a head of
business ‘should be aware of the main activities of the legal entity under his
control’, and that he is ‘reasonably bound to take measures to ensure those main
activities from being in violation of the law. If he fails to do so, he accepts that
those illicit actions will occur’ (Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, 7 March
2016, ECLI:NL:CBB:2016:54 and October 2017, ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:326 and, 327).
115 Supreme Court 16 June 1981, NJ 1981, 586; HORNMAN (n 14) 66. Probably
with the exception of acts that were unforeseeable or highly unlikely. In addition, it
must be mentioned that this rule was developed in a case dealing with clear collective
criminal intentions to commit large-scale fraud. It remains to be seen whether the same
will hold up in cases where the accused’s criminal intentions are less explicit.
116 For a rare example, see Court of Appeal, Amsterdam 5 March 2004,
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2004:AO5069, where the Court of Appeal argued that the
accused was not bound to intervene once senior management decided to push
through its decision after obtaining legal advice.
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citly emerged in case law, various scholars have argued that, in case of
serious offences, corporate officials are obliged either to intervene and
halt the offences, resign their position as executives, or inform the autho-
rities in order to evade liability. 117
3.7. Corporate criminal liability
As stated above, the criminal liability of corporate officials is clo-
sely linked to the liability of legal entities, both historically and substan-
tively. Corporate criminal liability is a prerequisite for the liability of the
actual director, who only comes into view after it has been established
that the corporation has committed an offence. 118 Following the Su-
preme Court’s 2003 Drijfmest judgment, 119 criminal liability of legal
entities depends on whether the offence can reasonably be attributed
or imputed 120 (toerekenen) to the legal entity. This has to be assessed
by taking into account all circumstances of the case. Attribution is con-
sidered reasonable if the (illegal) conduct took place ‘within the sphere’
or ‘scope’ of the legal entity. Conduct can be considered to have taken
place in the sphere of the legal entity inter alia if:
117 SIKKEMA (n 36) 73–74; H.D. WOLSWIJK (n 37) 92. Also vide the paragraph on
Notification Requirements in Part 2.
118 This does not mean, however, that the corporation is also prosecuted, can be
prosecuted (for example, because the legal person ceased to exist) or can be punished
(for example, because it can invoke a justification or excuse). All that is required is that
the corporation can be identified as the offender.
119 Supreme Court, 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938, NJ 2006, 328.
The following description of the Drijfmest judgment is largely based on M.J. HORN-
MAN, E. SIKKEMA, ‘Corporate Intent: In Search for a Theoretical Foundation for Corpo-
rate Mens Rea’, in F. DE JONG et al. (eds), Overarching Views of Crime and De-
viancy; Rethinking the Legacy of the Utrecht School (Eleven International Publishing,
The Hague 2015) 293–297.
120 The exact meaning of the term toerekenen has been heavily debated in legal
doctrine. Some interpret the Supreme Court’s approach as a classical derivative model
in which corporate criminal liability is derived from the liability of its associated mem-
bers. I do not support this interpretation. It should be noted that the Supreme Court
speaks of the attribution of the (criminal) act and not of the attribution of the actions
of natural persons. As such, the criteria set out by the Supreme Court for corporate
criminal liability encompass elements of both a derivative model and a model of
organisational fault (E. GRITTER, ‘Duidelijkheid omtrent corporatief daderschap.
Enige beschouwingen naar aanleiding van het Drijfmest-arrest’, Tijdschrift voor
Onderneming en Strafrecht 2004, Vol. 2 (2) 31–38; for a further analysis in English,
see HORNMAN, SIKKEMA (n 119)).
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1) the act was committed by someone who is employed by or works
for the legal entity; 121
2) the act was part of the normal business activities of the legal en-
tity;
3) the legal entity benefited from the act; or,
4) the legal person had the power to decide whether or not the crim-
inal conduct occurred and accepted either this conduct or similar be-
haviour. Acceptance also includes the failure to fulfil the level of care
that could reasonably be requested from the corporation in view of
the prevention of the alleged criminal acts.
These criteria are neither cumulative nor exclusive, but are mere re-
levant factors that can be used to determine corporate criminal liability.
In the end, it is the overall reasonableness test that is decisive. In theory,
this means that meeting one of the listed criteria could be sufficient to
establish liability: in reality, courts often assess all of them. 122 In that
assessment, most weight seems to be attached to the second and fourth
criteria, whilst the first and third criteria are considered to be in them-
selves quite weak and non-determinative.
This framework allows for attributing the acts of any individual
who is in any way associated with the corporation to the legal entity.
Thus, on an actus reus level, Dutch law does not require the involve-
ment of the legal entities’ ‘directing minds’. 123 As such, the scope of
so-called ‘triggering persons’ 124 is substantial. However, in reality, attri-
bution is more restricted. Acts that are completely unrelated to the de
facto activities of the corporation will not be attributed to the corpora-
tion. A similar yet more debated question relates to the liability of cor-
porate groups. The Drijfmest framework on the attribution of the actus
reus of individuals to a corporate entity was developed by the Supreme
Court in a case dealing with several individuals working for one legal
121 In this regard, it suffices that it can be established that the acts were
committed by a person working on behalf of the legal person. It is not necessary
that this person can also be identified.
122 HORNMAN (n 84) 370-401. Punitive administrative law shows a slightly differ-
ent picture (see HORNMAN (n 14) 49).
123 It is debated whether this also holds true for the most heinous offences. H. VAN
DER WILT, ‘Corporate Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes: Exploring the
Possibilities’, Chinese Journal of International Law 2013, Vol. 12 (1) 66–77, holds a
strong argument that core international crimes require closer involvement and aware-
ness of the corporation’s leadership (for more on this, see CUPIDO et al. (n 31)).
124 Terminology derived from A. VALENZANO, ‘‘Triggering Persons’ in ‘Ex
Crimine’ Liability of Legal Entities’, in: D. BRODOWSKI et al. (eds), Regulating
corporate criminal liability (Springer, Heidelberg 2014) 95–107.
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person. However, most companies consist of multiple legal per-
sons—and, especially with regard to fraud, raising a smokescreen of le-
gal persons is a frequently used tactic. This means that cases of corpo-
rate involvement in PIF offences are more likely to deal with corporate
groups consisting of separate legal entities. This is not without legal sig-
nificance, because these groups will, as a whole, most likely lack legal
personhood, and therefore cannot be punished as such: only the indivi-
dual legal entities can. 125 Moreover, just as natural persons in general
cannot be held responsible for the behaviour and intentions of others, le-
gal persons are not responsible for the acts and intentions of another le-
gal entity belonging to the same group or taking part in the same busi-
ness deal. Each legal person bears his own legal responsibility. Thus,
when a group of corporations is involved, the question is not only
whether the acts and intentions of individuals can be attributed, but also
to whom they can be attributed, and whether the acts and intentions of
one legal entity can be attributed to another. 126
Finally, the mere fact that an act can be attributed to the legal entity
does not automatically imply that the corporation also acted with the re-
quired mens rea. This requires a separate analysis. 127 Corporate mens
rea can be established through the attribution of the intentions of one
or more associated individuals to the corporation (the so-called aggrega-
tion model), but it can also be founded on organisational deficiencies or
policies (the organisational fault model). A combination of these two ap-
proaches is also possible. 128 In general, corporate mens rea can be es-
tablished without the involvement of the corporation’s directing minds;
125 For more on this, see KRISTEN (n 38) and HORNMAN (n 14) 259–271.
126 Especially with regard to so-called international joint ventures, where Dutch
companies operate jointly with a local private or state-owned company, attribution to
the Dutch company might prove difficult, as the Dutch company might lack the
required de facto power over the acts of the daughter company. For some examples,
see W. HUISMAN, Business as usual? De betrokkenheid van ondernemingen bij interna-
tionale misdrijven (inaugural lecture VU University Amsterdam, Eleven International
Publishing, The Hague 2010); more in-depth on this issue (with a focus on international
core crimes) is M. CUPIDO, M. HORNMAN, W. HUISMAN, ‘Holding business leaders accoun-
table for international crimes: how to tackle remoteness?’, in: L.F.H. ENNEKING et al.
(eds), Corporate Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law. Accountability and Interna-
tional Business Operations (Routledge, London 2019).
127 Supreme Court 21 October 2003, ECLI:NL:HR:2003:AF7938, NJ 2006, 328,
para 3.5.
128 Supreme Court 26 April 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:733, NJ 2016, 375, para.
3.4.2; for more on this, see HORNMAN, SIKKEMA (n 119); HORNMAN (n 14) 52–55.
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nor is it required that those who performed the actus reus on behalf of
the legal entity are also the ones that had the mens rea. 129
Once corporate criminal liability has been established, both the le-
gal entity and the natural persons contributing to the corporate offence
can be prosecuted and punished. Both are held equally accountable un-
der Article 51 DPC. Hence, corporate criminal liability does not hamper,
diminish or alter individual responsibility.
3.8. Influence of compliance programmes and/or officers
Whilst administrative regulations regarding the financial services
sector might push for the adoption of a compliance programme or to ap-
point a compliance officer, 130 no such general obligation exists under
criminal law. As follows from the above, managers are—depending
on the nature of the offence, the moment they gain knowledge, and
whether they are prosecuted as a functional perpetrator or actual direc-
tor—bound to take either preventive or reactive measures in order to
prevent or halt offences. Those measures have to be effective from an
objective point of view, but management is free to choose which mea-
sures it wants to take. The duty of care, however, will always be a duty
of (strong) commitment, not one of result. 131 The scope of this duty of
care is defined by the accused’s de facto position within the corporate
hierarchy, his possibilities to intervene, the nature and gravity of the un-
derlying offence, the accused’s knowledge, and his assessment of the
available information. Communis opinio is that it is neither for the gov-
ernment nor the judiciary to prescribe how management should solve its
affairs. As a consequence, there is broad consensus on the existence of a
duty of care to intervene, but it remains unclear when a manager can
claim that he has done enough in order to evade liability. 132 After all,
doing too little to stop the offences could qualify as acceptance. So, with
regard to compliance, management can opt for the introduction of a
compliance programme and compliance officers, but it is not bound to
129 Supreme Court 29 April 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BB8977, NJ 2009, 130.
130 See, for example, Art. 22 Besluit marktmisbruik Wft.
131 HORNMAN (n 14) 69.
132 In my dissertation, I set out various archetypes of organisations and
managerial positions within them in order to further elaborate this duty of care
based on insights for organisational theory and criminology (see HORNMAN (n 14)).
It remains to be seen, however, whether legal practice will embrace approaches like
these.
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do so under domestic criminal law, nor will these measures automati-
cally get the head of business of the hook. Should the existence of a
compliance programme be brought forward as a defence—which thus
far has never been the case—courts will most likely scrutinise the pro-
gramme. A mere formal compliance programme on paper will not suf-
fice to evade or reduce liability. In case the programme does have true
substance, then such a programme could potentially limit or block lia-
bility because of the strong link with due diligence: this aspect will be
elaborated on in Part 4.
4. Defences
4.1. General
Like all other defendants, heads of business can invoke all justifica-
tions and excuses provided by law without limitations: most of them are,
however, very unlikely to be applicable in a PIF offence-related context.
Insofar as they could be applicable—for example, in case of necessity or
duress (Art. 40 DPC)—such a defence can only be successful if the head
of business was not responsible for creating the emergency situation in
the first place. How this doctrine of culpa in causa (or own fault) will
undermine a defence depends on the circumstances of the case. Some-
times this is judged with leniency: for instance, a self-defence plea by
a person who knowingly enters into a situation that could turn violent
will not automatically be denied, even though escalation was foresee-
able. The rationale behind this is apparent: every individual should be
free to move around and no one should be denied that right because
of aggressive threats by others. 133 In other cases, like self-intoxication,
a stricter norm applies. 134 With regard to economic activities, the argu-
ment that it was too expensive to comply with regulations will easily be
rebutted as a lack of resources does not release the accused of his obli-
gation to obey the law, especially since it was his free choice to engage
in these activities in the first place.
133 DE HULLU (n 32) 329–331.
134 DE HULLU (n 32) 349–351; J. BIJLSMA, ‘Drank, drugs en culpa. Zelfintoxicatie
en culpa in causa: pleidooi voor een voorzienbaarheidseis’, Delikt & Delinkwent 2011,
Vol. 41 (6) 654–678.
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4.2. Lack of power or supervision
The justification for allocating liability along hierarchical lines
within an organisation, as is the case with functional perpetration and
actually directing, depends on the possibilities the person has to exercise
control over the organisation and the persons within it. 135 As such, a
lack of de facto power is irreconcilable with the essence of these modes
of liability. It is the combination of power and knowledge that creates
and shapes, but also limits, the duty of care. 136 Without these pillars,
the sheer foundation of liability falls apart. As a consequence, there
can be no liability without or beyond power, which would also be in fla-
grant violation of the culpability principle. Therefore, in most cases, a
lack of power defence would not and should not qualify as an excuse
for not living up to the duty of care (schulduitsluitingsgrond), but rather
for contesting that there was a violation of this duty in the first place. At
the same time, in order for such a defence to be successful, the lack of
power should be grounded in objective factors beyond the accused’s
control—for instance, when the necessary measures go beyond the
authority of the accused, which is especially important for those in mid-
dle management. Furthermore, the lack of power should not be the ac-
cused’s own fault: poor management qualities will not exculpate the
head of business.
A different picture arises when it comes to supervision. As pre-
viously stated, for actually directing, it remains unclear to what extent
the duty of care also embodies a duty to supervise. If this is the case,
then a violation of this duty could result in liability. If this is not the case,
then the accused can simply claim he was unaware of the criminal con-
duct, even in cases where this ignorance was largely the consequence of
his own underachieving. 137 In this regard, a clear distinction must be
made between heads of business of smaller companies and middle man-
agers on the one hand, and senior management officials of large corpora-
tions on the other. The first category is much more involved in opera-
tional activities and is in closer cooperation with the operational level.
Ignorance on their part will be less understandable and excusable than
ignorance on the part of the senior managers in large companies. Be-
cause case law has shown that courts are very cautious about not violat-
135 M.A.P. BOVENS, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship
in Complex Organisations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998) 78–80.
136 HORNMAN (n 14) 82, 431–432.
137 DOORENBOS (n 90) 30; HORNMAN (n 14) 441, 449.
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ing the culpability principle, any doubt in this regard favours the ac-
cused, making those at the top of large corporations extremely favoured.
Unfortunately, this attention to the culpability principle does have the
side effect that, from a liability perspective, it is a good thing not to have
too much power or knowledge, as either will only increase the duty of
care. 138 As a consequence, the manager who gravely disregards his du-
ties has only a slim chance of gaining knowledge of criminal conduct.
For the ‘average’ manager who does a decent job, this chance already
increases, but it is the dedicated manager who goes beyond what others
do and who really monitors the events in his company, who runs the
greatest risk of becoming aware of unwanted conduct and seeing his
duty of care to stop such events being activated. 139
4.3. Delegation and supervision
As stated above, criminal law allows for delegation and shifting of
responsibilities provided that these tasks are delegated in a reasonable
manner and not meant to evade liability. The latter would be the case
if, for instance, one were to delegate only the responsibility but not
the required authority to intervene properly should such action be re-
quired. As mentioned in Part 3 and the previous paragraph, legitimate
delegation will make the person to whom those tasks are delegated
the primary responsible person. His seniors will only be bound to inter-
vene if this person falls short or is himself part of the problem. As such,
managers cannot simply hide behind their subordinates by delegating
unwanted responsibilities. Yet, because courts are hesitant to base liabi-
lity on deficiencies in corporate structures, and the manager who dele-
gates tasks will most likely become less involved in those tasks and
therefore be less informed, such an evasive tactic which, in theory,
should not hold up, might still be effective in practice, especially
since—as has been repeatedly mentioned—it is still under intense debate
whether and to what extent a manager is bound to exercise proper super-
vision.
138 HORNMAN (n 14) 448.
139 HORNMAN (n 14) 467–468.
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4.4. Due diligence
Compliance and other due diligence measures can have their effects
on various aspects of the criminal proceeding. In Dutch criminal law,
measures like these could be an indication that the corporation and/or
its leading officials really did their best to prevent criminal conduct. If
these measures reach the level where one could say that the accused
did everything that was in his power in order to prevent such criminal
conduct—thus stating that he took all measures that could be expected
of him—this would qualify as an absence-of-all-blameworthiness de-
fence, which impedes liability (see Part 2 for further detail). Such an ob-
servation could impact the procedure in various ways. First and fore-
most, it could be relevant for the prosecutors’ discretionary decision
whether or not to prosecute the offence (enshrined in Article 167
DCCP). From a substantive law perspective, such a defence could be
either (i) a denial of actus reus, as there was no violation of the duty
of care; (ii) a denial of mens rea, in which case there would be a viola-
tion of the duty of care but this would not have been done intentionally
or recklessly; or (iii) a denial of blameworthiness, thus claiming there
was a valid excuse for his actions. 140 While the legal outcome will de-
pend on the exact nature of the defence and the underlying offence, the
bottom line is that the accused cannot be punished. Finally, should the
level of care just fall short of evading liability, the measures taken could
still have a mitigating effect on the sentence.
4.5. Third-party advice or review
Because nobody is all-knowing, relying on professional third parties
for their advice, review or approval is a common practice in society. In
criminal law, such advice, etc., could be relevant with regard to mistake-
of-law (and even fact) defences or cases where the defendant claims to
have done everything within his power in order to respect the law. Both
of these defences qualify as an absence-of-blameworthiness defence. In
140 In this regard, there could be a small distinction between (i) and (iii). In order
to counter actus reus, it would suffice that the accused reached the level of care that
could reasonably be expected in order to prevent the criminal conduct that occurred.
For (iii), a slightly stricter rule seems to apply. Here, it is required that the accused took
all measures that could be expected, even though the latter probably is also subjected
to a reasonableness test. In the end, whether there is sufficient ground for liability will
be decisive.
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order for advice, review or approval from a third party to absolve a de-
fendant, certain criteria have to be met. First of all, the defendant has to
be in good faith and must have provided the third party with full, suffi-
cient and proper information. One cannot claim to have sincerely relied
on statements by a third party knowing that the foundations upon which
these arguments are made are either incorrect or otherwise questionable.
Furthermore, in order for the defendant to have acted in ‘an excusable
unconsciousness’ (verontschuldigbare onbewustheid) with regard to
his unauthorised conduct, he must have relied on the advice 141 of a per-
son or body to whom such authority can be attributed and thus that the
accused could reasonably rely on the validity of this advice. Relevant
factors in this regard are: the position of the accused within the com-
pany; the independence and impartiality of the advisor; the specific area
and level of expertise of the advisor; the complexity of the matter for
which advice is sought; and the way and circumstances under which
the advice was obtained and given. 142 Following from this, approval
by an external auditor could diminish or absolve liability. From a sub-
stantive law perspective, such a defence could have the same effect as
(i), (ii) and (iii) mentioned in the previous paragraph. 143 Whether or
not the third party itself is liable for any wrongdoing is not relevant
in this regard: after all, criminal liability is not a matter of communicat-
ing vessels. With regard to mistake-of-fact defences, whether the mis-
take was excusable will be decisive, as there can be no culpable igno-
rance (verwijtbare onwetendheid). This is a predominantly normative as-
sessment which also takes into consideration whether the accused ex-
ercised due care in order to avoid this mistake and whether or not he
held a special position or had, or should have had, special knowledge
(Garantenstellung). 144
141 There is no specific case law on the role of external auditors, but there is a
consistent line of jurisprudence on relying on advice from public officials, public
bodies and third parties (e.g. legal experts and tax consultants).
142 Supreme Court 4 April 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AU4664, NJ 2007, 144; Su-
preme Court 26 February 2008, ECLI:NL:HR: 2008:BC0813, NJ 2008, 148; B.F. KEU-
LEN, ‘Adviezen en rechtsdwaling’, Ondernemingsrecht 2011, Vol. 12 (7) 276–282;
R.M.I. LAMP, ‘De bestuurder, zijn advocaat en de strafrechter. Beschouwing naar aan-
leiding van de Content- en McGregor-zaken’, Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht 2007,
Vol. 9 (3) 56–61; M. MUSSCHE, Vertrouwen op informatie bij bestuurlijke taakvervul-
ling (dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam, Kluwer, Deventer 2011) 170–197.
143 The relevance of (ii) must not be underestimated, as both forgery (Art. 225
DPC) and publishing untrue financial documents (Art. 336 DPC) require intent.
144 DE HULLU (n 32) 364–365.
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5. Sanctions
5.1. General
With the exception of aiders who receive a mandatory reduction of
the maximum penalty (Art. 49 (1) DPC), Dutch law makes no distinc-
tion between offenders when it comes to sentencing. In the Dutch crim-
inal system, sanctions are divided into two categories: punishments
(straffen), which seek to denunciate, retribute, deter and rehabilitate;
and measures (maatregelen), which do not aim for retribution but seek
to protect the public, restore the status quo and/or compensate victims
for their grief and suffering. According to Article 9 DPC, the principal
punishments are imprisonment, detention, community service and the
fine. The additional punishments are disqualification from certain rights,
forfeiture and publication of the judgment. Measures that can be im-
posed on heads of businesses are—insofar as are relevant for this re-
search—withdrawal from circulation, confiscation of unlawfully ob-
tained gains and compensation for the victim. Besides remedial sanc-
tions, the only sanction known to administrative law with a punitive
component is the fine (Art. 5:40 GALA).
There are no official sentencing guidelines in the Netherlands.
However, the Prosecutor’s Office and various administrative regulatory
bodies do have several, mostly internal, guidelines, and there are non-
binding judiciary ‘points of orientation’ that are used by criminal courts.
If these prosecutorial guidelines have been made public, which is the
case with regard to many PIF-related offences, then the Prosecutor’s Of-
fice is also bound to adhere to them as long as they relate to policy
choices, 145 i.e. dismissal of procedures, una via related decisions, etc.
With regard to the nature and severity of the sentence, many of these
guidelines highlight important factors that have to be taken into consid-
eration. For instance, the money laundering guidelines mention (re-
peated) recidivism, categories of offenders (e.g. mules, facilitators,
etc.), and the amount of money that was being laundered. 146 However,
these guidelines still leave a lot of flexibility. Moreover, it must be borne
in mind that these guidelines do not bind the courts; nor are the courts
bound by their internal ‘points of orientation’ or sentences imposed in
145 Recently one of the administrative authorities was also obligated by the Trade
and Industry Appeals Tribunal to disclose its internal fines policy (Trade and Industry
Appeals Tribunal, 13 September 2017, ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:309). The tribunal also
took this policy into account when assessing the imposed fine.
146 Richtlijn voor strafvordering witwassen (2015R052).
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earlier similar cases. So, if the prosecutor decides to call for a more se-
vere sentence than is deemed appropriate according to the guidelines,
then he will probably have some explaining to do in court, but that will
be all, as it is for the judge(s) to impose the sentence. Whilst empirical
evidence is lacking, there are numerous signals coming from the field
stating that there is an increase in punitiveness in this regard. 147
5.2. Highlighted sanctions
Complementary to the general framework set out above, several
specific sanctions deserve special attention. The first is the disqualifica-
tion from certain rights, primarily because there is a limited list of rights
that can be denied. In short, this list—as far as it is relevant—boils down
to no longer being allowed to serve as a public servant or to exercise a
certain profession. The Economic Offences Act mentions various other
additional punishments and measures, such as revoking licenses, suspen-
sion of business activities and placing the business under legal restraint.
However, these sanctions can only be imposed if an economic offence
has been committed. All PIF offences fall under the general Penal Code
and therefore do not qualify for these sanctions.
However, any company that wants to compete in a public tender
must be able to submit a certificate of conduct (Verklaring Omtrent
het Gedrag: VOG), which can (and most likely will) be denied if a cor-
poration or senior members of its staff have engaged in criminal activity.
Furthermore, administrative law (the Bibob Act) allows for the (preven-
tive) repeal or denial of licenses if there are serious doubts regarding the
integrity of a legal entity or natural persons associated with it. 148
Dutch law only allows for confiscation of unlawfully obtained gains
from criminal offences (strafbare feiten): gains from administrative of-
fences are excluded (Art. 36e DPC). 149 While the confiscation proce-
dure has characteristics of a civil proceeding, it is still seen as a fol-
147 See Part 1 for further analysis and references.
148 For more extensive discussion of this issue, see D.R. DOORENBOS, ‘Integer on-
dernemen – met een strafblad’, in: I.P. ASSCHER-VONK et al. (eds), Onderneming en
Integriteit (Kluwer, Deventer 2007) 235–250, who also refers to the old procurement
Directive 2004/18/EG which already excluded convicted candidates and tenderers. It is
also noteworthy that neither the VOG test nor the Bibob check pays attention to admin-
istrative offences; only criminal offences are taken into consideration.
149 For tax offences, a special regime is in place (Art. 74 STA). However, this
provision is subject to a restrictive interpretation. Only if the offences exclusively
qualify as tax offences does this distinct procedure apply. See Supreme Court, 29
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low-up and integral part of the principal criminal proceeding. 150 Confis-
cation is allowed in order to seize unlawfully obtained gains from (i) of-
fences of which the person has been convicted; (ii) other offences of
which there is sufficient indication (voldoende aanwijzingen) that they
have been committed by the convicted person; and (iii) offences which
the convicted person himself has not necessarily been convicted, but
wherein it is probable that these or other offences in some way led to
unlawful advantage for the convicted person. The last, however, requires
that the person from whom the gains are confiscated must himself be
convicted of a crime sanctioned by a maximum penalty of at least the
fifth category (currently 82,000 euros; Art. 23 (4) DPC). Whilst most
do, it is not necessary that the PIF offence itself meets this criterion. 151
Any crime will do. The rationale behind (iii) is that in many cases, be-
sides (i) and (ii), it will be very difficult to prove a direct relationship
between the offence and the illicit gains, even when those gains can
be traced back to a variety of offences but the actual involvement of
the accused in those offences remains unclear. Therefore, (iii) opts for
a different approach. Instead of trying to find out how much the accused
gained from his illegal conduct, one looks at his entire estate and then
tries to figure out how much of it can be accounted for by legitimate
sources of income. The rest is then presumed to be acquired through
criminal conduct. 152 In light of the presumption of innocence, this as-
sumption only holds up if the state can demonstrate that the accused
has previously been actively involved in serious criminal offences.
As such, there are possibilities to confiscate gains under third par-
ties, including legal persons, provided that the person under whom the
gains are confiscated has at least been convicted of other serious of-
fences. Nonetheless, especially within a corporate setting, illicit gains
can easily end up in the pockets of those other than the direct offender,
e.g. by transferring them to other companies within the corporate group
or to the natural persons hiding behind the corporate veil. Disentangling
March 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BO2639, and 25 March 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:693,
NJ 2014, 410, both on offences that also amounted to money laundering.
150 D. EMMELKAMP et al., De ontnemingsmaatregel (Wolters Kluwer, Deventer
2016) 69.
151 See Commission (EC), ‘Annex to the Report from the Commission.
Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’
Financial Interests and its Protocols. Article 10 of the Convention’, SEC (2004)
1299, 25.10.2004, 60–62, 78–116. In Annex Table 7 on page 93, reference is made
to two provisions in the State Tax Act and the Custom Act which do not in
themselves meet this criterion.
152 EMMELKAMP et al. (n 150) 6–7.
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individual corporate involvement within corporate groups has proven to
be difficult, especially when the involvement of each of the companies
remains unclear, 153 and even more so when the nature of the coopera-
tion between these corporations is not apparently criminal in nature. 154
As a consequence, the natural and/or legal persons who end up with the
gains might not ever be prosecuted themselves, nor might they meet the
criteria for (ii) and (iii). The presumption of innocence embodied in Ar-
ticle 6 (2) ECHR therefore fully applies, yet it is eminently clear that
they benefitted from the illegal conduct. For these reasons, jurisprudence
has allowed for confiscation against such ‘innocent’ third parties, albeit
under strict conditions. After all, the ECtHR has ruled that confiscation
is only allowed for gains that were ‘actually obtained’. 155 The mere fact
that the accused is the sole owner of the company is insufficient to con-
fiscate from this individual or legal person as a third party. 156 Whilst the
Supreme Court has not laid down explicit rules in this regard, the Leeu-
warden Court of Appeal has stated that such confiscation is only allowed
if a) this person had a significant degree of control over the legal person,
b) this person could dispose of its assets, and c) the illicit gains made by
the legal person also stretched, or could stretch, to the personal benefit of
the third party, e.g. because of increasing stock value or by sharing ca-
pital in a foreign bank account to which it has access. 157 A similar ap-
proach is followed by the Supreme Court with regard to the recently in-
troduced joint and several liability (Art. 36e (7) DPC). 158 Following the
ECtHR criterion that only actually obtained gains can be confiscated, it
153 A.L.J. VAN STRIEN, intervention, in: Verslag van de op 11 juni 2010 te Amster-
dam gehouden algemene vergadering over: Maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen
(Handelingen Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging 2010–2) (Kluwer, Deventer 2011)
48–50.
154 Cp. BRANTS (n 93) 55; BRANTS, BRANTS (n 9) 149: the more the defendant com-
pany is embedded into the legitimate economic structures of society, the harder it be-
comes to establish criminal liability of that corporation and those within it.
155 ECtHR 1 March 2007, application no. 30810/03 (Geerings v. the Nether-
lands), para. 47.
156 Supreme Court 8 May 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1522, NJ 2001, 507; cp.
Supreme Court 22 May 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW5645, NJ 2012, 348.
157 EMMELKAMP et al. (n 150) 43–44. This judgment has not been published. The
considerations were, however, quoted when this case came before the Supreme Court
relating to other issues. See Supreme Court 6 February 2007, JOW 2007, 12.
158 The rationale behind this provision is that participants in criminal offences
should not be able to benefit from the fact that it cannot be proven who gained
what. By creating a strong incentive—making them liable for the whole sum instead
of just their share—the legislator expects that these participants will eventually open
up so that their fair share can be confiscated. See EMMELKAMP et al. (n 150) 42.
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ruled that such liability is only in place where there is a common advan-
tage to which each of the parties involved has access, and as such is able
to hand over the whole sum of illicit gains to the government. Otherwise
a proportionate settlement is more in order, 159 such as 25 per cent each
in the case of four participants.
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law
6.1. Ne bis in idem
Whilst Article 51 (2) DPC allows for the prosecution and punish-
ment of both the legal person and its leading officials—it even does
so in separate or consecutive proceedings 160—this cumulation is subject
to certain limitations. 161 First of all, there is the notion of una via (see
infra), which is especially relevant for cases dealing with taxation. If a
criminal charge in its autonomous meaning as interpreted by the ECtHR
can be addressed through both criminal law and administrative law, the
government may only use one of these tracks. It is not allowed to com-
bine or switch them.
Secondly, the ne bis in idem principle has to be respected. This
principle is laid down in Articles 68 DPC, 5:43 GALA, 14 of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR),
4 of Protocol No 7 annexed to the ECHR, and 50 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereafter the Charter).
With regard to the ICCPR and the seventh Protocol, the Netherlands
has not only made a reservation but has also abstained from ratifying
the protocol ever since. 162 As such, the case law of the ECtHR was
never directly applicable to the Dutch interpretation of the ne bis in
idem principle, even though it has served as an inspiration for the Su-
159 Supreme Court 7 April 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:878, NJ 2015, 522; EMMELKAMP
et al. (n 150) 42–43.
160 Supreme Court 6 December 1988, NJ 1989, 497; Supreme Court 26 April
2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:733, NJ 2016, 375, para. 3.2; KESTELOO (n 112) 81–85;
F.W.C. DE GRAAF, Meervoudige aansprakelijkheidstelling. Een analyse van rechtsfigu-
ren die aansprakelijkheidstelling voor meer dan één strafbaar feit normeren (disserta-
tion VU University Amsterdam, Boom juridisch, The Hague 2018) 278–281.
161 The same holds true if the accused leading official is prosecuted as a
perpetrator or participator under Articles 47 or 48 DPC, instead of as an orderer or
actual director under Article 51 (2) DPC.
162 https://archive.is/20120530085352/http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/73c66f024
99582e7c1256ab7002e2533/0f57e08b1f1 80210c1256aa1003805f8?OpenDocument
#selection-271.100-295.120; KAMERSTUKKEN II 2004/05, 29 800 VI, nr. 9.
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preme Court. 163 However, it is debatable whether this persistent view
can still be upheld after the opinion of Advocate General Campos
Sánchez-Bordona in the Menci case. According to the Advocate Gen-
eral, Article 50 and the provisions on the interpretation of the Charter
explicitly lay down a minimum level of protection: the meaning and
scope of Charter rights must either correspond to or exceed the
ECtHR interpretation of similar rights enshrined in the Convention.
In that regard, neither the ECJ nor national judicial authorities apply-
ing EU law are bound by any reservations, declarations or lack of
ratification by member states. 164 As a consequence, the Netherlands
would be fully bound to Article 4 of Protocol No 7.
‘In order to consider the meaning of the same/idem,’ according to
Vervaele, ‘it may be asked whether the legal definition of the offences
should be considered as the basis of the definition of the term the same
(idem), or should it be the set of facts (idem factum)?’ 165 In its current
Dutch interpretation, a judge must take into account several factors
when assessing whether facts are the same. First of all, one must consid-
er the legal nature of the facts. According to the Supreme Court, if the
charges are not covered by the same offence, the degree of difference
between the offences may be relevant, in particular with regard to (i)
the legal interest which the various offences are intended to protect
and (ii) the maximum penalties imposed on these offences, as these
maximum sentences reflect the nature of the accusation and the qualifi-
cation as a crime or misdemeanour. Secondly, one must take into consid-
eration the behaviour of the suspect. If the indictments do not describe
the same behaviour, the degree of difference in the behaviours may be
important, both with regard to the nature and the apparent scope of
the behaviours and with regard to the time, the place and the circum-
stances in which they were performed. 166 Based on an analysis of the
Supreme Court’s case law, Borgers states that the emphasis in the Neth-
erlands is clearly on the legal nature of the facts as the most important, if
not decisive, factor. 167 This emphasis has been criticised, as it appears to
163 DE GRAAF (n 160) 256.
164 Opinion of the Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, 12 September
2017, C 524/15, Menci Luca, ECLI:EU:C:2017:667, para. 57.
165 J.A.E. VERVAELE, ‘Ne Bis In Idem: Towards a Transnational Constitutional
Principle in the EU?’, Utrecht Law Review 2013, Vol. 9 (4) 212.
166 Supreme Court 1 February 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102, NJ 2011, 394;
DE GRAAF (n 159) 256–263.
167 M.J. BORGERS, annotation to Supreme Court 25 September 2012,
ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BX5012, NJ 2013, 176.
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be out of line with ECtHR and ECJ case law, which is said to opt for a
purely factual approach to the concept of ‘same facts’. 168 According to
Borgers—who, by the way, doubts whether these arguments actually
hold up, as differences seem to be much smaller if one looks at the
way they are applied by these supranational courts—the Supreme Court
must not have found these arguments convincing either, as it has main-
tained this approach ever since. 169
In the concluding remarks of their country report on ne bis in idem
in the Netherlands, Klip and Van der Wilt state: ‘It is our understanding
that the most prominent issue regarding the application of the principle
ne bis in idem is the interpretation of “the same (set of) facts”. As long
as that is not decided on an international level, disputes may arise.’ 170
As shown above, not much has changed fifteen years later, and the in-
terpretation of the same (set of) facts is still under intense debate. Thus,
while the principle might be widely supported, this does not mean it is
interpreted in the same way by all member states, the ECtHR and the
ECJ.
6.2. Legal entity and head of business: two separate subjects of law
The ne bis in idem principle is only applicable in respect of sanc-
tions that are imposed on the same person. As such, it does not neces-
sarily hinder the consecutive or cumulative prosecution of a legal entity
and its leading officials with regard to the same facts. 171 After all, these
are two separate and independent subjects of law with their own legal
personality. Therefore, these prosecutions do not concern the same per-
son. 172 Whilst this distinction certainly holds true for large corporations,
it is debatable whether such a rigid approach would still be reasonable
with regard to heads of small businesses. In cases concerning small busi-
nesses, the distinction between natural and legal person becomes some-
what artificial, as the two coincide to a great extent.
168 See a.o. J.W. OUWERKERK, ‘Het feitsbegrip bij ne bis in idem en eendaadse sa-
menloop: Tussen nationale uitlegging en internationale verplichtingen’, Delikt & De-
linkwent 2012, Vol. 42 (6) 490–507; Y. BURUMA, annotation to Supreme Court, 1 Feb-
ruary 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BM9102, NJ 2011, 394; J.M. REIJNTJES, annotation to
Supreme Court 6 March 2012, NJ 2012, 448.
169 BORGERS (n 167); cp. DE GRAAF (n 160) 269–282.
170 A. KLIP, H. VAN DER WILT, ‘The Netherlands Non bis in idem’, Revue interna-
tionale de droit pénal 2002/3, Vol. 73 1137.
171 KLIP , VAN DER WILT (n 170) 1092–1093.
172 KLIP , VAN DER WILT (n 170) 1108.
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Nevertheless, Dutch courts are very hesitant to identify both legal
subjects as one (vereenzelviging). In two recent cases, for instance, the
Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal found that imposing an administra-
tive fine on both the legal entity and its sole shareholder (who was fined
as an actual director) did not violate the ne bis in idem principle, as they
were two separate subjects of law. It did, however, take this circum-
stance into consideration as a relevant factor when reconsidering the
amount of the fine. 173 This approach—choosing a clear and pragmatic,
yet from a dogmatic point of view, questionable, solution to what is a
complex theoretical issue—is typical of the way Dutch courts deal with
this problem. Whilst this specific case concerned an administrative pro-
ceeding, similar practical routes have previously been chosen by both
the fiscal and the criminal division of the Supreme Court. In a case con-
cerning a fiscal administrative penalty imposed on a depleted legal entity
where an out-of-court settlement (transactie) was already reached be-
tween the managing directors, who were also major shareholders, and
the Prosecutor’s Office, the fiscal division ruled that, given these cir-
cumstances, imposing a considerable fine would violate ‘the principle
of an equitable appraisal of interests’ (beginsel van een evenredige be-
langenafweging), as the same individuals would once again be affected
in their financial assets. 174 In a criminal case where the Court of Appeal
applied Article 9a DPC (guilty verdict without imposing a penalty) on
an actual director whose company had previously been convicted for
the same offences, the Supreme Court ruled that the ne bis in idem prin-
ciple had not been violated because the Court of Appeal deliberately
decided not to impose a second penalty. 175
The essence of these cases is that the ne bis in idem principle is
rarely directly applied because of the hesitancy to identify two legal sub-
jects as one. The only case which is indisputably accepted as dealing
with one and the same person is that of the one-person business, where
the entrepreneur exercises his business by operating through a legal per-
173 Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal , 25 January 2017, ECLI:
NL:CBB:2017:14, and 26 July 2017, ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:284.
174 Supreme Court, 20 June 1990, NJ 1990, 811. In a more recent case, the Crim-
i n a l D i v i s i o n o f t h e Sup r eme Cou r t ( j u dgmen t o f 3 Ma r ch 2015 ,
ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434, NJ 2015, 256) argued that a second criminal prosecution
for driving under the influence following an earlier administrative obligation to install
a so-called alcohol-lock would be ‘in violation of the principles of a proper procedural
order’ (in strijd met de beginselen van een goede procesorde). This latter description
seems to have become the more common phrase.
175 Supreme Court, 19 March 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD7004, NJ 2002, 581.
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son of which he is the sole employee. In all other cases, the principle is
applied through analogy and, in most cases where potential ne bis in
idem issues seem to loom on the horizon, courts opt for creative solu-
tions in order to evade them.
6.3. Parallel, concentrated and consecutive proceedings
Whether parallel or consecutive proceedings can be initiated, and
whether sanctions can be cumulated, will depend on the nature and aims
of those procedures and sanctions. Following the ne bis in idem princi-
ple, no problems arise as long as one of them is not—in its autonomous
meaning (see supra)—punitive in nature. Thus, a combination of a re-
medial sanction under administrative or tax law, such as a supplemen-
tary taxation for lost tax returns (naheffingsaanslag), and the imposition
of a fine, under either criminal, administrative or tax law, is allowed
even in separate procedures. However, if both procedures or sanctions
are punitive in nature and therefore must be regarded as a criminal
charge in the autonomous meaning of Article 6 ECHR, this would
amount to a violation of the ne bis in idem principle.
In such cases, the una via principle applies, meaning that the public
authorities have to choose between either administrative proceedings or
enforcement through criminal law, as the choice of one blocks the use of
the other (Art. 243 (2) DCCP; Art. 5:44 GALA). Which route is deemed
more appropriate is elaborated in detail in the binding guidelines men-
tioned in Part 5, and sometimes even in the legislation itself. 176 As a
consequence, there is little discretion for the authorities. Where there
is discretion, it is up to the administrative authorities and the Prosecu-
tor’s Office to coordinate their activities if they do not want to impede
each other, because one will bind the other. 177 Nonetheless, transna-
tional parallel proceedings still form a largely virgin territory. 178 All Ar-
ticles referred to address decisions and actions by Dutch authorities. The
ne bis in idem principle mentioned in Article 68 (2) DPC does take for-
eign judgments into account, but only once they have become res judi-
cata and only with regard to judgments in criminal courts. 179 Decisions
176 E.g. Article 69 (4) STA.
177 A. VERBRUGGEN et al. (n 26) 99–100.
178 For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, see M. LUCHTMAN, Transnationale
rechtshandhaving. Over fundamentele rechten in de Europese strafrechtelijke samen-
werking (inaugural lecture Utrecht University, Boom juridisch, The Hague 2017).
179 Moreover, in case a sentence has been imposed, it must also have been
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and sanctions from administrative courts or regulatory agencies are ex-
cluded. 180 Therefore, in the transnational field, the legal protection of
corporations and heads of business is still lagging. Nevertheless, it is
to be expected that a suitable outcome will eventually be reached, either
through analogical application of the current legislative framework or by
building upon contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence (also see su-
pra).
6.4. Use of evidence and defence rights
In the Netherlands, evidence gained in the course of an adminis-
trative and/or criminal proceeding can, in principle, be used in other
proceedings, and vice versa, provided that such use does not interfere
with defence rights. Thus, evidence found during a routine adminis-
trative supervision or a follow-up fine investigation is acceptable in a
criminal court, just as evidence that was contemplated in a criminal
investigation can be used in an administrative proceeding, should
an administrative settlement be more suitable, or (especially in tax
cases) prescribed. Moreover, an initial administrative proceeding
can turn into a criminal one should suspicion of a criminal offence
arise. 181 Nor are there any restrictions on using evidence that was
gained in an investigation of the legal person in a separate investiga-
tion of its leading officials, or vice versa. It is also not relevant
whether evidence was gained in a domestic or a foreign procedure.
Because of the system of mutual recognition within the EU, raising
questions concerning the legality and/or accuracy of evidence belong-
ing to the latter category, or other irregularities or lack of safeguards,
might even be more difficult due to the principles upon which trans-
national cooperation in the EU is founded, most notably the principle
of mutual trust in each other’s legal systems and proceedings. 182 In
the pretrial research phase, it is also possible to use the criminal
enforced in full in order for the ne bis in idem principle to take effect. For the rationale
behind this, see KLIP, VAN DER WILT (n 170) 1111–1112.
180 See more extensive discussion, see VERVAELE, (n 165) 211–229 and KLIP, VAN
DER WILT (n 170) 1091–1137.
181 VERBRUGGEN et al. (n 26) 47–53; M.J. BORGERS, ‘De onderzoeksfase: toezicht,
controle en opsporing’, in: F.G.H. KRISTEN et al. (eds), Bijzonder strafrecht. Straf-
rechtelijke handhaving van sociaal-economisch en fiscaal recht in Nederland (Boom
Lemma, The Hague 2011) 475–494.
182 For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, see M.C. VAN WIJK, Cross-border
evidence gathering. Equality of arms within the EU? (dissertation Utrecht University/
University of Luxembourg, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2017).
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and the administrative track at the same time, even after suspicions of
a criminal offence have arisen, provided that there is no détournement
de pouvoir or a violation of the nemo tenetur principle. 183 Thus, all
the rights that the defendant would have had in a criminal investiga-
tion must also be respected while exercising these administrative
powers, the latter, of course, being no surprise, as both can amount
to a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. With re-
gard to the nemo tenetur principle, it must be mentioned that both the
EOA and administrative law entail various provisions that oblige
companies or individuals to comply with the authorities and/or grant
information which could potentially incriminate them, including tes-
timonial or communicative evidence. The latter obligation could vio-
late this principle. The Supreme Court has therefore ruled that there is
no prohibition to impose a fine if the accused refuses to hand over
such information in order to impose a remedial tax measure, regard-
less of whether this information has an existence independent of the
will of the suspect, provided that the accused is guaranteed that such
evidence will not be used for any punitive measures. 184
6.5. Enforcement through administrative or criminal law?
The question of whether provisions should be enforced through
administrative or via criminal law has been, and still is, subject to in-
tense debate in the Netherlands. 185 In a 2005 government memoran-
dum regarding the sanctions system (sanctiestelsel), the government
stated that this decision should be based on the premise that ‘the na-
ture and seriousness of the fact’ should determine the choice of the
appropriate settlement regime. In concrete terms, this meant that ad-
ministrative law was seen as the instrument to enforce minor and sim-
ple violations which occurred on a frequent basis and where the sanc-
tion to be imposed was relatively low and there was little at stake for
183 VERBRUGGEN et al. (n 26) 53–57.
184 Supreme Court 12 July 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ3640, NJ 2013, 435. The
complaint against this decision was dismissed by the ECtHR. Decision 9 July 2015,
application no. 784/14 (Van Weerelt v. the Netherlands).
185 See a.o. ADVIES VAN DE AFDELING ADVISERING VAN DE RAAD VAN STATE AAN DE
MINISTER VAN VEILIGHEID EN JUSTITIE INZAKE SANCTIESTELSELS, Stc. 14 September 2015,
nr. 30, 280; H.E. BRÖRING, ‘Keuze voor een sanctiestelsel: bestuurlijke boete of bes-
tuurlijke strafbeschikking?’ RegelMaat 2017, Vol. 32 (5) 317–335; N.G.H. VERSCHAE-
REN, ‘(Buitengerechtelijke) strafrechtelijke, bestuursrechtelijke, duale of dubbele hand-
having?’ Tijdschrift Praktijkwijzer Strafrecht 2017, Vol. 23 (3) 128–136.
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the person concerned. 186 Just a few years later, in a 2008 memoran-
dum, a major policy shift took place and a completely different,
nearly opposing framework was adopted. The nature and seriousness
of the alleged facts were no longer decisive; whether there is a so-
called open or closed context would be. 187
An open context refers to the enforcement of general rules that ap-
ply equally to everyone. Furthermore, open contexts lack a specialised
enforcement body that fully concentrates on the enforcement of one spe-
cific type of regulation. Conversely, a closed context refers to the exis-
tence of a more or less structural and often fairly intensive relationship
of supervision in which the duties of the enforcement body remain lim-
ited to just one set of regulations, e.g. Autoriteit Financiële Markten
(Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets) and De Nederlandsche
Bank (Dutch Central Bank). As a result, these enforcement agencies
are highly specialised, thoroughly informed and very familiar with their
field, and their field is familiar with them. In a closed context, it is there-
fore deemed better to enforce regulations through administrative law and
its specialised enforcement agencies. In open contexts, the preference is
given to criminal law. 188
Thus, where previously the perpetrator’s behaviour—and, more par-
ticularly, the nature, seriousness, extent and complexity thereof—would
be decisive for the appropriate enforcement regime, this is now no long-
er the case. It is no longer about finding an appropriate regime that does
justice to the seriousness of the alleged actions, but about finding an ap-
propriate regime that fits best—or makes it easier—from an enforcement
perspective. So, while in 2005 it seemed to be a matter of principle—-
criminal law is appropriate if the nature, seriousness and magnitude of
violations call for a more robust and morally loaded type of enforce-
ment—in 2008 the reasoning shifted and pragmatic arguments have
come to be decisive, more or less irrespective of the seriousness of
the underlying offence. As a consequence, sanctions imposed by admin-
istrative authorities and courts sometimes exceed by far the penalties
that would be imposed by criminal courts. Thus far, PIF offences have
always been considered to belong to the realm of the open context, and
have also been used as an argument to call for further reform of criminal
186 KAMERSTUKKEN II 2005/06, 29 849, nr. 30.
187 KAMERSTUKKEN II 2008/09, 31 700 VI, nr. 69.
188 M.J.A. DUKER, ‘Vervolging en berechting’, in: F.G.H. KRISTEN et al. (eds),
Bijzonder strafrecht. Strafrechtelijke handhaving van sociaal-economisch en fiscaal
recht in Nederland (Boom Lemma Publishers, The Hague 2011) 511–514.
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law (meaning more severe sanctions). 189 However, if a specialised
supervisory mechanism or authority were to be introduced, this perspec-
tive could change and the legislator might opt for a closed context sys-
tem under administrative law.
ANNEX I
Relevant provisions from Dutch Penal Code
Article 47
1. The following persons are liable as perpetrators of a criminal act:
(1) those who commit a criminal offence, either personally or
jointly with another or others, or cause a criminal offence to be com-
mitted;
(2) those who, by means of gifts, promises, abuse of authority, use
of violence, threat or deception or by providing the opportunity, means
or information, intentionally solicit the commission of a crime.
2. With regard to the last category, only those actions intentionally
solicited by them and the consequences of such actions are to be taken
into consideration.
Article 48
The following persons are liable as accessories to a serious offence:
(1) those who intentionally assist during the commission of the se-
rious offence;
(2) those who intentionally provide the opportunity, means or infor-
mation necessary to commit the serious offence.
Article 49
1. In case of aiding, the maximum penalty is reduced by one third.
2. In case the maximum penalty is a life prison sentence, the max-
imum penalty for aiding will be 20 years’ imprisonment.
3. The additional penalties for aiding a crime are the same as those
for committing the crime.
4. In determining the penalty, account may only be taken of those
189 KAMERSTUKKEN II 2012/13, 33 685, nr. 3.
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crimes that the aider intentionally enabled or promoted, as well as the
consequences of these crimes.
Article 51
1. Criminal offences can be committed by natural persons and legal
persons.
2. If an offence is committed by a legal person, criminal proceed-
ings may be instituted and the punishments and other measures provided
for by law may be implemented where appropriate:
a) against the legal person; or
b) against those who ordered the commission of the offence (op-
drachtgeven), as well as those who actually directed the prohibited act
(feitelijk leidinggeven); or
c) against both those named under (a) and (b).
3. For the purpose of the application of the above paragraphs, legal
persons shall be deemed to include: an unincorporated company, a part-
nership, a shipping company and a capital asset set aside for a special
purpose (doelvermogen).
ANNEX II
Relevant provisions from General Administrative Law Act
Article 5:1
1. In this Act, ‘violation’ means an act violating a rule laid down by
or pursuant to law.
2. ‘Violator’ means the person committing a violation or participat-
ing in its commission.
3. Violations can be committed by natural persons and by juristic
persons. Articles 51.2 and 51.3 of the Penal Code apply mutatis mutan-
dis.
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of foreign evidence against the head of business. – 6.1.3. Administrative
investigations and right to silence of the head of business. – 6.2. Multiple
and parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against the legal
person and the head of business. – 6.2.1. Right to silence of the head
of business in proceedings against the legal person. – 6.3. Relationship
between liability of the legal person and liability of the head of business.
1. Introduction 1
1.1. Debate on the implementation of Art. 3 of the PIF Convention
Poland has not enacted a single specific provision regarding the lia-
bility of heads of business (HoB) (as described in Art. 3). It was deemed
unnecessary in general criminal law because of regulations already pre-
sent on preparation, attempt, incitement, assistance, joint perpetration,
perpetration by order and perpetration by directing, as well as criminal
liability for omission (principal and secondary complicity). Crimes in
the Polish legal system are constructed in a relatively general manner,
allowing broad liability for perpetration; crimes drafted in a very com-
plex, detailed and casuistic manner are very rare. For example, the gen-
eral crime of fraud is worded in a way that allows the prosecution of a
variety of individuals responsible for the disadvantageous disposition of
property by another: ‘Whoever, with the purpose of gaining a material
benefit, induces another person to disadvantageously dispose of personal
or someone else’s property by misleading this person or by exploiting
this person’s error or incapability to duly understand the undertaken ac-
tion, is subject to the penalty’. During the implementation procedure of
the PIF Convention (and later on with regard to other crimes either sug-
gested or demanded in international agreements), it has been the very
consistent position that the general principles of criminal liability and
the legislative tradition of rather general wording of particular criminal
provisions do not require additional forms of complicity or new casuistic
solutions.
Due to the Polish legislative tradition, implementation of the Con-
vention’s requirements was conducted in a twofold manner: the intro-
duction or amendment of particular criminal provisions, and adding or
processing some definitions (e.g. in the Fiscal Criminal Code, a new
1 All translations of the Polish Criminal Code are based on A. WOJTASZCZYK, W.
WRÓBEL, W. ZONTEK, Criminal Code-Kodeks Karny (Przepisy dwujęzyczne, Warsaw
2014).
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definition of the taxpayer was introduced to cover beneficiaries of EU
funds). 2
1.2. Debate on corporate criminal liability
In Poland, the liability of corporations is provided for in the Statute
on Liability of Corporate Entities for Acts Prohibited Under a Penalty of
2002 (with significant amendments from 2005). Corporate liability is
provided for a list of crimes committed by its representatives. That list
covers all PIF crimes (fraud, corruption and money laundering) since the
enactment of the statute and its amendments in 2005 (required due to a
ruling of the Constitutional Court from 3 November 2004, K 18/03). The
Constitutional Court, in its ruling, indicated that criminal liability is just
one of several ways of holding someone liable and imposing means of a
repressive character. Not every repressive form of liability must neces-
sarily be deemed criminal. From that perspective, regardless of the label
attached by the legislator or doctrine of a particular mode of liability, if it
has repressive features, a constitutional standard characteristic of crim-
inal liability must be provided (nullum crimen sine lege certa stricta).
As the title of the statute indicates, the liability is not called ‘crimi-
nal’—which was a very premeditated decision during the legislative pro-
cess—but still provides for acts prohibited under a penalty. It is com-
monly claimed in the doctrine that this statute introduced a sui generis
kind of liability which is indeed repressive but not purely criminal. A
description of sensu largo criminal liability is also used. That is why
it is hard to answer unambiguously the question of whether in Poland
a criminal or an administrative liability is provided for corporations.
The safest but still apt description of the liability would be to consider
it as a hybrid form of responsibility, having both classical criminal and
administrative elements. 3
2 Generally, see F. PRUSAK, ‘Zakres związania polskiego prawa karnego kon-
wencją Unii Europejskiej w zakresie ochrony interesów finansowych Wspólnot Eur-
opejskich’, Prokuratura i Prawo 6 (2009) 5–25.
3 See, for example, B. MIK, ‘Charakter prawny odpowiedzialności podmiotów
zbiorowych w świetle ustawy z dnia 28 października’, Przegląd Sądowy 7/8 (2002)
49–65; W. WRÓBEL, ‘Odpowiedzialność karna podmiotów zbiorowych (Projekt now-
ych uregulowań)’, Państwo i Prawo 9 (2005) 3–16; H. SKWARCZYńSKI, ‘Odpowiedzial-
ność podmiotów zbiorowych jako nowy rodzaj odpowiedzialności za czyny zagrożone
pod groźbą kary’, Monitor Podatkowy 2 (2004) 85–86; M. CZYżAK, ‘Karnoadministra-
cyjne, karnoskarbowe i quasi-karne formy odpowiedzialności podmiotów zbioro-
wych’, Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy 1 (2004) 38; B. NITA, ‘Model odpowiedzialnoś-
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It may seem unusual, but there was no countrywide expert debate at
all before introducing the liability of corporations in 2002. The justifica-
tion of the statute presented by the government was rather desultory and
focused on a claim that it was required by the Convention. The first aca-
demic conference dedicated solely to this topic was held in Jastrzębia
Góra on 12–14 October 2003 (thus after the statute had already entered
into force). 4 Also, the parliamentary debate did not generate any quote-
worthy material. However, after the statute entered into force, a signifi-
cant number of publications (papers as well as monographs and com-
mentaries) were dedicated to it. One aspect of their subject matter was
the reconstruction of the model on which the liability was based and
the character of the liability, i.e. criminal or not. The main issue with
the statute was that it was something entirely new to the classic division
of criminal/administrative/civil liability. It was considered a sui generis
liability which may never be unanimously qualified to one of the said
groups. However, it is quite clear that it is not an administrative liability,
because the procedure is conducted pursuant to the Code of Criminal
Procedure and common courts are the proper forum rather than admin-
istrative authorities. It seems that it has, however, been agreed upon that
the liability is somewhat repressive in character and adopts several clas-
sic criminal law rules and procedures. Another aspect was how to deal
with it in practice and what consequences in a criminal trial there are for
an individual, and subsequently the entity (right to defence counsel, the
presumption of innocence, etc.). Rather promptly, the Constitutional
Court addressed many of the issues raised in its ruling from 3 November
2004, K 18/03. Afterwards, a new wave of papers, mostly commenting
on the ruling, appeared.
As to the policy debate, it was rather a matter of implementing the
Convention than a methodical debate on the issue of whether such a
form of liability was necessary, considering the economic situation at
that time in Poland. Looking at the statistics for the last 15 years, one
may conclude that this kind of liability was not a question of any need
articulated by law enforcement or the administration of justice. There
have been between five and thirty cases a year, with 6–14 convictions
(compared to around 300,000 convictions annually).
ci podmiotów zbiorowych za czyny zabronione pod groźbą kary’, Państwo i Prawo 6
(2003) 17–33; B. NAMYSłOWSKA, Gabrysiak, Odpowiedzialność karna osób prawnych
(Warsaw 2003).
4 See Odpowiedzialnosc podmiotów zbiorowych. Konferencja Jastrzębia Góra
12–14 października 2003 r., Apelacja Gdańska – wydanie specjalne 2003.
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1.3. Significant cases involving the liability of heads of business
There are no quote-worthy cases regarding HoB. The main criminal
cases are related to simple tax evasion, fraud by deception or causing
damage by abuse of trust in business transactions, which do not bring
any ground-breaking changes in perception of this sort of liability.
2. Relationship with general principles of criminal law
2.1. General information on the system of perpetration and complicity
Polish law provides a system of criminal complicity applicable to
all offences (Art. 116). The provisions of the General Part of this Code
apply to other statutes providing for criminal liability, unless these
statutes explicitly provide otherwise. The following ways of complicity
are provided by the Code:
1) Joint perpetration. A person committing a prohibited act jointly
and upon mutual agreement with another person is liable for perpetra-
tion.
2) Perpetration by ordering. A person who orders another person to
commit such an act by exploiting this person’s dependence on him is li-
able for perpetration.
3) Perpetration by directing. A person who directs the commission
of a prohibited act by another person is liable for perpetration.
4) Incitement. Whoever, wanting another person to commit a pro-
hibited act, persuades this person to do so, is liable for incitement.
5) Assistance. Whoever, intending another person to commit a pro-
hibited act, facilitates it by his conduct, especially by providing instru-
ments, conveyance, counsel or information, is liable for assistance; who-
ever by his conduct facilitates commission of a prohibited act by another
person, in defiance of a legal, special duty not to allow commission of
such a prohibited act, is also liable for assistance. 5
These modes of participation in a crime are reserved only for crim-
inal law, to which a general part of criminal code applies. In case of pu-
nitive administrative law, due to a lack of any sort of general part, all
means of participation in a wrongdoing must be precisely provided by
a relevant statute. In several cases of administrative liability (not, how-
5 See P. KARDAS, M. DĄBROWSKA-KARDAS, in: A. Zoll, W. Wróbel (eds) Kodeks
karny. Część ogólna. Tom I. Komentarz do Art. 1–52 [commentary to Art. 18 of the
Criminal Code] (cz.1, Warsaw 2017).
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ever, related to the PIF Convention), administrative sanctions are im-
posed when a company violates laws regulating particular activities.
Such a broad description of grounds for liability may per se incorporate
all potential ways of complicity by the said company management. The
entire board of directors may jointly decide upon violation, or a CEO
may order a bookkeeping department to counterfeit a document reflect-
ing the company’s activity on the market.
2.2. General information on omission liability
The Polish Criminal Code provides a general basis for criminal lia-
bility for omission in case of result (consequence) crimes. The objective
aspect of crime (actus reus) consists in bringing about a specific conse-
quence, i.e. it includes both the conduct and its consequence. The latter
means a change in the existing reality that needs to occur (independently
from the conduct itself) if a specific consequence crime is to be com-
mitted, as such change is explicitly referred to in a statutory description
of such a crime. The provision regarding the general basis for omission
liability is as follows:
Art. 2. Only a person having a legal, specific duty to prevent a con-
sequence from happening is subject to criminal liability for a conse-
quence crime committed by omission.
In case of formal crimes, the commission of which does not require
the occurrence of any consequence/result, it is possible to commit them
by omission only when, from a linguistic point of view, a verb describ-
ing the criminal activity also may mean passivity. In almost all such
cases, a provision explicitly provides a verb that is accompanied by ne-
gation or antonym, e.g. ‘does not provide’, ‘does not reveal’, ‘evades’,
‘avoids’, etc.
In case of result crimes, a duty of care must be specific and of legal
character. It may stem from a normative act, employment agreement, ci-
vil law contract, public authority decision, court ruling or even a volun-
tary undertaking of a certain activity.
Criminal liability for omission has a purely normative aspect. There
is no empirical causal link between one’s passivity and the occurrence of
a result. This means that we observe the behaviour of a potential perpe-
trator only according to legal standards and his duties. The accompany-
ing evaluation of risk occurrence is based on the ontological danger,
which is not caused by the perpetrator. The commonly accepted norma-
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tive method of establishing the liability for omission requires proving
the following:
1) The perpetrator, in fact, has a specific legal duty to prevent a par-
ticular consequence from happening.
2) The perpetrator’s conduct needs to be unlawful, i.e. it should vio-
late rules of conduct that were to be applied in the given circumstances.
Such violation should consist of omitting the performance of an ex-
pected action, i.e. the rules of conduct demanded action, but the perpe-
trator has failed to act; violation of the rules of conduct must be signifi-
cant and blameworthy (not every infringement may lead to liability).
3) From the very beginning (ex ante), the need to undertake the ex-
pected action and the risk of consequence happening without such ex-
pected action should be objectively foreseeable.
4) The risk of occurrence of an unwanted result needs to be signif-
icant (high, or at least above average).
5) It should be established that preventing the consequence has been
objectively possible, i.e. the causal knowledge suggests that there was at
least one possible action within the perpetrator’s duties that could have
prevented the consequence from happening.
6) It should be established whether undertaking the expected action
would have prevented the consequence. This is done by considering
whether the consequence would have happened had the perpetrator acted
in conformity with the binding rules of conduct. 6
2.3. Duty to report an offence
The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a general civic
duty to report a crime prosecuted ex officio if one has information about
6 See, generally, T. SROKA, Odpowiedzialność karna za niewłaściwe leczenie.
Problematyka obiektywnego przypisania skutku (Warsaw 2013); M. KRÓLKIKOWSKI,
‘Odpowiedzialnosć za przestępstwo skutkoweprzez zaniechanie’, Monitor Prawniczy
3 (2006) 154–160; W. PATRYAS, Zaniechanie. Próba analizy metodologicznej, (Poznań
1993); M. BIELSKI, ‘Naruszenie reguł ostrożności czy nadmierna ryzykowność zacho-
wania jako właściwe kryterium prawnokarnego przypisania skutku’, Czasopismo Pra-
wa Karnego i Nauk Penalnych, Rok VIII 1 (2004) 25–46; M. BIELSKI, ‘Prawnokarne
przypisanie skutku w postaci konkretnego narażenia na niebezpieczeństwo – uwagi
na marginesie postanowienia Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 3 czerwca 2004 r., V KK
37/04’, Przegląd Sądowy 4 (2005) 119–133; M. BIELSKI, ‘Obiektywne przypisanie
skutku przestępnego w przypadku kolizji odpowiedzialności za skutek,’ Państwo i
Prawo 10 (2005) 75–89.
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its perpetration. State and local government institutions which, in con-
nection to their operations, learn that a criminal offence prosecuted ex
officio has been committed shall be obliged to inform the police or a
public prosecutor thereof immediately. Also, they are obliged to take
the necessary steps until the arrival of the officials of a body authorised
to prosecute such criminal offences, or until that body issues a suitable
order, to prevent the effacing of traces and evidence of the criminal of-
fence.
However, the above duty in some cases goes beyond just a civic
character and a failure to perform it is sanctioned. Article 240 § 1 of
the Criminal Code provides that:
Whoever, having reliable information about a punishable prepara-
tion, attempt or the commission of a prohibited act provided for in [a list
of Articles follows] or a crime of a terrorist character, fails to report it
promptly to a law enforcement authority responsible for prosecuting
crimes, is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to three
years.
Crimes indicated in the above provision include murder, unlawful
deprivation of liberty, hostage-taking, crimes against peace, humanity
and war crimes, but not economic crimes.
The code explicitly provides that whoever has abstained from re-
porting a crime, reasonably assuming that the law enforcement authority
knows about the prepared, attempted or committed prohibited act, does
not commit a crime. A person who has prevented the commission of the
prepared or attempted prohibited act provided for by Art. 240 also does
not commit a crime (§2).
In the case where someone has abstained from reporting a crime out
of fear of that criminal liability would threaten himself or his immediate
family member is not subject to a penalty (§3).
Thus it is clear that in case of potential self-incrimination, the code
provides a circumstance excluding his/her liability. It is neither an ex-
cuse nor a justification, but a legislator’s decision based on criminal pol-
icy rather than constitutional aspects of the privilege against self-incri-
mination. The phrase ‘is not subject to penalty’ means that investigation
into such a case shall never be instigated; if it has been, it shall be dis-
continued. 7
7 See Art. 17 sec. 1 Polish Code of Criminal Procedure.
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2.4. General information on strict liability
If one understands strict liability offences as regulatory in nature,
lacking a true mens rea ingredient—i.e. prosecution is required only
to prove actus reus but in relation to one or more elements of the actus
reus there is no mens rea element to prove—then, in the scope of crim-
inal law, there are no such offences. In the already mentioned ruling of
the Constitutional Court of 3 November 2004, K 18/03, it was indicated
that every repressive liability must be based upon the prerequisite of at-
tributability, which is constituted by the possibility/ability to conform
one’s behaviour to the law (fault). It was also raised that it stems from
the principle of presumption of innocence.
However, the principle of nullum crimen sine culpa is identified by
the doctrine of criminal law as stemming directly from human dignity,
which prevents the state from punishing individuals for behaviour that
they had no fair opportunity to avoid. 8
It seems that, from a constitutional point of view, there is no possi-
bility of introducing strict liability crimes. Criminal liability must be
based upon a violation of a standard of care which must be attributable
and foreseeable; one must also be able to contradict the indictment.
2.5. Special rules on liability
In Poland, there is a separate Code of Fiscal Crimes which modifies
part of the general rules of criminal liability because of the specificity of
tax law. The system of liability for so-called fiscal crimes is deemed a
separate model. 9 However, it refers in many cases to the general part
of the Criminal Code, as well as to the basic rules of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. The general principles of liability for fiscal crime are
largely the same as in the case of a regular crime, but there are some
significant differences:
1) The Criminal Code does not provide an excuse based on mistake
in relation to punishability (only in relation to unlawfulness, justification
or excuse, and in relation to an element constituting a crime). The Fiscal
Criminal Code provides such an excuse, instead of an excuse based on
mistake in relation to unlawfulness; it can be rather easily explained: in
8 See A. BARCZAK-OPLUSTIL, Zasada koincydencji winy i czynu w kodeksie kar-
nym (Kraków 2016).
9 See, generally, P. KARDAS, G. ŁABUDA, T. RAZOWSKI, Kodeks karny skarbowy
(Komentarz, Warsaw 2017).
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case of criminal liability connected to taxation, not being aware of a le-
gal obligation to pay taxes or to keep tax records does not constitute an
issue. The more important question is what forms of tax evasion or fail-
ure in the bookkeeping department are penalised.
2) The Fiscal Criminal Code provides a specific form of ending the
investigation, voluntary submission to liability, the sense of which is de-
rived from the benefits provided by paying the due tax as soon as pos-
sible. It is not a conviction with all of the concomitant negative conse-
quences.
3) Liability for an attempt contrary to the Criminal Code is limited
and, in case of a fiscal crime with a maximum penalty not exceeding one
year of deprivation of liberty or a more lenient penalty, may be applied
only if the code explicitly provides for it.
4) A fine imposed for a fiscal crime may be enforced not only for
the perpetrator but also for another individual or legal entity if they
gained a benefit from committing a crime and the perpetrator was the
proxy or subordinate.
5) Contrary to the Criminal Code, the Fiscal Criminal Code pro-
vides many more prerequisites for extraordinary aggravation of penalty.
3. Concept and scope of the criminal law responsibilities of heads
of business
3.1. Liability of heads of business (general information) 10
Polish criminal law does not provide a general provision establish-
ing the liability of a supervisor (based on the concepts known from civil
law: culpa in eligendo or culpa in custodiendo). If the issue is not cov-
ered by one of the complicity (principal or secondary) regulations, or
may not be subsumed under a general provision providing broad liability
even for lone perpetration, a supervisor may not be held liable for a
crime committed by his subordinates. For example, if a CEO by his con-
duct facilitates the commission of a prohibited act by another person, in
defiance of a legal, special duty not to allow the commission of such a
prohibited act, he is liable for assistance to that crime (if intent can be
proved).
The closest criminal regulation which resembles the general liabili-
10 See, generally, Chapters 7 and 12 in R. ZAWłOCKI (ed.), Prawo karne gospo-
darcze. System Prawa Handlowego (Tom 10, Warsaw 2012).
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ty of heads of business as a separate concept is Art. 296 of the Criminal
Code, providing a crime of causing damage by abuse of trust in business
transactions:
Art. 296. § 1. Whoever, being obliged by a statutory provision, de-
cision of a competent authority or a contract to manage the financial
matters or business activity of a natural person, juridical person or an
organisational entity without a legal personality, inflicts substantial ma-
terial damage upon such person or entity by abusing the granted author-
ity or failing to fulfil the incumbent duties, is subject to the penalty of
deprivation of liberty for between three months and five years.
It covers only situations in which either a real damage occurs or
(§2) an immediate danger of inflicting substantial material damage oc-
curs. It may, of course, be a derivative effect of a crime committed by
a subordinate, but it does not directly make a HoB liable in every case
their subordinate commits a crime.
If, for example, such an employee counterfeits a document in or-
der to save himself from being fired for neglecting his duties, it is
highly plausible that despite the criminal character of his act the com-
pany will not suffer any damage. However, if he tries to bribe a public
official in order to win a public tender and, due to that, the company
is subsequently excluded from tenders, his supervisor may be held li-
able for the omission in supervision leading to a substantial loss for
the company.
Another group of crimes directly linked to the HoB is those re-
lated to debtor/creditor relations (Arts. 300–302). The Code provides
explicitly that whoever manages the financial matters of a juridical
person, a natural person, a group of persons or an organisational en-
tity without a legal personality, pursuant to a statutory provision, de-
cision of a competent authority or a contract, or just actually manages
such matters for someone else, is liable for the crimes provided for in
Arts. 300–302 as a debtor or creditor. The above-mentioned crimes
are connected to business relations and solvency law. For example,
a person who, facing the threat of insolvency or bankruptcy and being
unable to satisfy the claims of all his creditors, satisfies only the
claims of some of the creditors or provides security only for the
claims of some of the creditors, and thereby acts to the detriment
of other creditors, is liable for a crime. Pursuant to Art. 308 of the
Criminal Code, it is possible to hold the CEO of a company who
either directly decides upon illegal preferences towards one of the
creditors or colludes with his subordinates (e.g. bookkeeping depart-
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ment) to do so. It is, however, important to indicate that Arts.
300–302 concern intentional crimes, so unintentional neglecting of
one’s duties does not constitute one of them.
The last group of criminal offences related to HoB liability com-
prises those provided for in the Fiscal Criminal Code. Almost all of
them penalise the actions of a taxpayer or another individual upon whom
tax obligations of different sorts are vested. Moreover, Art. 9, § 3 of the
Fiscal Criminal Code provides explicitly that an individual who man-
ages the financial matters of a juridical person, a natural person or an
organisational entity without a legal personality pursuant to a statutory
provision, decision of a competent authority or a contract, or just actu-
ally manages such matters for someone else, is liable for fiscal crimes
and fiscal transgressions just as a perpetrator is. In these cases, general
principles of perpetration and complicity (similar to those covered by the
Criminal Code) also apply. For example, it is a fiscal crime to mislead a
proper tax authority by providing it with information contrary to the real
state of affairs or concealing that state which may result in receiving an
undue tax return. This may be committed by an HoB who endorses such
information being passed according to the organisational scheme of a
company.
Henceforth I will be describing the liability of an HoB in a twofold
manner: generally (considering general rules of perpetration and compli-
city) and specifically (focusing on Art. 296 of the Criminal Code).
3.2. Personal scope of the liability
3.2.1. Under the general rules of perpetration and complicity
The scope of liability pursuant to the Fiscal Criminal Code (FCP),
considering individuals who manage the financial matters of another, is
broad, covering different types of manager: those having their precise
statutory duties (e.g. members of the board of directors, supervisory
board, a proxy of a company, internal auditor). In this perspective, how-
ever, it is difficult to imagine the liability of shareholders of a limited
liability company or stockholders of a stock-offering company because
there is no statutory provision vesting any duties or obligations regard-
ing managing financial matters on those persons. They are not taxpayers
in this understanding.
The above applies to liability for debtor/creditor crimes.
In other crimes of general application, the liability of the HoB for
crimes committed by a subordinate is possible provided that some form
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of complicity is proven. Most of the crimes in the Polish legal system
are intentional, so additional subjective elements of the HoB must be
proved.
3.2.2. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code
The scope of liability pursuant to Art. 296 of the Criminal Code is
rather broad, considering every possible unlawful damage caused to the
entity. The prerequisites for the liability are also broad: abusing the
granted authority or failing to fulfil the incumbent duties may take var-
ious forms in contemporary corporate governance.
The subject of the potential liability is an individual who manages
the financial matters or business activity of another. It is understood as
having duties and obligations covering care for entrusted property in or-
der to secure it from damage, destruction or loss; prevention from dimin-
ishing the assets; and management of these assets in a way which leads
to an increase in their worth or economic scale. Managing in this context
requires the power to have a real influence on the decision-making pro-
cess in the designated area. Management performed by an individual de-
scribed by the provision in question needs to be almost identical to the
powers of his principal in every aspect, including decision-making to-
wards the entire structure of an entity (e.g. a company). Such a person
must be empowered to undertake actions regarding the assets of the
company, concluding contracts, encumbrance of property, representing
the interest of the principal before the administration of justice and state
authorities, managing human resources, etc. However, the evaluation of
that person’s endeavours must be done by considering the scope of the
given authority and the structure of the entity, especially if it is a more
complicated organism (like a stock company, holding or transnational
group of companies).
Pursuant to that provision, shareholders of a limited liability com-
pany or stockholders of a stock-offering company are excluded from
its application because currently there is no statutory provision vesting
any duties or obligations regarding managing financial matters or busi-
ness activity in those persons. If they join the board of directors or un-
dertake management pursuant to a separate contract, then they may be
liable.
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3.3. Duties to control and supervise
3.3.1. Under the general rules of perpetration and complicity
Every criminal liability in the Polish legal system is based upon
legal duties, which incorporate a variety of standard of care regimes.
Some of them (like those related to taxes) are provided by statutes
and regulations; others stem from developed standards and rules gov-
erning a particular branch of social relations (e.g. medicine, traffic,
commerce). It is difficult to describe those regimes in general without
analysing a case in question. Obviously, the statutory duties are more
tangible and, in many cases, precise enough to establish a framework
for the liability of a supervisor for his subordinate’s mistakes result-
ing in the criminal liability of both. However, in some cases, the stat-
utory duty is framed in a very general way—e.g. ‘to manage the as-
sets of a company’—but it is made more and more precise in different
internal regulations, employment or management contracts, etc.
Within those documents, the duties may be very detailed; such a gen-
eral duty may also be different depending on the area of business
(banking, managing a medical facility, managing a petrol company,
etc.). The specificity of the branch determines the real scope of a
manager’s duties.
For omission liability, the duty must be statutory and specific,
which means that the competence to make it precise may stem from
a general statutory obligation; the best example is a doctor who, ac-
cording to Polish law, has some general duties regarding patients,
which are then specified in that doctor’s employment contract. If a
president of a board orders his employee to counterfeit a document
and send it to a tax office, which the latter does, both are liable for
a crime of counterfeiting a document and using such document as
an authentic one (Art. 270 Criminal Code). The HoB may also facil-
itate the commission of a crime by his subordinate in defiance of a
legal, special duty not to allow the commission of such a prohibited
act (Art. 18 § 3 Criminal Code).
3.3.2. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code
As the provision explicitly provides, the basis for the liability is
abusing the granted authority or failing to fulfil the incumbent duties.
The scope of authority and duties may be provided for by a statute
(as is the case with regard to board members, the supervisory board,
etc.) or by a management contract. However, the authority/duties are
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in most cases described in a very general manner, thus in practice they
need to be specified in particular cases of management. The most gen-
eral and abstract framework is the standard of a ‘good and reasonable
manager’, which at least provides for a threshold of meticulousness
far above the average. Particular duties/authority must be considered ac-
cording to the branch of business, including the legal framework, tradi-
tion and longstanding practice in the particular area of commerce. Every
manager must be empowered within a rational scope of sovereignty in
decision-making, including a tolerance for mistakes and missed deci-
sions. The level of that tolerance is described by the particular branch
of business and the risks characteristic of the profession (food factory
vs. hedge fund). The duties/authority, at least in theory, must secure that
if one acts according to them, the risk of the behaviour does not exceed a
certain level of social tolerability.
3.4. Violation of supervisory duties and the commission of an offence
3.4.1. Causal link
3.4.1.1. Under the general rules of perpetration and complicity
General liability, according to complicity principles, depends on the
particular case.
Assistance and incitement do not require the actual perpetrator to
commit a crime in which he was assisted or incited. It is sufficient to
link the persuasion with the decision of an individual to commit a
crime he was incited to. The same is true of assistance: an objective
facilitation of a prohibited act must be linked to the action of the per-
son assisting, e.g. providing another person with tools. Assistance by
omission must also be linked with the actions of a person assisting,
but only on a normative level (defiance of duties must make the com-
mission easier).
In case of joint perpetration or perpetration by directing a result
crime, the consequence constituting an element of a crime must be
attributed to both perpetrators.
In case of perpetration by the ordering of a result crime, the conse-
quence constituting an element of a crime must be attributed to the prin-
cipal perpetrator and the act of the principal perpetrator must be attrib-
uted to the person giving orders.
When it comes to consequence crimes committed by action, there
are two separate aspects of objective attribution of consequence: ontolo-
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gical/empirical/causal and normative. 11 In case of result crimes, the fol-
lowing consequence attribution test must be performed:
1) Is there a scientifically established, general causal connection be-
tween such conduct and such consequence, i.e. is there a regularity that
conduct A normally and usually causes consequence B?
2) Is the particular conduct and consequence an example of such
general regularity, i.e. there is a general causal connection between con-
duct A and consequence B, but are the conduct and the consequence in
question really an example of such a situation?
3) The perpetrator’s conduct needs to be unlawful, i.e. it should vio-
late rules of conduct that were to be applied in the given circumstances
and, as a result, create a highly unacceptable danger/risk of causing a
criminal consequence, i.e. instigating causal process leading to a crim-
inal consequence.
4) From the very beginning (ex ante), the creation of such an unac-
ceptable danger/risk of causing a criminal consequence should be objec-
tively foreseeable, i.e. there should be an objective possibility of foresee-
ing the creation of such an unacceptable danger/risk at the moment the
perpetrator started to act.
5) It should be established that the highly unacceptable danger/risk
the perpetrator has created by violating rules of conduct has actually
brought about the consequence. This is done by considering whether
the consequence would have happened had the perpetrator acted in con-
formity with the binding rules of conduct.
6) It should be established that the rules and legal norms that the
perpetrator has violated had been specifically designed to prevent the
consequence the perpetrator has caused, i.e. it should be established
whether the violation of rules was actually relevant with regard to the
consequence.
11 T. SROKA, Odpowiedzialność (n 5), passim, S. Tarapata, ‘Głos w sprawie ‘nie-
bezprawnego naruszenia reguł postępowania z dobrem prawnym (o przypadku tzw.
’płonącego anioła)’, Czasopismo Prawa Karnego i Nauk Penalnych 2 (2013) 25–42;
M. Bielski, ‘Naruszenie reguł ostrożności czy nadmierna ryzykowność zachowania
jako właściwe kryterium prawnokarnego przypisania skutku’, Czasopismo Prawa Kar-
nego i Nauk Penalnych, Rok VIII (2004) 1, s.25–46, ibid. ‘Obiektywne przypisanie
skutku przestępnego w przypadku kolizji odpowiedzialności za skutek’, Państwo i
Prawo 10 (2005) 75–89; M. Małecki, ‘Ustawowa regulacja kryteriów przypisania
skutku (analiza wybranych uwag krytycznych)’, Państwo i Prawo 8 (2015) 91–103.
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3.4.1.2. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code
In the case of Art. 296 of the Criminal Code, the damage is a con-
sequence of the crime, so it must be attributed to the HoB. As previously
mentioned, due to the specificity of said crime, not only must the crime
of a subordinate be linked with the HoB’s behaviour, but so too must the
damage resulting from that crime that harms the company. It may hap-
pen that the crime of a subordinate is attributable to the HoB but the da-
mage, due to some extraordinary circumstance or intervention of a third
party, is not.
3.4.2. Mens rea
3.4.2.1. Under the general rules of perpetration and complicity
In case of principal complicity, every accomplice to the prohib-
ited act is liable within the limits of his intentional or unintentional
behaviour, irrespective of the liability of other accomplices. 12 This
means in practice that it may be that an HoB orders his subordinate
to undertake a behaviour which constitutes non-compliance with
carefulness required in the given circumstances and he might have
foreseen the possibility of the commission of a crime due to that vio-
lation, but the subordinate realises that it is a crime and accepts that
or even intends to proceed. In such a case, provided that a particular
crime is penalised as both intentional and unintentional, the HoB is
liable for unintentional perpetration and the principal perpetrator
for intentional perpetration.
Considering the most general aspect of this sort of liability, its form
depends on whether the supervisor intends commission of the
crime—i.e. wants to commit it or, foreseeing the possibility of its com-
mission, accepts it—or, without having an intent of its commission,
commits it due to non-compliance with carefulness required in the given
circumstances, although he has foreseen or might have foreseen the pos-
sibility of its commission. His state of mind determines whether he may
be held liable for intentional or unintentional crime (if the law provides
an unintentional counterpart).
12 Article 21 of the CC.
POLAND NATIONAL REPORT 257
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
3.4.2.2. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code
Considering the liability pursuant to Art. 296 of the Criminal Code,
a crime may be committed both intentionally and unintentionally. This
means that, according to the Polish Criminal Code, the perpetrator in-
tends commission of the crime—i.e. wants to commit it or, foreseeing
the possibility of its commission, accepts it—or, without having an in-
tent of its commission, commits it due to non-compliance with careful-
ness required in the given circumstances, although he has foreseen or
might have foreseen the possibility of its commission. Proving the sub-
jective element of a crime is one of the most difficult issues in the crim-
inal trial, especially if we consider the complex structure of management
and decision-making.
3.5. Delegation of control and supervisory duties: scope and limits
Considering corporations (limited liability companies and stock of-
fering companies), their statutes may incorporate the division of compe-
tences within the corporation, providing explicitly who is responsible for
what part of the business. This limitation, however, applies only to inter-
nal relationships: limitations are not in force outside the company. 13
This means that a board member may, for example, be responsible only
for human resources in the company but remains a board member with
all statutory privileges and rights and obligations towards the outside
world. He may sign general documents (including court documents,
powers of attorney) according to the representation rules accepted in
the company even if his tasks within the structure are described differ-
ently. This may influence the HoB’s criminal liability, but not in every
aspect. Some provisions make the board member responsible for per-
forming certain duties (including annual reporting to the registry court
or to the tax office) and it may be irrelevant that the internal division
of tasks puts someone else in charge of that. 14 However, the problem
13 Article 204 of the Commercial Companies Code.
§ 1. The power of a member of the management board to conduct the affairs of
the company and represent the company shall embrace all actions of the company,
whether in court or out of court.
§ 2. The right of a member of the management board to represent the company
may not be restricted with a legal effect with respect to third parties.
14 Article 208 of the Commercial Companies Code.
§ 2. Each member of the management board shall have the right and duty to
conduct the company’s affairs.
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which may appear is relevant mens rea. If a crime is intentional and a
particular board member genuinely did not know what was happening
in a division not under his supervision, he may be at most held criminal-
ly liable for an unintentional crime. There is a statutory scope of board
members’ obligations which may not be limited. However, in other
cases, a board member may contend that he was not responsible for a
particular part of the business, thus he had no powers or information
in that regard.
The situation is slightly different when a board member would like
to delegate some responsibilities. He is free to do that, but with the res-
ervation that it may not necessarily prevent him from potential liability
for the mischiefs of the said subordinate. Despite the delegation, it is still
his duty to act according to the legal requirements. For example, a board
member must present the register court with an annual balance sheet:
naturally, in almost every case, this is outsourced to the bookkeeping of-
fice (internal or external), but nevertheless it is a board member who will
be responsible for failing to provide the document regardless of his sub-
ordinate’s or another contractor’s fault. Also, the only issue here may be
the mens rea required for a crime in question. In extreme cases of some
sort of in blanco delegation of duties to subordinates, it may be proved
that the HoB foresaw the possibility of its commission, accepted the pos-
sibility of perpetration by that subordinate and, by his actions, facilitated
that by omission.
3.6. Fulfilment of supervisory duties and disciplinary powers
If the crime of the subordinate is either attributable under general
principles to the HoB or may lead to his liability for Art. 296 of the
Criminal Code, there are very limited options to exclude liability. Of
course, immediate removal of the subordinate and subsequent actions
leading to remedy of the situation would be considered as goodwill
and motivation in penalty imposition. It may also indicate a lack of in-
tent on the side of the HoB. Also, Art. 296 of the Criminal Code, for
example, provides that if the perpetrator has voluntarily redressed the
§ 3. Each member of the management board may, without a prior resolution of
the management board, conduct the company’s affairs within the ordinary course of
the company’s business.
§ 7. Any member of the management board may revoke the commercial power of
attorney.
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full damage, the court may apply extraordinary mitigation of the penalty
or even waive its imposition.
Some criminal provisions explicitly provide impunity clauses, as in
case of bank fraud: if the perpetrator has voluntarily prevented the use of
the financial support or payment instrument, renounced the subsidy or
public procurement, or satisfied the claims of the harmed party before
criminal proceedings have been instituted, he is not subject to a penalty.
In corruption cases, the perpetrator who has reported giving or offering a
bribe to a law enforcement authority responsible for prosecuting crimes
and who has disclosed all the substantive circumstances of the crime be-
fore this authority has learned about it is not subject to a penalty.
3.7. Liability and collective decisions
There are no special rules of attributing liability in cases of collec-
tive decisions. The participation of each board member, for example,
must be evaluated, considering his intent or defiance of duties in the
context of the decisions of the remaining ones. It may be a case of joint
perpetration. If the rules of objective attribution of a result in the case of
result crimes allow ascribing the responsibility for said consequence to
him, considering the context, there are no obstacles to criminal liability.
The problem may appear if the voting took the form of a secret ballot. It
may be impossible to prove who was in favour of a decision that led to a
crime.
In these cases, it seems that not only substantive law principles but
also principles governing criminal procedure—mainly the principle pro-
viding a rule that irremovable doubts shall be resolved in favour of the
accused—are crucial.
3.8. Relationship with corporate liability
3.8.1. Triggering persons
The Statute on Liability of Corporate Entities for Acts Prohibited
Under a Penalty of 2002 (with significant amendments from 2005) is
based on the identification model. This means that an individual acting
on behalf and for the benefit of the entity must be found guilty in order
to trigger the procedure against the entity (by a final and non-appealable
judgment convicting that person, a judgment conditionally discontinuing
the criminal proceedings or criminal fiscal proceedings against that per-
son, a ruling to grant that person the right to voluntarily submit to pen-
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alty, or a court ruling to terminate the proceedings against that person
due to circumstances preventing him from being punished).
The entity is liable if one of the following individuals commits a
crime from the list provided in the statute (Art. 3) and if such a criminal
behaviour brought or might have brought a benefit (material or immate-
rial) to that entity:
1) A person acting on behalf or for the benefit of a collective entity
or pursuant to an obligation to represent it, making decisions on its be-
half or enforcing internal control or by exceeding his authority or failing
to fulfil his duties.
2) A person allowed to perform actions due to exceeding authority
or failing to fulfil duties by a person referred to in 1.
3) A person acting on behalf or for the benefit of a collective entity
with knowledge and consent of a person referred to in 1.
4) An entrepreneur who directly cooperates with the entity in pur-
suing a legal goal.
A collective entity shall be held liable if the offence was committed
as a result of (Art 5):
1) at a minimum, a lack of due diligence in selecting the individual
referred to above in points 2 and 3 or, at a minimum, a lack of due super-
vision of that person on the part of a body or representative of the col-
lective entity.
2) the internal organisation of the collective entity that did not pre-
vent an offence committed by the person referred to above in points 1 or
4 if it could have been prevented had the body or representative of the
collective entity applied the due diligence required in the circumstances
in question.
3.8.2. Concurrence and accumulation of liabilities
The liability or lack of liability of a collective entity in accordance
with the provisions of this Act does not preclude civil liability for the
damage caused, administrative liability or the individual legal liability
of the person committing an offence. This means that it may be possible
to commence additional administrative or civil proceedings against the
entity or other individuals acting for its benefit regardless of the pro-
ceedings undertaken pursuant to the act. Also, the court trying the entity
shall independently adjudicate on factual and legal issues within the
scope of the petition to punish the entity. However, the criminal court’s
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final and non-appealable judgment convicting that person, or a judgment
conditionally discontinuing the criminal proceedings or criminal fiscal
proceedings against that person, or a ruling to grant that person the right
to voluntarily submit to penalty, or a court ruling to terminate the pro-
ceedings against that person due to circumstances preventing him from
being punished, providing the basis for liability of the entity, is binding.
Thus, during subsequent proceedings against the entity, the court must
not decide that the initial crime of an individual was never in fact com-
mitted. It is possible, however, to evaluate the factual surroundings and
legal environment of an entity’s decision-making process differently
from how it was done during the initial criminal trial of the individual.
3.9. Compliance programmes (general application)
Currently, compliance programmes have a limited legal basis in
banking law and insurance law, where particular statutes (or recommen-
dations of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority) provide a duty to
implement internal and external regulations ensuring risk control. 15
In other fields of business, preparing this kind of document is only
voluntary. It seems that in the field of criminal liability, compliance pro-
grammes may have a very limited impact on a case. Of course, the HoB
may claim that there was a valid and professional compliance pro-
gramme implemented by the company which was to ensure that a par-
ticular mischief would not happen. If it happened anyway, it might be
argued that it was independent of the HoB. However, this is only a par-
tial excuse and other circumstances will be investigated. It may seem
that a valid compliance programme has a much bigger influence on
the liability of collective entities when considering one of the liability-
triggering conditions: when an offence was committed as a result of
the operations of an organisation of the collective entity in such a man-
ner that did not prevent an offence being committed by a relevant indi-
vidual. In that case, providing the prosecutor’s office with a compliance
programme may fully justify the entity by showing that the internal or-
ganisation was impeccable and the crime in question was the unforesee-
able excess of an employee.
15 M. KOZAK, Programy compliance jako narzędzie skutecznego wdrażania pra-
wa konkurencji – metoda kija i marchewki? https://www.1pkpk.wz.uw.edu.pl/work-
ing_papers/Kozak_Compliance.pdf.
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4. Defences
4.1. Effective powers of supervision and control and liability
As a clear majority of economic crimes (including Convention
ones) are intentional, so if an HoB claims an effective lack of control
it simultaneously excludes his intent. A person cannot desire a crime
to happen if he is not aware of the risk of its commission.
In rare cases of intentional crimes, however, a certain level of lack
of control may be deemed to be to the detriment of the HoB, because it
can be indicated that he accepted the commission of crimes by his sub-
ordinates by not implementing any remedies to his powerlessness.
In case of unintentional crimes, lack of control may be an excuse
but is strongly dependent on the scope and wording of the legal duty
in that area of commerce. It may be claimed that an HoB actually did
not have, but should have had, effective control over supervision. To
put it in another way, he should have guaranteed himself better supervi-
sion and management tools while it was objectively possible, as well as
demanded that people do a better job.
4.1.1. Under Art. 296 of the Criminal Code
Art. 296 § 4 of the Criminal Code provides for an unintentional
counterpart (‘If the perpetrator of the crime provided for in § 1 or 3 acts
unintentionally, he is subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty for
up to 3 years’). Claiming that the HoB had no effective control over em-
ployees, for example, due to the organisational scheme of the company
or other arrangements, may be a justification for his omissions only pro-
vided that he had no further legal duty to assure a more complex super-
vision. It may be indicated that although he did not have relevant con-
trol/supervisory tools, he should have provided them.
The same arguments apply to liability for fiscal crimes, because the
subjective basis for the liability of an HoB is worded almost identically
to that pursuant to Art. 296 of the Criminal Code.
4.2. Delegation of supervisory powers
In the cases of both the general rules of perpetration and complicity
and Art. 296 of the Criminal Code, formal delegation of duties may be
an excuse or even a justification provided that it was not contrary to the
legal obligations of a person delegating. For instance, a board member in
a limited liability company may defend himself by arguing sub-delega-
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tion provided that, according to the relevant provisions of the Code of
Commercial Companies, he offered due diligence in both shaping the
rules of delegation and subsequent supervision. Of course, the criminal
law shall not prevent companies from adopting complex structures with
a variety of delegation principles, but there are some inherent functions
of the board which may not be discharged. In the remaining scope, prob-
ably the more complex the structure of the company, the greater chance
the HoB will claim that he did not violate any safeguard rules: thus, even
with due diligence, it was not objectively foreseeable that a subordinate
may commit a crime.
4.3. Compliance programmes as a defence
To ensure compliance, programmes work for the benefit of the
HoB: though they may not necessarily provide an excuse every time,
they will—especially in cases of unintentional crimes—impact the scope
of the penalty, even allowing the application of extraordinary mitigation
of penalty. The HoB, simply by implementing a compliance programme,
shows due diligence, approvable motivation and genuine endeavour to
limit potential damage that may be caused by a crime or by the perpe-
tration itself. According to the Criminal Code, while imposing a penalty,
the court especially takes into account the perpetrator’s motivation and
manner of conduct, the type and degree of violation of the perpetrator’s
duties, the type and extent of the negative consequences of the crime, the
characteristics and personal conditions of the perpetrator, the perpetra-
tor’s way of life prior to the commission of the crime and his behaviour
after the commission of the crime, especially his efforts to redress the
damage or to satisfy a public sense of justice in any other form.
4.4. Third-party advice, external auditing and liability of heads of busi-
ness
According to the Bookkeeping Act, the entity’s manager shall be
liable for the fulfilment of duties related to accounting, including super-
visory duties specified in the statute, and where certain duties related to
accounting are entrusted to another person or to an entrepreneur (profes-
sional accountant) with their consent. The acceptance of responsibility
by another person or an entrepreneur shall be confirmed in writing. For-
mally, it only broadens the liability for bookkeeping crimes to the ac-
countant (arg. ex Art. 9 § 3 FCP: a natural person or an organisational
entity without a legal personality managing financial matters of another
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pursuant to a contract is liable for fiscal crimes and fiscal transgressions
as a perpetrator). In reality, especially when the entity is a company and
there is a professional accountant or accounting firm hired, the supervi-
sory abilities of the HoB are significantly limited. Practice shows that in
cases of petty fiscal crimes or transgressions, tax offices indict accoun-
tants rather than the HoB.
5. Liability of heads of business and sanctions
5.1. Criminal and punitive sanctions
Depending on the particular crime, the penalties may be the follow-
ing:
1) A fine imposed at daily rates by indicating a number of daily
rates and the value of one daily rate; unless a statute provides otherwise,
the number of daily rates shall not amount to fewer than ten or more
than 540; in case of commercial crimes and debtor/creditor crimes, a
daily rate of up to 3,000 may be imposed. When determining the value
of the daily rate, the court takes into consideration the perpetrator’s in-
come, personal and family conditions, financial situation and income
perspectives; the value of one daily rate may not amount to less than
PLN 10 or more than PLN 2,000.
2) Limitation of liberty lasting no less than one month and not more
than two years. This consists of:
- the obligation to perform unremunerated, supervised work for
community purposes for 20 to 40 hours per month;
- the obligation to remain in a place of permanent residence or other
designated place, under electronic supervision;
- a deduction of 10 per cent to 25 per cent of one’s monthly remu-
neration for work for a court-designated community purpose;
- other duties, but this is not applicable in case of commercial crime.
3) Deprivation of liberty lasting no less than a month and no more
than 15 years. In case of presenting counterfeited VAT invoices for over
10 million PLN, the penalty provided for that crime may be up to 25
years’ deprivation of liberty.
In case of a fiscal crime, the following penalties are provided:
1) a fine imposed at daily rates by indicating a number of daily rates
and the value of one daily rate; unless a statute provides otherwise, the
number of daily rates shall not amount to fewer than 10 or more than
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720 rates. When determining the value of the daily rate, the court takes
into consideration the perpetrator’s income, personal and family condi-
tions, financial situation and income perspectives; the value of one daily
rate may not amount to less than 1/30 of the minimum monthly salary in
the country or more than 400 times that.
2) limitation of liberty lasting no less than one month and not more
than two years. This consists of:
- the obligation to perform unremunerated, supervised work for
community purposes for 20 to 40 hours per month;
- the obligation to remain in a place of permanent residence or other
designated place under electronic supervision;
- a deduction of 10 per cent to 25 per cent of one’s monthly remu-
neration for work for a court-designated community purpose.
3) Deprivation of liberty lasting no less than five days and no more
than aggravated 15 years.
Fiscal transgressions other than fiscal crimes are punished by a fine
of an amount from one tenth up to 20 times the minimummonthly salary
in the country.
As to the punitive administrative sanctions scattered around the Pol-
ish legal system, pecuniary penalty is dominant. Depending on the
branch in question, the fine may be for up to five million PLN. The sys-
tem is rather random and not as structured as in criminal law.
5.2. Other sanctions and measures
The Polish legal system provides a selection of penal measures tar-
geting repression, compensation and/or (public) protection.
The ones provided in the Criminal Code (relevant to commercial
crimes) are the following:
1) Deprivation of public rights, consisting of the loss of active
and passive voting rights with regard to public authority offices, pro-
fessional and economic self-government authorities, loss of the right
to participate in the administration of justice and to perform a func-
tion in public and local and professional self-government authorities
and institutions, as well as loss of held military rank and reversion to
the rank of private. The deprivation of public rights also includes the
loss of medals, decorations and honorary titles and the loss of capac-
ity to acquire them during the period of the deprivation of rights. The
court may impose the deprivation of public rights while sentencing to
the penalty of deprivation of liberty for a period of no less than three
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years for the commission of a crime driven by motivation deserving
special condemnation.
2) Prohibition from occupying a specific position, practising a specif-
ic profession or operating a specific business activity if, during the com-
mission of a crime, the perpetrator has abused his position or the practised
profession, or has shown that his further occupation of such a position or
practising such a profession poses a threat to substantive, legally pro-
tected interests. The court may impose a prohibition to operate a specific
business activity while sentencing for a crime committed in relation to op-
erating such a business activity if its further operation poses a threat to
substantive, legally protected interests.
3) Prohibition on entering gambling facilities and engaging in gam-
bling games is imposed while sentencing for a crime committed in rela-
tion to the organisation of or participation in gambling games.
4) Publication of the sentence if it is expedient, especially due to the
social impact of the sentence, unless it infringes the harmed party’s in-
terests.
The penal measures provided in the Fiscal Criminal Code (relevant
to commercial crimes) are the following:
1) Voluntary submission to liability.
2) Forfeiture of items, imposed only if explicitly provided for in the
Code.
3) Collecting the equivalence in value of items undergoing forfei-
ture.
4) Forfeiture of material benefit.
5) Collecting the equivalence in value of material benefit.
6) Prohibition from occupying a specific position, practising a spe-
cific profession or operating a specific business activity; this may be im-
posed only in case of perpetration of a certain crime
7) Publication of the sentence.
8) Deprivation of public rights.
5.3. Sentencing criteria
The most relevant sentencing guidelines regarding HoBs are, in my
opinion, the following:
- Perpetrator’s motivation and manner of conduct.
- The type and degree of violation of the perpetrator’s duties.
- The type and the extent of negative consequences of the crime.
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- The characteristics and personal conditions of the perpetrator.
- The perpetrator’s way of life prior to the commission of the crime
and his behaviour after the commission of the crime, especially his ef-
forts to redress the damage or to satisfy the public sense of justice in
any other form.
- Positive results of mediation between the harmed party and the
perpetrator or the settlement they have reached during the proceedings
held before a court or a public prosecutor.
It is also worth mentioning that the court may apply extraordinary
mitigation of the penalty in exceptional situations, when even the lowest
penalty provided for a crime would be incommensurately severe, espe-
cially if:
1) the harmed party and the perpetrator have reconciled, the damage
has been redressed or the harmed party and the perpetrator have agreed
on the manner of redressing the damage; or
2) due to the perpetrator’s demeanour, he has taken efforts to re-
dress or prevent the damage.
Perpetration with intent to gain a material benefit also constitutes a
basis for a fine collateral to the penalty of deprivation of liberty pro-
vided.
In case of fiscal crimes, the system of sentencing guidelines, in gen-
eral, resembles that provided above with a special focus on fiscal duties.
However, the general part of the Fiscal Criminal Code provides for a set
of very complex and numerous specific guidelines, including a broad
catalogue of mitigating and aggravating factors, rules of extraordinary
mitigation and aggravation, etc. It is mostly determined by the scope
of tax evasion.
Considering the practice of fiscal crimes, it is still the primary goal
of the state to get the evaded tax back. Thus a dominant solution imple-
mented in the vast majority of cases is voluntary submission to liability,
a mechanism that allows avoiding conviction. The perpetrator, while fil-
ing a motion to submit himself to liability, needs to pay the evaded tax, a
fine in an amount at least one third of the minimum monthly salary in
the country (usually the fine is higher, individually negotiated with the
tax office) and a lump sum cost of the proceedings. If a particular crime
provides for the forfeiture of certain objects, it is also mandatory to hand
them over to the tax office.
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5.4. Confiscation
Forfeiture is provided in the Criminal Code as a general solution in
case of perpetration that brings any kind of benefit. The following assets
are subject to forfeiture:
1) Items that have been derived directly from crime.
2) Items that have served to commit a crime or have been intended
to serve in the commission of a crime.
3) Material benefit, even indirectly gained from committing a
crime, or its equivalence in value.
4) Enterprise from which material benefit of significant value was
gained, even indirectly, or which served to commit a crime or to conceal
benefits gained beforehand.
In case of joint ownership, the forfeiture applies to a share belong-
ing to the perpetrator or its equivalence in value.
It may operate against third parties if a property constituting a ben-
efit derived from committing a crime has been, effectively or under any
legal title, transferred to another natural person, juridical person or orga-
nisational entity without a legal personality. It is deemed that the items
remaining in the autonomous possession of that person or organisational
entity, and other property rights that person is entitled to, belong to the
perpetrator unless the circumstances attendant to the acquisition of such
property could not have given rise to the assumption that it has been
even indirectly obtained by means of a prohibited act.
As to the collective entities, forfeiture regards:
1) objects derived, even indirectly, from an offence or used or in-
tended to be used to commit an offence;
2) financial benefits derived, even indirectly, from an offence;
3) the equivalent of the objects or financial benefits derived, even
indirectly, from an offence.
However, the forfeiture shall not be adjudged if the object or finan-
cial benefit or their equivalent is to be returned to another entitled entity.
5.5. Enforcement practice
The practice of forfeiture is difficult to establish unambiguously.
Statistics do not allow determination of the amount of forfeited prop-
erty in cases related to HoBs. Generally, it is indicated that every year
around 200 million PLN worth of property is forfeited (the court rul-
ings contain such a decision towards approximately 20,000 convicts a
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year). 16 However, after amendments were introduced to the Criminal
Code (implementing Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confis-
cation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European
Union), the scope of forfeiture is expected to be significantly higher
due to provisions extending its scope and making it easier.
6. Relationship with punitive administrative law
6.1. Parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against the head
of business
Provided that the normative description of both an offence and an
administrative misconduct allows for one act or omission to fulfil their
definition (being sufficiently similar or identical), it is allowed to impose
both types of sanction in parallel. However, this may infringe the prin-
ciple of ne bis in idem and the principle of proportionality. As yet, there
is no clear picture in this regard. The problem has been analysed by the
Polish Constitutional Court on several occasions in individual cases.
Generally parallel (simultaneous) sanctioning is not unconstitutional as
such. It however requires the criminal court to take into account the con-
sequences imposed in another proceeding (civil or administrative) when
imposing the criminal sanction in order not to exceed the overall propor-
tionality of all sanctions (ruling of the Constitutional Court from 21 Oc-
tober 2014 P 50/13).
Administrative and criminal proceedings may be run in parallel and
there are no rules on their concurrence. Criminal and administrative en-
forcement systems are parallel. However, some misconducts are de-
scribed in a normative sense both as an administrative transgression
and a criminal offence. In that situation, if the elements of a crime are
met, the proper investigatory authority is by law obliged to commence
criminal proceedings even if the proper administrative authority has al-
ready commenced the administrative proceedings within its powers. In
those situations, there is no place for any discretionary decision about
which path to choose. It may also happen that the administrative author-
ity will not inform the prosecution authority of misconduct that may also
16 See governmental information in the draft of the amendment to the Criminal
Code implementing Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and
proceeds of crime in the European Union. http://www.konsultacje.gov.pl.
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constitute a crime and which is dealt with during ongoing administrative
proceedings. It is often because the administrative authority has its own
responsibilities and providing information or further cooperation with,
for example, the Prosecutor’s Office may prolong the administrative case
or add a significant amount of work. It is also possible that the adminis-
trative authority does not recognise the potential perpetration due to a
lack of expertise in the criminal law area. There are solid and coherent
decisions of the Administrative Courts that pending criminal proceedings
do not present a reason to suspend the administrative proceedings in a
particular case. This means that there may be parallel criminal and ad-
ministrative cases. 17
6.1.1. Trans-procedural use of evidence against the head of business
There is no limitation on transferring evidence from an administra-
tive procedure into a criminal one. However, in case of witnesses, they
must be put on the stand again during a criminal trial (it does not exclude
use of technical devices enabling interrogation to be conducted remotely
on the basis of a simultaneous direct transmission of image and sound.)
6.1.2. Admissibility and use of foreign evidence against the head of
business
If evidence is not inadmissible according to Polish regulations, it
may constitute the basis of fact-finding. However, it must be verified
whether the evidence is solid and reliable; this is done according to gen-
eral rules of the evaluation of evidence.
6.1.3. Administrative investigations and right to silence of the head of
business
During administrative proceedings, the party is obliged to cooperate
and provide all required evidence. However, the general rules of the
Code of Administrative Procedure provide explicitly that a witness
may refuse to answer a question if the answer could bring about a risk
of criminal investigation towards him or his immediate family.
17 See a comprehensive description of that issue in A. BŁACHNIO-PARZYCH, Zbieg
odpowiedzialności karnej i administracyjno-karnej jako zbieg reżimów odpowiedzial-
ności represyjne (Warsaw 2016).
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6.2. Multiple and parallel criminal and administrative proceedings
against the legal person and the head of business
The liability or lack of liability of a collective entity in accordance
with the provisions of this Act does not preclude civil liability for the
damage caused, administrative liability or the individual legal liability
of the person committing an offence. The most recent opinion of the
Constitutional Court considers parallel sanctioning not to be unconstitu-
tional per se but as requiring the Criminal Court to take into account the
consequences imposed in another proceeding (civil or administrative)
when imposing the criminal sanction in order not to exceed the overall
proportionality of the sanction as a whole. Furthermore, it seems
conceivable that in some extreme cases the court will continue to strike
down provisions that in abstracto allow imposing several sanctions for
the same act/omission, justifying it by saying that they do not allow a
potential lowering of the sanction for the above reasons.
6.2.1. Right to silence of the head of business in proceedings against
the legal person
There is no specific rule regarding the liability of collective entities.
The HoB as a witness may therefore decline to answer a question if such
an answer might expose the witness or closest relatives by blood or af-
finity to liability for a criminal or fiscal offence (Art. 183 CCP). One
must remember that the procedure against the legal entity may be insti-
gated only after the final and valid conviction of an individual provided
in provision cited beforehand.
6.3. Relationship between liability of the legal person and liability of
the head of business
As was described in section 3.8 above, the entity is not held liable
for a failure to supervise its managers. From this perspective, the entity
is not liable in the broadest possible way – thus the Supreme Court has
consistently ruled. This means that the criminal liability of a CEO of a
company in Poland does not trigger the liability of the entity.
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CHAPTER VII
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS FOR HEADS
OF BUSINESS IN LIGHT OF THE ECtHR
AND CJEU CASE LAW
Dr András Csúri and Prof. Michiel Luchtman * 1
SUMMARY: – 1. Presumption of innocence. – 1.1. The case law of the ECtHR
on the compatibility between presumptions of fact and law and the pre-
sumption of innocence in criminal cases. – 1.2. The relationship between
presumption of innocence and modes of criminal liability based on lack
of supervision or control. – 1.3. The presumption of innocence and heads
of business – concluding remarks. – 2. Privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. – 2.1. The case law of the ECtHR on the privilege against self-in-
crimination in criminal matters. – 2.2. The case law of the CJEU on the
privilege against self-incrimination in competition proceedings. – 2.3.
The right of heads of business to remain silent in the context of admin-
istrative or criminal investigations against the legal entity. – 2.4. The po-
tential use of evidence gathered in a previous investigation against the
legal entity in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the individual
head of business. – 2.5. The privilege against self-incrimination and
heads of business – concluding remarks. – 3. Principle of ne bis in idem.
– 3.1. The case law of the European Courts (ECtHR and CJEU) on the
principle of ne bis in idem. – 3.2. Overview and critical assessment of
the case law of the ECtHR and of the CJEU on the compatibility of ‘dual
track enforcement systems’ with the principle of ne bis in idem. – 3.2.1.
ECtHR’s new approach in A. and B. v. Norway. – 3.2.2. Follow-up in
European Union. – 3.3. Overview and critical assessment of the case
law of the ECtHR and of the CJEU on the relationship between individu-
al liability and corporate liability in the context of ne bis in idem. – 3.4.
Results with respect to ne bis in idem.
* This chapter was concluded on 5 March 2018.
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
1. Presumption of innocence
1.1. The case law of the ECtHR on the compatibility between presump-
tions of fact and law and the presumption of innocence in criminal
cases
Overview. Article 6 (2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) states, ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law’. The pre-
sumption of innocence governs criminal proceedings in their entirety.
It is a core principle of the criminal justice process, aiming to protect
the individual against the improper use of coercive state power, thereby
preventing wrongful convictions.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) has ruled
extensively on the presumption of innocence. The meaning of Article 6
(2) was elaborated in Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain. 1 Ac-
cordingly, the presumption is violated if a judicial decision reflects an
opinion that the accused is guilty without him previously been proved
guilty according to law. The presumption requires from the members
of a court not to start a case with the preconceived idea that the accused
committed the offence; the burden of proof is on the prosecution and any
doubt should benefit the accused (Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v.
Spain paras 77 and 91). The presumption is violated if a judicial decision
reflects an opinion that the accused is guilty without him previously
been proved guilty according to law. For the presumption to be meaning-
ful, certain procedural safeguards are required. Notably, the prosecution
must prove the case in trial; the defendant has the right to be heard; and
it is unlawful to base a conviction solely on the defendant’s silence. 2
The ECtHR has also held that a person’s right in a criminal case to
be presumed innocent is not absolute, since presumptions of fact or law
1 ECtHR, 6 December 1988, Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, appl. no.
10590/83.
2 This also shows the close relationship of the presumption of innocence to the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. The ECtHR first dealt in
John Murray v. United Kingdom with the issue of drawing subsequent adverse infer-
ences from the applicants’ failure to answer when questioned by the police. See also S
Peers, T Hervey, J Kenner, AWard (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CH
Beck-Hart-Nomos 2015) 1306; U Karpenstein, F Meyer (eds) Konvention zum Schutz
der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten: EMRK (CH Beck, München 2015)
200–214; S Lamberigts, The Presumption of Innocence (and the Right to be Present
at Trial). Directive. https://europeanlawblog.eu/2016/05/03/the-presumption-of-inno-
cence-and-the-right-to-be-present-at-trial-directive/.
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operate in every criminal law system and are not prohibited in principle
by the Convention (Salabiaku v. France 3 para 28; Falk v. The Nether-
lands (Dec.)). 4 Accordingly, the Contracting States may, under certain
conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of
whether it results from criminal intent or negligence (Salabiaku v.
France, § 27; Janosevic v. Sweden para 100). However, the Contracting
States are required to confine these presumptions within reasonable lim-
its and to strike a balance between the importance of what is at stake and
the rights of the defence (Salabiaku v. France para 28; Radio France
and Others v. France para 24; Janosevic v. Sweden para 101). In other
words, the means employed have to be reasonably proportionate to the
legitimate aim (Janosevic v. Sweden para 101).
Case law
In the following, the analysis focuses on selected cases before the
ECtHR, which might prove to be useful in the context of the liability
of heads of business.
The Court had held in Salabiaku v. France that a person’s right in a
criminal case to be presumed innocent (and to require the prosecution to
bear the onus of proving the allegations against him/her) is not absolute,
since presumptions of fact or law are not prohibited in principle by the
Convention (Salabiaku v. France para 28). National criminal systems
operate on such presumptions, especially with regard to taxation and
traffic offences. Accordingly, ‘the Contracting States may, under certain
conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of
whether it results from criminal intent or from negligence’ (Salabiaku
v. France para 27; see also Janosevic v. Sweden para 104). That said,
the means employed have to be reasonably proportionate to the legiti-
mate aim pursued (Falk v. The Netherlands (Dec.); Salabiaku v. France
para 28; Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden 5 para 113; Ja-
nosevic v. Sweden 6 para 101).
In Janosevic v. Sweden, the main question concerned whether in-
stituting enforcement proceedings of administrative sanctions im-
posed on objective grounds prior to a court determination of the dis-
pute violated the right to presumption of innocence. The competent
Swedish tax authority discovered certain irregularities in the tax re-
3 ECtHR 7 October 1988, Salabiaku v. France, appl. no. 10519/83.
4 ECtHR 2004-XI, Falk v. The Netherlands, appl. no. 66273/01.
5 ECtHR, Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v. Sweden, appl. no. 36985/97.
6 ECtHR, 21 May 2003 (final), Janosevic v. Sweden, appl. no. 34619/97.
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turns of the applicant’s taxi firm and invited him to submit comments.
Janosevic challenged the audit report, but the authorities subse-
quently increased his liability in accordance with domestic rules
and ordered him to pay tax surcharges on objective grounds (Janose-
vic v. Sweden para 68). In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Janose-
vic was sentenced to imprisonment for tax fraud primarily based on
information obtained by the tax authority during its audit and state-
ments made by the applicant in his tax returns. The applicant claimed
that his right to be presumed innocent was breached by the fact that
the Tax Authority’s decisions concerning tax surcharges were en-
forced prior to a determination by a court of his liability to pay them
(Janosevic v. Sweden para 99).
The Court held that the presumptions applied in Swedish law
with regard to surcharges were confined within reasonable limits (Ja-
nosevic v. Sweden para 104). Though the presumed liability on objec-
tive grounds was difficult to rebut, Janosevic was not left without any
means of defence and it was open to him to put forward grounds for a
reduction or remission of the surcharges and to adduce supporting
evidence (Janosevic v. Sweden para 102). Thus, the relevant domestic
rules on tax surcharges provided for certain means of defence based
on subjective elements. The Court acknowledged that ‘a system that
allows enforcement of considerable amounts of tax surcharges before
there has been a court determination of the liability to pay the sur-
charges is open to criticism’ (Janosevic v. Sweden para 108). Never-
theless, in the specific case, Article 6 ECHR was not infringed, as no
amount was actually recovered from the applicant and the possibility
provided for by Swedish law of securing reimbursement of any
amount paid constituted a sufficient safeguard of the applicant’s in-
terests (Janosevic v. Sweden para 109).
Finally, the Court explicitly noted that no provision of the Conven-
tion could be seen as excluding, in principle, early enforcement mea-
sures being taken before decisions on tax surcharges have become final.
That said, the Contracting States are required to confine such enforce-
ment within reasonable limits (Janosevic v. Sweden para 106).
The Radio France and Others v. France defamation case concerned
a series of news flashes and bulletins on Radio France reporting on al-
legations published in the French weekly Le Point. A journalist reported
in a live broadcast that a French civil servant, Mr Juno, had supervised
in the past the deportation of one thousand Jews, while in reality he did
not take decisions on deportation. In line with French law, news bulletins
had to be updated before going on air again. The broadcast in question
was, however, repeated in either the same or a slightly different form
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sixty-two times. 7 The difficulties of the case stemmed from a combina-
tion of presumptions under French law. On the one hand, that defama-
tory statements are made in bad faith, on the other hand that a publishing
director was criminally responsible (as principal) for any defamatory
statement made on air where the content of that statement has been
‘fixed prior to being communicated to the public’ (Section 93-3 of the
Audiovisual Communication Act of 29 July 1982). Proceedings were
brought against the company, the publishing director and the journalist
who reported the story on air. The director and journalist were fined,
while the company was ordered to broadcast a report on the judgment.
The Paris Criminal Court found that the publishing director was not li-
able for the first live broadcast but for the ‘systematic repetition of the
disputed statements’, as his duty was to control what is broadcast on the
station.
The applicants claimed that French law established an irrebuttable
presumption of the director’s responsibility, which was inferred from
the sole objective facts of repeated statements and his function as direc-
tor. They argued that by applying an irrebuttable presumption of liability
on the part of the director, the decision involved breaches of Article 6
ECHR (Radio France and Others v. France para 21).
The French government claimed that the Convention did not
prohibit presumptions of fact or of law as such provided that they were
kept within reasonable limits (i.e. a balance between the importance of
what is at stake and the rights of the defence). Additionally, the pre-
sumption was neither absolute nor irrebuttable. Firstly, the prosecution
was still obliged to prove the objective elements of the offence, notably
the broadcast of a defamatory statement. Secondly, defendants could still
deny the facts or challenge their classification. Thirdly, the defendants
could have overturned the presumption by establishing good faith.
Therefore, the publishing director have put forward legal arguments
other than a claim not to be the director (his function) as an effective
defence (Radio France and Others v. France para 22). The government
further claimed that the presumption in question was within reasonable
limits, as it came into play solely with regard to specific offences and the
legal responsibility of each defendant was determined in strict propor-
tion to the part he or she had actually, played with a legal distinction
being drawn according to whether or not the content of the information
7 ECtHR, 30 March 2004, Radio France and Others v. France, appl. no. 53984/
00.
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had been fixed prior to its communication to the public (Radio France
and Others v. France para 22).
The Court took the view that French law presumed the director to
be responsible for the repeated defamatory broadcast. That said, his guilt
was not presumed as such, as it was a valid defence to prove good faith
through reasonable enquiry of facts. Further, the Court agreed with the
arguments of the French government that the journalist and the director
should have exercised the utmost care, as they must have been aware of
the potential impact for Mr Junot, and that it was possible to consider the
responsibility of the director (Radio France and Others v. France paras
24 and 39).
1.2. The relationship between presumption of innocence and modes of
criminal liability based on lack of supervision or control
In Radio France and Others v. France, the presumed responsibility
and so the criminal liability of the director was based on his lack of
supervision arising from his function, where such control could have
been exercised. The applicants claimed that the director’s guilt was auto-
matically inferred from mere objective facts and that the prosecution
was not being required to prove criminal intent.
Even if the prosecution was absolved from proving the mental ele-
ment, a number of objective elements still had to be proved, such as the
broadcast itself or the defamatory nature of the statement. Most impor-
tantly however, the director had a valid defence to overturn the presump-
tion when establishing that the offending remarks by the journalist had
been made in good faith.
Therefore, analogous to the Radio France case, it is conceivable
that heads of business might be responsible on objective grounds based
on their lack of control in breach of their duties. In line with the ECtHR
case law, responsibility could be established regardless of whether the
breach of duty occurred intentionally or negligently. However, strict lia-
bility in the narrow sense cannot be based on the ECtHR case law as in
Radio France, criminal liability was established only to the extent that
the director would have been able to exercise such oversight and there
was avalid defence to overturn the presumption and thus avoid criminal
liability completely.
1.3. The presumption of innocence and heads of business – concluding
remarks
The presumption of innocence is a core principle of the criminal
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justice process to protect the individual against the improper use of coer-
cive state power. Accordingly, the prosecution must prove the case in
trial, the defendant has the right to be heard, and it is unlawful to base
a conviction solely on the defendant’s silence.
According to the case law of the ECtHR a person’s right in a crim-
inal case to be presumed innocent and to require the prosecution to bear
the onus of proving the allegations against him or her is not absolute,
since presumptions of fact or law operate in every criminal law system
and are not prohibited in principle by the Convention. However, the
means employed have to be reasonably proportionate. In line with the
Courts’ case law, it is conceivable that under certain circumstances de-
fined by law, heads of business might be responsible on objective
grounds and without proving the mental element for their failure to per-
form their duty. Such responsibility could be established without breach-
ing the right to be presumed innocent, regardless of the mode of criminal
liability. However, strict criminal liability cannot be derived from the
ECtHR case law as in the elaborated cases a valid defence, thus a pos-
sibility to rebut the presumption was always available.
2. Privilege against self-incrimination
2.1. The case law of the ECtHR on the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in criminal matters
Overview. The privilege against self-incrimination, together with
the right to remain silent, is not expressly declared in the ECHR.
They have been implied in Article 6 ECHR through various judg-
ments of the Court which have recognised these immunities as ‘inter-
national standards, which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair pro-
cedure’ (John Murray v. United Kingdom 8 para 45; Funke v. France 9
para 44). The right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion shall minimise the risk of miscarriages of justice. The former
concerns individuals’ freedom not to speak/testify when questioned
by the police; the latter concerns the limits of coercive and oppressive
methods while the prosecution proves its case (Saunders v. United
Kingdom 10 para 68; Bykov v. Russia 11 para 92; John Murray v. Unit-
8 ECtHR, 8 February 1996, John Murray v. United Kingdom, appl.no. 18731/91.
9 ECtHR, 25 February 1993, Funke v. France, appl. no. 10828/84.
10 ECtHR, 17 December 1996, Saunders v. United Kingdom, appl. no. 19187/91.
11 ECtHR, 10 March 2009, Bykov v. France, appl. no. 4378/02.
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ed Kingdom para 45). 12 The right is relative. On the one hand, the
accused’s decision to remain silent throughout criminal proceedings
may carry consequences. On the other hand, the nature and degree
of compulsion, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the proce-
dure, the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punish-
ment of the offence at issue, and the use to which any material so ob-
tained is put may still allow the use of evidence obtained under com-
pulsion (Jalloh v. Germany paras 101 and 117; Bykov v. Russia para
104).
Case law
In the following, the analysis focuses on selected cases before the
ECtHR which dealt with the essence, scope and limitations of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent. Though the
ECtHR has not directly addressed the question of whether its case law
on the right to remain silent applies to legal persons, the following cases
might provide for some insights in the context of this study.
The privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain si-
lent were introduced to the Court’s jurisdiction in Funke v. France, a
customs case, where the applicant was convicted for his failure to give
information (to produce papers and documents in the form of foreign
bank accounts) which the authorities assumed to exist.
The Court found that the attempt to compel the applicant himself to
provide the evidence violated Article 6 ECHR. Even if later no criminal
proceedings were brought in the underlying case, the authorities—un-
able or unwilling to produce the evidence otherwise—compelled Funke
by threat of coercion (criminal sanctions) to provide the evidence him-
self, thereby contributing to his own incrimination (Funke v. France para
44).
In John Murray v. United Kingdom, the applicant, who was arrested
by police officers under the 1989 Prevention of Terrorism Act, decided
not to reply to police questioning, which eventually led to his conviction.
The Court found that there was no doubt that ‘the right to remain silent
under police questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are
generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the
notion of a fair procedure under Article 6’ (John Murray v. United King-
12 A Ashworth, ‘Self-Incrimination in European Human Rights Law – A
Pregnant Pragmatism?’ Cardozo Law Review 30 (2008) 767. See also S Lamberigts,
‘The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - A Chameleon of Criminal Procedure’, 7
New Journal of European Criminal Law (2016) 4, 418–438.
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dom para 45). The central question, however, concerned the impact of
the applicant’s silence during police questioning and trial. The Court
held it incompatible with the immunities to base a conviction solely
or mainly on the accused’s silence or on a refusal to answer questions
or to give evidence himself (John Murray v. United Kingdom para
47). Notwithstanding, the immunities could not and should not prevent
the accused’s silence from being taken into account in situations which
clearly call for an explanation or where the only explanation of the ac-
cused’s silence is that he had no answer to the case against him (John
Murray v. United Kingdom para 47). That said, even in such cases,
the silence cannot provide the sole or main reason for the accused’s con-
viction.
Thus, the right to silence is relative. The accused’s decision to re-
main silent throughout criminal proceedings may carry consequences,
but silence, in itself, cannot, be regarded as the sole indication of guilt.
The case of Saunders v. United Kingdom concerned the use of the
applicant’s statements in a criminal trial, these having been obtained un-
der legal compulsion in a previous administrative investigation. Saun-
ders, the applicant, had become a director and chief executive of Guin-
ness PLC. In a takeover battle for a third company, the company made
use of unlawful share support operations, which led to subsequent ad-
ministrative investigations. The domestic provisions required company
officers to produce books and documents, cooperate with inspectors
and give evidence under legal compulsion. A refusal could have led
to a finding of contempt of court, threatened by the imposition of a fine
or committal to prison. The transcripts were passed to the police and
formed a significant part of a subsequent prosecution case, in which
Saunders was convicted.
The Court held that in the context of the particular case, the use of
statements in a criminal case, compelled in a previous administrative in-
vestigation, infringed Article 6. Under Article 6 (1) ECHR, the right not
to incriminate oneself presupposes that the prosecution must prove their
case against the accused without recourse to evidence obtained ‘through
methods of coercion or oppression against the will of the accused’
(Saunders v. United Kingdom para 68). In a subsequent case, the Court
established key factors, such as the degree and nature of compulsion,
which are particularly decisive when establishing whether coercion/op-
pression against the individual’s will has violated Article 6 ECHR (see
Jalloh v. Germany below). The essence in the Saunders case was how-
ever the use to which evidence obtained under compulsion was put in
the course of the subsequent criminal trial (Saunders v. United Kingdom
para 71). The transcripts of the applicant’s answers, whether directly
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self-incriminating or not, were used in the course of the proceedings in a
manner which sought to incriminate the applicant in support of the pros-
ecution (Saunders v. United Kingdom para 72). Thus, not the degree or
nature of compulsion, or the use of compelled materials in criminal pro-
ceedings in general, but their use in a way that intended to support the
prosecution (e.g. potentially incriminating evidence) violated Article 6
ECHR in Saunders v. United Kingdom.
The Court also ruled that the right not to incriminate oneself is pri-
marily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to re-
main silent. It did not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of ma-
terial which may be obtained from the accused through the use of com-
pulsory powers but which had an existence independent of the will of
the suspect, such as breath, blood and urine samples. With that, the
Court distinguished between real evidence and oral or testimonial evi-
dence in the context of the right not to incriminate oneself (Saunders
v. United Kingdom para 69).
Finally, the Court also determined that the complexity of the of-
fence (corporate fraud) and the vital public interest in the investigation
of such fraud as well as the punishment of those responsible could not
justify a violation of Article 6 (Saunders v. United Kingdom para 74).
In Shannon v. United Kingdom, 13 the applicant—who had been al-
ready charged with criminal offences (false accounting and conspiracy
to defraud)—was at the same time summoned to a further interview with
financial investigators in connection with the same events. Shannon did
not attend the interview, as he received no written guarantee that his an-
swers would not be used in the parallel criminal proceedings. Subse-
quently, he was convicted for failing to comply without reasonable ex-
cuse with the investigators’ request.
The ECtHR found that, even if there were no subsequent proceed-
ings in which the evidence could have been used, being compelled to
answer questions when there is an ongoing parallel criminal investiga-
tion violates the privilege of not incriminating oneself (Shannon v. Unit-
ed Kingdom para 41). If Shannon had attended the interview, it would
have been open to the investigators to forward information to the police.
Even if the two investigations were being run separately, once the infor-
mation had been passed they would have converged, at least as far as the
applicant was concerned (Shannon v. United Kingdom para 39). Finally,
the Court found that the privilege not to incriminate oneself applies with
13 ECtHR, Shannon v. United Kingdom (Dec.) appl. no. 67537/01.
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no need for proceedings even to be brought (Shannon v. United Kingdom
para 40).
In Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland 14 the investigations were
criminal from the start but, as in Funke, the failure to give informa-
tion was a criminal offence itself (use of compulsion in respect of an
offence with which the person has been charged). The applicants,
who had been arrested in connection with a bombing, declined to an-
swer questions under special legislation requiring an individual to
provide a full account of his movements and actions during a speci-
fied period. Eventually, the applicants were acquitted of the underly-
ing offence but were imprisoned for failing to give an account of their
movements. The Court stressed once again that the right to remain
silent and the right not to incriminate oneself were not absolute
rights. That said, it found, that the ‘degree of compulsion’ imposed
on the applicants—namely, a conviction and imprisonment for failing
to give ‘a full account of [their] movements and actions during any
specified period and all information in [their] possession in relation
to the commission or intended commission [of specified of-
fences]’—in effect destroyed the very essence of their privilege
against self-incrimination and their right to remain silent’ (Heaney
and McGuinness v. Ireland para 55). Thus, the liability for an offence
arising from failing to provide information violated the privilege
against self-incrimination under Article 6 even without incriminating
evidence actually being used in criminal proceedings. 15
The Court noted anew that the security and public-order concerns
arising from terrorism could not justify such a legal regime, which ex-
tinguishes the very essence of the applicant’s rights to silence and privi-
lege against self-incrimination (Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland para
58).
Jalloh v. Germany 16 concerned the use of evidence, in the form of
drugs swallowed by the applicant, which had been obtained by the for-
cible administration of emetics. Policemen repeatedly observed Jalloh
supposedly handing over drugs in plastic bags to another person in ex-
change for money. The police officers went on to arrest him, where-
upon he swallowed another plastic bag. Since further delay might have
14 ECtHR, 21 March 2001 (final), Heaney and McGuiness v. Ireland, appl. no.
34720/97.
15 See also A Ashworth, ‘Self-Incrimination in European Human Rights Law – A
Pregnant Pragmatism?’ Cardozo Law Review 30 (2008) 756-757.
16 ECtHR, 15 November 2016, Jalloh v. Germany, appl. no. 54810/00.
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frustrated the conduct of the investigation, the public prosecutor or-
dered that a doctor administer emetics to the applicant in order to pro-
voke the regurgitation of the bag. In its judgment, the Court established
the key factors, which are particularly decisive when establishing
whether coercion/oppression against the individual’s will has violated
Article 6 ECHR.
These are the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the
evidence, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure,
the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment
of the offence at issue, and the use to which any material so obtained
is put (Jalloh v. Germany paras 101 and 117; Bykov v. Russia para
104). The Court also upheld his opinion that public interest concerns
cannot justify measures which extinguish the very essence of an appli-
cant’s defence rights (Jalloh v. Germany para 119).
2.2. The case law of the CJEU on the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in competition proceedings
The scope of the privilege against self-incrimination in competition
proceedings differs in nature from that in criminal law proceedings.
Neither the CJEU nor Article 23 (5) of Council Regulation (EC) 1/
2003 accepts punitive administrative sanctions in competition cases as
criminal in nature. 17 The Commission has no real power to summon
persons for questioning: Article 19 Reg. 1/2003 is limited to situations
of consent, whereas Article 20 deals with explanations of facts or docu-
ments relating to the subject matter and purpose of inspections. 18 In
these cases, the main questions concern the powers of the Commission
and the cooperation duty of the undertakings. 19
The privilege against self-incrimination, as in the ECHR, is not
expressly articulated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
17 S Lamberigts, ‘The Directive on the Presumption of Innocence: A Missed
Opportunity for Legal Persons?’ 1 Eucrim (2016) 36–37. See Council Regulation
(EC) 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=ce-
lex:32003R0001
18 M Luchtman, J Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safe-
guards: Improving OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with other
EU Law Enforcement Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB 2015) 259.
19 See Orkem v. Commission 374/87 (1989) E.C.R. 3282, para 18. See M Veen-
brink, ‘The Privilege against Self-Incrimination in EU Competition Law: A Deafening
Silence?’ 42 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2015) 2, 119.
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European Union. 20 The explanatory note on Article 47 of the Charter
(fair trial) states that the second paragraph of the Article corresponds
to Article 6 (1) of the ECHR. 21 Nevertheless, it is Article 48 (2) of
the Charter that covers the prohibition of self-incrimination. 22 To
date, the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination
in competition proceedings remain embedded in the case law and
could be summarised as not including a broader right not to cooperate
with the Commission. 23
The CJEU ruled on the question of whether a right to silence applies
to undertakings in Orkem v. Commission, 24 a judgment which predated
the first ECtHR judgment on the right to silence in Funke v. France. Or-
kem, a limited liability company, challenged a decision of the Commis-
sion requesting information on several grounds, one of which compelled
Orkem to incriminate itself by admitting an infringement of competition
law (Orkem v. Commission para 18). The CJEU turned to the general
principles (at that time) of Community law and took stock of the fact
that there was neither an express legal basis in the ECHR nor a judgment
of ECtHR recognising a right to silence. The Court further argued that
the right was primarily reserved for natural persons in the criminal pro-
ceedings of Member States (Orkem v. Commission para 29). The CJEU
found, however, that the power of the Commission to compel undertak-
ings to provide it with information and documents may not go so far that
it would, by means of a decision calling for information, undermine the
undertaking’s rights of defence (Orkem v. Commission para 34). It then
held that requiring undertakings to provide answers to factual questions
and the handing over of documents is acceptable, whereas requiring an
admission of infringement of EU competition law (i.e. guilt), which it is
incumbent upon the Commission to prove, is not (Orkem v. Commission
para 35). 25 Orkem was later incorporated into Recital 23 of Regulation
1/2003, according to which ‘undertakings cannot be forced to admit that
they have committed an infringement’; however, ‘they are in any event
20 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2010 C83/02.
21 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02).
22 M Veenbrink, ‘The Privilege against Self-Incrimination in EU Competition
Law: A Deafening Silence?’ 42 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2015) 2, 120.
23 M Luchtman et al. (eds) Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: Im-
proving OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with other EU Law En-
forcement Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB 2015) 258.
24 ECJ Case C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission, 18 October 1989.
25 S Lamberigts, ‘The Directive on the Presumption of Innocence: A Missed
Opportunity for Legal Persons?’ 1 Eucrim (2016) 40.
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obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents, even if
this information may be used to establish against them or against another
undertaking the existence of an infringement’. Thus, undertakings may
only refuse to answer questions that would require them to admit di-
rectly the very infringement that the Commission is trying to prove
(see the different approach of the ECtHR in Saunders above, section
2.1).
While Orkem predated Funke, the CJEU has not fundamentally al-
tered its position in light of the subsequent case law of the ECtHR. In
fact, it confirmed its position in Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG, 26 by
stating that an undertaking ‘can be recognised as having a right to si-
lence only to the extent that it would be compelled to provide answers
which might involve an admission on its part of the existence of an in-
fringement which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove’ (paras
29 and 67). In Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG, questions were consid-
ered whereby the Commission called upon an undertaking to describe
the purpose of meetings and the decisions adopted during them, even
though it was clear that this might compel the undertaking to admit
its participation in an unlawful agreement contrary to the Community
rules on competition and thus breach the rights of the defence (paras
71 and 73).
The case law of the CJEU leads to difficult distinctions in practice
between admissible factual questions and forbidden questions on guilt.
On the one hand, undertakings must communicate all facts which may
be relevant in light of the law relating to restrictive agreements and prac-
tices. On the other hand, they may not be questioned on the intention,
aim or purpose of particular practices or measures, given that such ques-
tions might constrain them to admit infringements. 27
2.3. The right of heads of business to remain silent in the context of
administrative or criminal investigations against the legal entity
The ECtHR has not directly addressed the question of whether its
case law on the right to remain silence applies to legal persons. On
the one hand, the Court has generally been willing to apply several other
rights covered by Article 6 ECHR to legal persons; on the other hand,
26 Case T-112/98, Mannesmannröhren-Werke [2001] ECR II-00729,
ECLI:EU:T:2001:61.
27 S Lamberigts, ‘The Directive on the Presumption of Innocence: A Missed
Opportunity for Legal Persons?’ 1 Eucrim (2016) 40.
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some of the Court’s case law—for example, in relation to Article
8—suggests that it is more willing to accept restrictions to corporate
rights than to those of individuals. Therefore, should the ECtHR ex-
pressly apply the right to silence for legal persons in the future, it is un-
certain whether legal persons would be able to fully rely on the protec-
tion. 28
The Saunders case has some relevance with regard to the issue.
The applicant was the chief executive of Guinness and acted in his
capacity of corporate official, even if prosecuted in his individual ca-
pacity. 29 Moreover, the case covers both administrative and criminal
investigations. In this judgment, the Court held that the use to which
evidence obtained under compulsion is put in a criminal proceeding
might amount to an unjustifiable infringement of Article 6 if it is used
in a way to support the prosecution. The Court did not restrict Saun-
ders’s privilege against self-incrimination on the grounds that he
acted in his capacity of corporate official. This suggests that the
Court does not find that by accepting a position of corporate official
one waives the personal privilege against self-incrimination in rela-
tion to those corporate activities. 30 Therefore, the ECtHR case law
suggests that the privilege might apply for heads of business when
being questioned regarding the company if their answers could
incriminate them in person. In the context of heads of business, it
would be important both for the individuals involved and for the cor-
poration that a clear indication is given as to the capacity in which the
individuals are being interviewed: as a representative of the corpora-
tion, as a witness or as a suspect. 31
2.4. The potential use of evidence gathered in a previous investigation
against the legal entity in a subsequent criminal proceeding against
the individual head of business
The Court still has to address directly whether the scope of the
28 S Lamberigts, The privilege against self-incrimination of corporations (Doc-
toral thesis, University of Luxembourg 2017) 99. See, for example, ECtHR, Menarini
Diagnostics v. Italy, 27 September 2011. appl. no. 43509/08 in relation to Art. 1.
29 S Lamberigts, The privilege against self-incrimination of corporations (Doc-
toral thesis, University of Luxembourg 2017) 92.
30 S Lamberigts, The privilege against self-incrimination of corporations (Doc-
toral thesis, University of Luxembourg 2017) 92.
31 S Lamberigts, The privilege against self-incrimination of corporations (Doc-
toral thesis, University of Luxembourg 2017) 49.
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privilege covers legal entities at all. If so, which employees could rely
on the privilege, and could evidence gathered against the legal entity
subsequently be used against the individual head of business?
Once again, Saunders might provide some useful insights, as the
ECtHR gave a clear indication on the use of evidence obtained under
compulsion in an administrative investigation in a subsequent criminal
proceeding against the same individual. In Saunders, the evidence was
compelled in a non-criminal investigation and used in a subsequent
criminal case against the same person. The Court held that it was neither
the compulsory questioning nor the use of compelled evidence that vio-
lated Article 6 ECHR, but the use to which compelled evidence was put
by the prosecution in the subsequent criminal proceedings. Therefore,
according to the ECtHR case law, the privilege might solely protect
heads of business by excluding the use of evidence obtained under com-
pulsion in the context of a previous administrative investigation if it is
used in an incriminating manner in order to assist the prosecution of
the head of business in a subsequent criminal trial.
2.5. The privilege against self-incrimination and heads of business –
concluding remarks
The privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain si-
lent are not expressly declared in the ECHR, but have been implied in
Article 6 ECHR through various judgments of the Court, minimising
the risk of miscarriages of justice. The right is not absolute. The ac-
cused’s decision to remain silent throughout criminal proceedings may
carry consequences, while the nature and degree of compulsion, the ex-
istence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure, the weight of the
public interest in the investigation and punishment of the offence at is-
sue, and the use to which any material so obtained is put may allow the
use of evidence obtained under compulsion. That said, the use of mate-
rials compelled in administrative investigations as evidence in parallel or
subsequent criminal proceedings in order to support the prosecution
does violate Article 6 ECHR.
Similarly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union does not provide for an express articulation of these immunities.
The protection that legal persons can derive from the Luxembourg
Court’s case law with regard to the right to silence is limited: factual
questions must be answered, the handing over of incriminating docu-
ments can be required, and only questions that might imply an admission
of guilt do not have to be answered. Thus, under EU law, there is no
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right to refuse to hand over documents and the privilege against self-in-
crimination is limited to confessions. 32
The ECtHR still has to address directly whether the scope of the
privilege covers legal entities at all. The ECtHR case law suggests that
the privilege might apply to heads of business when being questioned
regarding the company if their answers could incriminate them in per-
son. In line with the ECtHR case law, the privilege might also protect
heads of businesses by excluding the use of evidence obtained under
compulsion in the context of a previous administrative investigation if
it is used in an incriminating manner against them in a subsequent crim-
inal trial.
3. Principle of ne bis in idem
3.1. The case law of the European Courts (ECtHR and CJEU) on the
principle of ne bis in idem
The right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings
for the same criminal offence is laid down in Article 4 P7 ECHR and
Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The relevance of this
right for the present study is well demonstrated by some high profile
cases in the financial sector. 33
In 2007, Banco Santander, Fortis Bank and the Royal Bank of Scot-
land, for instance, obtained control over ABN AMRO Bank through a
hostile takeover. 34 Fortis Bank had problems financing its part of the
takeover and decided to go to the capital market for fresh capital. Due
to the financial meltdown, and the nationalisation and dismantling of
Fortis Bank, doubts were very soon raised about the financial integrity
of the company and the information given to existing and new share-
32 S Lamberigts, The privilege against self-incrimination of corporations (Doc-
toral thesis, University of Luxembourg 2017) 120.
33 For instance, the Fortis case, discussed by JAE Vervaele, MJJP Luchtman,
‘Criminal Law Enforcement of EU Harmonised Financial Policies - The Need for a
Shared Criminal Policy’, in: F de Jong (ed) Overarching views of Crime and Deviancy
- Rethinking the Legacy of the Utrecht School (Eleven International Publishers, The
Hague 2015).
34 This case description is based on JAE Vervaele, MJJP Luchtman, ‘Criminal
Law Enforcement of EU Harmonised Financial Policies - The Need for a Shared
Criminal Policy,’ in: F de Jong (ed) Overarching views of Crime and Deviancy - Re-
thinking the Legacy of the Utrecht School (Eleven International Publishers, The Hague
2015).
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holders at the time of the capital extension. The rules on market abuse,
part of the hardcore European law on the financial markets, 35 apply in
all EU Member States. Nonetheless, the enforcement of these rules in
the Fortis case was almost completely driven by the national enforce-
ment design and national enforcement agendas, as the European rules
leave much discretion to the Member States. Infringements of the EU
market abuse rules are administrative irregularities and criminal offences
in both Belgium and Luxembourg, as well as in the Netherlands. More-
over, legal persons can be criminally liable in the three countries for
these types of offences. However, in Luxembourg, no action was under-
taken at all by the administrative or judicial authorities, although Lux-
embourg was involved in the later (partial) nationalisation of Fortis.
In the Netherlands, administrative enforcement authorities opened inves-
tigations against the former Fortis Bank concerning suspicions of market
abuse. In Belgium, both administrative and judicial authorities opened
investigations against the former Fortis Bank and against the CEOs. This
led to concurrent and parallel investigations and proceedings in Belgium
and the Netherlands, but to no investigations at all in Luxembourg. In
2012, the Dutch Financial Services Authority (Autoriteit Financiële
Markten: AFM), the administrative enforcement agency, was the first
to conclude proceedings and imposed four fines 36 of 144,000 euros each
on the two legal persons that constituted the Fortis Bank corporation/
holding. They were found guilty of market abuse.
The imposition of the administrative fines by the AFM on the two
legal persons constituting the holding of Fortis Bank had undoubtedly
been coordinated together with the Dutch judicial authorities. In the
Netherlands, the legal framework imposes a duty upon the administrative
and judicial enforcement authorities to choose, at a certain stage, one of
the two enforcement regimes—in other words, to opt either for adminis-
trative sanctions or criminal prosecution (the so-called una via princi-
ple). 37 However, this does not preclude criminal proceedings against
the former CEOs. The Dutch Public Prosecution Service has not given
formal notice of any ongoing judicial investigation in that sphere. 38
35 At that time, Directive 6/2003/EC of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and
market manipulation (market abuse), OJ EU L 96/16.
36 See www.afm.nl/~/media/files/boete/2010/fortis-besluit-nv.ashx and
www.afm.nl/~/media/files/boete/2010/fortis-besluit-sanv.ashx.
37 This means that the administrative and criminal enforcement authorities have
to decide at a certain stage in the investigation to opt for either administrative
sanctioning or criminal prosecution.
38 The Dutch Public Prosecution Service does not, in general, publish
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It is not known and is difficult to guess if the authorities took into
account the transnational dimension of the case when deciding to opt for
administrative enforcement rather than taking the criminal law route.
However, what is clear is that we can talk about unilateral action by
the Dutch authorities without coordinating with the Belgian administra-
tive and judicial authorities despite Article 16 (3) MAD 2003. In 2012,
the Belgian administrative enforcement agency, the Financial Services
and Markets Authority (FSMA), found evidence that the company had
distributed misleading information and imposed fines of 500,000 euros
on the former Fortis Bank and fines of up to 400,000 euros against the
CEOs. Finally, in 2013, the Belgian judicial authorities decided to prose-
cute seven former CEOs for misleading information, market abuse, the
forgery of documents and deception, but decided not to prosecute the
former Fortis Bank or BNP Paribas Fortis (the new owner of the bank).
The Fortis case illustrates the complex issues the ne bis in idem
principle brings about, particularly when multiple authorities take part
in the investigations. Further complications arise when those investiga-
tions take different paths—i.e. of a criminal or administrative law na-
ture—and/or when they involve different legal orders. Fortis illustrates
the need to develop an encompassing vision on the ne bis in idem prin-
ciple in the EU setting, taking account not only of the national/inner
state dimension of law enforcement, but also the transnational dimen-
sion.
The principle of ne bis in idem can be said to protect, first of all, the
res judicata status of the first (court) ruling on the matter and thus to pre-
vent the possibility of contradicting verdicts. Secondly, the principle is
nowadays also seen as a fundamental right, protecting the interests of in-
dividuals. 39 The transnational safeguard of Article 54 CISA, for instance,
ensures ‘that a person whose trial has been finally disposed of is not
prosecuted in several Contracting States for the same acts on account
of his having exercised his right to freedom of movement, the aim being
to ensure legal certainty—in the absence of harmonisation or approxima-
tion of the criminal laws of the Member States—through respect for de-
cisions of public bodies which have become final.’ 40
For the purposes of application of the ne bis in idem principle, four
communications on the opening or non-opening of financial judicial investigations or
on ongoing financial judicial investigations. In Belgium, however, this is the current
practice.
39 See M. Luchtman, ‘Transnational law enforcement in the European Union and
the ne bis in idem principle’, 4 REALaw (2011), 5-29, with further references.
40 Case C-486/14, Kossowski, ECLI:EU:C:2016:483, para 44.
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conditions must be satisfied: (1) the person prosecuted or on whom the
penalty is imposed is the same; (2) the acts being judged are the same
(idem); (3) there are two sets of proceedings in which a punitive penalty
is imposed (bis); and (4) one of the two decisions is final. 41 The prin-
ciple only applies to punitive penalties 42. This means that combinations
of criminal law and punitive administrative law penalties also come
within the scope of the principle. The Strasbourg Court confirmed in
A. and B. v. Norway that this is still the case. 43 As regards the finality
of the verdict, this depends on the issue of whether prosecution has been
definitively barred according to national law and whether there has been
a decision on the merits of the case. 44 The concept of ‘idem’ has been
defined by both of the European Courts as ‘a set of concrete factual cir-
cumstances involving the same defendant and inextricably linked to-
gether in time and space, the existence of which must be demonstrated
in order to secure a conviction or institute criminal proceedings.’ 45
Recently, much debate has arisen around the concept of ‘bis’. After
intense pressure by signatory States, the ECtHR mitigated the effects of
the principle by redefining the concept. Essentially, the Court held
that—depending on whether combinations of criminal and administra-
tive law penalties are sufficiently connected in substance and time—-
those combinations may not constitute two distinct, consecutive sets
of proceedings (‘bis’) but are more accurately regarded as one and the
same procedure, thereby precluding the application of the principle.
This new case law has now been put before the Luxembourg Court.
The issue is whether the article in question—Article 50 CFR—has the
same meaning and the same scope as the corresponding right in the
ECHR (at least within the same Member State) or whether the EU
should maintain its previous, higher standard (cf. Article 52 (3) CFR),
as it already did, for instance, in Åkerberg Fransson. 46
It appears to us that the key to answering this question is to identify
whether the specifics of the EU legal order, which is based on such prin-
41 Cf. Case C-596/16, Enzo di Puma, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:669, para 53.
42 ECtHR, Engel and Others v. The Netherlands, 8 June 1976, para 80–82; Case
C-489/10, Bonda, ECLI:EU:C:2012:319.
43 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B. v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11
and 29758/11, para 107.
44 Cf. Case C-398/12, M, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1057, para 31.
45 ECtHR 10 February 2009, Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, appl. no. 14939/03,
para 84. See also ECJ Case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, ECLI:EU:C:2006:165, para
36, 38.
46 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:280.
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ciples as primacy, loyal cooperation but also procedural autonomy, and
the principle of attributed powers merit a deviation from the new Stras-
bourg case law. Two elements will certainly have to be taken into con-
sideration for that. First of all, it is well known that the Seventh Protocol
has not been ratified very well by European States and that many signa-
tory States have limited the scope of the ne bis in idem safeguard further
to criminal law sensu stricto. Secondly, there are differences in the prin-
ciple’s scope as put forward by its different supranational sources, par-
ticularly Article 4 P7 ECHR and Article 50 CFR. The scope of the prin-
ciple is, after all, linked to the functional, personal and territorial bound-
aries of the legal order of which it is part. Under Article 4 P7 ECHR, the
application of the principle is limited to the legal orders of the individual
signatory States. That article provides that ‘no one shall be liable to be
tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of
the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally ac-
quitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of
that State’ (our emphasis). The territorial scope of the corresponding
Charter provision is much wider: ‘no one shall be liable to be tried or
punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or
she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union
in accordance with the law’ (our emphasis).
The Court of Justice’s case law on Articles 54–58 CISA (which, ac-
cording to the Explanatory Report to the Charter, has inspired the scope
and content of Article 50 CFR) has already pointed out that these articles
form a part of the area of freedom, security and justice and are to be in-
terpreted accordingly; Article 3 (2) TEU states that ‘the European Union
is to offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in
conjunction with appropriate measures with regard to, amongst other
matters, the prevention and combating of crime. Therefore, the interpre-
tation of the final nature, for the purposes of Article 54 of the CISA, of a
decision in criminal proceedings in a Member State must be undertaken
in the light not only of the need to ensure the free movement of persons
but also of the need to promote the prevention and combating of crime
within the area of freedom, security and justice.’ 47
The Court of Justice seems to follow a similar approach in compe-
tition matters, in cases where EU competition law and the national com-
petition law of its Member States coincide. 48 It does recognise that de-
47 Case C-486/14, Kossowski, ECLI:EU:C:2016:483, para 46–47.
48 Cf. Case C-289/04 P, Showa Denko v. Commission, EU:C:2006:431, para 50–58.
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cisions taken within one legal order have a bearing on the other, where
both are part of the European legal order. However, it has been reluctant
to introduce a full Erledigungsprinzip in that respect. Already in Walt
Wilhelm, the Court held that ‘the acceptability of a dual procedure of
[national and EC competition law] follows in fact from the special sys-
tem of the sharing of jurisdiction between the Community and the Mem-
ber States with regard to cartels. If, however, the possibility of two pro-
cedures being conducted separately were to lead to the imposition of
consecutive sanctions, a general requirement of natural justice...demands
that any previous punitive decision must be taken into account in deter-
mining any sanction which is to be imposed.’ 49
Article 50 CFR is not an absolute right. It may be subjected to lim-
itations in accordance with Article 52 CFR. 50 In that situation, those
limitations must have a decent legal basis in the law, must not nullify
the essence of the principle, must answer an important public interest/le-
gitimate goal and must meet the requirements of the proportionality
principle. Recently, AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona argued (in our opin-
ion, convincingly) that the route of Article 52 CFR is the only route to
limit the scope of Article 50; 51 the principle that sanctions of EU law
are dissuasive, proportionate and effective can, as such, not be consid-
ered to be a limitation of the principle. 52
3.2. Overview and critical assessment of the case law of the ECtHR
and of the CJEU on the compatibility of ‘dual track enforcement sys-
tems’ with the principle of ne bis in idem
3.2.1. ECtHR’s new approach in A. and B. v. Norway
As indicated above, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR changed its
This is different for third states; see C-231/14 P, Innolux, ECLI:EU:C:2015:451, para 75;
C-289/04 P, Showa Denko v. Commission, EU:C:2006:431, para 52–58; Case C-308/04
P, SGL Carbon v. Commission, EU:C:2006:433, para 28–34; and C-328/05 P, SGL Car-
bon v. Commission, EU:C:2007:277, para 24–35.
49 Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4, para 11.
50 Case C-129/14 PPU, Zoran Spasic, EU:C:2014:586, discussed by JAE Ver-
vaele, ‘Schengen and Charter Related ne bis in idem Protection in the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice: M and Zoran Spasic’, 52 Common Market Law Review
(2015) 1339–1360.
51 Case C-524/15, Menci, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:667, para 120–125; C-596/
16, Di Puma, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:669, para 81-88; C-537/16, Garlsson Real
Estate, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:668, para 74–81.
52 C-537/16, Garlsson Real Estate, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:668, para 72–74.
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case law on the concept of ‘bis’ in A. and B. v. Norway. The case in-
volved a combination of tax and criminal proceedings, including puni-
tive tax sanctions. The facts in the two sets of proceedings were essen-
tially the same. The tax decisions became final in December 2008, less
than two years before the criminal proceedings. The obvious question
was whether all of this was in line with the ne bis in idem principle.
In its judgment, the majority of the Grand Chamber held that ‘in
cases raising an issue under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, it is the task
of the Court to determine whether the specific national measure com-
plained of entails, in substance or in effect, double jeopardy to the detri-
ment of the individual or whether, in contrast, it is the product of an in-
tegrated system enabling different aspects of the wrongdoing to be ad-
dressed in a foreseeable and proportionate manner forming a coherent
whole, so that the individual concerned is not thereby subjected to injus-
tice.’ 53 For that, ‘it must be shown that [the proceedings] have been
combined in an integrated manner so as to form a coherent whole. This
implies not only that the purposes pursued and the means used to
achieve them should in essence be complementary and linked in time,
but also that the possible consequences of organising the legal treatment
of the conduct concerned in such a manner should be proportionate and
foreseeable for the persons affected.’ 54
Consequently, the Grand Chamber held in para 132:
‘Material factors for determining whether there is a sufficiently
close connection in substance include:
- whether the different proceedings pursue complementary purposes
and thus address, not only in abstracto but also in concreto, different as-
pects of the social misconduct involved;
- whether the duality of proceedings concerned is a foreseeable con-
sequence, both in law and in practice, of the same impugned conduct
(idem);
- whether the relevant sets of proceedings are conducted in such a
manner as to avoid as far as possible any duplication in the collection as
well as the assessment of the evidence, notably through adequate inter-
53 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11 and
29758/11, para 122.
54 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11 and
29758/11, para 130.
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action between the various competent authorities to bring about that the
establishment of facts in one set is also used in the other set;
- and, above all, whether the sanction imposed in the proceedings
which become final first is taken into account in those which become
final last, so as to prevent that the individual concerned is in the end
made to bear an excessive burden, this latter risk being least likely to
be present where there is in place an offsetting mechanism designed
to ensure that the overall amount of any penalties imposed is proportion-
ate.’
The Grand Chamber clarified the first criterion as follows:
‘Combined proceedings will more likely meet the criteria of com-
plementarity and coherence if the sanctions to be imposed in the pro-
ceedings not formally classified as "criminal" are specific for the con-
duct in question and thus differ from "the hard core of criminal law"...-
The additional factor that those proceedings do not carry any significant
degree of stigma renders it less likely that the combination of proceed-
ings will entail a disproportionate burden on the accused person. Con-
versely, the fact that the administrative proceedings have stigmatising
features largely resembling those of ordinary criminal proceedings en-
hances the risk that the social purposes pursued in sanctioning the con-
duct in different proceedings will be duplicated (bis) rather than comple-
menting one another.’ 55
Moreover, the Grand Chamber continued:
‘[W]here the connection in substance is sufficiently strong, the
requirement of a connection in time nonetheless remains and must
be satisfied. This does not mean, however, that the two sets of pro-
ceedings have to be conducted simultaneously from beginning to
end. It should be open to States to opt for conducting the proceedings
progressively in instances where doing so is motivated by interests of
efficiency and the proper administration of justice, pursued for differ-
ent social purposes, and has not caused the applicant to suffer dispro-
portionate prejudice. However, as indicated above, the connection in
time must always be present. Thus, the connection in time must be
sufficiently close to protect the individual from being subjected to un-
55 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11 and
29758/11, para 133.
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certainty and delay and from proceedings becoming protracted over
time...even where the relevant national system provides for an “inte-
grated” scheme separating administrative and criminal components.
The weaker the connection in time the greater the burden on the State
to explain and justify any such delay as may be attributable to its con-
duct of the proceedings.’ 56
Applying these criteria to the case of A, the Grand Chamber clari-
fied that, under Norwegian law:
‘the purpose of ordinary tax penalties was first and foremost to en-
hance the effectiveness of the taxpayer’s duty to provide complete and
correct information and to secure the foundations of the national tax sys-
tem, a precondition for a functioning State and thus a functioning so-
ciety. Criminal conviction (...), on the other hand, (...), served not only
as a deterrent but also had a punitive purpose in respect of the same
anti-social omission, involving the additional element of the commission
of culpable fraud.’ 57
The Grand Chamber concluded that no violation of Article 4 P7
could be established, because:
‘1. There was no cause to call into doubt either the reasons why the
Norwegian legislature opted to regulate the socially undesirable conduct
of non-payment of taxes in an integrated dual (administrative/criminal)
process or the reasons why the competent Norwegian authorities chose
to deal separately with the more serious and socially reprehensible as-
pect of fraud in a criminal procedure rather than in the ordinary admin-
istrative procedure.
2. The conduct of dual proceedings, with the possibility of differ-
ent cumulated penalties, was foreseeable for the applicant, who must
have known from the outset that criminal prosecution and the impo-
sition of tax penalties was possible, or even likely, on the facts of the
case.
3. The criminal proceedings and the administrative proceedings
were conducted in parallel and were interconnected. The establishment
56 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11 and
29758/11, para 134.
57 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11 and
29758/11, para 144.
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of facts made in one set was used in the other set and, as regards the
proportionality of the overall punishment inflicted, the sentence imposed
in the criminal trial had regard to the tax penalty.’ 58
With respect to B, the Grand Chamber came to the same conclusion
after having explained why the delay in the criminal proceedings did not
alter this outcome. The Grand Chamber held:
‘[T]he second applicant had withdrawn his confession in February
2009, with the consequence that he had had to be indicted anew on 29
May 2009 and an ordinary adversarial trial hearing had had to be sched-
uled. This circumstance, resulting from a change of stance by the second
applicant, cannot of itself suffice to disconnect in time the tax proceed-
ings and the criminal proceedings. In particular, the additional lapse of
time before the criminal trial hearing cannot be considered dispropor-
tionate or unreasonable, having regard to its cause.’ 59
Dissenter, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque strongly disagreed with the
majority. By reformulating the concept of ‘bis’, the majority has in fact
reduced the principle to a guarantee for ‘the authority of the chose jugée,
with the sole purpose of ensuring the punitive interest of the State and
the impugnability of State adjudicatory decisions.’ 60 The dissenter is
critical, first of all, because of the fact that the dividing line between
the hard core of criminal law and other types of irregularity has always
been a particularly problematic issue, certainly in light of the conse-
quences that may follow from this division in terms of different levels
of fundamental rights protection.
The dissenter also, and rightly, stresses that the issue of the foresee-
ability is—as it is now applied— an empty shell. Criminal offences and
sanctions, as defined by the Strasbourg organs, will always have to meet
the requirements of foreseeability; that already follows from Article 7
ECHR. What needs to be foreseeable is the duality of the proceedings,
but hardly any consideration was given by the majority to that condition
and the choices to be made by the cooperating authorities in that respect
(with a view to preventing arbitrary outcomes). In fact, as the dissenter
58 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11 and
29758/11, para 146.
59 ECtHR (GC), 15 November 2016, A. and B v. Norway, appl. nos. 24130/11 and
29758/11, para 151.
60 Dissenting opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para 49.
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notices, the applicable national guidelines were not followed in this case.
From that point of view, the Grand Chamber’s approach also raises
questions in light of Strasbourg case law, particularly Camilleri v. Mal-
ta. 61
As regards the issue of the avoidance of unnecessary duplications,
the dissenting judge argues that the approach chosen by the majority
poses challenges to the (overall) authority of the state (because of the
risk of contradicting decisions) and removes barriers to forum shopping
and manipulations by the authorities. We would add to that criticism that
the arguments put forward by the majority could just as easily have been
applied in the opposite direction. The Court emphasises that the comple-
mentarity of the proceedings is essential to prevent a bis in idem situa-
tion. But now that coordination and cooperation are so strongly pro-
moted, why should those authorities not be given the joint responsibility
to prevent or stall dual proceedings in the first place?
Finally, as regards the offsetting mechanism designed to ensure that
the overall amount of any penalties imposed is proportionate, this criteri-
on can only be of help in those cases where the first set of proceedings
led to the application of sanctions. In the end, the new case law appears
incredibly difficult to apply, the ‘gains’ for states not very clear, and the
position of the individual increasingly complicated.
3.2.2. Follow-up in European Union
Obviously, A. and B. v. Norway did not go unnoticed by the EU
Member States. Following the apparent overturning of Grande Stevens
v. Italy by that judgment, four Italian cases have now been put to the
ECJ, all of them dealing with the issue of whether the new Strasbourg
approach will have consequences for the course of the European Union.
After all, as the Explanation to Article 50 CFR indicates, regarding the
situations referred to by Article 4 of Protocol No 7 (i.e. the application
of the principle within the same Member State), the guaranteed right has
the same meaning and the same scope as the corresponding right in the
ECHR. However, Article 53 (3) CFR also stipulates that that provision
shall not prevent Union law from providing more extensive protection.
So, what should be the course of the EU after A. and B. v. Norway?
All four Italian cases revolve around the compatibility of combina-
tions of criminal law and administrative law (punitive) sanctions with
61 ECtHR 22 January 2013, Camilleri v. Malta, appl. no. 42931/10.
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Article 50 CFR. One of these cases concerns the protection of the EU’s
financial interests; the other three are related to the area of market abuse.
Menci Luca is the most important case in this regard. 62 In that case,
Menci Luca was inter alia fined for an amount of over 80,000 euros by
the tax authorities in November 2013 for a failure to pay VAT. In No-
vember 2014, criminal proceedings were opened into the same facts,
long after the tax fine had become final. Is this in line with the principle
of ne bis in idem (Article 50 CFR)? What is the influence of the changed
Strasbourg approach in this regard? AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona con-
sidered that the Court essentially had the choice between:
1. acceptance of the new course of the ECtHR and to follow that
approach.
2. rejection of that course and the further development of its own
course in light of Article 52 (3) CFR.
The AG clearly advised the Court not to follow Strasbourg and not
to bow to pressure exerted by the Member States, many of which have
dual regimes of enforcement and have made reservations to the scope of
Article 4 P7 (or have not even ratified it). According to the AG, it would
make the scope of the guarantee dependent on the choices made by the
Member States, whereas the new Strasbourg criterion of sufficient con-
nection easily leads to legal uncertainty and complexities.
Consequently, the AG explores to what extent Article 50 CFR
may be limited through Article 52 (1) CFR in combined proceedings
of administrative and criminal law. He ultimately rejects that position
because of a lack of need for such a far-reaching limitation of the
principle. There are other options available to guarantee the goals
pursued by dual systems that do not come into conflict with the ne
bis in idem principle. This is demonstrated, according to the AG,
by the mere existence of mechanisms that prevent ne bis in idem situ-
ations from occurring in other states (una via systems). A duality of
proceedings without additional measures—even when it has a legal
basis and serves legitimate interests—does not therefore meet the re-
quirement of necessity, as meant in Article 52 (1) CFR. It may even
nullify the essence of the guarantee.
62 C-524/15, Menci, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:667. The subsequent develop-
ments on ne bis in idem have been analysed in M Luchtman, ‘The ECJ’s recent case
law on ne bis in idem: Implications for law enforcement in a shared legal order’, Com-
mon Market Law Review 55 (2018), 1717-1750.
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We agree with that approach. What the AG ultimately tries to
achieve is to protect the coherence and unity of the European legal order.
The principle of procedural autonomy, which gives Member States a
certain degree of leeway when implementing EU law, cannot offer a
convincing argument for limiting the scope of the principle of ne bis
in idem, as there are enough viable alternatives for reconciling the dif-
ferent interests involved. The AG has moreover rightfully stated that
the requirement of EU market abuse law that sanctions be effective, dis-
suasive and proportionate cannot warrant that conclusion either. 63 There
is no reason to conclude otherwise in the area of the EU’s financial in-
terests. 64
In light of that latter area, the issue may arise as to what extent
Article 6 of Reg. 2988/95 can serve as the basis for a limitation of
Article 50 CFR. On the basis of that Article, and without prejudice
to other sectoral rules, the imposition of financial penalties may be
suspended by a decision of the competent authority if criminal pro-
ceedings have been initiated against the person concerned in connec-
tion with the same facts. If the criminal proceedings are then not con-
tinued, the suspended administrative proceedings shall be resumed.
Moreover, when the criminal proceedings are concluded, the sus-
pended administrative proceedings shall be resumed, unless that is
precluded by general legal principles. In that case, the administrative
authority must ensure that a penalty at least equivalent to that pre-
scribed by Community rules is imposed, which may take into account
any penalty imposed by the judicial authority on the same person in
respect of the same facts. Whether this can truly serve as an accept-
able limitation of Article 50 CFR (basically offering the possibility of
Anrechnung instead of Erledigung, when criminal proceedings pre-
cede administrative sanctions) remains to be seen.
We submit that, in addition to the arguments presented by the AG,
the coherence of the EU legal order has not only a national, but also a
transnational dimension. Article 50 CFR does after all apply not only
within the jurisdiction of one State, but also between the jurisdictions
of several Member States. That corresponds to the acquis in Union
law (Articles. 54–58 CISA). This offers an additional argument for
not adopting the A. and B. v. Norway approach. The course taken in
A. and B. v. Norway will, if followed by the ECJ, inevitably also affect
63 C-596/16, Di Puma, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:669; C-537/16, Garlsson Real
Estate, Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:668.
64 Cf. Art. 2 of Reg. 2988/95.
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other building blocks of the European legal order, i.e. the principle of
mutual recognition in criminal matters and the free movement of people.
Following A. and B. v. Norway, the situation may after all occur that a
prior criminal acquittal (in one State) does not necessarily prevent a later
administrative punitive procedure (in another State) from being started
or continued (or vice versa). That situation would not only produce very
arbitrary results, depending on the choices made by different Member
States, but would also effectively mean that, where a second set of ad-
ministrative proceedings is opened or continued, the prior criminal judg-
ment cannot be given full effect in the area and possible contradictory
decisions on the subject matter may be rendered. That, in itself, is also
capable of affecting the free movement of people, which has always
been an important rationale in the Court’s interpretation of Article 54
CISA, and which warrants the EU to take its own approach. 65 Its insti-
tutional setting is different from that of the Member States and its con-
stitutional setting will require a more stringent approach than taken by
the Strasbourg Court in purely national matters.
3.3. Overview and critical assessment of the case law of the ECtHR
and of the CJEU on the relationship between individual liability and
corporate liability in the context of ne bis in idem
On this particular question, there does not seem to be a great lack of
clarity. The principle of ne bis in idem hinges, as previously mentioned,
on different elements. Its invocation requires a same set of facts, a con-
cluded, first set of (punitive) proceedings and, finally, that the persons
concerned in the first and the second set of proceedings are indeed
the same.
The latter was clarified in Orsi and Baldetti. 66 Both men were
criminally prosecuted for VAT fraud on the ground that they failed, in
their capacity as legal representatives of their companies, to pay VAT
within the time limit stipulated by law. Those criminal proceedings were
brought after the tax authorities reported the offences to the public
prosecutor. Yet before those criminal proceedings were initiated, the
amounts of VAT at issue in the main proceedings were also subject to
assessment by the tax authorities, which not only calculated the tax lia-
bility, but also imposed a tax penalty on the companies Orsi and Baldetti
65 Supra note 40.
66 Joined cases C-217/15 and C-350/15, Orsi and Baldetti, ECLI:EU:C:2017:264.
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represented equivalent to 30 per cent of the amount of VAT owed. Fol-
lowing a transaction relating to those assessment measures, they became
definitive without being contested.
The question that was raised by the referring court was whether the
criminal prosecution of Orsi and Baldetti was to be terminated as a result
of the ne bis in idem principle. In a rather short ruling, the ECJ indeed
clarified—as had the ECtHR—that the principle cannot be infringed if it
is not the same person who was sanctioned more than once for the same
unlawful act. Also, according to the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, the imposition of penalties, whether tax or criminal, does
not constitute an infringement of Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the
ECHR where the penalties at issue concern natural or legal persons
who are legally distinct. 67
3.4. Results with respect to ne bis in idem
With respect to the principle of ne bis in idem, developments are
tempestuous. The ne bis in idem principle has always been at the fore-
front of human rights protection in Europe. Important questions on
the transnational scope of the principle will remain high on the agen-
da for the period to come. In consequence, we do not know yet
whether the principle will apply on combinations of administrative
and criminal law sanctions from different EU Member States. Those
situations may very well occur in the PIF area. As states will then be
conducting proceedings that (also) protect the EU’s financial inter-
ests, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is likely to be applicable.
That brings us to the most urgent question for now: To what extent
should the Luxembourg Court follow the Strasbourg Court’s new ap-
proach on the concept of ‘bis’ (A. and B. v. Norway)? Those judg-
ments will be expected very soon. It is difficult to predict whether
Luxembourg will maintain its present course. In the foregoing, we
have argued that it should, particularly because the key concept of
the new Strasbourg case law—whether combinations of criminal
and administrative law penalties are sufficiently connected in sub-
stance and time—will be very difficult, if not impossible, to operate
in the complex, transnational setting of the EU. By that, we mean that
we do not see how such a criterion could prevent arbitrariness in such
67 Orsi and Baldetti, para 25, citing ECtHR, 20 May 2014, Pirttimäki v. Finland,
CE:ECHR:2014:0520JUD00353211, para 51.
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a sensitive area as criminal justice and punitive law enforcement in
general. That touches upon the very core of fundamental rights pro-
tection in Europe.
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rective and liability of head of business. – 3. Liability of head of business
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3.2. Omission liability and duties of care. – 3.2.1. Omission liability:
general remarks. – 3.2.2. Omission liability and actus reus. – 3.2.3.
Omission liability and duties of care. – 3.2.4. Omission liability and cau-
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1. Introduction
The comparative study Liability of Company Directors in a Com-
parative EU Criminal Justice Context was conducted between April
2017 and April 2018, led by Prof. Katalin Ligeti and Dr Angelo Marlet-
ta, with the essential contribution of reputed academics from Finland
(Prof. Raimo Lathi), France (Prof. Juliette Tricot), Germany (Prof. Mar-
tin Waßmer), the Netherlands (Prof. Michiel Luchtman, Dr Mark Horn-
man and Dr András Csúri) and Poland (Dr Witold Zontek). 1
* University of Luxembourg.
1 The selected jurisdictions represent different approaches towards the liability of
legal entities, which is an inevitable point of reference for reflection on the individual
liability of the head of business. In the Netherlands, corporate criminal liability has a
long-standing practice dating back to the 1950s; Germany, on the other hand, still
rejects the idea that criminal liability—and the moral blame it implies—may be
ascribed to any subject other than a human being (although, as will be explained,
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The renewed interest of national criminal justice systems in the in-
dividual liability of company directors and other employees in a deci-
sion-making position for economic and financial crimes is not mirrored
by the new PIF Directive. 2 Unlike the PIF Convention, the new PIF Di-
rective contains no provision on the liability of heads of business.
As will be further explained below, the relationship between the lia-
bility of legal persons and the individual liability of heads of business
cannot be overlooked from the perspective of the coherent protection
of the EU budget. On the side of both expenditure and revenue, offences
against the EU’s financial interests 3 often originate in a corporate con-
text, and the failure of managers (if not their direct involvement) is of
decisive importance in determining the commission of such offences. 4
Starting from the domestic rules on criminal liability, the national
reports provide an overview of the conditions and the limits to hold
the heads of business accountable in case of commission of an offence
by an employee under their responsibility. National rules on administra-
tive liability and on corporate liability have also been assessed from the
perspective of an integrated approach to punitive enforcement.
This report provides a comparative analysis of the findings of the
analysed national legal systems, as well as their impact on the effective-
ness and coherence of PIF enforcement.
this does not prevent the possibility of an administrative liability of the legal person).
France and Finland introduced the criminal liability of legal persons respectively in
1994 and 1995; although conceived in the same period, the models of liability
enacted in the two jurisdictions present certain significant differences, at least on
paper (such as the material scope or the model of attribution chosen). Poland, on
the other hand, introduced more recently a form of liability of legal persons which
is not formally labelled criminal but is of a punitive nature: it endorses a hybrid
model based on both the identification and the organisational fault doctrine.
2 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud affecting the Union’s
financial interests by means of criminal law, in OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29 ff
(hereinafter ‘PIF Directive’).
3 Meaning fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests, passive and active
corruption, misappropriation and money laundering, nowadays defined by the PIF
Directive.
4 The Preamble of the 1995 Convention on the Protection of the European
Communities’ financial interests (‘PIF Convention’) acknowledged that ‘businesses
play an important role in the areas financed by the European Communities and that
those with decision-making powers in business should not escape criminal
responsibility in appropriate circumstances’.
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2. Renewed interest in individual liability of head of business
The commission of a corporate-related offence raises the question
of who deserves punishment and where responsibility should be allo-
cated in the ‘complex triangle’ 5 between the direct material perpetrator,
the legal entity and its senior management. The complex triangle dilem-
ma is an inherent feature of white-collar crime and poses a considerable
challenge to criminal law systems: while establishing the criminal liabi-
lity of the direct perpetrator might not per se appear problematic (the
employee materially committing the offence directly fulfils the material
and subjective elements required by the statutory definition), the level of
complexity significantly increases when such liability is considered in
the broader context of modern economic actors and placed in relation-
ship with the roles and responsibilities of managers and those of the le-
gal entity.
Corporate-related offences, indeed, are only rarely the result of the
isolated initiative of a rogue employee. On the contrary, the commission
of this kind of offence is often nested in a broader context of corporate
misconduct, either because it is deliberately conceived—incentivised or
even instigated—as part of the corporate policy or because it is the result
of a reprehensible lack of supervision by the senior management.
Against this background, the individual liability of low- and mid-
dle-level employees, along with corporate criminal liability, seem to
have delivered only a partially satisfactory answer 6 and, in recent times,
a renewed interest in the individual liability of heads of business has
emerged even in those national legal systems, like the United States,
the United Kingdom or the Netherlands, in which the criminal liability
of corporations represented an established reality. 7
In the US, indeed, the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis revealed
5 The expression ‘complex triangle’ was coined by E Lederman to identify and
highlight the complexities in allocating liability for business crimes. See E
Lederman, ‘Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex
Triangle’, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1985) 285 ff.
6 See the considerations made by K Ligeti, ‘Criminal Liability of Heads of
Business. A Necessary Pillar in the Enforcement of the Protection of the Financial
Interests of the EU’, 4 Eucrim (2015) 145 ff.
7 For a historical account, TJ Bernard, ‘The Historical Development of Corporate
Criminal Liability’, Criminology (1984) 3 ff; EB Mills, ‘Perspectives on Corporate
Crime and the Evasive Individual’, Criminal Justice Journal (1986) 327 ff; E Lieder-
man, ‘Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imita-
tion toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity’, Buffalo Criminal Law Re-
view (2000) 641 ff.
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that the enforcement practice focused mainly—if not exclusively—on
the legal entity, with middle- or low-level management leaving open a
‘responsibility gap’, 8 which is problematic in terms of both deterrence
and the legitimacy of the punitive intervention.
The 2008 financial crisis judicially resulted in a number of small
players being prosecuted for mortgage fraud, while only one top Wall
Street executive was prosecuted and sentenced for having misrepre-
sented the values of securities during the crisis. 9 This discrepancy,
coupled with the emergence of ‘too big to jail’ thinking 10 and the pop-
ular perception that large corporations can sacrifice their fungible mid-
dle-level managers as scapegoats to eventually go unpunished, fuelled
strong criticism of the criminal enforcement policy of the Department
of Justice (DoJ) against corporate wrongdoing. 11 It was also in response
to such criticisms that the DoJ gradually reoriented its policy and, in
2015, issued a memorandum (the so-called Yates Memorandum) reaf-
firming the need to focus on individuals from the first steps of the inves-
tigations with the aim, where possible, of reaching the responsible senior
managers higher up in the corporate hierarchy. 12
8 In these terms, SW Buell, ‘The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime’, Crim-
inal Law and Philosophy (2017) 1. The author acknowledges the existence of a ‘re-
sponsibility gap’ in regard to the senior management of a large-scale corporation; how-
ever, he argues that such responsibility has a mere moral connotation and ‘core doc-
trines of criminal law have nothing to offer those who would seek to convert this ac-
count of moral responsibility into a case for criminal punishment. Indeed, those doc-
trines, and their animating principles, prohibit liability for corporate managers in the
case of no action, no mental state, and high responsibility’ (p. 19).
9 For an account, see S Headworth, JL Hagan, ‘White-Collar Crimes of the
Financial Crisis’, in SR Van Slyke, ML Benson, FT Cullen, The Oxford Handbook
of White-Collar Crime (2016).
10 The prosecution and punishment of large financial institutions in cases of
serious economic crimes may indeed prove difficult on several counts in terms of
its sustainability when the adequate punishment of the legal entity for serious
wrongdoings and harms would entail its collapse and severe negative externalities
upon on a large number of subjects extraneous to the criminal conduct (workers,
small shareholders, creditors, consumers); this problem represents an extreme form
of the ‘externality trap’ described by JC Coffee, ‘“No Soul to Damn: No Body to
Kick”. An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’, Michi-
gan Law Review (1981) 407, and is at the same time an argument to target criminal
enforcement on the individual.
11 See, R Steinzor, Why Not Jail? Industrial Catastrophes, Corporate Malfea-
sance, and Government Inaction (Cambridge University Press 2015) 42.
12 See the Memorandum on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing
issued by Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates on 9 September 2015,
available at: https://www.justice.gov/dag/individual-accountability. The Yates
Memorandum, however, acknowledged the substantial challenges surrounding the
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Besides the prosecutorial policy shift, the rediscovery of the impor-
tance of the individual liability of senior managers is an important ele-
ment of a multifaceted strategy against corporate crime. An exclusive
focus on the legal entity may indeed lead in several cases to the dilemma
between punishing too much and ending up in the blind alley of ‘too big
to jail’ thinking or punishing too little and transforming the sanction into
a mere cost that the corporation can eventually transfer/pass on to con-
sumers, shareholders or employees. 13 Targeting only the middle- or
low-level employee (who materially committed the offence), on the
other hand, may result in unfairness and, ultimately, a lack of real deter-
rence where the offence is actually the by-product and part of a bigger
scheme. The individual employee, indeed, is fungible.
Holding senior managers accountable, in contrast, may in many
cases turn out to be necessary to ensure an adequate level of deterrence
at the appropriate level, the level where the corporate culture is shaped.
As pointed out by J. C. Coffee in his seminal work, ‘a dual focus on the
firm and the individual is necessary. Neither can be safely ignored’. 14
The US trend is not system-specific. The complex triangle dilemma
also surfaced in European systems 15 and, within the European debate on
white collar crime, 16 the pendulum has swung on various occasions be-
tween the liability of the individual head of business and that of the legal
entity.
As will be explained below, the responsibility of the heads of busi-
ness emerged as an important element of an effective and comprehen-
sive anti-fraud enforcement policy following the first PIF Convention
prosecution of high-level corporate officials and the proof of their guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt.
13 See N Foster, ‘Individual Liability of Company Officers’, in J Gobert, A
Pascal, European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability (Routledge 2011)
117; JC Coffee, ‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’, cit., 408.
14 See JC Coffee, ‘No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick’, cit., 410.
15 Interestingly, the Dutch rapporteur signalled an endorsement of the Yates
Memorandum by Dutch prosecutors in recent developments of Dutch enforcement
policy against white-collar crime. See Netherlands National Report, p. 213. Among
the systems compared in this research, the Netherlands is the one that recognised
the criminal liability of legal entities first, in the 1950s. For a historical overview of
the individual liability of company directors under the Dutch system, see
Netherlands National Report, pp. 204–207 and MJ Hornman, De strafterchtelijke aan-
sprakelijkheid van leidinggevenden van ondernemingen, Een beschouwing vanuit mul-
tidimensional perspectief (dissertation Utrecht University 2016).
16 See J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 447; K. Ligeti, Criminal Liability of Heads of
Business, cit., 145 ff; J Gobert, ‘Squaring the Circle. The Relationship between Indi-
vidual and Organizational Fault’, in J Gobert, A Pascal, European Developments in
Corporate Criminal Liability (Routledge 2011) 137, 148.
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adopted in 1995. 17 The Corpus Juris project (infra 2.2) confirmed such
an approach, proposing a dedicated provision on the liability of the head
of business. Nonetheless, over the last two decades, this form of individ-
ual liability has met with variable fortune and its consideration has been
often overshadowed by the debate on the introduction of the liability of
legal entities, which for several systems represented an absolute novelty.
2.1. Liability of heads of business in PIF Convention
The liability of heads of business was addressed in the very first in-
strument approximating the definition of offences against the EU’s fi-
nancial interests (the 1995 PIF Convention) and chronologically
emerged before the EU legal framework started considering the liability
of legal entities. 18
In 1995, Art. 3 of the PIF Convention provided an obligation for the
Member States ‘to take all the necessary measures’ to hold criminally
liable 19 the ‘heads of business or any persons having power to take de-
cisions or exercise control’ in case a PIF offence were committed ‘by a
person under their authority acting on behalf of the business’. 20
The provision did not receive an enthusiastic reception among the
Member States. The two reports on the implementation of the PIF Con-
vention released by the European Commission in 2004 21 and 2008 22
highlighted the reluctance of the Member States to introduce ad hoc pro-
17 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European
Union on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, in OJ C
316, 27.11.1995, 49 ff.
18 Chronologically, the liability of legal persons in the PIF domain came under
consideration slightly later: it was introduced for the first time in an EC legal
instrument by the Second Protocol to the PIF Convention in 1997 (OJ C 221,
19.7.1997, 11 ff). Since then, EU instruments approximating criminal law have
normally included provisions on the liability of legal entities. See D Flore, Droit Pénal
Européen. Les Enjeux d’une Justice Pénale Européenne (2nd edition, Larcier 2014)
251.
19 Unlike the standard EU provisions on the liability of legal entities, which do
not impose a ‘criminal label’ on the form of liability the Member States are
requested to introduce in this regard.
20 See supra fn 17.
21 See the Report from the Commission Implementation by Member States of the
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and its
protocols: COM (2004) 709 final.
22 See Second Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests and
its Protocols: COM (2008) 77 final.
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visions on the matter. A recurring objection raised by the Member States
to the need for a specific implementation of Art. 3 relied on the ade-
quacy of the existing national rules on complicity to cover the liability
of corporate owners and directors.
The same provision of the PIF Convention, on the other hand, had
expressly allowed the Member States to establish the liability of the head
of business ‘in accordance with the principles defined by the national
law’, leaving broad leeway to national legislators in regard to the scope
and modality of its enactment. 23 Not surprisingly, the level of harmoni-
sation on this point remained rather low, determining—as the Commis-
sion pointed out in its impact assessment for the 2012 PIF Directive Pro-
posal—a normative gap that potentially could jeopardise the effective-
ness of enforcement in the PIF area (see infra). 24
2.2. Liability of heads of business in the Corpus Juris
Before moving forward with the analysis, a reference needs to be
made to the Corpus Juris project. 25 This academic research, conducted
between 1997 and 1999 by a group of eminent scholars, delivered a draft
set of provisions covering both the special and the general parts of a ‘mi-
cro system’ of criminal law for the protection of EU financial interests.
Recalling the Corpus Juris is relevant since its general part contained an
express provision on the criminal liability of the heads of business (Art.
13). The existence of such a provision in economic and financial matters
(together with a provision on the criminal liability of organisations) 26
was deemed necessary by the authors, even recognising the sensitivity
and the divergences between systems on the matter. 27
The Corpus Juris considered two distinct forms of liability of the
head of business: a) as a ‘principal offender’ if a ‘PIF offence’ 28 has
been committed for the benefit of the business by a subordinate and the
23 See D Flore, Droit Pénal Européen, cit., 255, and the Explanatory Report ac-
companying the PIF Convention, III.3.
24 See SWD (2012) 195 final, 16.
25 See M Delmas-Marty, JAE Vervaele (eds), The Implementation of the Corpus
Juris in the Member States (Volume I, Intersentia 2000).
26 Art. 14 of the Corpus Juris.
27 See Delmas, Marty, Vervaele (eds), The Implementation, cit., 73.
28 The Corpus Juris considered and defined eight possible PIF offences: fraud in
the Community budget, market rigging, corruption, misappropriation of funds, abuse
of office, disclosure of secrets pertaining to an office, money laundering, and receiving
and conspiracy. See Art. 1–8 of the draft Corpus Juris.
COMPARATIVE REPORT 311
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
head of business has ‘knowingly allowed’ the commission; and b) for
lack of supervision if the head of business (or ‘any other person with
powers of decision and control within the business’) has knowingly
omitted to exercise the necessary supervision over the subordinate
and such omission has facilitated commission of the offence by the lat-
ter. 29
These two forms of liability proposed in the Corpus Juris reflect a
theoretical distinction that can be generally drawn in regard to the re-
sponsibility of the head of business. As mentioned in the introduction,
the commission of a corporate-related offence by an employee may be
either deliberately ordered or incentivised by the senior management
or indirectly made possible by its reprehensible lack of supervision. The-
oretically, this would correspond to two different forms of responsibility
of the head of business: the first hypothesis is indeed a form of active
(although indirect or functional) involvement of the head of business
in the offence materially committed by another person (the employee)
and its configuration belongs to the traditional categories of co-perpetra-
tion and participation; the second hypothesis, instead, represents a form
of responsibility for own wrongdoing of the head of business based on
the violation of a duty of care (supervision) and follows the pattern of
omission liability (on which, see infra).
As for compatibility with the national systems of the suggested
forms of liability, the Corpus Juris study reported three different atti-
tudes emerging from the comparative analysis: a) a favourable position,
expressed by countries where specific forms of liability for the heads of
business have already been introduced by statutory provisions or recog-
nised by the case law; 30 b) an intermediate, ‘possibilist’ position consid-
ering the ‘omission of necessary supervision’ as a mere specification of
the concept of ‘commission by omission’; 31 and c) a negative position,
considering the liability for lack of supervision a form of vicarious or
29 The first draft of the Corpus Juris study (1997) contained only the first form of
liability of a head of business as ‘principal offender’. The second form of liability for
lack of supervision was added as an amendment to the second draft of the Corpus Juris
and the authors expressly recognised that it had been based on the model of adminis-
trative liability provided by the German § 130 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (on which
see infra).
30 In the specific context of the Corpus Juris study, the Netherlands and France.
See Delmas-Marty, Vervaele (eds), The Implementation, cit., 73.
31 Germany and Spain; see Delmas, Marty, Vervaele (eds), The Implementation,
cit., 74.
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strict liability incompatible with the principle of personal criminal liabi-
lity. 32
In regard to this last position, however, it is fair to note that the
commentary accompanying the Corpus Juris was clear in stating that
the aim of Art. 13 was not ‘to establish vicarious liability but liability
based on the individual fault of a “decision maker” who consciously al-
lowed the offence to take place’. 33 In both forms of liability provided,
indeed, the Corpus Juris required a rather high threshold for the cogni-
tive element of the mens rea of the head of business: he/she should have
either ‘knowingly’ allowed the commission of the offence or ‘know-
ingly’ omitted the necessary supervision.
It is important to highlight that the Corpus Juris addressed in detail
the issue of delegation of powers and tasks as a defence, a crucial point
for defining the scope of such a form of liability in the concrete reality of
modern businesses. The solution proposed on this point by the Corpus
Juris relied on two essential elements: on the one hand, the requirements
for the validity of the delegation which had to be ‘partial, precise and
specific’; on the other, the express exclusion of the possibility to dele-
gate the general responsibilities of the head of business in regard to
the monitoring, supervision and selection of the business personnel.
2.3. New PIF Directive and liability of head of business
Notwithstanding the existence of Art. 3 of the 1995 PIF Convention
and the academic inputs provided by the Corpus Juris, the level of har-
monisation on the liability of heads of business across the EU remained
low. The two Commission reports on the implementation of the PIF
Convention (2004 and 2008) highlighted the existence of different
(and sometimes too restrictive) national approaches to the liability of se-
nior managers, which could potentially jeopardise the effectiveness of
enforcement in the PIF area.
The same concerns about this ‘normative gap’ and the possible lack
of deterrence it might determine were reproduced in the impact assess-
ment accompanying the Commission’s proposal fora new PIF Direc-
tive. 34 Surprisingly, however, the Commission proposal did not include
32 Ireland. See Delmas, Marty, Vervaele (eds), The Implementation, cit., 74.
33 Delmas, Marty, Vervaele (eds), The Implementation, cit., 74.
34 See SWD (2012) 195 final, 16. The Impact Assessment points out that the
approaches to the criminal liability of managers ‘differ widely across the EU’ with
some Member States applying restrictive definitions resulting in ‘a lack of deterrence’.
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any provision on the liability of heads of business, not even in the mini-
malistic form previously considered under the 1995 PIF Convention. 35
The negotiations between the co-legislators apparently did not ad-
dress the issue and the final text of the recently adopted Directive on
the protection of the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law
(PIF Directive) 36 nowadays only contains a general provision on the
criminalisation of ‘inciting, aiding and abetting’ 37 PIF offences and
on the liability of legal persons. 38 In regard to the criminalisation of ‘in-
citing, aiding and abetting’, the PIF Directive leaves the definition of
such concepts entirely to national law, 39 relying on the traditionally cau-
tious approach of the EU legislator to the general part of criminal law.
Such an approach, common to several EU criminal law instruments,
originates from doubts about the scope of the conferred EU legislative
competence for the approximation of substantive criminal law.
The general legal basis for criminal law approximation under cur-
rent Art. 83 (1) and (2) TFEU is indeed (still) focused on the adoption
of ‘minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and
sanctions’, 40 which has suggested to several commentators and the
EU legislator a scope limited solely to the ‘special part’ (the definition
of the offences). 41
35 See K Ligeti, Criminal Liability of Heads of Business, cit., 148.
36 See the Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud affecting the
Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law, in OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, 29 ff.
37 Art. 5 of the PIF Directive (Incitement, aiding and abetting, and attempt).
38 Art. 6 of the PIF Directive (Liability of legal persons).
39 See J Blomsma, C Peristeridou, ‘The Way Forward: A General Part of
European Criminal Law’, in AWeyembergh, F Galli (eds), Approximation of Substan-
tive Criminal Law in the EU. The Way Forward (Editions de L’ Université de Bruxelles
2013) 122.
40 Similarly, the pre-Lisbon (and post-Amsterdam) legal basis under Art. 31 (1)
TEU referred to ‘minimum rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts
and to penalties’.
41 In this regard, see L Picotti, Le basi giuridiche per l’introduzione di norme pe-
nali comuni relative ai reati oggetto della competenza della procura europea, in
www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 30, expressly arguing in the sense of a lack of general
competence for the approximation of concepts of the general part. In contrast, J Bloms-
ma, C Peristeridou, cit., 136, consider that under the current legal basis (Art. 83 (1) and
(2) TFEU), nothing would preclude the possibility of defining certain concepts such as
mens rea and actus reus. Some scholars, furthermore, have argued that ‘visible frag-
ments’ of the general part can be retraced across the various legal instruments,
although ‘the way in which the European Union has legislated (from issue to issue)
may raise some doubts as to the general part “character” of certain provisions’; see
A Klip, European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach (3rd edition, Intersentia,
2016) 196.
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Concepts such as ‘aiding and abetting’ or ‘incitement’ (and, more
generally, norms on perpetration and participation), however, are crucial
in determining the actual scope of applicability of the provisions of the
special part at the national level and may have a significant impact on
the uniform and consistent application of EU criminal law. 42
The question of how, and how adequately, European criminal jus-
tice systems address the liability of heads of business under their general
rules on criminal liability, participation and complicity thus remains
open. On the other hand, the PIF Directive maintained a provision on
the liability of the legal entity based on the identification doctrine 43
and the active or passive conduct (the lack of supervision or control over
a subordinate) 44 of persons ‘having a leading position within the legal
42 As observed, ‘the rules of the “general part”...inter alia strive to secure a trans-
parent and equal application of criminal law...the lack of a general part can however
jeopardize the uniform application of European criminal law’; see J Keiler, Actus Reus
and Participation in European Criminal Law (Intersentia 2013) 3.
43 The identification doctrine (in certain cases called also the doctrine of direct
liability or alter ego doctrine) is one of the models for establishing corporate
(criminal) liability. According to this doctrine/model, the legal entity is identified
with its company organs or other natural persons. Therefore, an offence can be
attributed to the entity if one of its organs or leading persons has acted within the
scope of his employment or authority and has committed the offence, fulfilling its
objective (actus reus) and subjective requirements (mens rea). In this case, ‘the blame
that the officer deserves is also attributed to the corporation’ (in these terms, T Wei-
gend, ‘Societas Delinquere Non Potest’, Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2008) 933). See J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 453; J Gobert, M Punch, Rethinking Cor-
porate Crime (Cambridge 2003) 59. The identification doctrine originated and devel-
oped in the common law of England and Wales around the 1940s. In this regard, it
seems interesting to note that the UK legislator recently expressed concerns that the
identification doctrine—and the need to prove the mens rea (intent) of the ‘leading per-
sons’ for the predicate offence— may ultimately hinder the enforcement action in cer-
tain specific fields. With regard to bribery and corruption, the 2010 reform of the Brib-
ery Act introduced an exception to the identification model with a new form of corpo-
rate criminal liability based on the failure of the company to prevent bribery on its be-
half (Section 7). The possibility of expanding such a model of corporate liability to
other fields of economic and financial crime has recently been considered by the
UK Ministry of Justice in a call for evidence issued on January 2017 (see https://con-
sult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/corporate-liability-for-economic-crime/). In
the financial sector, on the other hand, the UK has, since 2016, introduced a specific
regulatory regime focused on the individual liability of senior managers, the Senior
Managers and Certification Regime (SMR; on which, see infra).
44 The standard model for the liability of legal persons included in all the EU
approximation instruments provides for a direct and indirect liability of the legal
person without specifying the nature or the label of such liability (criminal,
administrative or civil), provided that the applicable sanctions are ‘effective,
proportionate and dissuasive’. In the ‘direct’ form, the liability of the legal person is
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entity’. 45 While it is expressly stated that the liability of the legal per-
sons ‘shall not exclude the possibility of criminal proceedings against
the natural persons’, 46 it would have been more consistent, in view of
a coherent application of the two forms of liability, to define more
clearly the scope of the individual liability of ‘persons having a leading
position’, especially in regard to their liability for the lack (omission) of
control and supervision. Leaving this aspect entirely at the mercy of the
different national rules on perpetration and participation, in contrast,
may not just lead to a ‘deterrence gap’ but, first and foremost, a ‘coher-
ence gap’ in the enforcement process. 47
In light of these considerations, this research project represents an
attempt to map and systematise the answers from selected national
frameworks, taking into particular account the rules on commission by
omission and the interplay between the individual liability of the head
of business and the liability of legal persons (either administrative or,
where applicable, criminal).
3. Liability of head of business and general rules of criminal law
The main objection raised by the Member States against the in-
troduction of a dedicated form of liability for the heads of business
recalled the adequacy of the existing national rules on perpetration
and participation to cover the issue. Since the new PIF Directive dis-
carded the respective provision of the 1995 PIF Convention and, fol-
established when an offence (in this case, a PIF offence) has been committed for the
benefit of the legal entity by any person having a leading position within the same
entity. In the ‘indirect’ form, the liability of the legal person is established when the
lack of supervision or control by a ‘leading person’ has made possible the
commission of a (PIF) offence by an employee for the benefit of the entity. This latter
form of liability, it has been argued, is not construed as strict or objective liability but
a form of (derivative) liability for negligent lack of control or supervision. In this
sense, see D Flore, Droit Pénal Européen, cit., 254; A Klip, European Criminal Law,
228.
45 According to the standard EU model for the liability of legal persons, the
identification of a natural person ‘having a leading position’ within the entity can be
based on his/her power of representation, decision or control. In the case of the PIF
Directive, see Art. 6 (1) (a–c).
46 Both the direct perpetrators of the offence and the persons responsible under
Art. 5 of the PIF Directive for incitement, aiding and abetting of its commission.
See Art. 6 (3) PIF Directive.
47 As pointed out by J Blomsma and C Peristeridou (The Way Forward, cit., 127):
‘consistency and coherency have been explicitly recognized as core values of future
European criminal law’ by the EU institutions.
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lowing the traditional approach of EU approximating instruments,
left the definition of the concepts of ‘incitement, aiding and abetting’
to national law, the analysis of such national rules appears crucial to
gauging the effectiveness and coherence of PIF criminal enforcement.
This comparative report provides an overview of the main findings
emerging from the national reports as to the possibility of holding heads
of business criminally accountable for offences committed by an em-
ployee. To this end, the next sections will present and analyse in a syn-
thetic way the relevant national approaches to:
• perpetration and participation;
• omission liability and duties of care;
• individual criminal liability and collegial decisions;
• individual criminal liability and delegation of tasks;
• individual criminal liability and compliance programmes;
• sanctions applicable to heads of business;
• the relationship between individual liability and the liability of le-
gal entities;
• the role of punitive administrative law.
3.1. Perpetration and participation
Theories of perpetration and participation are the starting point
of the analysis. When the commission of a crime by an employee
is actively ordered, instigated or facilitated by the head of business,
the establishment of the responsibility of the head of business will
rely on the traditional models of (co)perpetration and participation
in the offence materially committed by the employee. As men-
tioned, 48 this form of liability is focused on active involvement in
the wrongdoing materially committed by another person and must
be kept conceptually separate from the liability for lack of supervi-
sion, which is a form of liability for the own wrongdoing of the head
of business and will be discussed below when addressing the general
rules for omission liability.
In regard to perpetration and participation, criminal law theory ac-
knowledges two main models: the unified model and the differentiated
model. In the unified system, every participant in crime is formally treat-
ed by the law as a perpetrator. Differentiated models, in contrast, distin-
guish between principal perpetrators and secondary participants or ac-
48 See supra 1.2.
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cessories. 49 The EU instruments on the approximation of substantive
criminal law have so far adopted a differentiated model, distinguishing
between perpetrators and participants, but without providing any unitary
supranational definition of the concepts of incitement, aiding and abet-
ting. 50
All the compared systems endorse a differentiated model of partici-
pation. Distinctions are relevant since participants or accessories might
receive a mitigated sentence compared to perpetrators and, most impor-
tantly, because the determination of their mens rea might require addi-
tional elements (for instance, the existence of a ‘double intent’ relating
to both the perpetrator’s crime and to his/her own contribution to the
commission of the crime).
Moving to the analysis of the national rules, German criminal law
distinguishes between principal perpetrators and secondary participants
in intentional offences, while adopting a unified system for negligent of-
fences and regulatory (punitive administrative) offences. 51 Perpetration
may take the form of direct, indirect or joint perpetration. Participation,
on the other hand, includes aiding and abetting. The criteria for distin-
guishing between perpetrators are not defined by the StGB but have
been developed by the courts and academic literature. 52 German courts
nowadays apply a subjective and objective test to differentiate between
perpetrators and participants (relevant factors for this purpose may be
the degree of personal interest in the success of the offence, the will
to dominate it and the extent of the contribution to the offence). German
scholarly writing instead bases the distinction on objective theory: the
‘doctrine of the domination of the offence’, 53 according to which the
‘perpetrator’ is whoever can run or stop the commission of the offence;
the participant, in contrast, can only initiate or support its realisation.
The distinction is relevant, inter alia, because the aider receives a man-
datory mitigation of the sentence. According to the intensity of their
domination over the commission of the offence, heads of business can
49 See J Keiler, D Roef, ‘Forms of Participation’, in J Keiler, D Roef, (eds), Com-
parative Concepts of Criminal Law (Intersentia 2015) 213.
50 In this sense, A Klip, European Criminal Law, cit., 225. In the field of com-
petition law, the CJEU favoured a unitary and rather extensive approach to perpetra-
tion, under which the mere tacit approval of the cartel and the failure to report it to
the authorities is sufficient to configure the liability of the company. See the case
GC, AC-Treuhand, 8.8.2008, T-99/04.
51 See Germany National Report, 126.
52 See Germany National Report, 138.
53 Germany National Report, 142.
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be held responsible either as perpetrators or aiders for their intentional
positive acts or omissions. 54
Finland presents a very similar system, differentiating between prin-
cipals (direct principal, indirect principal, co-perpetrator) and accom-
plices (instigators and abettors). The abettor must have furthered inten-
tionally, ‘through advice, action or otherwise’, the commission of the of-
fence by the principal and receives a mitigated sentence. In direct con-
nection with the liability of the heads of business, it is worth noting that
in 1995 a partial reform 55 of the Finnish Criminal Code introduced two
provisions (Chapter 47 Section 7; Chapter 47 Section 8) dealing with the
allocation of liability in respect of employment and environmental of-
fences; these two special provisions established liability for relevant of-
fences of ‘the person into whose sphere of responsibility the act or omis-
sion belongs’, further specifying that ‘due consideration shall be given
to the position of the said person, the nature of his or her duties and com-
petence’ and ‘his or her participation in the origin and continuation’ of
the violation. 56
Under Dutch criminal law, the concept of perpetration includes
both direct (physical) and indirect (functional) commission of an of-
fence. Participation includes instigation and aiding in the commission
of a crime. With regard to the direct involvement of the head of busi-
ness, functional perpetration may be generally applicable if it can be
established that the head of business acted ‘through’ the employee
and with the mens rea required by the offence (thus, in regard to
fraud, with intent or, at least, dolus eventualis). However, Dutch
criminal law also provides for a sui generis mode of individual par-
ticipation called ‘actually directing’ (feitelijk leidinggeven), 57 which
is strictly related to corporate criminal liability. The ‘actually direct-
ing’ model seems particularly relevant for establishing the liability of
heads of business, since it allows accountable managers to be held re-
sponsible for the wrongdoing that can be attributed to their corpora-
tion. 58 ‘Actually directing’ covers both active and passive involve-
ment and thus is relevant also in regard to the liability for lack of
supervision; passive involvement, in particular, may occur when
the ‘“actual director” 1) knew the corporation was engaging or would
54 Germany National Report, 138.
55 Parallel to the introduction of corporate criminal liability.
56 See Finland National Report, 16.
57 Art. 51 para 2 of the Dutch Penal Code.
58 See Netherlands National Report, 206.
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engage in criminal activities, 2) omitted to take measures to halt or
prevent the further occurrence of these activities, despite 3) being
authorised, or at least able and 4) reasonably bound to do so’. 59
The mens rea element for ‘actually directing’, however, seems to re-
quire a rather high standard of actual knowledge and it has been ar-
gued that that may hardly work in the context of a large organised
structure (see infra 3.4).
Polish criminal law provides for four different types of perpetra-
tion and complicity: joint perpetration, perpetration by ordering, per-
petration by directing and incitement, and assistance. 60 Perpetration
by directing and incitement, in abstract terms, would cover the direct
and intentional involvement of the head of business in an offence
(fraud) materially committed by the employee. 61 The concept of as-
sistance under Polish criminal law, on the other hand, expressly cov-
ers the responsibility of ‘whoever by his conduct facilitates the com-
mission of a prohibited act by another person, in defiance of a legal,
special duty not to allow the commission of such a prohibited act’. 62
Perpetrators and participants are in abstracto submitted to the same
sanction range, but in regard to the aider and the abettor the sentence
may be mitigated.
In France, the criminal code distinguishes between perpetrators
and accomplices. Perpetration may take three forms: material perpe-
tration (auteur matériel), co-perpetration (coauteur) and moral perpe-
tration (auteur intellectual ou moral). Moral perpetration may be re-
levant to ascribe responsibility to the head of business when he or she
intentionally directed the commission of the offence and used the em-
ployee (auteur matériel) as a mere instrument of execution. 63 On the
other hand, the concept of complicity encompasses aiding, abetting
and instigation. 64 Complicity in the form of aiding and abetting
may be committed through an omission in cases of collusion or where
the accomplice had a legal or contractual duty to prevent the of-
59 See Netherlands National Report, 226.
60 See Poland National Report, 263–264.
61 The difference between ordering and directing under Polish criminal law lies
in the nature and the degree of power over the material perpetrator. For perpetration by
ordering, there should be a strong relationship of dependence, securing a blunt
obedience of the material perpetrator. For perpetration by directing, in contrast, such
a strong dependence is not required.
62 See Poland National Report, 274.
63 See France National Report, 57.
64 See France National Report, 61.
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fence. 65 Instigation in the form of provocation may occur by ‘gift,
promise, threat, order or abuse of authority or power’. 66 On the level
of mens rea, the accomplice can be punished only if he acted know-
ingly, ‘having the knowledge and willingness to associate himself
with the criminal fact’. 67 Both the hypotheses of collusion and insti-
gation/provocation could in abstracto capture the direct involvement
of the head of business. French case law, however, has long recog-
nised a special form of liability for the head of business (responsabil-
ité pénale du chef d’entreprise) which holds him liable as an indirect
perpetrator (auteur médiat) for the offences committed in the course
of the operations of the company on the basis of a functional respon-
sibility (see infra). 68
3.2. Omission liability and duties of care
With regard to the liability of the head of business for lack of con-
trol or supervision, the national rules on omission liability and duties of
care represent the second point of analysis. This form of liability is prob-
ably the most relevant and challenging from the perspective of this re-
search and, unlike the classical schemes of perpetration or participation
in an offence committed by another person mentioned above, it entails a
responsibility for the own (in the sense of autonomous) wrongdoing of
the head of business.
Such ‘own wrongdoing’ of the head of business, consisting in the
failure to fulfil a duty to supervise his employees, relies on two essential
criminal law concepts: the concepts of omission and duty of care, which
will be unpacked in the following paragraphs.
3.2.1 Omission liability: general remarks
It has been interestingly argued that, in modern society, omission
65 France National Report, 62.
66 France National Report, 58.
67 France National Report, 63.
68 France National Report, 49. Originally construed by the Court of Cassation as
a positional and vicarious form of liability based on a non-rebuttable presumption of
fault (présomption de faute irrefragable), today the majority of the literature seems
to consider the liability of the head of business a personal form of liability based on
the powers and responsibilities connected to the function. See France National Report,
50 and infra in the text.
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liability is gaining increasing influence, especially in regard to the pro-
tection of collective interests. 69
In general terms, an omission may be defined as ‘a failure to per-
form a specific duty which has been imposed by law’. 70 In a more pre-
cise way, omission liability is generally known in criminal law theory
under two forms: proper omission offences, occurring when a statutory
provision expressly criminalises the omission of a due positive action,
and improper crimes of omission (‘commission by omission’), occurring
when an offence (often a crime event) whose conduct is statutorily de-
fined in positive terms may be committed by failing to act according to a
duty of care. 71
Under EU Law, Art. 49 (1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, 72 similarly to Art. 7 (1) ECHR, expressly recalls the concept
of omission, thereby recognising it as a possible legitimate form of
the actus reus under EU criminal law; 73 yet there is no general defini-
tion of the concept under EU criminal law.
With regard to the legal systems compared in the context of this re-
search (Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, France and Poland), all of
them recognise forms of omission liability, although certain significant
differences with regard to the acceptance of the concept of ‘commission
by omission’ need to be highlighted. The following section will there-
fore address omission liability in regard to the:
• actus reus;
• source and scope of duties of care;
• causal link between the omission and the result;
• mens rea (subjective) element.
69 See J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 70; see also A Ashworth, ‘The Scope of Criminal
Liability for Omissions’, The Law Quarterly Review (1989) 442.
70 J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 69.
71 See J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 71. G Fletcher distinguishes two forms of omis-
sion: ‘the breach of a statutory obligation to act’ (breach of duty) and the failure ‘to
intervene, when necessary, to prevent the occurrence of a serious harm’ (commission
by omission); G Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000)
422.
72 Art. 49 (1) of the EU CFR provides that ‘No one shall be held guilty of any
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national law or international law at the time when it was
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable
at the time the criminal offence was committed.’
73 See, in this regard, A Klip, European Criminal Law, cit., 219; J Keiler, Actus
Reus, cit., 511.
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3.2.2. Omission liability and actus reus
As previously mentioned, an omission generally entails a failure to
act according to a duty imposed by law.
The idea of omission as a form of manifestation of the actus reus
(conduct) is well-established under German, Dutch and Polish criminal
law. Section 13 of the German Criminal Code 74 expressly provides for
omission liability under two conditions: a legal obligation on the subject
omitting a certain action to prevent a result (‘guarantor position’,
Garantenstellung) 75 and a ‘clause of equivalence’ (Entsprechensklau-
sel), 76 meaning that the omission, in order to be criminally relevant,
must be equivalent to the realisation of the statutory elements of the of-
fence through a positive act. 77
After the reform of 2003, Finnish criminal law also foresaw a gen-
eral provision on omission, covering both ‘genuine omissions’ and
‘commission by omission’ (‘derivative omission’). 78 In regard to the lat-
ter type, the failure to prevent the commission of an offence becomes
criminally relevant only where there exists a special legal duty to pre-
vent the commission of such offences. The sources of such special legal
duties are indicated in the provision (see infra).
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Criminal Code, unlike the German
StGB, does not provide for a general provision on liability for omission;
however, such liability is accepted if there was an obligation to act ac-
cording to a duty of care (zorgplicht) and such obligation was brea-
ched. 79 It is important to highlight that, in the context of the present
study, commission by omission is compatible and can be combined with
the concepts of ‘functional perpetration’ and ‘actually directing’ and
thus may be relevant to hold heads of business liable in case of lack
of control or supervision.
Under Polish criminal law, an omission is relevant only when a spe-
cific legal duty to prevent a consequence is imposed on the person omit-
74 The express introduction of a provision on omission under § 13 StGB was
intended to provide a legal basis and remedy to the legality objections moved to
improper crimes of omission. See J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 83.
75 On the guarantor position and the duty of care, see below 3.2.3. Omission lia-
bility and duties of care.
76 See Germany National Report, 128.
77 Germany National Report, 128; J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 84, who specifies
that in regard to fraud and omission, equivalence implies that the omission ‘must lead
to a deception which subsequently causes the pecuniary loss’.
78 See Finland National Report, 13.
79 See Netherlands National Report, 216.
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ting a certain conduct (Art. 2 of the Polish Criminal Code); 80 for formal
crimes (in which no result or consequence is foreseen), liability for
omission is possible only if the description of the offence expressly de-
fines the actus reus as an omission. It is important to highlight that Art.
18 (3) of the Polish Criminal Code expressly states that ‘whoever, acting
against a particular legal duty of preventing the prohibited act, facilitates
its commission by another person through his omission, shall also be li-
able for assistance’. 81
The French approach is rather different. Historically, French crim-
inal law rejected the concept of ‘commission by omission’ as a general
category. 82 However, beyond a theoretical rejection of the concept,
omission liability is indirectly recognised by French criminal law
through the concept of negligence: negligent offences, ‘due to their
broadly worded definitions’, can also encompass commission by omis-
sion. Furthermore, French case law has recognised that aiding and abet-
ting may also occur in passive forms, especially when there is a legal
duty to act (devoir juridique) or when the abstention reveals a punish-
able collusion. 83
3.2.3. Omission liability and duties of care
An omission is relevant as actus reus insofar as a legal obligation to
act exists. Such legal obligations may be defined as duties of care and
can theoretically derive from a variety of different sources: statutory
law, general clauses of diligence, voluntary or contractual assumptions
of responsibility, a specific position of ownership or responsibility to-
wards a source of danger, or a specific role or position within society
or an organisation.
The notion of duty of care is central to reconstructing omission lia-
bility. With regard to the head of business, it can be argued, in general
terms, that duties of care (including supervision and control over em-
ployees) represent the other side of their power to organise and direct
the business. However, this is not immediately and per se sufficient to
establish their relevance under criminal law. As duties of care multiply
80 See Poland National Report, 265.
81 See Poland National Report, 274.
82 See France National Report, 65; J Pradel, Droit Pénal Comparé (4th edition,
Dalloz 2016) 78; A Ashworth, E Steiner, ‘Criminal Omissions and Public Duties:
The French Experience’, Legal Studies (1990) 155.
83 See France National Report, 62.
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and acquire an increasing role in our modern industrialised societies, 84
the problem of their objective foreseeability and compatibility with the
principle of legality represents a central issue for criminal law theory
and for European criminal law. 85
The analysis of the compared systems, in this regard, provides a
variety of answers.
Under German criminal law, the StGB does not provide a general
definition of duty of care. However, duties based upon written and un-
written rules can be discerned in other sectors of the legal system. A
general standard of care is identified in the ‘behaviour of a prudent
and conscientious person from the criminal’s public sphere’, 86 while
an example of a sectoral written rule particularly relevant for the topic
of the liability of company directors is represented by § 93 of the Ger-
man Stock Corporations Act (Aktiengesetz: AktG), which states that
‘members of the board of directors of a public limited company must
exercise the diligence of a prudent and conscientious managing director
when conducting their business’. 87
Finnish criminal law identifies a number of sources of duties of
care, including the assumption of an office, function or position, a con-
tract or the creation of a dangerous situation. In regard to the position of
head of business, general duties of appropriate organisation and supervi-
sion are expressly laid down under company law in regard to the board
of directors and the managing director. 88 Special legislation and regula-
tions (such as in the fields of labour safety and environmental protec-
tion) do provide for additional supervisory duties which may trigger
the liability of the head of business. 89
84 J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 77 observes that ‘while duties of care are increas-
ingly applied as a means of crime control, it should not be overlooked that they can
also fulfil a safeguard function, protecting the freedom of the citizen.’
85 See J Keiler, Actus Reus, cit., 509. Foreseeability being an essential aspect of the
principle of legality recognised under Art. 49 of the EU CFR and Art. 7 ECHR, the source
and scope of the duty of care therefore also constitute an essential point for European
criminal law.
86 See Germany National Report, 128.
87 Germany National Report, 128. Within the German literature, however, a
debate seems to exist regarding: a) the possibility to consider the special knowledge
and abilities of the individual as a factor for individualising and assessing the level
of diligence due in the specific circumstances; and b) the compatibility, as such, of
unwritten duties with the principle of legality (lex certa principle).
88 See Finland National Report, 17.
89 See Finland National Report, 18. In the specific fields of labour safety and
environmental protection, the special duties of control and supervision determine the
scope of application of the special provisions on the liability of ‘the persons into
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In the Netherlands, the duties of care are identified as ‘open norms’
and their scope and nature need to be determined ‘on a case by case ap-
proach’. 90 Lacking a general provision in the Criminal Code, the source
of duties of care can be found in regulatory law, ‘memorandums, guide-
lines from governmental or professional (supervisory) agencies, juris-
prudence and legal literature’. 91
In Poland, to be unlawful an omission must violate the rules of con-
duct and duties foreseen for the given circumstance. 92 The sources of
duties of care are provided by the statutes and regulations belonging
to the particular branch of social or commercial relations, but a general
standard of ‘a good and reasonable manager’ has been developed by
case law and the literature. 93
French criminal law provides for a general concept of duty of care
as a subjective element of the offence under the definition of negligent
conduct; 94 beyond that, duties of care may derive from sectoral laws
and regulations and a failure to comply with the respective obligations
may constitute the basis for a (negligent) offence. 95 With regard to
the liability of the heads of business, a special regime applies: the estab-
lished jurisprudence of the French Court of Cassation has recognised the
existence of a general duty of supervision, meaning a duty for the head
of business to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations appli-
cable to the company. Such a duty is the basis for establishing the func-
tional responsibility of the head of business for the crimes committed by
subordinates in the course of the operation of the company. 96
whose sphere of responsibility the act or omission belongs’ mentioned supra (Chapter
47 Section 7 and Chapter 48 Section 8 of the Finnish Criminal Code).
90 See Netherlands National Report, 216–217.
91 Netherlands National Report, 216–217.
92 See Poland National Report, 273.
93 See Poland National Report, 274.
94 Art. 121–3 (3) and (4) of the French Criminal Code provide that: ‘(3) Il y a
également délit, lorsque la loi le prévoit, en cas de faute d’imprudence, de négligence
ou de manquement à une obligation de prudence ou de sécurité prévue par la loi ou le
règlement, s’il est établi que l’auteur des faits n’a pas accompli les diligences nor-
males compte tenu, le cas échéant, de la nature de ses missions ou de ses fonctions,
de ses compétences ainsi que du pouvoir et des moyens dont il disposait.’ See France
National Report, 82–83.
95 See the France National Report, 66.
96 See France National Report, 48-49; B Bouloc, Droit Pénal Général (25th edi-
tion, 2017) 321.
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3.2.4. Omission liability and causal link
A causal link between the omission (the lack of control and
supervision of the head of business) and the result (the commission
of the offence by the employee) is required in all the systems exam-
ined, although following very different standards. Among the systems
compared, causality is established in rather strict terms in Germany
and Poland, while—especially with regard to the liability of the heads
of business—it seems quite loose in France. Dutch criminal law,
meanwhile, appears to follow an intermediate and ‘flexible’ ap-
proach.
German criminal law provides for the stricter standard, requiring a
hypothetical (counter-factual) model of causality (Quasi-Kausalität),
which establishes whether the result would not have occurred ‘with al-
most certain probability’ if the omitted action had taken place. Proposals
to adopt a ‘risk reduction’ paradigm (establishing a causal link when the
omitted action would have reduced the risk of the result) have so far
been rejected. 97 Together with the mens rea element (infra), the strict
causal link required under ordinary criminal law is considered one of
the main obstacles to establishing the criminal liability of the head of
business for lack of control or supervision in the case of commission
of a corporate-related offence by one of his/her subordinates. Those ob-
stacles, however, are overcome in the domain of administrative offences
and § 130 OWiG (see infra).
Finland follows a similar approach, applying a causality test in-
spired by the conditio sine qua non formula. 98 The probability assess-
ment therefore requires a causality relationship of near certainty between
the violation of the specific duty of care and the occurrence of the result.
In Poland, assessment of the causal link required to establish the lia-
bility for omission is based on a normative method. According to this
method, ‘it should be established whether undertaking the expected ac-
tion would have prevented the consequence’. 99 Also, this standard, in its
formulation, seems very close to German ‘quasi-causality’.
Dutch criminal law, on the other hand, endorses a much more flex-
ible approach based on a ‘reasonable attribution’ test. This test is based
on a ‘multi-factor approach’ which aims to ascertain whether the defen-
dant’s omission ‘seriously raised the risk of the consequence setting
97 See Germany National Report, 114.
98 See Finland National Report, 13.
99 See Poland National Report, 269, 276.
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in’. 100 Such a standard is different from the conditio sine qua non stan-
dard and originated from private law. 101
Under French criminal law, the causal link is considered in broad
terms. In regard to the functional criminal liability of the head of busi-
ness, however, causality is assessed in abstracto, meaning not on the ba-
sis of the concrete relationship between the specific behaviour of the
head of business and the commission of the offence by his/her employ-
ee, but with the mere consideration of the abstract power of the former
to provoke or prevent the commission of the offence by the latter. 102
3.2.5. Actus reus: interim conclusions
With regard to the actus reus, it might be partially concluded that all
the systems analysed would in principle admit the possibility of consid-
ering an omission (such as the omission of supervision and control) the
objective element of an offence. However, two aspects should be taken
into account in terms of establishing the liability of the head of business:
the definition of a specific duty of supervision and control, and the caus-
al link. Notwithstanding the existence in all the systems of general duties
of care based on standards of good management, the introduction of a
specific obligation of supervision and control expressly aimed at the pre-
vention of PIF offences would guarantee the objective foreseeability of
the managerial duties and a sounder basis, on the level of the actus reus,
for establishing their criminal liability in case of failure to comply with
their supervisory duties.
The other critical point is represented by the causal link. The sys-
tems compared, indeed, present rather different approaches: Germany,
Finland and Poland, as mentioned, endorse a rather strict approach to
causation under criminal law, 103 implying that the omission of supervi-
sion may be criminally relevant only when an almost certain causal re-
100 See Netherlands National Report, 217-218.
101 Such an approach is also defined as a normative/legal approach and was
developed by the Dutch Supreme Court at the end of the 1970s. Criticisms of the
doctrine of ‘reasonable attribution’ point out its ‘indeterminate nature’ and its
problematic relationship with the principle of legal certainty; see J Keiler, Actus Reus,
cit., 136.
102 See France National Report, 82. The report specifies that the causal attribution
to the head of business ‘results less from an effective influence on the infringement
than from an ability to influence.’
103 The German legal system, however, adopts a more flexible causal link under
the administrative provision of § 130 OWiG (see infra).
328 CHAPTER VIII
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
lationship with the commission of the offence is established. France and
the Netherlands, in contrast, seem to adopt a more flexible approach.
3.3. Omission liability and mens rea
Across the compared legal systems, the mens rea element appar-
ently represents the most problematic aspect of establishing the liability
of heads of business for omitted control or supervision.
Under German criminal law, the holder of a guarantor position who
allows the commission of an intentional crime by a subordinate must
hold intent. Dolus eventualis 104 is sufficient and therefore liability
may be established if the guarantor, on the one hand, recognised the seri-
ous possibility of the commission of the offence by the subordinate and,
on the other, accepted the possible occurrence of such a risk. 105 Exact
and secure knowledge of the commission is apparently not necessary,
but the supervisor must have considered the commission of the offence
‘probable’. 106 The concurrent responsibility of the head of business for
his/her negligent conduct or omission, however, cannot be established in
regard to an intentional offence committed by the employee unless the
underlying offence expressly admits the possibility of commission by
negligence. Since fraud and all the other PIF offences are intentional of-
fences that cannot be committed negligently, the criminal liability of the
head of business is here limited to cases of intentional omission or lack
of supervision. 107 However, a negligent violation of obligatory supervi-
sion may be relevant under § 130 OWiG (see infra).
In Finland, intent is the form of mens rea generally required for
omission liability, although, similarly to Germany, the lowest level of in-
tent (dolus eventualis) may suffice. In this regard, the National Report
highlighted that the proof of intent (even in the form of dolus eventualis)
might often pose difficulties in the context of omission and further re-
ferred to a line of case law which adopts the ‘must have known’ formu-
la. This formula is not considered a means for actually widening the sub-
104 According to Blomsma, dolus eventualis can be defined as ‘the conscious ac-
ceptance of a considerable chance to a consequence’. This form of mens rea enables
the extended interpretation of intention and accordingly allows an extension of criminal
liability for intentional offences. See J Blomsma, ‘Mens Rea and Defences’, European
Criminal Law Intersentia (2013) 99.
105 See Germany National Report, 145.
106 Germany National Report, 145.
107 See Germany National Report, 126, 144.
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stantial scope of the required mens rea, however, but rather an eviden-
tiary rule allowing the inference of intent from circumstantial evi-
dence. 108 A negligent omission may be relevant only if the statutory de-
finition of the offence allows for its commission by negligence.
Under the Dutch Criminal Code, no general norm on the mens rea
for omission liability is expressly provided. This implies that the subjec-
tive element for the omission must be determined case by case, accord-
ing to the mens rea required for the underlying offence (intent, negli-
gence or, in case of misdemeanours and administrative offences, strict
liability). 109 In regard to ‘functional perpetration by omission’, the re-
port highlights that case law of the Dutch Supreme Court has recently
admitted the possibility of ascribing dolus eventualis to the head of busi-
ness if he did not take ‘reasonable measures of care to prevent the crim-
inal conduct’. 110 In contrast, in regard to the mens rea for ‘actually di-
recting’ by omission, Dutch case law has maintained a more protective
standard of actual knowledge, therefore excluding the possibility that
poor or negligent management might suffice to configure liability unless
through ‘wilful blindness’. 111
The approach to the mens rea required under French law is not uni-
form. In general, a distinction will need to be drawn between intentional
and unintentional offences: with regard to intentional offences such as
fraud, the head of business will be liable only if he holds intent towards
the underlying offence committed by the employee; negligence will not
suffice. 112 With regard to unintentional offences, following a reform in
2000 an ‘aggravated or qualified fault’ (faute délibérée) was established
in regard to the head of business as ‘indirect perpetrator’. 113 With regard
108 See Finland National Report, 19.
109 See Netherlands National Report, 217.
110 See Netherlands National Report, 218, 228.
111 See Netherlands National Report, 229. Wilful blindness can be defined as ‘a
suspicion coupled with a deliberate failure to use readily available and effective means
to resolve the suspicion, in short, suspicion and the blameworthiness of not checking’;
see J Blomsma, Mens Rea, cit., 97.
112 See France National Report, 84-85.
113 According to Art. 121–3 (4): ‘Dans le cas prévu par l’alinéa qui précède, les
personnes physiques qui n’ont pas causé directement le dommage, mais qui ont créé
ou contribué à créer la situation qui a permis la réalisation du dommage ou qui n’ont
pas pris les mesures permettant de l’éviter, sont responsables pénalement s’il est établi
qu’elles ont, soit violé de façon manifestement délibérée une obligation particulière de
prudence ou de sécurité prévue par la loi ou le règlement, soit commis une faute
caractérisée et qui exposait autrui à un risque d’une particulière gravité qu’elles ne
pouvaient ignorer.’
330 CHAPTER VIII
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
to contraventions, the mens rea required upon the head of business is a
form of ‘presumed’ negligence. 114
4. Liability for collegiate decisions
Strategic business decisions are often taken by a collegiate organ
(for instance, the board of directors); when a collegiate decision entails
the commission of a criminal offence, the allocation of individual re-
sponsibility for its adoption is an important aspect in addressing the lia-
bility of the head of business. In this regard, the analysed systems pre-
sent different approaches. Voting in favour of the adoption of a decision
constituting a criminal offence generally determines liability of the indi-
vidual voter. Abstention and mere participation in the vote, in contrast,
do not always exclude liability (for instance, in the Netherlands, even
mere dissociation would not automatically exempt the participant). 115
Under German criminal law, voting against or abstaining excludes liabi-
lity, but only if the unlawful decision is not implemented. 116 In France,
individual liability in the context of collective decisions seems to require
a quid pluris expressing personal participation in the offence and not just
in the vote (such as being a promoter or rapporteur of the decision). 117
Poland and Finland, in contrast, do not provide specific rules for at-
tributing individual responsibility in respect of collective decisions: the
ordinary rules on joint perpetration (and the individual assessment of the
objective and subjective elements of the offence) therefore are, in prin-
ciple, to be applied in regard to each participant. 118
114 See France National Report, 84.
115 Participants voting in favour of the adoption of the decision may be held
criminally liable ‘for all of the criminal activity that flows from’ that decision and
only one who has openly opposed the adoption can be exempted due to lack of mens
rea. Merely distancing does not automatically exempt. The National Report highlights
that, in respect of serious offences, a position has been expressed in literature that cor-
porate officials participating in a collegiate decision are obliged either to intervene and
halt the offences or to inform the authorities in order to escape liability. See Nether-
lands National Report, 234.
116 See Germany National Report, 154. This might therefore imply that
participants who abstained or voted against must step up and take action in order to
prevent the implementation of an unlawful decision (informing the supervisory
board or the shareholders or, if necessary, resigning).
117 See France National Report, 88.
118 See Finland National Report, 21 and Poland National Report, 282.
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5. Delegation
Delegation nowadays represents a necessity for the efficient func-
tioning of most (if not all) corporate realities; to a certain extent, it is
an expression of diligent and conscientious management. At the same
time, delegation of tasks and powers represents a central issue in relation
to the liability of the head of business. Delegation may indeed determine
a proper transfer and discharge of supervisory responsibility and exclude
the mens rea of the delegating head of business.
With regard to the power to delegate tasks and responsibilities to
employees, the national systems analysed adopt different approaches.
As a baseline, however, the systems seem to converge on the fact that
general and undetermined delegation (delegation in blanco) should
not be allowed and that delegation does not automatically relieve
the head of business of potential liability. Under German law, for in-
stance, delegation does not relieve a head of business of his duties of
‘selection, organisation, instruction, supervision and control’ over the
delegatee. In particular, the appointment of a supervisor does not ex-
empt the owner from the duty of supervision and control ‘but merely
reduces the intensity’. 119 Furthermore, with regard to the punitive ad-
ministrative liability under § 130 OWiG (see infra), a distinction is
drawn between two different types of supervisor: qualified supervi-
sors, whose position is characterised by autonomous decision-making
powers, and simple supervisors, who do not hold such autonomous
powers. In relation to the administrative punitive liability under §
130 OWiG, qualified supervisors are liable on an equal footing with
the owner who delegated to them and their responsibility may trigger
the administrative liability of the legal person under § 30 OWiG (see
infra). Mere supervisors, on the other hand, are not responsible under
punitive administrative liability. 120
Under Finnish criminal law, delegation is admitted, but it does not
per se exclude the supervisory duties incumbent on the members of the
board of directors and possible liability for their violation. Delegation
must, however, be clear and specific. 121
In the Netherlands, the delegation of powers and supervisory tasks
may determine a transfer of responsibility provided that the delegation is
119 See Germany National Report, 148.
120 See Germany National Report, 149.
121 See the Finland National Report, 19-20.
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reasonable. However, even in this case, the delegating person remains
bound to intervene if the person delegated to falls short of his duties. 122
In Poland, delegation may be relevant for limiting or excluding the
mens rea of heads of business in case of an offence committed by a sub-
ordinate. For certain specific duties that are reserved for members of the
board (such as annual reporting to the tax office), the internal division of
tasks is irrelevant and cannot discharge the members of the board. 123
In France, delegation is considered by the case law of the Court of
Cassation ‘a normal mode of management of the company’ 124 and its
absence may constitute a form of organisational fault ‘which could pos-
sibly be blamed on the company manager in the event of an acci-
dent’. 125 Essential requirements for the validity of the delegation are:
a) lawfulness (meaning that the delegation of a specific task must not
be forbidden by a legal provision); b) precision and limitation (the con-
tents must be certain, unambiguous and partial); c) effectivity, meaning
that delegation must include the authority and the means necessary to
carry out the tasks assigned; and d) the delegate’s autonomy of action.
Finally, and most importantly, according to French case law, ‘own man-
agement powers’ (such as the power to take strategic decisions) are not
the subject of delegation. 126
6. Compliance programmes
Compliance programmes can be broadly defined as management
tools used to prevent and detect misconduct within businesses. 127 They
represent a relative novelty in Europe 128 and, like the delegation of
supervisory tasks, they may be seen as another expression of diligent
management. Compliance programmes have an inherently self-regula-
tory and preventive function and normally include rules on business
122 See Netherlands National Report, 231.
123 See Poland National Report, 280.
124 See France National Report, 86.
125 See France National Report, 86.
126 France National Report, 86.
127 See F Thépot, ‘Can Compliance Programmes Contribute to Effective
Antitrust Enforcement?’ in J Paha (ed.), Competition Law Compliance Programmes.
An Interdisciplinary Approach (Springer 2016) 191.
128 Compliance programmes originated in the United States in the 1980s as an
element following the theories of ‘self-regulation’ and of the ‘new regulatory State’;
see K Wulf, Ethics and Compliance Programs in Multinational Organizations (Spring-
er 2011) 38, 41.
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ethics and leadership, risk assessment and risk management, controls and
monitoring, internal reporting, training on compliance and business
ethics. 129 As an expression of self-regulation, the adoption of a compli-
ance programme is still largely voluntary. However, obligations to adopt
a compliance programme are often provided in certain business sectors
(financial services, banking, insurance) which are considered particularly
sensitive or with regard to specific risks or misconduct (for example, cor-
ruption, money laundering).
A notable development in the field of anti-corruption has been re-
cently introduced in France in the 2017 so-called Sapin II law. The law
established an obligation for companies above a certain size to adopt a
specific anti-corruption compliance programme; in case of non-adoption,
the heads of business of the company may be held personally responsible
and subject to a considerable administrative fine. 130
Generally, however, the non-adoption of a compliance programme
does not entail punitive consequences per se.
In the perspective of this research, however, an aspect of interest is
represented by the potential impact of compliance programmes as a de-
fence in order to limit or exclude the individual responsibility of the
head of business when a compliance programme has been adopted
but, nonetheless, an offence has been committed by an employee.
In this regard, the findings of the comparative analysis highlighted
limited impact with regard to individual criminal liability: the existence
of a compliance programme per se does not automatically exclude the
responsibility of the individual, although its effective implementation
may be assessed in terms of diligent fulfilment of the manager’s duty
of care. A greater role of the compliance programme seems to be recog-
nised in regard to the establishment of the liability of the legal person: in
those cases, the existence of a compliance programme may exclude lia-
bility based on ‘organisational fault’. 131
7. Sanctions
With regard to sanctions, the compared systems present a great vari-
ety of options.
129 See, for instance, the OECD Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls,
Ethics, and Compliance adopted on 18 February 2010.
130 See France National Report, 95. The fine imposed by the National Anti-
Corruption Agency can be up to 200,000 euros.
131 See in particular Finland National Report, 23; Poland National Report, 284.
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In Germany, criminal law provides for mandatory mitigation with
regard to aiders and for optional mitigation in case of omission. The
penalty level for fraud under § 263 StGB provides a maximum of up
to five years’ imprisonment or a fine for the basic form of the offence.
In especially severe cases, the penalty range extends from a minimum of
six months to a maximum of ten years, while, where the offender acted
on a commercial basis and as a member of a gang, the potential sentence
may extend from a minimum of one year up to ten years and a minimum
of six months to five years ‘in less serious cases’. 132 Confiscation of un-
lawfully obtained gains is possible under different headings and by re-
sorting to different tools. A major reform in this regard was introduced
in 2017. In particular, extended confiscation and third-party confiscation
are possible. 133 Measures of incapacitation, such as professional dis-
qualification, are available under general criminal law, but the German
National Report highlights that it actually ‘gained little practice’. 134
The National Report also provides interesting statistical data for
2015 on the type and range of criminal penalties applied for fraud, 135
highlighting the undisputed preponderance of fines (85 per cent). The
National Report further considers that, in concreto, the average level
of the fines imposed appears very lenient. 136
Significant regulatory fines may theoretically be imposed for the
violation of obligatory supervision under § 130 OWiG (see infra) and
upon legal persons according to § 30 OWiG; however, statistical data
for 2015 also indicate in this sector an enforcement practice which is
far from approaching the maximum—or even the middle—level of
penalty. 137
In Finland, a special sanction prohibiting future engagement in
business activity was introduced in 1985 with regard to economic
offences and may be applicable to entrepreneurs and managers
who have committed an economic crime or ‘otherwise crucially
omitted their legal duties’. 138 The nature of this sanction is charac-
terised as criminal and may concur with the ordinary criminal sanc-
tions (fine, conditional imprisonment, community service, electronic
132 See Germany National Report, 169.
133 Germany National Report, 181.
134 Germany National Report, 173.
135 Germany National Report, 185.
136 Germany National Report, 184-185.
137 Germany National Report, 186.
138 See Finland National Report, 26.
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monitoring and unconditional imprisonment) provided by the Crim-
inal Code. 139
In the Netherlands, besides criminal punishment, certain measures
(maatregelen) can be imposed on the head of business: withdrawal from
circulation, confiscation of unlawfully obtained gains and compensation
for the victims. 140 Administrative law, in addition, provides for the pos-
sibility of repealing or denying licences in case of serious doubts regard-
ing the integrity of a legal entity or a natural person associated with
it. 141 Third-party confiscation of unlawfully obtained gains is possible,
but the Dutch Report also notes that ‘disentangling individual corporate
involvement within corporate groups has proved difficult’. 142
In Poland, alongside the general criminal sanctions applied under
the Criminal Code (fines, limitation of liberty and deprivation of lib-
erty), other specific criminal measures are available for economic
crimes, such as the deprivation of public rights; the prohibition from oc-
cupying a specific position, practising a specific profession or operating
a specific business activity; the prohibition from entering gambling fa-
cilities and engaging in gambling games; and the publication of the sen-
tence. For fiscal crimes, specific measures are provided (including, in
particular, forfeiture of the equivalence in value of the material benefit
or the prohibition from operating a specific business activity). 143
8. Relationship with liability of legal person
The liability of legal persons remains a sensitive issue at the na-
tional level. As mentioned above, several EU approximation instruments
introduced obligations to establish such a form of liability, but without
specifying the nature/label to be attached to it. Member States have
therefore remained free to label the new form of liability criminal, ad-
ministrative or civil, providing the effective, proportionate and dissua-
sive nature of the applicable penalties. The compared systems represent
a variety of options in this regard, from an established tradition of crim-
inal liability of legal entities (in the Netherlands) to the German punitive
administrative model. In line with the model of liability designed in EU
criminal instruments, however, the responsibility of the legal entity in all
139 Finland National Report, 25-26.
140 See Netherlands National Report, 244.
141 Netherlands National Report, 246.
142 Netherlands National Report, 247.
143 See Poland National Report, 290.
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systems does not exclude and may concur with the responsibility of the
individual employee or head of business.
In Germany, quite large administrative fines can be imposed upon
the legal entity under the German Code on Administrative Offences (Or-
dungswidrigkeitengesetz, OWiG, see § 30). According to the provision,
the corporation may be liable if certain ‘triggering persons’ 144 com-
mitted a criminal or administrative offence that either violated an obli-
gation incumbent on the corporation or led (or was intended to lead)
to an enrichment thereof (‘company-related offences’). It is important
to note that under this scheme of liability, the ‘company-related offence’
may also be represented by § 130 OWiG (violation of a supervisory duty
by the owner). Secondly, since 2002, persons responsible for supervisory
functions (such as supervisory boards, environmental officers) are in-
cluded among the ‘triggering persons’ for the purposes of § 30
OWiG. 145
Finland introduced the criminal liability of legal persons in 1995.
The Finnish model of corporate criminal liability is limited to certain
enumerated offences (which nevertheless include PIF offences) and en-
dorses a ‘hybrid model’ of attribution. The liability of the legal person
may indeed be established either on the basis of the ‘identification doc-
trine’ 146 or on the basis of an organisational fault. In the first case, the
corporation may be held liable when a person who is a member of a stat-
utory organ or who exercises actual decision-making powers within it is
liable as a perpetrator or accomplice in the commission of an offence on
behalf or for the benefit of the corporation. The second scenario occurs
when a relevant offence has been committed and it is established that
‘the care and diligence necessary for the prevention of the offence have
not been observed in the operations of the corporation’. 147 Individual
and corporate responsibility may concur: corporate criminal liability in-
deed does not exclude the criminal liability of the individual head of
business and, normally, both the corporate entity and the manager are
prosecuted in parallel and coordinated proceedings. On the other hand,
corporate liability based on organisational fault may also be established
144 See Germany National Report, 155.
145 The National Report expressly mentions that such an extension of the
personal scope of § 30 OWiG occurred in the enactment of Art. 3 (1) of the Second
Protocol to the PIF Convention. Germany National Report, 156.
146 See supra section 2.3, 344.
147 See Finland National Report, 21.
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when the individual liability of the head of business is not established
(‘anonymous culpa’). 148
In the Netherlands, corporate criminal liability has been admitted
since the 1950s and, moreover, represents a prerequisite for the indivi-
dual liability of the head of business under the scheme of ‘actually di-
recting’ (Art. 51 (2) of the Dutch Criminal Code). 149 Corporate criminal
liability, in this scheme, is triggered if the commission of a criminal of-
fence ‘can be reasonably attributed or imputed to the legal entity’. 150
Reasonable attribution is based on an overall assessment elaborated
by the case law of the Supreme Court and includes several factors
(the employment status of the perpetrator, the normal business activities
conducted by the legal entity, the benefit obtained by the legal entity, the
control over the commission of the crime or its acceptance by the legal
entity). The National Report also highlighted how the scope of the per-
sons that may involve the criminal liability of the legal entity is substan-
tial and potentially quite broad: in particular, it does not necessarily re-
quire the involvement of the ‘directing minds’ of the corporation. 151
The mens rea element for the corporation may be fulfilled either by at-
tributing the subjective mens rea of the individuals to the corporation or,
more relevantly, on the basis of ‘organisational deficiencies or policies
(the organisational fault model)’. 152
In Poland, liability of legal entities as a consequence of the commis-
sion of a criminal offence was introduced in 2002. The liability of the
legal entity has not been expressly labelled as criminal, but entails a pu-
nitive (repressive) nature, 153 as was acknowledged by the Polish Consti-
tutional Court in 2004. Liability of legal entities comprises a list of spe-
cific offences, including PIF offences, and is triggered when such an of-
fence is committed by certain qualified ‘triggering persons’ for the ben-
efit of the legal entity, and if the commission was the result of either a
lack of due diligence in hiring or supervising the ‘triggering’ individual
or an organisation of the operations of the collective entity in such a
manner that the commission of the offence could not have been pre-
vented. 154 The liability of the legal entity does not exclude the indivi-
dual liability of the natural person committing the offence.
148 See Finland National Report, 22.
149 See Netherlands National Report, 205.
150 See Netherlands National Report, 235.
151 Netherlands National Report, 236.
152 Netherlands National Report, 237.
153 See Poland National Report, 263.
154 Poland National Report, 282-283.
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In France, the criminal liability of legal persons was introduced for
the first time in 1994 and is nowadays applicable to all the offences
committed ‘pour leur compte’ by their organs or representatives. 155 Re-
sponsibility is based on the ‘identification doctrine’ and does not ex-
clude the accumulation and concurrence with the individual criminal re-
sponsibility of the perpetrators and accomplices.
9. Punitive administrative law
Administrative regimes are receiving increasing attention in order
to hold senior managers accountable for their omissions or lack of super-
vision or control. Beyond the scope of this research, one notable exam-
ple is represented by the introduction in 2016 of the UK Senior Manager
and Certification Regime (SM&CR) for the financial sector. 156 Under
this regime, senior managers in the top two tiers of corporations (board
of directors and executive management) are obliged to subscribe to an
individual ‘statement of responsibilities’ setting out areas of responsibil-
ity. A failure to take ‘reasonable steps’ 157 to prevent regulatory breaches
in the area of responsibility may eventually lead to the imposition upon
the individual senior manager of a regulatory fine. 158 Legal entities,
furthermore, are obliged to adopt and share with the FCA (Financial
Conduct Authority) and the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority)
‘management responsibilities maps’ in order to facilitate the identifica-
tion of responsibilities for regulatory purposes.
Another recent example of individual administrative liability focus-
ing on heads of business is provided by the new anticorruption scheme
introduced in France with the Sapin II law: as previously mentioned, un-
der the new law, companies above a certain size 159 are obliged to adopt
and implement specific anti-corruption compliance programmes and
procedures and, in the event of a failure, both the senior manager and
the legal person can be fined by the Anti-Corruption Agency.
155 See Art. 121-2 French Criminal Code.
156 See K Ligeti, Criminal Liability of Heads of Business, cit., 146.
157 Appropriate and clear delegation is considered part of the “‘reasonable
steps”.’
158 The imposition of a fine under the SM&CR would not occur ex abrupto; the
senior manager is, in the first place, enabled to demonstrate to the regulatory authority
the reasonableness of the steps he undertook.
159 The applicability threshold requires more than 500 employees and a turnover
exceeding 100 million euros. See the France National Report, 95.
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In the field of administrative punitive law, a German provision ap-
pears particularly relevant for the purposes of this research, the already
mentioned § 130 OWiG. 160 This provision establishes the administra-
tive liability of owners of corporations for failing to supervise their em-
ployees, in the event that the latter commit an administrative or criminal
offence. The liability scheme of § 130 OWiG relaxes the strict causality
requirement that would be necessary to establish criminal liability by
omission; it also covers negligent violations of the supervisory duties
by the owner. 161 In particular, under § 130 OWiG, in order to establish
a causal link between the breach of the supervisory duty and the com-
mission of the offence by the subordinate, it would be sufficient to
demonstrate that the omitted supervision, had it been in place, would
have ‘made much more difficult’ the commission of the offence (there-
fore, endorsing a lower risk-reduction standard than the ‘almost certain
probability’ required for criminal omission). 162 Further simplifying the
liability scheme, § 130 OWiG considers the predicate offence committed
by the subordinate a mere objective condition of punishment, implying
that the mens rea of the supervisor need not extend to it. Finally, § 130
OWiG constitutes the ‘connecting offence’ for triggering the administra-
tive liability of the legal person under § 30 OWiG.
From an EU perspective, however, administrative liability may po-
tentially provide a viable alternative to close the ‘responsibility gap’ in
relation to the liability of heads of business in the PIF domain. In this
regard, it might be useful to consider the possibility of introducing an
autonomous administrative offence sanctioning the negligent supervi-
sion or control of the head of business in the event of the commission
of a PIF offence by one of his/her subordinates. The administrative
qualification of the offence would allow resorting to Art. 325 TFEU
as a legal basis and for the possibility of adopting different and more
stringent schemes of responsibility for failure to supervise (strict liability
160 § 130 (1) OWiG provides: ‘Whoever, as the owner of an operation or
undertaking, intentionally or negligently omits to take the supervisory measures
required to prevent contraventions, within the operation or undertaking, of duties
incumbent on the owner and the violation of which carries a criminal penalty or a
regulatory fine, shall be deemed to have committed a regulatory offence in a case
where such contravention has been committed as would have been prevented, or
made much more difficult, if there had been proper supervision. The required
supervisory measures shall also comprise appointment, careful selection and
surveillance of supervisory personnel.’ English translation available at: https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_owig/index.html.
161 See Germany National Report, 139,143
162 Germany National Report, 139.
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may be provided as a criterion for attribution, 163 although a negli-
gence 164 standard would probably be preferable).
10. Conclusions
In light of the findings from the national reports, national law seems
to provide different answers and different scopes of liability for heads of
business under the general rules of criminal perpetration and complicity.
The PIF Directive, relying entirely on such national rules, seems
therefore at risk of reproducing the deterrence (and coherence) gap al-
ready acknowledged by the Commission reports on the implementation
of the PIF Convention and the Impact Assessment accompanying the
proposal for the PIF Directive back in 2012. 165
Considering that the same PIF Directive maintained the obligation
for the Member States to hold accountable the legal entity for the lack
of supervision or control by one of its leading persons, the silence
around—or rather the step back from—the individual liability of those
same leading persons appears inconsistent from the perspective of an
effective anti-fraud enforcement.
A coherent approach would therefore require consideration of the
most adequate way to close potential responsibility gaps and to enforce
effective supervision and control for the prevention of PIF offences in a
corporate environment.
In this regard, two options might deserve consideration:
- The introduction of an autonomous criminal offence under Art. 83
para 2 TFEU for the negligent supervision or control by a leading person
that made possible the commission of a PIF offence by a person under
its authority.
- The introduction of an autonomous administrative offence based
on Art. 325 para 4 TFEU for the negligent supervision or control by a
163 The CJEU acknowledges that strict liability as such is not incompatible with
EU Law, CJEU, 10.7.1990, C-326/88, Hansen and Son, para 11; CJEU, 27.2.1997, C-
177/95, Ebony Maritime SA, para 37.
164 The CJEU provided a definition of ‘serious negligence’ in the case Intertanko
(CJEU, 3.6.2008, C-308/06, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
(Intertanko), para 77: ‘An unintentional act or omission by which the person respon-
sible commits a patent breach of the duty of care which he should have and could have
complied with in view of his attributes, knowledge, abilities and individual situation.’
165 See supra.
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leading person that made possible the commission of a PIF offence by a
person under its authority.
In both cases, following the example of the Corpus Juris, rules on
the validity of delegation of supervisory tasks should be provided. In
particular, delegation should be made conditional on the requirements
of the specificity and precision of the delegated task and on the transfer
of actual powers and means (including disciplinary powers) for the ef-
fective fulfilment of supervisory functions by the delegate. The respon-
sibility of the senior manager, in any case, should be retained for what
concerns the appointment and the selection of delegates.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
ON THE PUNITIVE LIABILITY
OF COMPANY DIRECTORS IN A
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONTEXT
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Policy options. – 2.1. Policy option A): reten-
tion of the current scenario. – 2.2. Policy option B): introduction of a
criminal offence of seriously negligent supervision or control in the cur-
rent PIF Directive. – 2.3. Policy option C): introduction of an administra-
tive offence of negligent supervision under Art. 325 para. 4 TFEU. – 3.
Conclusion.
1. Introduction
The current legal framework on the criminal law protection of EU
financial interests 1 relies entirely on national criminal law for determin-
ing the scope of liability of company directors for offences committed
by their employees. The Comparative Report highlighted the existence
of rather different approaches to the scope of criminal perpetration
and complicity at national level, a circumstance that may potentially de-
termine significant disparities in the enforcement of the criminal law
protection of EU financial interests across the EU territory and a ‘deter-
rence gap’ in the PIF policy.
The following policy recommendations are based on the findings of
this volume’s Comparative Report and the Transversal Report.
From a policy perspective, three options might deserve considera-
tion:
1 Directive EU 2017/1731 of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s
financial interests by means of criminal law, OJ L 198/29 28 July 2017, Art. 5.
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• Option A: retaining the current scenario;
• Option B: changing the current scenario by introducing an
autonomous criminal offence for seriously negligent supervision under
the current PIF Directive on the basis of Art. 83 para. 2 TFEU;
• Option C: changing the current scenario by introducing an
autonomous administrative offence for negligent supervision on the ba-
sis of Art. 325 para. 4 TFEU.
The three policy options will be briefly illustrated in the following
paragraphs, together with specific recommendations for their implemen-
tation and with an assessment of their feasibility and convenience from
the perspective of achieving the best possible protection of the EU’s fi-
nancial interests.
2. Policy options
2.1. Policy option A): retention of the current scenario
The most basic policy option is the maintenance of the current state
of affairs on the punitive liability of the head of business under the PIF
legal framework.
This option, by definition, would entail no further action at the EU
level. The liability of the head of business would therefore continue to
entirely rely on national rules on criminal perpetration and complicity,
as currently provided under the 2017 PIF Directive. 2
2 As the Comparative Report demonstrated, the 2017 PIF Directive represented a
step back on the issue of liability of heads of business compared to the 1995 PIF
Convention. The 2012 Commission Proposal for the PIF Directive did not
reproduce the contents of Art. 3 of the 1995 Convention, which provided an
obligation for the Member States ‘to take all the necessary measures’ to hold
criminally liable ‘heads of business or any persons having power to take decisions
or exercise control’ in case a PIF offence were committed ‘by a person under their
authority acting on behalf of the business’. This approach, actually, seems surprising
in light of the policy statements that preceded the presentation of the proposal. The
issue and the importance of the liability of heads of business was indeed highlighted
in the 2011 Commission Communication on the protection of the financial interests
of the EU by criminal law and by administrative investigations - An Integrated
policy to safeguard taxpayers money, COM (2011) 293 final, p. 7. The same
Communication also considered the inclusion under the new EU instrument on PIF
protection criminal law of ‘more systematic rules on aiding and abetting, instigation,
attempt, as well as on intent and negligence’. Art. 5 of the adopted PIF Directive,
as already specified, left the definition of those concepts to national law.
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This option is not advised because, as indicated in the Comparative
Report, the national rules on perpetration and complicity do actually di-
verge significantly and the current scenario will perpetuate the ‘deter-
rence gap’ pointed out in the Commission reports on the implementation
of the 1995 PIF Convention. 3 Furthermore, as highlighted in the Com-
parative Report, the lack of an express provision on the punitive liability
of heads of business appears incoherent with the retention under the PIF
framework of a specific provision on the liability of legal persons for the
lack of supervision or control by a leading person. 4
A preference for maintaining the status quo may be supported by
opportunity considerations of not reopening the negotiations on the
framework for the criminal law protection of EU financial interests
before the implementation of the new PIF Directive is completed
and assessed and, particularly, pending the ‘start-up’ phase of the
European Public Prosecutor’s Office. While understandable, such
considerations do not invalidate the conclusion of the inadequacy
of the current legal framework on the liability of heads of business.
On the contrary, it is very likely that the entry into service of the
EPPO and the multiplication of transnational PIF prosecutions will
further highlight the limits of leaving liability rules (including those
on the liability of heads of business) entirely determined by national
law. 5
3 See the Report from the Commission Implementation by Member States of the
Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and its
protocols, COM (2004) 709 final; Second Report from the Commission on the
Implementation of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’
financial interests and its protocols, COM (2008) 77 final. See also the Commission
Impact Assessment accompanying the 2012 Proposal for the new PIF Directive,
SWD (2012) 195 final, p. 16. Although not reflected in the proposal text, the 2012
Impact Assessment stressed that the criminal liability of managers ‘differ[s] widely
across the EU’ with some Member States applying restrictive approaches resulting
in ‘a lack of deterrence’.
4 Art. 6 para. 2 of the PIF Directive provides that ‘Member States shall also take
the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable where the lack of
supervision or control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article (‘person
having a leading position’) has made possible the commission, by a person under
its authority, of any of the criminal offences referred to in Article 3, 4 or 5 for the ben-
efit of that legal person’.
5 More generally, the differences and lack of harmonisation of certain general
concepts of criminal law, and particularly rules on participation and complicity, may
pose a significant challenge to consistent EPPO prosecutions.
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In any event, should this option be preferred, it is recommended to
specifically monitor and assess under Art. 18 paras 2 and 3 of the PIF
Directive the consistency of the implementation of the PIF Directive
in regard to the prosecution of heads of business according to the na-
tional rules on ‘inciting, aiding and abetting’. 6
2.2. Policy option B): introduction of a criminal offence of seriously
negligent supervision or control in the current PIF Directive
The second possible option would entail a policy change on the
specific issue and require legislative action under Art. 83 para. 2
TFEU.
Legislative action under this option might take the form of an
amendment to the current PIF Directive and the introduction of a
new provision (e.g. a new Art. 5bis) that establishes an autonomous
criminal offence of seriously negligent supervision and control by a
natural person ‘having a leading position’ 7 within the legal person,
in the event of the commission of a PIF offence by a person under
his/her authority. The legal basis for introducing such an amendment,
as mentioned, would be the same as that for the PIF Directive, Art. 83
para. 2 TFEU.
In implementing this policy option, the consideration of the follow-
ing aspects is recommended:
• Respect of the principle of legality and specification of the
duty of care: The new provision should expressly establish (in its
first paragraph) an obligation for the persons ‘having a leading posi-
6 Art. 18 para. 2 of the PIF Directive requires the Member States to submit
statistics on the criminal offences referred under Arts 3, 4 and 5 of the Directive,
therefore including also the ‘number of criminal proceedings initiated, dismissed,
resulting in an acquittal, resulting in a conviction and ongoing’ relating to persons
suspected or accused of ‘incitement, aiding or abetting’ according to Art. 5 of the
Directive.
7 The definition of a person having a leading position is contained under Art. 6 of
the PIF Directive in the context of the liability of legal persons. According to this
definition a ‘leading position’ is based on: ‘(a) a power of representation of the
legal person; (b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or (c)
an authority to exercise control within the legal person’. In order to ensure
consistency and a coherent application of the two forms of liability (individual and
of the legal person), the same definition of ‘leading person’ should be adopted
under the new criminal offence of seriously negligent supervision or control.
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tion’ within a legal person to exercise supervision and control in or-
der to prevent the commission of PIF offences by persons under
their authority. This obligation would constitute the precondition
for the establishment of criminal liability of the head of business
and represent a specification of the duty of care in the PIF domain.
As already mentioned in the Comparative Report, 8 such a specifica-
tion would ensure objective foreseeability of the managerial duty
and exclude concerns about the compatibility of this specific form
of omission liability with the principle of legality under Art. 49 of
the EUCFR. In the same context, rules on delegation of supervisory
and control duties should be laid down. Delegation of tasks within a
complex organisation represents indeed a way to enact the duty of
care. Nonetheless, in order to avoid abuses, delegation should ex-
clude the liability of the leading person only if certain requirements
are met. Those requirements may be identified in the specificity and
precision of the delegated tasks and in the transfer of actual powers
and means (including organisational and financial means and disci-
plinary powers) for the effective fulfilment of the supervisory tasks
by the delegate. The person having a leading position, nonetheless,
should be responsible for the selection of delegates and their ap-
pointment.
• Respect of the principle of individual guilt and mens rea: As
the Comparative Report showed, the mens rea element represents
one of the most critical points for establishing the criminal liability
of the head of business (especially when applying the scheme of
omission liability to those predicate offences—such as PIF of-
fences—which are inherently intentional 9). The establishment of
an autonomous offence for lack of supervision, however, would al-
low for the adoption of an autonomous mens rea requirement for
the own omission of the head of business, independently from the in-
tentional nature of the PIF offence committed by employee. In other
words, under this scheme, the violation of the duty to supervise and
control might be attributed to the head of business also on the basis
of negligence. The standard of ‘serious negligence’ is recommende-
d—although the new offence of negligent supervision or control
would represent the only non-intentional PIF offence under the cur-
8 See Comparative Report, p. 358.
9 See Comparative Report, p. 359.
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rent framework. 10 An autonomous definition of such a standard has
been provided by the CJEU in the Intertanko case as ‘an uninten-
tional act or omission by which the person responsible commits a pa-
tent breach of the duty of care which he should have and could have
complied with in view of his attributes, knowledge, abilities and in-
dividual situation’. 11
• The combination of the ‘serious negligence’ standard and the ex-
press provision of an obligation for the person ‘having a leading posi-
tion’ to exercise supervision and control in order to prevent the commis-
sion of PIF offences should guarantee an adequate balance between the
respect of the principle of personal guilt and the deterring function of the
new offence. As pointed out in the Comparative Report and in the Trans-
versal Report, strict liability as a criterion for attribution in criminal law
is not per se considered to contrast with EU Law; 12 nonetheless, the en-
dorsement of such a standard (strict liability) is not advised, since its ad-
missibility in the field of criminal law stricto sensu is controversial in
several Member States.
• Complementarity and consistency with the liability of legal
persons: The new norms should coherently complement the existing
provisions on the liability of legal persons for lack of control or
supervision (Art. 6 para. 2 of the current PIF Directive). In particular,
it should be maintained that the (seriously) negligent failure of the
head of business may be criminally relevant only when the PIF of-
fence has been committed by the person under his/her authority
‘for the benefit’ of the legal person. This specification would keep
the scope of the liability for the violation of the duty of supervision
or control tied to the sphere of activity of the economic operator, mi-
10 To date, under EU Criminal Law, the standard of ‘serious negligence’ has been
endorsed under the Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through
criminal law. The Directive itself does not contain, however, a definition of the concept
of ‘serious negligence’; however, the concept has been defined by the CJEU.
11 See CJEU, 3.6.2008, C-308/06, International Association of Independent Tank
Owners (Intertanko), para. 77. The definition provided by the CJEU should be recalled
in the recitals or in the Explanatory Memorandum of the future proposal.
12 See the CJEU cases Hansen and Son (CJEU, 10.7.1990, C-326/88) and Eb-
ony Maritime SA (CJEU, 27.2.1997, C-177/95). See Comparative Report, p. 371
and Transversal Report, pp. 299-300, for the analysis of ECtHR case law on (limits
to) the compatibility of presumptions of fact and law with the presumption of in-
nocence.
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tigating potential concerns about overcriminalisation of the manage-
rial function.
• Proportionality of the penalties: The introduction of the new of-
fence should comply with the principle of proportionality under Art. 49
para. 3 of the Charter. In concrete terms, however, it has to be recalled
that the current PIF Directive is not particularly clear (nor ambitious) in
terms of approximation of the sanctions for natural persons. Under the
current framework, imprisonment is indeed required as a sanction only
with regard to the offences provided under Art. 3 and 4 of the Directive
and not also for the hypotheses of ‘incitement, aiding and abetting’ un-
der Art. 5. 13 A minimum maximum penalty threshold of four years im-
prisonment is only foreseen when the offences ‘involve considerable da-
mage or advantage’. 14 From the perspective of the introduction of a new
offence of seriously negligent supervision and control, it is recom-
mended that imprisonment be required as a penalty at least when the
PIF offence committed by the employee involved a ‘considerable da-
mage or advantage’.
2.3. Policy option C): introduction of an administrative offence of neg-
ligent supervision under Art. 325 para. 4 TFEU
The third suggested option focuses on punitive administrative en-
forcement and concretely foresees the introduction of an administrative
offence for the negligent supervision or control by a leading person in
the event of the commission of a PIF offence by a person under his
or her authority. Similar to the previous policy option, this option would
imply a policy change and require legislative action.
13 This is inferred a contrario by comparing paras 1 and 2 of Art. 7 of the PIF
Directive. Under the general provision of para. 1, which merely requires the Member
States to lay down effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions, Art. 5 is
indeed cited. However, under para. 2, which expressly foresees the obligation to pro-
vide for imprisonment, only Arts 3 and 4 are cited. In other words, it seems that Mem-
ber States are not obliged to impose imprisonment on the aider or abettor of a PIF of-
fence.
14 See Art. 7 para. 3 of the PIF Directive.
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The legal basis for such intervention could be identified in Art. 325
para. 4 TFEU and, in order to ensure the highest degree of consistency
and legal certainty, the legislative instrument could in this case take
the form of a regulation. 15 Such a regulation should be complementary
to the PIF Directive and subsidiary to its criminal law provisions (see be-
low).
Under this policy option, the consideration of the following aspects
is recommended:
• Complementarity to the PIF Directive: The new regulation
should lay down complementary provisions to be applied in the
event of the commission of an offence provided under Arts 3, 4
and 5 of the PIF Directive ‘for the benefit’ of a legal person by
one of its employees. Also, in this case the focus of the offence
should be based on the negligent supervision or control by a person
in a leading position if such negligent control made possible the
commission of the PIF offence by the employee. This complemen-
tary function, however, should be subsidiary to the application of
criminal law provisions and exercised by OLAF and the competent
national authorities in conformity with the EPPO mandate (see be-
low).
• Subsidiarity to criminal law provisions: The administrative of-
fence should apply only if the negligent supervision or control by the
head of business does not constitute criminally punishable co-perpetra-
tion or another form of instigation, aiding or abetting in the meaning of
Art. 5 of the current PIF Directive. This subsidiarity would ensure a co-
herent and integrated enforcement framework and avoid—on a substan-
tive level—the risk of violating ne bis in idem. The subsidiarity may be
expressed by the inclusion of a subsidiarity clause in the definition of the
administrative offence (e.g. specifying that the offence would apply ‘ex-
cept where the conduct of the leading person constitutes a criminal of-
fence’).
• Complementarity to the EPPO mandate: The subsidiarity of
the provision would also be functional to ensure complementarity to
and respect of the EPPO mandate. Conversely, in case the negligent
15 Following a similar approach to Regulation 2988/95 on the protection of the
European Communities’ financial interests.
350 CHAPTER IX
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
supervision or control would not integrate a criminal offence ac-
cording to the national rules on participation or complicity, the
EPPO could transfer the case against the head of business to OLAF
according to Art. 39 para. 4 of the EPPO Regulation. The proceeding
for the administrative offence, in this regard, would represent ‘other
administrative follow up’ in the meaning of the aforementioned pro-
vision.
• Respect of the principle of legality and specification the
duty of care: Similar to Option B, the new regulation under Option
C should preliminarily lay down an obligation for the persons ‘hav-
ing a leading position’ within a legal person to exercise supervision
and control in order to prevent the commission of PIF offences by
persons under their authority. The respect of the principle of legality
is relevant also in the context of punitive administrative law, and a
specification and concretisation of the duty of care by establishing
an express obligation for the head of business would also be needed
under this option. A regulation adopted under Art. 325 para. 4
TFEU, in this regard, could include a far more detailed description
of the specific obligations of the head of business, such as adopting
and implementing an ad hoc compliance programme for the preven-
tion of PIF offences or the subscription of individual ‘statements of
PIF responsibilities’ by the persons holding a leading position.
Rules on delegation, similar to the Option B, should be considered
in this context.
• Mens rea: Similar to Option B, the autonomous configuration of
an administrative offence for lack of supervision might allow the attribu-
tion of responsibility to the head of business on the basis of a negligence
standard. In the field of punitive administrative law, a negligence stan-
dard less demanding than ‘serious negligence’ may be considered and
strict liability may also represent an option. Considering the punitive
nature of the provision and the need to respect the principle of individual
guilt, the adoption of a (simple) negligence standard is nonetheless re-
commended.
• Causal link between the negligent supervision or control by
the head of business and the commission of the PIF offence: As
the Comparative Report showed, under criminal law, the configuration
of the causal link between the omission of a supervisory duty by a lead-
ing person and the commission of an offence by an employee represents
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a critical point. 16 While some systems (France, the Netherlands) accept
a more flexible approach, others (Germany, Finland, Poland) retain a
strict approach to causality that in practice would hinder the possibility
of ascribing the responsibility to the head of business at the level of the
actus reus (in the German model of Quasi-Kausalität, liability for the
omission requires establishing that the result would not have oc-
curred ‘with almost certain probability’ if the omitted action had ta-
ken place). Under punitive administrative law, on the other hand,
the causal link may be intended in a more flexible way, e.g. by estab-
lishing liability when the (omitted) due supervision would have made
much more difficult the commission of the offence. 17
• Proportionality of the sanctions: The option for punitive ad-
ministrative enforcement, obviously, excludes the opportunity to re-
sort to the most symbolic criminal sanction, ‘imprisonment’. In ad-
herence to the principle of proportionality, the new instrument could,
however, provide for adequate punitive fines and exclusion measures
(extending, e.g. the application of Art. 106 of the EU Financial Reg-
ulation 18) that should apply to the individual head of business re-
sponsible for negligent control of supervision. 19 Since the new ad-
ministrative offence would address negligent behaviours (which
could carry very different degrees of actual social disvalue), an ar-
ticulate and differentiated punitive response should be considered
(e.g. prescribing that only fines should apply in the case of simply
negligent omissions or minimal damage, while reserving a cumula-
tive application of fines and exclusive measures for seriously negli-
gent omissions or significant damage situations). The level of fines,
in abstracto, should take into account the damage caused to EU fi-
nancial interests and the advantage (for the legal person) gained
through the commission of the PIF offence by the employee.
16 See Comparative Report, p. 356-357.
17 An example of such a standard for causality is provided under the German §
130 of the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OWiG) which lays down an administrative of-
fence for the violation of obligatory supervision in the context of enterprises; see Com-
parative Report, p. 357.
18 Regulation 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of
the Union.
19 Art. 106 para. 1 (d) of the EU Financial Regulation already provides for such
an exclusion, but its application is conditional on a final criminal judgement.
352 CHAPTER IX
© Wolters Kluwer Italia
3. Conclusion
A preference and recommendation may be expressed in favour of
Option C and the introduction of an administrative offence of negligent
supervision and control under Art. 325 para. 4 TFEU. Although this op-
tion would actually represent a ‘second-best’ compared to the genuine
criminal law intervention of Option B, in terms of feasibility, it would
allow for a complementary intervention in the current state of affairs
without immediately reopening and putting into question the framework
of material competence for the EPPO. If set at an adequate level, com-
plementary punitive administrative sanctions, on the other hand, may
contribute to remedying the ‘deterrence gap’ that results from the exist-
ing divergence between national rules on perpetration and complicity.
This conclusion, however, does not deny the need for reflection on
the need to address at least some concepts of the general part of criminal
law, even beyond the specific issue of the punitive liability of the head of
business.
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ANNEX
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL REPORTS
OBJECTIVES:
The rise of new forms and modes of commission of EU-related of-
fences and the corresponding challenges for law enforcement have trig-
gered a series of developments in the area of the criminal law protection
of the financial interests of the EU. In particular, many recent examples
of fraudulent or corrupt management of corporations in the areas of cus-
toms, taxes, subsidies et cetera urge for a debate on whether or not to
‘pierce the corporate veil’ also with respect to the punitive law enforce-
ment of EU policies.
Article 3 of the 1995 PIF Convention provided for an obligation on
the Member States to take all the necessary measures to hold criminally
liable the “heads of business or any persons having power to take deci-
sions or exercise control” for a PIF crime committed “by a person under
their authority”.
The provision, however, expressly specified that such a form of lia-
bility had to be established “in accordance with the principles defined by
the national law” of the Member State concerned.
The two Reports on the implementation of the Convention released
by the European Commission in 2004 1 and 2008 2 highlighted a signif-
icant reluctance of the Member States to introduce ad hoc provisions,
with some notable exceptions.
The level of harmonization on the liability of the heads of business
across the EU territory, therefore, appears low and, as the Commission
has pointed out in its reports, this may potentially jeopardize effective
enforcement in this area.
1 COM (2004) 709 final, p. 5.
2 COM (2008) 77 final, p. 3.
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On the other hand, the current text of the proposal for a Directive on
the protection of the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law 3
seems to have overlooked the issue previously considered under the
1995 Convention.
The aim of this questionnaire, within the broader objectives of the
HOB study, is to map and systematize the national frameworks on the
responsibility of heads of business, taking into particular consideration
the hypothesis of commission by omission and the interplay between
the individual liability of the head of business and the liability of the le-
gal person (either administrative or – where applicable – criminal).
National rapporteurs are therefore requested to present their national
legal framework under the 6 conceptual clusters of the questionnaire,
providing where possible an account of the most relevant case law
and the problems that have arisen in practice.
PART 1: CRITERIA FOR IMPUTATION OF CRIMINAL LAW
RESPONSIBILITIES OF HEADS OF BUSINESSES AND THEIR
THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Preliminary information
1. Has your country implemented article 3 of the 1995 Convention
on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests on
the liability of heads of business through a specific provision? In the af-
firmative case, could you please provide an unofficial translation of the
relevant legal provision?
1.1 In case of non-implementation, which were the reasons?
1.2 Were considerations relating to procedural safeguards involved
in the national decision whether to implement or not the provision?
2. Could you provide some relevant examples of cases in which top
managers were investigated for offences committed by an employee act-
ing on behalf of the business 4?
3 Commission Proposal COM (2012) 363 final; interinstitutional file 2012/0193
(COD).
4 We are interested in both court cases and out of court cases. Please, focus only
on the most recent cases and, particularly, highlight if there is the need for a
supranational intervention. Please, consider both cases where the “rogue employee”
was identified and cases where he/she was not clearly identified.
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3. Could you provide a brief description of the policy debate in your
country about the introduction of liability of company directors 5?
B. Preliminary information on corporate liability
4. Does your national legal system provide for corporate criminal
liability? In the affirmative case, is corporate criminal liability estab-
lished for all offences or is it restricted to specific offences? Are PIF of-
fences 6 covered by the provisions on corporate criminal liability?
5. Does your national legal system provide for the administrative
liability of legal persons as a consequence of an offence? In the affirma-
tive case, is the administrative liability of legal persons established for
all offences or is it restricted to specific offences? Are PIF offences cov-
ered by the provisions on the administrative liability of legal persons?
5bis. Could you please describe the policy debate about the intro-
duction of corporate liability in your national system?
PART 2: RELATIONSHIP WITH GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW
6. Does your national criminal law provide for a unified or differ-
entiated system of participation in a criminal offence?
7. Does your system formally distinguish and define different forms
of accessory liability such as instigating, aiding and abetting? In the af-
firmative case, could you please provide a translation of the relevant le-
gal provisions or a brief account of the most relevant case law? How
does this apply in the field of punitive administrative law?
8. Does your national criminal law provide for omission liability?
Could you please provide a brief, general description of the require-
ments for such a form of liability and, in particular:
8.1 is there any general provision about the duty of care? How does
5 Please provide a short overview on the historical evolution, including
prosecutorial policy (if any).
6 For the purposes of our questionnaire, we are considering the current PIF
framework established under the 1995 Convention and the First and Second
Protocols, i.e. fraud affecting the EU financial interests both in respect of the
expenditure and of the revenue of the EU, active and passive corruption of officials
and money laundering.
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your national system reconcile the concept of “duty of care” and the
principle of lex certa?
8.2 is a causal link required between the omission and the commis-
sion of the offence? And in what terms (conditio sine qua non, increase
of risk of commission)?
8.3 what is the mens rea required for omission liability?
8.4 how does this apply in the field of punitive administrative law?
9. Does your system provide any general provisions about the duty
to report an offence and on the criminal consequences for the failure to
do so? In the affirmative case, could you please indicate the subjective
and objective scope of the duty and the requirements to establish crim-
inal liability in case of a failure to report an offence?
9.1 How do reporting obligations relate with the privilege against
self-incrimination?
10. Does your national system allow for strict liability offences? Is
there any constitutional case law on the minimum requirement of mens
rea for criminal liability? How does this relate to the presumption of in-
nocence? How does this apply in the field of punitive administrative
law?
10bis. Does your national system allow for special rules on liability
with regard to specific fields, such as taxation?
PART 3: CONCEPTAND SCOPE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW RE-
SPONSIBILITIES OF HEADS OF BUSINESS
11. Does your national criminal law system expressly establish the
criminal liability of heads of business through a specific provision?
12. In the affirmative case, what is the subjective scope of such lia-
bility? Does it cover corporate owners, members of the board of direc-
tors and executive directors?
13. Is such a form of liability based on specific duties to control and
supervise the activities of the subordinates 7?
14. Does your national criminal law require a causal link between
the violation of the duties by the supervisor and the commission of
the crime by the subordinate? Which type of causal relation is required?
15. Which form of mens rea is required to establish the responsibil-
ity of the supervisor? And in particular:
7 As, f.i. labour safety, environmental regulations, social security.
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15.1 Must the supervisor actually be aware of the commission of
the offence? F.i. by consciously disregarding information indicating
the commission of an offence?
15.2 Or would it suffice that he or she should have known that an
offence had been committed?
16. Under which limitations and conditions are corporate officials
allowed to delegate control or supervision functions to subordinates?
17. How should the control and supervision duties of the head of
business be discharged once an offence by a subordinate is discovered?
Would the adoption of disciplinary measures and removal of the subor-
dinate suffice to exclude the responsibility of the head of business? Is
reporting to the judicial authority necessary?
18. How is the liability of heads of business established with regard
to collective decisions?
19. How does the individual liability of heads of business relate to
corporate criminal liability (if applicable)? And in particular:
19.1 Who are the individuals whose activity may implicate the lia-
bility of the corporation?
19.2 May the two forms of liability concur? (see also infra)
19.3 How may the liability of the corporation affect the liability of
the individual?
20. What is the role of compliance programmes on the liability of
heads of business?
20bis. Does your national system provide for an obligation to adopt
a compliance programme and/or to appoint a compliance officer?
20bis.1 In the affirmative case, what are the consequences of failing
to adopt a compliance programme?
PART 4: DEFENCES
21. May the actual effectiveness of supervision and control powers
be raised in order to exclude the liability of heads of business, and if so
to what extent? Can, f.i., an executive director claim as a defence that he
was actually lacking effective powers of control and supervision?
21bis. May the delegation of control and supervision powers relieve
the head of business of his/her duties, and if so to what extent? Is a for-
mal delegation sufficient to discharge the duty and to shift the responsi-
bility onto the subordinate?
22. Is the effective implementation of the compliance program/ or
the appointment of the compliance officer reviewable in order to estab-
lish or exclude the liability of the head of business?
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23. To what extent may the liability of an external auditor limit or
exclude the responsibility of the head of business, f.i., with regard to
bookkeeping offences?
PART 5: SANCTIONS
24. What type of criminal or punitive administrative sanctions are
provided in your system in regard to the responsibility of the head of
business?
25. Which are the sentencing criteria/guidelines followed in crim-
inal and administrative punitive law in order to determine the punish-
ment for the individual head of business? Are there any specific sen-
tencing criteria which are accorded particular weight in the national
practice?
26. Could you compare the actual level of criminal sanctions or pu-
nitive administrative sanctions applied?
27. Are other types of punitive measures, such as administrative
bans on negotiations in tender procedures or suspension of a profes-
sional licence, available in your national legal system? Are those mea-
sures available for all offences or just for specific offences? Where such
measures exist, what is their target?
28. Is confiscation provided as a sanction for PIF offences? Is con-
fiscation possible in criminal or administrative proceedings against the
legal person? Under which conditions can confiscation be operated
against a third party?
PART 6: RELATIONSHIPWITH PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
29. Are parallel criminal and administrative proceedings against the
individual HoB allowed? In the affirmative case:
29.1 Does your national legal system impose the concentration of
the proceedings?
29.2 Does your national legal system impose coordination of the
two proceedings? And in which terms?
29.3 To what extent can evidence gathered in the course of admin-
istrative proceedings be used in criminal proceedings against the head of
business?
29.4 To what extent can information gathered in a foreign proceed-
ing be used in the proceedings against the HoB?
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29.5 Is the head of business allowed to exercise his/her right to si-
lence in the context of an administrative investigation? In the affirmative
case, under which conditions?
30. Are parallel criminal or administrative proceedings against the
legal person and against the individual head of business allowed? In
the affirmative case:
30.1 Does your national legal system impose the concentration of
the proceedings?
30.2 Does your national legal system impose coordination of the
two proceedings? And in which terms?
30.3 To what extent can evidence gathered in the administrative
proceedings against the legal person be used in the proceedings against
the head of business?
30.4 To what extent can information gathered in a foreign proceed-
ing against the legal person be used in the proceedings against the head
of business (or viceversa)?
30.5 Is the head of business allowed to exercise his/her right to si-
lence in the context of an administrative investigation against the legal
person? In the affirmative case, under which conditions?
31. Is the individual liability of the head of business shielded or di-
minished if the corporation has previously pleaded guilty?
32. Is the previous imposition of an administrative penalty against
the head of business taken into account in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceedings against the head of business for the same facts?
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ANNEX
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE TRANSVERSAL REPORT ON
THE SAFEGUARDS AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE
HEADS OF BUSINESS
OBJECTIVES:
The specific objective of this transversal report is to map those es-
sential aspects of the supranational case law on the presumption of inno-
cence, on the privilege against self-incrimination and on the principle of
ne bis in idem which may result relevant in the context of the criminal
liability of the heads of business.
For this purpose, we would ask the rapporteur to provide under each
heading an overview and a critical assessment of the case law of the
ECtHR and, where possible, of the CJEU. In particular, we would ask
the rapporteur to highlight, where existent, the discrepancies between
the case law of the two Courts which may impact on the scope of pro-
tection of the three fundamental rights under scrutiny.
The findings of this report will be used as an analytical grid for the
comparative analysis and will be tested against the findings emerging
from the national reports to identify the minimum standard and the lim-
its of the protection of the fundamental rights of the head of business.
1. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE:
1.1. Could you please provide us with an overview and a critical
assessment of the case law of the ECtHR on the compatibility between
presumptions of fact and of law in criminal cases and the presumption of
innocence?
1.2. Are there any cases dealing with the relationship between the
presumption of innocence and modes of criminal liability based on lack
of supervision or control?
1.3. Are there any cases addressing the relationship between collec-
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tive decisions of corporate organs and the individual liability of head of
business?
2. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:
2.1. Could you please provide us with an overview and a critical
assessment of the case law of the ECtHR on the privilege against
self-incrimination in criminal matters?
2.2. Could you please provide us with an overview and critical as-
sessment of the case law of the CJEU on the privilege against self-incri-
mination in competition proceedings?
2.3. Would the privilege against self-incrimination – as interpreted
by the ECtHR – allow a head of business to remain silent in the context
of an administrative or criminal investigation conducted against the legal
entity?
2.4. Would the privilege against self-incrimination – as interpreted
by the ECtHR - allow for the use of evidence gathered in the context of a
previous administrative or criminal investigation against the legal entity
in a subsequent criminal proceedings against the individual head of busi-
ness?
3. THE PRINCIPLE OF NE BIS IN IDEM:
3.1. Could you please provide us with a preliminary general back-
ground on the case law of the European Courts (ECtHR and CJEU) on
the principle of ne bis in idem?
3.2. Could you please provide us with an overview and a critical
assessment of the case law of the ECtHR and of the CJEU on the com-
patibility of “dual track enforcement systems” (administrative and crim-
inal) with the principle of ne bis in idem?
3.3. Could you please provide us with an overview and a critical
assessment of the case law of the ECtHR and of the CJEU on the rela-
tionship between individual liability and corporate liability in the context
of ne bis in idem?
4. CONCLUSIONS
4.1. Would you consider the level of protection offered by the
ECtHR (in regard to the three fundamental rights analysed) as adequate
and sufficient to effectively guarantee the individual head of business?
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4.2. Did you identify discrepancies or inconsistencies in the case
law of two Courts that could impact and determine a different scope
of protection between the ECHR framework and the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights?
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